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The relationship between China and international human rights law (IHRL) is an often-discussed 
issue that nonetheless remains peripheral from an academic perspective. The reason that it is often 
discussed has to do with China’s rapid rise to its global superpower status—economically, 
politically, militarily, and (in a way) culturally. Against this background, China’s relationship with 
the international (legal) order in general and with IHRL in particular has thus gathered quite some 
scholarly attention over the past decades.1 It remains ‘peripheral’, however, insofar as the common 
approach situates China as an outlier 2  in the international legal order that must be treated 
differently. It follows that this often-presupposed difference when it comes to China’s engagement 
with the international legal order has to either be tamed in order to preserve the current UN system 
or be encouraged in order to change or reform the system. Either way, it is probably fair to say that 
China is often considered an ‘outsider’ with regard to the international legal order. It is this 
commonly held point of view that first prompted this study.  
This research focuses on the justifiability of arguments found in the ongoing dialogue 
between China and international human rights treaty bodies and the implications of this 
constructive (and sometimes less constructive) dialogue on the relationship between them. 
Research on this rather niche topic has been limited. Nonetheless, given the new insights and ways 
of looking it may provide, it is worthy of much attention. The procedure of constructive dialogue, 
as a formal procedure in which international human rights treaty bodies examine state parties’ 
compliance with human rights standards they adhere to, is where we find the most systemic and 
comprehensive arguments from both state parties and treaty bodies. The justifiability of arguments 
used serves as an indicator of where the state situates itself in relation to the international legal 
order, in particular to IHRL. It is probably reasonable to suggest that a party that provides 
justifiable arguments, or tries to justify its arguments under the rules is a ‘game player’, whereas 
                                                 
1  For example, Ann Kent, ‘China and the International Human Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral 
Monitoring, 1989-1994’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1; Daniel A. Bell, ‘The East Asian Challenge to Human 
Rights: Reflections on an East-West Dialogue’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 641; Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel 
A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ann Kent, China, the 
United Nations, and Human Rights: The limits of Compliance (University of Pennsylvania Press 1999); Ann Kent, 
‘China’s International Sociolization: The Role of International Organization’ (2002) 8 Global Governance 343; Marc 
Lanteigne, China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power (Routledge 2005); Ann Kent, 
Beyond Compliance: China, International Organizations, and Global Security (Stanford University Press 2007); Phil 
C.W. Chan, China, State Sovereignty and International Legal order (Brill Nijhoff 2015).   
2 I use this term neutrally. 
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one that insists on unjustifiable views without further intention to change can be seen as an 
‘outsider’, wilfully or not. In a more nuanced (and perhaps more common) understanding of this 
phenomenon, the justifiability of the arguments may vary from topic to topic and from time to 
time. In this sense, whether China is a ‘game player’ or indeed an ‘outsider’ (or somewhat of both) 
is the overarching question of this study. A carefully mapped discussion on this matter can then 
reveal an important facet of the relationship between China and the international human rights 
legal order—a facet to which other types of research do not have access. 
I will explain the main definitions, research question, and scope of this study in the 
following sections. However, I would first like to begin by outlining two forms of scholarship in 
international legal studies—studies on compliance and critical legal studies. These two 
approaches, which have gathered much attention and support in the past decades, provide 
something of a backdrop for this research: it is by critically reflecting on the insights from these 
two approaches that I have come to the conclusion that a (re)turn to legal argumentation is 
necessary in order to better understand China’s relationship with substantive IHRL and the bodies 
of independent experts looking after the compliance thereof by the state parties.  
In the remainder of the introduction, I will first briefly depict these two forms of scholarship 
(i.e. studies on compliance and critical legal studies). I will then explain the main definitions, 
research question, and scope of the study. Finally, I will indicate three implications of this study. 
 
1. Compliance study and critical legal studies in international (human rights) law3 
The famous quote from Louis Henkin that ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time’,4 whether true or false, 
has become a tagline in promoting the importance of international (human rights) law. The most 
pressing question that follows is: why do states comply with international (human rights) law?5 
                                                 
3 The term ‘international (human rights) law’ here means international law in general and IHRL in particular.  
4 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (2nd ed. edn, Published for the Council on Foreign 
Relations by Columbia University Press 1979) 47.  
5  See, for instance, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, ‘On Compliance’ (1993) 47 International 
Organization 175; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press 1995); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?’ (1997) 106 The Yale Law Journal 2599; Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?’ 
(June 2002) The Yale Law Journal 1935; Oona A. Hathaway, ‘Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?’ 
(Aug 2007) 51 Journal of Conflict Resolution 588, Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance’ in Thomas Risse-Kappen Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A 
Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications 2002); Beth Simmons, ‘Civil Rights in 
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Strictly speaking, studies on compliance with international (human rights) law is not a school in 
the sense that scholars who study compliance do not necessarily share the same fundamental 
assumptions. However, they do share the same focal point, which is state compliance with 
international (human rights) law and the incentives behind it. State compliance therefore becomes 
a key (and perhaps the only) measurement not only for depicting the relationship between states 
and the international (human rights) legal order, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for 
measuring states’ ‘good-will’. Those states that fall short when it comes to compliance are 
considered threats or ‘destabilisations’ with regard to IHRL.   
This emphasis on compliance is understandable. Given that there is little strictly legal 
enforcement in the international (human rights) legal mechanism, states must be given other 
incentives to obey the rules. In the course of exploring the possible (mostly non-legal) incentives 
for state compliance, however, some legal perspectives, which concern questions such as how to 
interpret the law, what makes an argument good in the given context, and how great a margin the 
law grants when it comes to implementation, get lost. This is because, as Kratochwil rightly points 
out, ‘no rule “makes” one behave in a certain way, as rules or norms are not causes, but provide 
reasons for actions’.6  
In a similar way, the school of critical legal studies (CLS) is also constituted by a highly 
heterogeneous group of scholars. Unlike compliance studies, which shares the same focal point, 
the subjects studied by CLS span from the history of international law to feminist critiques of law, 
from development and law to post-colonial research.7 The commonality among these studies is 
                                                 
International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the “International Bill of Rights”’ (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 437. Andrew T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 California 
Law Review 1823.  
6 Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law (Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press 2014) 57. cf: Koh distinguishes between four concepts 
of compliance based on the relationship between norms and conduct: coincidence, conformity, compliance, and 
obedience. According to Koh, a coincidence occurs when the subject simply appears to ‘follow’ the rules. Conformity 
occurs when subjects only ‘loosely conform[] their conduct to the rule when convenient, but feel little or no legal or 
moral obligation to do so.’ Compliance is when ‘entities accept the influence of the rule, but only to gain specific 
rewards … or to avoid specific punishments’. Obedience ‘occurs when an entity adopts rule-induced behavior because 
it has internalized the norm and has incorporated it into its own internal value system’. Therefore, Koh is concerned 
with the ‘causes’ that make states behave a certain way, not their ‘reasons’ for action. Koh. ‘How is International 
Human Rights Law Enforced?’ (1999) 74 Indiana Law Journal 1397. 
7 Works that represent the main thesis of CLS include, for instance, Deborah Z. Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: 
Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law’ (1996) Nordic Journal of International Law 341; David Kennedy, 
International legal structures (Nomos 1987); David Kennedy, ‘A New Stream of International Law Scholarship’ 
(1988) 7 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press 2005); and Martti Koskenniemi, The politics of 
international law (Hart 2011). 
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their shared critique of the traditional liberal approach to law, which treats law as an objective, 
neutral, rational institution. In the branch of CLS that focuses on international law, also known as 
the ‘New Stream’, the work of two scholars in particular, David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi, 
have had the most impact—so much so that ‘critical legal scholarly work has now reversed the 
roles by becoming “mainstream” in international legal scholarship’.8 Although both scholars have 
different focuses when it comes to the critical legal approach to international law and may even 
have different theoretical views, they do share certain basic assumptions. For instance, they both 
agree that international law is inherently political: ‘[p]olitics is … inescapable and inherent in the 
very argumentative structure of international law’.9 The structure (rather than the content) of 
international law discourse should be brought to the forefront, as ‘international law is rhetoric and 
is characterized by a dialectical process’.10 There is much left to say about CLS’s main ideas and 
its impact on international (human rights) law.11 This shall be pursued gradually in the course of 
this study, however. Here, it is sufficient to point out one aspect that CLS may fall short of 
justifying. This is the jump from the assumption of the constitutive power of language to CLS’s 
disregard for the performativity of law. The former is the assumption that language has social 
constitutive power in and of itself. This assumption is shared by most CLS scholars, especially 
regarding the myth of sovereignty. The latter is the fact that by taking up the slogan ‘law is 
politics’,12 CLS scholars treat politics, rather than law, as the foundation of the international legal 
enterprise. It is this very assumption that I do not share in this research.13   
By no means do studies on compliance and CLS exhaust the interests, ideas, and focuses 
of current international legal studies. Nonetheless, these two approaches form a useful backdrop 
for the present research in the sense that the idea of this research comes from engaging with those 
two branches of work regarding international law. Learning about compliance theories prompted 
me to consider other possible forms of relationship between IHRL and its state parties; while 
contemplating the eloquent arguments provided by CLS scholars inspired me to focus on the role 
                                                 
8 Jan Klabbers, ‘Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New Legal Realism’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 471.  
9 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Critical Legal Studies and the New Stream’ in Andrea Bianchi (ed), International Law Theories: 
An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking (Oxford University Press 2016) 148.  
10 ibid 145. 
11 From here on, I will use CLS to denote critical legal studies in general, and the New Stream studies in particular; it 
is not necessary to differentiate the two in the current discussion (unless stated otherwise).  
12 For a nuanced discussion on this slogan, see Bianchi (n 9) 136.  
13 I do, nevertheless, agree with some of the ideas of CLS, particularly on the social constitutive power of language 
and the myth of sovereignty.  
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of dialogue and the power of language. Nevertheless, at its core, this study returns to the basics of 
law. Rather than centring on buzzwords such as compliance, the structure of law, post-modernism, 
etc., this study focuses on a traditional branch of legal study, namely legal argumentation and its 
justification. In this sense, this study may not be situated in the schools of thought mentioned 
above. The main focus of this research is to analyse argumentation and its justification in the 
context of IHRL, to apply this understanding to the relationship between China and international 
human rights treaty bodies, and to engage with the ideas put forward by these schools of thought.   
 
2. Working definition, the research question, and the scope of the research 
The present study is concerned with the following question: in what sense and to what extent are 
the particular reasoning–based arguments offered by China in constructive dialogue in human 
rights treaty bodies justifiable? Its corollary question is: can a development of the relationship 
between China and IHRL towards institutionalisation be detected? Particular reasoning–based 
arguments are arguments that invoke particular reasoning. Particular reasoning is a type of 
reasoning that resorts to particular facts or circumstances, arguing for exclusion or deviation from 
certain rules or principles.14 To answer the questions, I first identify the nature of constructive 
dialogue. I then develop evaluation criteria for the justifiability of arguments in this context and 
apply these criteria to the actual arguments I have chosen as case studies. Finally, I outline key 
implications of this study, with emphasis on the relationship between China and IHRL.  
Let me now clarify the terms and delineate the boundaries of this study. Given their rich 
connotations (and potential confusions) in the area of logic, and especially in argumentation 
theory, it seems necessary to first outline the differences between the terms ‘argument’, 
‘argumentation’, ‘dialogue’, and ‘reasoning’. According to Douglas Walton, an argument refers to 
‘a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at least to contend with, a conflict or difference 
that has arisen or exists between two (or more) parties. An argument necessarily involves a claim 
that is advanced by at least one of the parties’.15 In this sense, not all opinions or statements in 
constructive dialogue between China and the committees are considered arguments.  
                                                 
14 For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter 3. 
15 Douglas N. Walton, ‘What Is Reasoning? What Is an Argument?’ (1990) 87 The Journal of Philosophy 399, 411. 
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Building upon the term ‘argument’, argumentation denotes the ‘dynamic process of 
connecting arguments together for some purpose in a dialogue’.16 A dialogue is ‘a type of goal-
directed conversation in which two participants (in the minimum case) are participating by taking 
turns. At each move one party responds to the previous move of the other party’. 17 Reasoning, ‘is 
the making or granting of assumptions called premises (starting points) and the process of moving 
toward conclusions (end points) from these assumptions by means of warrants. A warrant is a rule 
or frame that allows the move from one point to the next point in the sequence of reasoning’.18  
Although there are categorical differences between these concepts, there is also an organic 
connection among them: a chain of argument constitutes argumentation, which usually comes in 
the form of a dialogue composed of reasoning. I therefore suggest leaving the nuanced distinctions 
between these terms to the logicians. In the following discussion, these terms will be used 
according to the above definitions, but their differences will not be emphasised unless doing so is 
necessary.  
The scope of this study is the arguments found in constructive dialogue between China and 
international human rights treaty bodies. The term ‘constructive dialogue’ was first suggested by 
Phillip Alston.19 It is a process in which state delegations and treaty body committee members 
exchange information and opinions on state compliance with IHRL.  
The term ‘justifiable’ is used in accordance with its dictionary meaning, i.e. ‘able to be 
shown to be right or reasonable; defensible’ (I will further elaborate on this term in Chapter 1).20 
Therefore, the starting point of this research is to ask what counts as good reasoning in this context. 
It will become clear that the arguments considered in this study are not the full-fledged legal 
arguments commonly found in courtroom debates. Thus, being justifiable in this broad sense is 
not restricted to legal criteria. In fact, I will argue that a justifiable argument in constructive 
dialogue must be both legally justifiable and dialogically constructive.21 
                                                 
16 Douglas Walton, Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation (Cambridge University Press 2006) 1.  
17 ibid 2. 
18 Walton (n 15) 403.  
19  Philip Alston, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting 
Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights. United Nations General Assembly, Forty-fourth 
session. A/44/668. 8 NOV 1989. 
20 See https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/justifiable 
21 In what follows, the term ‘justifiable’ or ‘justifiability’ is used in a broad sense, while ‘legally justifiable’ or ‘legal 
justifiability’ is used to denote the legal context, unless otherwise stated.  
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Following this logic, this study investigates particular reasoning–based arguments offered 
by China in constructive dialogue on specific topics (i.e. interpretation, reservation, sovereignty, 
and treaty implementation). The purpose of conducting this investigation is first and foremost to 
examine the justifiability of China’s arguments—that is, to identify those arguments that are in 
fact justifiable from the point of view of the human rights treaties to which China is a party, along 
with other human rights instruments it adheres to, versus those arguments that indeed deviate from 
IHRL. Therefore, it aims to give China’s arguments a fair examination. Moreover, by investigating 
the arguments in constructive dialogue between China and human rights treaty bodies over time, 
this research also expounds the relationship between China and the international human rights 
legal order. 
This study can be situated in at least three larger debates: the debate on the universality vs. 
the relativity of human rights, the debate on the relevance of legal arguments in international law, 
and the debate on the relationship between China and IHRL. I shall therefore ground this study in 
each of these debates. By revealing its place in these debates, I aim to make clear the purpose and 
relevance of this study.   
 
3.  The debate on the universality versus the relativity of human rights 
The question whether human rights are universal or relative has plagued human rights scholars for 
decades. Four sorts of opinions have been brought to the table thus far. The first group of opinions 
asks us to abandon the universality vs. relativity debate altogether. The second group argues for 
the universal character of human rights, whereas the third defends the relative character of human 
rights. The last group tries to find a ‘mid-way’ and strives for reconciliation.22 
This debate is far from settled (if the settlement of divergent opinions is ever possible). 
However, we can still contribute to the debate by bringing clarity to the discussion. First and 
foremost, it is important to differentiate between ontological and epistemic perspectives on the 
debate. That is to say, there are at least two different senses of universality/relativity at issue: an 
ontological sense and an epistemic sense. ‘The ontological sense has to do with existence’, whereas 
‘[t]he epistemic sense has to do with knowledge’.23 Therefore, the ontological question about the 
                                                 
22 Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the four sorts of opinions.  




universality/relativity of human rights concerns whether human rights are universal/relative in 
nature, independently of how we think about them. On the other hand, the epistemic question about 
the universality/relativity of human rights concerns whether human rights are recognised 
as/perceived as being/claimed to be universal/relative. Without an ex ante clarification of what 
sense (ontological or epistemic) of universality vs. relativity is being discussed, we risk confusing 
these two questions (for example by using an argument for ontological universality to respond to 
questions about epistemic relativity, or vice versa), which would largely hamper the debate’s 
progress.  
This study, which focuses exclusively on arguments about core international human rights 
instruments, restricts itself to the epistemic side of the debate. A state’s joining a human rights 
instrument is an epistemically objective fact. This is to say that the state’s accepting to be a party 
to that human rights instrument is the foundation of the following discussion. Therefore, this study 
does not answer ontological questions about, for example, what the nature of human rights is, or 
whether human rights indeed ‘trump’ other considerations.24 Instead, this study concerns the sense 
in which (and the extent to which) a state (such as China), which has become a party to an 
international human rights treaty, can justifiably offer relative arguments for its exclusion or 
deviation from the rules and principles as codified in that treaty. Put differently, this study 
investigates how rights and obligations regarding human rights are perceived by both China and 
the relevant international human rights instruments. This is not to say that this study merely 
concerns opinions held by China or these treaty bodies, however. To the contrary, this study 
discusses the criterion (or criteria) for judging these opinions when they are voiced in the form of 
arguments. It therefore concerns epistemic objectivity rather than epistemic subjectivity.25 In a 
way, epistemic objectivity is the foundation of universality in the context of international human 
rights instruments, whereas the criterion for reaching such objectivity is the benchmark for 
determining the line between ‘particular’ and ‘too particular’.   
The above distinction between epistemic subjectivity and epistemic objectivity leads us to 
a second key debate. This is the debate on the relevance of legal arguments in international law in 
general.  
                                                 
24 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Rights as Trumps’ in Jeremy  Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (Oxford University Press 1984) 
153–67. 
25 For the concepts of epistemic subjectivity and epistemic objectivity, see Searle (n 22) 17–18.   
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4. The debate on the relevance of legal arguments in international law  
In arguably one of the most cited works in CLS, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument, Martti Koskenniemi argues that objectivity in international law is 
a mirage insofar as there is a fundamental dilemma that cannot be solved in international legal 
discourse. The dilemma hinges on the fact that the two asserted necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the objectivity of international law, namely concreteness (i.e. ‘the law [is] to be verifiable, or 
justifiable, independently of what anyone might think that the law should be’) and normativity (i.e. 
‘the law [is] to be applicable even against a state … which opposed its application to itself’) cannot 
be achieved simultaneously. 26  Correspondingly, two kinds of arguments are found in the 
international legal order. The first are ‘descending’ arguments, which assume that there is ‘a given 
normative code which precedes the State and effectively dictates how a State is allowed to behave, 
what it may will and what its legitimate interests can be’.27 The second are ‘ascending’ arguments, 
which take ‘the existence of States and attempt to construct a normative order on the basis of the 
“factual’’ State behaviour, will and interest’.28 Koskenniemi points out that although international 
legal discourse aims to make the two kinds of arguments seem compatible, this always leads to ‘an 
incoherent argument which constantly shifts between the opposing positions while remaining open 
to challenge from the opposite argument’. 29  Therefore, in his view, these two conditions 
(concreteness and normativity) function as two ‘intellectual operations’ in international legal 
discourse, which not only give rise to a dilemma but, if taken together, ‘do not leave room for any 
specific legal discourse’.30 About 15 years later, in the new epilogue to From Apology to Utopia, 
Koskenniemi again confirmed this idea:  
 
In the search for justifiability, again, every argument is vulnerable to the logic of apology and utopia. 
Of course, no argument can continue interminably. At some point, it is better to agree than to fight, and 
the competent lawyer is constantly keeping an eye on that point. But there is no legal criterion that will 
say when it has been reached. And even when it has been reached, the law will always possess resources 
                                                 
26 Koskenniemi (n 7) 513. 
27 ibid 59. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid 16. 
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for re-opening the debate, undoing the settlement, attacking the (‘unjust’) hegemony of the 
mainstream.31 
 
In his view, therefore, the relevant legal argumentation is primarily meant to justify 
political standpoints that states and agencies take in the first place. This is to say that legal 
arguments have merely instrumental meaning. Moreover, there is no single specific overriding 
criterion or set of criteria for determining the justifiability of legal arguments in the context of 
international law. Therefore, when it comes to assessing arguments in international law, even if it 
is not true that ‘anything goes’, at least, as Klabbers says ‘quite a lot goes’.32  
Although I do not intend to refute speculation about the political agendas that lie behind 
legal arguments in international law, I do hold that it is possible to derive certain criteria for 
deciding on the justifiability of arguments in the context of IHRL. I will show not only that 
identifying such criteria is possible but that the process of argumentation also has a normative 
function.  
The possibility of determining the justifiability of arguments in the context of international 
(human rights) law can be derived precisely from the concept of epistemic objectivity. The term 
‘epistemic objectivity’ is used to describe a phenomenon that, although it depends on and exists 
from the perspective of the subject, is not determined by the particular intentions of individual 
subjects. For instance, the concept of money depends on and only exists from the perspective of 
individuals in society. However, the value of a twenty euro note is not determined by any 
individual’s particular understanding of it. A person may say that it is just a piece of paper, but 
this opinion does not take away from the fact that anyone can use that piece of paper to pay for a 
taxi where euros are accepted. On the other hand, two people may disagree about whether 
Beethoven is a better composer than Mozart. The question of whether Beethoven is indeed a better 
composer than Mozart can only be settled by a person’s own criteria, which may or may not be 
shared by others. The first scenario concerns epistemic objectivity, while the second concerns 
epistemic subjectivity. IHRL is, as I view it, more akin to a twenty euro note than the evaluation 
                                                 
31 ibid 598.  
32  Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ in M. Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty 




of famous composers. In this sense, although different individuals or states may hold different 
opinions regarding IHRL, it is not a field in which ‘anything goes’. 
One may argue that what Koskenniemi’s theory explicitly shows is not that international 
law is subject to individuals’ intentions but rather that there are two kinds of sources (concreteness 
and normativity) in international law, which makes any argument based on either of the sources 
vulnerable to attacks from arguments based on the other. As this study will reveal, however, in the 
context of IHRL, even though there are indeed different sources for justifying a legal argument, it 
is still possible to decide on the threshold for considering the justifiability of a given argument. 
This study shows that bridging the gap between apology and utopia is to some extent still possible, 
and we (those in legal professions) are better to take up this task sooner rather than later. Moreover, 
the process of arguing, and especially the ways in which arguments change during this process, 
can be viewed as an indicator (alongside compliance) of a state’s relationship with international 
human rights legal regimes. This brings us to the final debate concerning the relationship between 
China and international (human rights) law. 
 
5.  The debate on the relationship between China and international (human rights) law 
In Beyond Compliance: China, International Organisations, and Global Security, Ann Kent views 
China as a special case with regard to state compliance with international treaties. She argues that 
because China historically considered itself the ‘Middle Kingdom’, ‘constrained by the 
international society’, culturally speaking it lacked ‘a tradition of the rule of law’ and was 
‘powerful enough to ignore its international obligations’. China therefore constitutes a ‘least-likely 
case’ when it comes to complying with ‘the norms, principles, and rules of international 
organizations and their associated treaties’.33 Therefore, by assessing the extent to which China—
the least likely case—has complied with international treaties, Kent examines the extent to which 
‘all states, even non-liberal ones, comply with the norms and rules of the international system’.34 
In other words, Kent treats China’s compliance as a special case in international law: as the shortest 
plank on the bucket (as described in the bucket theory).35    
                                                 
33 Kent (n 1) 2. 
34 ibid. 
35 According to the bucket theory, because a bucket will leak as soon as the water reaches the shortest plank, this plank 
is the threshold for measuring the bucket’s capacity. In this context, this means that if China complies with 
international law, other countries may comply as well.  
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Phil Chan criticises Kent’s ideas regarding China’s compliance with international treaties, 
particularly her Western-centred perspective. Chan argues that China’s compliance with 
international law, where it does occur, does not prove that all states comply with international law; 
‘it only shows that China does, and only on those occasions of compliance’.36 Distinguishing his 
work from Western-centred studies, Chan focuses on ‘China’s potential to influence and shape the 
substantive content of international norms’, 37  arguing that ‘China has served important 
contributions, an objective appraisal of which is essential to our understanding of international 
law, including the locus in which the principle of State sovereignty resides in international legal 
order, and its continuing significance and implications’.38 
I agree to a great extent with Chan’s criticism of the ‘Western bias’ when it comes to the 
relationship between China and the international legal order. Studies along this line tend to 
underestimate China’s role in the international legal order and fail to take concerns and requests 
from non-Western or non-liberal countries seriously. However, I am hesitant to claim that China 
is a special case with regard to the international legal order (for better or for worse). This claim 
will be developed in the remainder of this study. Nonetheless, it can already be seen that the view 
of compliance offered in compliance theories is far from comprehensive when it comes to 
understanding the relationship between states and international (human rights) law. China might 
be deemed special in the sense that it uses its own reasoning and arguments regarding international 
(human rights) law. China is also one of many countries to do so, because just like other state 
parties, China is trying to argue its way out rather than simply refusing to cooperate with IHRL 
instruments. In this sense, Chan’s claim that China has the ‘potential to influence and shape the 
substantive content of international norms’ has yet to be examined.  
In sum, this study will shed light on: 1) the sense in which and the extent to which 
relativistic arguments qua particular reasoning can be considered justifiable when it comes to 
universal human rights rules and principles; 2) the sense in which these arguments matter in the 
context of IHRL; and 3) how to view the relationship between China and IHRL when we move 
beyond traditional compliance theory. The main tasks of this study are to derive criteria for 
‘justifiable’ argumentation in the context of constructive dialogue before international human 
                                                 
36 Chan (n 1) 8.  
37 ibid 7.  
38 ibid 19.  
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rights treaty bodies, to reconstruct the arguments used by China and the relevant treaty bodies, and 
to deconstruct the relationship between China and the relevant treaty bodies from the perspective 
of argumentation. 
 
6.  Research outlook and methodology 
This study consists of two parts. The first part (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) lays the groundwork for the 
study. The framework, methods and materials, as well as the relevant justification rules, will be 
discussed in each chapter. The second part (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) investigates arguments 
concerning specific topics. A conclusion is provided in Chapter 8. 
In Part I of this study, I consider the question of what counts as a good argument in 
constructive dialogue. I begin by identifying the characteristics of constructive dialogue by 
comparing it with legal arguments in the courtroom, which helps me to develop criteria for 
determining what counts as a justifiable argument in constructive dialogue. I then investigate the 
interpretation rules for international treaties in general and international human rights law in 
particular. Finally, I articulate the concept of particular reasoning and its implications for legal 
argumentation in constructive dialogue. This part mainly builds on the legal theories of Neil 
MacCormick, Robert Alexy, and Ian Sinclair. Placing these theories in the current context of 
constructive dialogue and international human rights law provides a theoretical framework for the 
remainder of the study.  
In Part II, I investigate arguments that employ particular reasoning under the four topics 
identified above (namely the core definitions of a given treaty, substantive reservations, the 
sovereignty and mandate of treaty bodies, and the implementation gap regarding economic, social, 
and cultural rights in the constructive dialogue between China and the five human rights treaty 
bodies (i.e. CAT, CEDAW, CRC, CERD, and CESCR). A representation and reconstruction of 
the arguments is then carried out, in chronological order. The main materials for my analysis are 
summary records39. It should be noted that state reports and concluding observations may also be 
referred to when necessary to complete the arguments insofar as they are the organic constitution 
of constructive dialogue. In the interest of brevity, the original arguments will not be cited in full 
                                                 
39 The summary records are part of the United Nations official record, which is defined as follows: ‘a series of printed 
publications relating to the proceedings of the principal organs of the United Nations or certain United Nations 
conferences; they include verbatim or summary records of the meetings of the organ concerned, annexes and 
supplements’ (Rf. ST/AI/189/Add.3/Rev.2).  
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unless it is necessary to do so. Nevertheless, all of the original arguments can be found in the 
annex.  
To summarise the main content of each chapter:  
Chapter 1 discusses ‘justifiability’ with regard to arguments in constructive dialogue before 
international human rights treaty bodies. This chapter argues that constructive dialogue has a 
‘quasi-legal’ character and that the arguments raised in it have a dual function. Therefore, the 
criteria for argumentative ‘justifiability’ in this context include both criteria of legal justifiability 
and criteria of dialogical constructiveness. 
The main criteria for determining the legal justifiability of an argument are further 
discussed in Chapter 2, which considers IHRL interpretation rules. Based on the interpretative 
character of law, this chapter provides the foundation for determining the legal justifiability of 
arguments in constructive dialogue. 
Nonetheless, as pointed out in Chapter 3, this study does not cover all of the arguments that 
occur in constructive dialogue. It only concerns those that use what I call ‘particular reasoning’. 
Chapter 3 provides an account of particular reasoning and the general rule for justifying particular 
reasoning in the legal context. It also summarises the methods and topics that will be investigated 
in Part II of this study.  
Chapters 4 to 7 (Part II) investigate cases of particular reasoning raised in constructive 
dialogue in which China 1) holds to its own understanding of certain treaty provisions (Chapter 
4), 2) makes substantive treaty reservations (Chapter 5), 3) uses sovereignty as a shield against 
interference by committees on certain subjects (Chapter 6), and 4) requests a margin of discretion 
in implementing economic, social, and culture rights (Chapter 7). 
Chapter 8 concludes the study by summarizing the observations gleaned thus far and by 
situating these observations in the three abovementioned debates, as a means of clarifying how 







Chapter 1 Between Legal Justifiability and Constructiveness: The Janus Face 
of Justifying Arguments in Constructive Dialogue  
 
 
‘Legal praxis, unlike many other social phenomena, is argumentative.’ 




Constructive dialogue is a long-established means of holding states accountable for their treaty 
obligations. Not only has this process ‘been vindicated in practice and has the potential to be an 
important and effective means by which to promote respect for human rights’, but it is also 
considered not to have been superseded by other approaches or mechanisms created for the same 
purpose.40 It provides a space for dialogue between state representatives and committee members 
concerning states’ human rights treaty obligations. As a result, the committees issue (non-
binding)41 judgements and recommendations (i.e. concluding observations) to states in order to 
improve their human rights situations. Therefore, given current developments in human rights 
treaty body mechanisms, constructive dialogue is one of the most important means of monitoring 
state parties’ compliance with IHRL. 
However, this topic has not received sufficient attention in the numerous studies on 
international human rights treaty bodies in general, which can be divided into two general groups: 
studies that are conducted by or within the UN system and studies conducted by researchers who 
                                                 
40 Philip Alston, ‘Effective Functioning Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights Instruments’, 
Final report on Enhancing the Long-term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System. 
E/CN.4/1997/74 (27 March 1997). 
41 The word ‘binding’ here is understood in its narrow and strict legal sense: that is, having validly entered the apposite 
legal systems, such that an authoritative body can impose the decisions or rules coercively by sanctioning non-
compliance. In this sense, the recommendations (concluding observations) issued by the treaty bodies are considered 
to be non-binding, for they are not accompanied by a sanctioning mechanism (either the use of force or other coercive 
methods). Nevertheless, the wording does not mean that this recommendation does not have legal effects or is 
practically ineffective.  
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are not directly linked (in an administrative sense) to the UN machinery. With regard to the former 
group, representative studies include the reports prepared by Philip Alston on enhancing the long-
term effectiveness of the United Nations human rights treaty system,42 the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2005 report on improving the working 
method of the state party reporting process,43 the concept paper adopted by OHCHR in 2006,44 
and the 2012 report by OHCHR on strengthening human rights treaty bodies.45 This group’s main 
concern is reforming the procedures and formality of the treaty body machinery in order to tackle 
obstacles to implementing treaties, such as overdue state reports, overloading examining tasks for 
each committee, the burden of preparing different reports for different committees, etc. With 
regard to the latter group, which includes research conducted outside the UN system, there are a 
large number of studies that focus on the impact and effectiveness of treaty bodies.46 Within this 
large body of research, however, little attention has been paid to the particular process of 
constructive dialogue.47 It is even said that, ‘“constructive dialogue” has not been sufficiently 
developed in terms of substance and process to deliver on the potential added value in providing 
… authoritative recommendations’.48  
In my view, this under-development regarding constructive dialogue is largely due to a 
mistaken understanding of the characteristics of this process. On the one hand, certain studies tend 
                                                 
42  Philip Alston, ‘Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting 
Obligations under International Instruments on Human Rights’, A/44/668 (8 November 1989); ‘Status of preparation 
of publications, studies and documents for the world conference’ A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.11/Rev.1 (22 April 1993). 
Philip Alston (n 40). 
43 OHCHR, Report on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting 
Process, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2005/4 (25 May 2005). 
44 OHCHR, Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body—Report by the 
Secretariat, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (22 March 2006).  
45 Navanethem Pillay, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System—A report by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human rights, UNCHR (June 2012). 
46 For instance, see Christof Heyns and Frans Vijoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level (Kluwer Law International 2002); Ann Bayefsky (ed), The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21 
Century (Brill Nijhoff 2000); Philip Alston and James Crawford, The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 
(Cambridge University Press 2000); Alfred Zayas et al. (eds), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: 
Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009); John Morijn, ‘Reforming United 
Nations Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Reform’ (2011) 58 Netherlands International Law Review 295; Jasper 
Krommendijk, ‘The Domestic Dffectiveness of International Human Rights Monitoring in Established Democracies: 
The Case of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2015) 10 The Reivew of International Organization 489. 
47 For recent research focused on constructive dialogue, see Beata Faracik, ‘“Constructive Dialogue” as a Cornerstone 
of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 38 Bracton Law Journal 39. For other research that, while not concerned 
exclusively with ‘constructive dialogue’, treats it as an important part of the discussion, see, for instance, Morijn (n 
46); Kerstin Mechlem ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 905. 
48 Morijn (n 46) 313. 
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to overlook its legal characteristics and view the entire process as an exchange of (political) 
opinions among committee members and state parties.49 This view underestimates what I call the 
‘enacting’ or performative role that constructive dialogue plays in the international human rights 
legal order. As a result, most of these analyses tend to focus solely on the procedures of the 
monitoring mechanism (in order to improve communication between the state parties and the 
committees), thus downplaying the differences between the procedure and the substance of the 
process, which usually follows with suggestions for reforming the procedures and the formality of 
the treaty body machinery.50 These suggestions, although important and necessary, often fail to 
reflect on the legal substance of this process. On the other hand, some analyses seem over-
emphasise the legal nature of international human rights treaties. While these studies usually give 
attention to legal arguments and justifications under IHRL, they tend to neglect the 
political/dialogical characteristics of this process.51 Therefore, a lack of interest in the political and 
dialogical role of the process may make some of the research unable to respond to the practical 
challenges that treaty bodies face.52 With regard to the latter group, the bar is sometimes set so 
high that international human rights treaties are considered to have something of a constitutional 
character and even to be out of the scope of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—the most 
authoritative tool for understanding the characteristics of international law thus far, which seems 
too ambitious for the current human rights treaty body system.53 Hence, these suggestions usually 
fail to gain support from state parties, let alone to have an impact on them. All this is an illustration 
of the diversity of the landscape of international human rights scholarship. While both groups 
greatly contribute to our understanding of international human rights treaty bodies, and while their 
views will be revisited in later chapters, they do, in my view, to varying extents mistake the nature 
                                                 
49 Philip Alston and James Crawford (n 46), for instance, assert that ‘[t]he process (constructive dialogue) takes on the 
aura of a conversation, albeit an often difficult one, described by the Committee as a process of “constructive dialogue” 
rather than as a discrete moment of third-party judgement and demand for compliance’ (p. 51). Morijn (n 46) also 
suggests that constructive dialogue is ‘pre-legislative, pre-policy and pre-judicial authoritative’, 317. See also Beata 
Faracik, ‘“Constructive Dialogue” as a Cornerstone of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 38 Bracton Law 
Journal 39.  
50 For instance, see Alfred Zayas et al. (eds) (n 46). 
51  See, for instance, Matthew Craven, ‘Legal Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in 
International Law’ (2000) 11 EJIL 489, 489–519; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of 
Treaties, Part I’ (2008) XXI Hague Yearbook of International Law 101, 101-53; Kerstin Mechlem (n 47); and John 
William Tobin, ‘Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty Interpretation’ (2010) 23 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 1. 
52 See the reform suggestions from the OHCHR, Ann Bayefsky (n 46). 
53 See HR Committee General Comment no. 24 (52) on the ‘special character’ of the human rights treaties. See also 
Matthew Craven (n 51).  
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of constructive dialogue. Therefore, this chapter will begin by identifying the nature and function 
of constructive dialogue.  
1.1 introduces the process of constructive dialogue conducted under human rights treaty 
bodies. 1.2 investigates the nature of constructive dialogue by comparing it with the use of legal 
arguments in the courtroom. It then reveals the characteristics that arguments in constructive 
dialogue and arguments in the courtroom share, as well as what differentiates them. Following this 
analysis, 1.3 discusses the way in which legal justification types can be applied to arguments in 
constructive dialogue. 1.4 moves on to discuss the non-legal (dialogical) nature of constructive 
dialogue. This is where the normative goal of this process—being ‘constructive’—comes into the 
picture, which makes up for what the legal perspective could not grasp.  
 
1.1 Constructive dialogue in treaty-based international human rights bodies: A synopsis 
Treaty-based international human rights bodies (also known as treaty bodies) are to be 
distinguished from UN Charter–based bodies. The latter include the Human Rights Council (the 
successor to the Commission on Human Rights) and Special Procedures. The former, as the name 
suggests, are based on international human rights treaties. There are currently nine core 
international human rights treaties and ten treaty bodies (the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has its own 
treaty body, the SPT).54 The treaty bodies are created in accordance with the treaties they monitor 
and are constituted by a committee of individual experts. The output of a treaty body is viewed as 
authoritative expert output and is used to ‘help in building up judicial argumentation’.55 In general, 
the treaty monitoring mechanism is carried out through five modalities: state reporting, individual 
complaints, inquiries, inter-state complaints, and treaty bodies’ adoption of explanatory texts.56 
Among these five modalities, it is largely held that state reporting is the most important mechanism 
for monitoring international human rights treaties.57 Constructive dialogue is essential to the state 
reporting procedure.     
                                                 
54 For the full list of international human rights treaties and their treaty bodies, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx.  
55 Morijn (n 46) 304. 
56 ibid 301–02.  
57 See, for instance, Alston (n 42). 
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The whole process of state reporting starts when the state ratifies a treaty, because ‘it is 
exactly at that moment that the state … “announce[s]” its readiness to enter the dialogue based on 
considerations of periodic reports on the measures it has adopted’.58 Each treaty lays down specific 
obligations to submit state reports. Hence, after the entering into force of the treaty, together with 
the ratification of a state, that state party is under a treaty obligation to submit state reports under 
the guidance of the reporting guidelines of the given treaty. An initial state report must be 
submitted within a fixed time period and ‘must be comprehensive to give the members of the treaty 
body an in-depth understanding of the situation in the country regarding the specific area or areas 
covered by the conventions’.59 After the initial report, the state must submit periodic reports at 
fixed intervals. 
Constructive dialogue, considered essential to the examination process, is conducted 
between the committee members and the state’s delegation. There are also exchanges between 
both sides before and after the constructive dialogue. Before the constructive dialogue takes place, 
committee members prepare lists of issues and questions for the state party in order ‘to receive 
additional information on issues of particular concern, and at the same time to indicate to the state 
party the issues that will be raised during the formal examination’.60 In this sense, the lists of issues 
and questions usually form the ground for the constructive dialogue. The formal examination 
usually begins with an opening statement from the head of the state’s delegation. The country 
rapporteur or members of the country task force then present their evaluation of the state party’s 
situation (with further inquiries to the delegation). The committee members also address their 
concerns, inquiries, and General Comments. The delegation is expected to give the country 
rapporteur and committee members a response to the best of its ability. The delegation’s response 
may generate further questions or comments from the committee members or country rapporteur. 
This ‘to and fro’ is the prima facie reason why the whole process is considered a dialogue between 
the committees and the states. Moreover, it is said that ‘the purpose of the examination is not to 
“blame and shame”, but rather to offer assistance to the state party on how to improve 
implementation of the convention’. 61  This process is also described in the OHCHR report 
                                                 
58 Faracik (n 47) 41. 
59 Marten Kjaerum, ‘State Report’ in Alfred Zayas et al. (eds) (n 46) 18–19. 
60 ibid 21. 
61 Report on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting Process, 
(HRI/MC/206/4, 17 May 2006). See also: ibid. 
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Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System—A Report by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
 
In general, the face-to-face or constructive dialogue in all treaty bodies follows the same broad structure: 
(a) The State party is invited to send a delegation to attend the meetings at which the committee will 
consider the State party’s report; (b) The head of the delegation, usually led by Government experts 
from the capital, is invited to make a brief opening statement; and (c) Members of the committee, in 
some cases led by the country rapporteur(s) or country task force members, pose questions on specific 
aspects of the report of particular concern. Dialogues based on an initial report require the treaty body 
to cover most if not all treaty provisions in order to allow a complete understanding of the country 
situation; dialogues on a periodic report require more focused attention on a number of key specific 
issues and provisions which the State party is not yet fully implementing. In practice, depending on the 
treaty body, there is regularly no difference or a superficial difference between the dialogue for an initial 
report and the one for a periodic report. Many periodic dialogues are similar to comprehensive ones for 
initial reports and discussions on the implementation of the previous concluding observations often 
remain marginal to the dialogue.62 
 
At the end of each session, the committee members issue a concluding observation, which 
usually includes both positive and negative perspectives (which are usually addressed in the 
section titled ‘subjects of concern’) regarding the state’s compliance with its treaty obligations. 
The committee also provides recommendations for how the state might improve its human rights 
situation. States are usually expected to mention any developments in the relevant areas of concern 
in order to maintain continuity of dialogue. 
A recent development that concerns the post-examination period are reports of follow-ups 
that the state party is requested to make. At the time of writing, follow-up procedures have been 
developed by HR Committee, CAT, CERD, CEDAW, CRPD, and CED.63 In this procedure, the 
state party is asked to prepare an additional document with information on implementation 
regarding specific concerns voiced by the committees (usually drawn from the concerns and 
recommendations in the concluding observations) within a timeframe of one year (two years in the 
case of CEDAW). This procedure, as some scholars have pointed out, has further contributed to 
the continuity of constructive dialogue in general.64 
                                                 
62 http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/HCReportTBStrengthening.pdf, 56. 
63 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/FollowUpProcedure.aspx. 
64 Kjaerum (n 59) 22. 
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It is clear that the discursive element is central to the process as a whole. Dialogue is 
therefore the main form of monitoring used by the treaty bodies. However, the main suggestions 
and proposals concerning constructive dialogue given by both scholars and the United Nations 
mainly focus on the formality and procedural aspects of the process, not the actual arguments. In 
his 1993 report,65 for instance, Phillip Alston suggests that treaty bodies should focus on ‘(a) 
dissemination in local language of the text of the relevant instrument; (b) the modalities of the 
preparation of the State report; (c) the submission of information to the treaty body from diverse 
sources in connection with the examination of State reports; and (d) national level discussion of 
the results of the Committee-State party dialogue’.66 He also addresses the problem of overdue 
state reporting and methods for tackling the problem.67 Matters of content (especially arguments) 
are seldom discussed in these reports, however.68  It seems that, in this regard, the arguments that 
take place in constructive dialogue have been left largely unexplored. This is a dangerous lacuna. 
If we continue to exclude the content of this dialogue from the discussion, suggestions concerning 
how to reform the formality and procedures of human rights monitoring instruments may seem 
less and less convincing. After all, the content of the dialogue is the main (if not the only) 
substantive part of this monitoring process. Moreover, the shortcomings of the examination 
process usually identified by state parties (such as ‘[state parties] do not always feel they are 
receiving useful guidance on implementing their international obligations’, 69  or ‘the 
recommendations issued by the Committees often lack the clarity, precision and practical value 
required to be seen as giving helpful support’70) are more often than not substantive problems 
which cannot be addressed by proposals and suggestions that mainly concern formality and 
procedures. The construction of a method for analysing the content of constructive dialogue 
therefore remains an urgent task.  
                                                 
65 This is the second of three reports on reforming treaty bodies submitted by Alston to the Commission on Human 
Rights, referred to above in note 3. 
66 Alston (n 42) (A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.11/Rev.1 (22 April 1993)) [12]. 
67 ibid [13]–[16]. 
68 Alston offers twin criteria for determining which demands from the committee should be met by the states: ‘(i) 
minimizing the burden placed on States and (ii) maximizing the effectiveness of measures to ensure respect for human 
rights’ (ibid, [17]). In addition to possibly clashing with each other, however, these criteria seem to lead to more 
questions than solutions.  
69 Morijn (n 46) 297. 




1.2 The quasi-legal nature of constructive dialogue 71  
In this section, I argue that the arguments in constructive dialogue are quasi-legal in nature. That 
is to say, the arguments in constructive dialogue share essential characteristics with legal 
arguments, although there are also significant differences between them.  
 
1.2.1 What is legal argumentation? 
Studying legal argumentation is like stepping into a swamp that includes not only theories of legal 
reasoning but also logic, linguistics, argumentation theory, and legal theory in general. One 
strategy in this situation is to follow reasonably sound tracks that have already been marked by 
former scholars and to build one’s own path from there. This also means that a clear definition of 
legal argumentation and its characteristics must first be provided in order to determine the 
directions and boundaries of the discussion. 
There are certain constraints that distinguish legal arguments from other practical 
arguments. These constraints can therefore be viewed as characteristics of legal argumentation. In 
A Theory of Legal Argumentation—the Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal 
Justification, Robert Alexy distinguishes legal reasoning from general practical reasoning by 
appealing to the following features: (1) ‘legal discussions are concerned with practical 
questions’;72 (2) these questions are discussed under the claim to correctness by virtue of ‘[their] 
relationship with valid law, however this is to be determined’;73 and (3) legal arguments in the 
courtroom are subject to further constraints. These constraints include being ‘institutionalised’ and 
resulting in ‘binding decisions’.74  
For the institutionalisation of legal arguments in the courtroom, for instance,  
 
the roles are unequally distributed, the participation of the defendant is not voluntary, and the obligation 
to tell the truth is limited. The reasoning process is limited in time and regulated by the rules of 
procedural law. The parties are entitled to be guided by their own interests. Frequently, perhaps even 
                                                 
71 All subsequent references to ‘constructive dialogue’ refer to the entire examination process.  
72 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification 
(Oxford University Press 1989) 212. 
73 ibid.  
74 ibid 211. 
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commonly, they are not concerned with arriving at a correct or just outcome but rather at one that is 
advantageous to themselves.75  
 
Legal arguments that result in binding decisions means that in the courtroom, legal arguments shall 
have ‘an impartial and respected judgement’, and result in situations ‘where someone refuses 
voluntary compliance [are met] with backup sanctioning or remedial norm[s]’.76  The former 
secures a third impartial party for adjudication; the latter requires an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure the bindingness of the decision.  
The above features and constraints may seem scattered at first glance. They can be grouped 
into three categories, however, which together depict the distinguishing features of legal 
argumentation: it is 1) based on valid law and established procedures; 2) defeasible; and 3) 
constrained by a binding judgement. 
Let us elaborate on these three features of legal argument.77 First, the connection between 
legal argumentation and valid law, along with its institutionalisation, should be self-evident; legal 
reasoning is meant to be derived from norms found in valid law and conducted in line with 
procedural rules. In Chapter 3, I further explain the legal syllogism, which is a crucial format when 
it comes to capturing this relation. For now, it suffices to say that valid law and established 
procedures demarcate the sources and bases of legal argumentation.  
Second, the defeasibility of legal arguments entails that the goal of legal argumentation is 
to attack and defeat the rival party’s argument.78 A defeasible argument is one ‘in which the 
conclusion can be accepted tentatively in relation to the evidence known so far in a case, but may 
                                                 
75 ibid 212. These constraints specifically describe the constraints of a ‘trial’—one of the legal discourse types under 
Alexy’s taxonomy. Other types include discussions in legal science (legal dogmatics), judicial deliberation, debates 
in courts of law, legislative treatments of legal questions, discussions of legal questions among students or among 
jurists, lawyers, or legally qualified personnel in administration or industry, as well as debates on legal problems in 
the media, at least where these take the form of juristic arguments (ibid 211). In the context of the above discussion, 
however, legal discourse is to be understood in its narrow sense, namely in terms of courtroom debate (during a trial). 
Therefore, the above constraints that apply to this case in particular are used directly. Moreover, legal argument as 
defined in this discussion is also understood in its narrow sense, as legal argument in the courtroom.  
76 Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005) 3.  
77 The term ‘legal argument’ will thus be understood here in its strict sense, as ‘legal argument in the courtroom’, 
unless indicated otherwise.  
78 In the case of legal arguments in judgements, this can be understood in terms of attacking and defeating one’s 
opponent’s arguments, whomever those arguments belong to.  
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need to be retracted as new evidence comes in’.79 Douglas Walton defines the term ‘defeasibility’ 
in the context of the argumentation scheme: 
 
If an argument put forward by a proponent meets the requirements of a scheme, and the premises are 
acceptable to the respondent, then the respondent is obliged to accept the conclusion. But such an 
acceptance—or commitment, as it is often called—is provisional in the dialogue. If the respondent asks 
one of the critical questions matching the scheme and the proponent fails to offer an adequate answer, 
the argument defaults. Thus we see that defeasibility is linked to a dialogue structure in which a burden 
can shift back and forth. The original weight of an argument, before it defaulted and had to be retracted, 
is restored only when the proponent gives a successful answer to the question.80  
 
I shall refrain from discussing the rich topic of argumentation schemes. My reason for 
referring to Walton’s definition of defeasibility is that this definition underscores the practical 
consequences of a defeasible argument, which can be summarised as follows: 1) a defeasible 
argument is to be taken as justified as long as it has not been defeated; 2) a defeasible argument is 
defeated when the proponent cannot offer an adequate answer to the opponent’s inquiry or attack; 
and therefore 3) the burden of argument shifts between proponents and opponents throughout the 
dialogue.  
Legal arguments are defeasible insofar as they involve more than deductive reasoning on 
the basis of valid law.81 As long as external justification (over and above a syllogism) is required, 
it is possible to ask critical questions, and hence to attack a proponent’s argument, which means 
that it is always possible to defeat a legal argument. In most current legal systems, for example, 
expert testimony (such as ballistics evidence, DNA evidence, etc.) is accepted as evidence in 
support of a legal argument. However, such arguments are only justified and accepted if the party 
who submits the evidence is willing and able, if challenged, to prove the credibility of the expert, 
his or her expertise in the given case, the reliability of the relevant sources, and so on. This is what 
Prakken and Sartor call ‘inference-based defeasibility’. It means that the conclusions of legal 
                                                 
79 Douglas Walton, Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes (Cambridge University Press 2008) 
2. 
80 ibid 9.  
81 It could also be inductive, abductive, analogical, or empirical and practical. See Scott Brewer, ‘An Essay by S. 
Brewer: Law, Logic, and Leibniz. A Contemporary Perspective’ in Alberto Artosi et al. (eds), Leibniz: Logico-
Philosophical Puzzles in the Law: Philosophical Questions and Perplexing cases in the Law (Springer 2013).  
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reasoning are open to defeat as further input information is provided.82 In their view, there are two 
other types of defeasibility concerning legal reasoning: ‘process-based defeasibility’ and ‘theory-
based defeasibility’. The former is due to the rules of legal procedures (for instance, rules on the 
admissibility of evidence provided in court). The latter concerns the development of legal theory, 
which can result in one argument’s being defeated by another that is based on a better legal 
theory. 83  Therefore, based on Prakken and Sartor’s account of defeasibility, because legal 
reasoning is inferential by nature, regulated by rules of procedure, and based on legal theories, it 
is innately defeasible. In this sense, any legal argument is only tentatively justified. 
In courtroom debate, the defeasibility of legal argumentation is overcome by the third 
feature of legal argumentation, namely that it is constrained by a binding judgement supported by 
authority. This feature relates to what Radbruch termed ‘legal certainty’. In his Antinomies of the 
Idea of Law, Radbruch stated that legal certainty is one of the three values (or postulates) that are 
necessarily inherent in the idea of law (the other two are justice and expediency). This postulate 
requires that the law be positive.84 It means that ‘if what is just cannot be settled, then what ought 
to be right must be laid down; and this must be done by an agency able to carry through what it 
lays down’.85 In other words, in courtroom debate, not only is the adjudicator the (only) authority 
for deciding whether the opponent has indeed defeated the proponent’s argument, but what the 
adjudicator decides is to be carried out.86 By virtue of legal certainty, authority therefore constrains 
the infinite loop of argument between rival parties that stems from the defeasibility of legal 
argument.  
Although the characteristics of legal argument listed at the beginning of this section are not 
exhaustive, the three features of legal argumentation are. They are in this sense categorical. That 
is to say, any characteristic of legal argument can be placed under one of these categories. For 
instance, one characteristic of legal argument is that it maximises the advantages and interests of 
                                                 
82 Henry Prakken and Giovanni Sartor, 'The Three Faces of Defeasibility in the Law' (2004) 17 Ratio Juris, 118. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Emil Lask et al., The legal philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (Harvard University Press 2013), 108. 
85 ibid. 
86 Of course, in the court debate, there is also the appeal procedure. At the end of the chain, however, there is always 
a judicial body that functions as a final check on the defeasibility of a legal argument, and what that body decides is 
therefore final and certain. The same logic applies to judicial dialogue and legal scholars’ views on law. They are at 
first glance rather ‘un-judiciable’ in the sense that no judgement is made that relates to them directly and immediately. 
However, all of these arguments are put forward for the purposes of influencing ‘final decisions’ which have legal 
certainty and are supported by authority. In this sense, being ‘judiciable’ (in the sense of reaching legal certainty 
supported by authority) is indeed a necessary condition of legal argument.   
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one’s own party. In the context of courtroom debate, this aim can be understood in terms of 
attacking and defeating the rival party’s arguments, and thus persuading the adjudicator to make 
judgements that favour one’s own position. This indicates the defeasibility of legal argumentation. 
Characteristics such as ‘governed by valid law’, ‘related to the procedure of law’, and ‘concerned 
with practical questions’ are characteristics that connect legal argument with valid law. Impartial 
third-party adjudication and enforcement are meant to guarantee legal certainty. In sum, because 
these three features (being based on valid law, being defeasible, and being constrained by a binding 
judgement backed up by authority) constitute the distinguishing features of legal argument, they 
are necessary and sufficient conditions for legal argument. 
 
1.2.2 The quasi-legal nature of constructive dialogue  
It is now time to examine the extent to which the arguments in constructive dialogue resemble 
legal arguments. Recall the characteristics of legal argument and the process of constructive 
dialogue. The resemblance can be identified as follows: they both concern practical questions and 
are based on valid law (in the case of constructive dialogue, the valid law is the body of 
international human rights treaties), regulated by the relevant procedural law (or the procedural 
clauses), and conducted under a limited timeframe. Moreover, the roles of the engaging parties are 
unequally distributed in various ways. On the other hand, there are also differences between these 
two types of argument. One of the most fundamental differences is that the roles of both parties in 
the constructive dialogue, i.e. committees and state parties, are not identical to the roles of the two 
rival parties (plaintiff and defendant) in the courtroom. In courtroom debate, the roles are not 
equally distributed in the sense that proponents and opponents are only equal to each other with 
regard to the superior position of the adjudicator, who has the authority to make binding 
judgements. In constructive dialogue, however, committee members are neither proponents, nor 
opponents, nor adjudicators. Instead, their role involves aspects of all three; they call a state to 
account, partly to defeat the state parties’ arguments and partly to decide whether the arguments 
are justified. One might argue that the committee members’ role is not to defeat or attack the state 
party’s arguments at all, but only to give recommendations and suggestions. Giving 
recommendations and suggestions is indeed an important part of their mandate. However, given 
that constructive dialogue is based on international human rights treaties for the purposes of 
examining state implementation and compliance, it is inevitable that any valid recommendation or 
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suggestion given by a committee must be based on a judgement of insufficient implementation or 
non-compliance on the part of a state party. On the other hand, state parties will defend their own 
positions. This means that defeating the state’s argument is a necessary step in making the relevant 
recommendations and suggestions. Nonetheless, the decisions (in the form of concluding 
observations and recommendations) that are made by committees are not binding and therefore 
lack the certainty enjoyed by courtroom judgements. Moreover, a state party can always make 
counter-arguments in its follow-up documents or in the next state’s session. Therefore, although 
the roles played by the committees and the state parties are not equally distributed, they are not 
distributed in the same way as the roles played by the rival parties and the adjudicator in the 
courtroom debate. Apart from the different roles played by each party, the parties in the 
constructive dialogue are not entitled to be entirely guided by their own interests; nor are they 
expected to only regard their own position or advantage. Committee members, who are selected 
for their ‘high moral standard[s]’,87 are expected to conduct the examination process with an eye 
to correctness and justice. As for the state parties, although they make arguments in their own 
interests, they are under an obligation to cooperate with the treaty bodies.88 
Thus far, it seems that the similarities and differences between constructive dialogue and 
courtroom legal argumentation are rather patchy. If we approach the above observations from the 
perspective of the three features of legal argumentation, however, the picture may become clearer. 
Arguments in constructive dialogue are based on valid law and are defeasible, which puts them 
alongside legal arguments. With this said, the committee does not have the authority to reach a 
binding judgement, which distinguishes the arguments in constructive dialogue from legal 
arguments in the courtroom. This observation might also explain certain requirements associated 
with constructive dialogue that are not commonplace in legal discourse. In constructive dialogue, 
for instance, the parties are not expected to maximise their own interests. This is because when a 
binding judgement is not guaranteed, other remedies are needed to constrain the infinite loop of 
argument that stems from the defeasibility of legal reasoning.  
                                                 
87 ICCPR Art.28: ‘2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who 
shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights, consideration being 
given to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experience.’ For the full text, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx. 
88 Such as the principle of Pacta sunt servanda. 
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In sum, the arguments conducted in constructive dialogue resemble legal arguments in two 
essential respects: they refer to valid law as their basis, and they are defeasible. One crucial feature 
of legal argument—providing legal certainty—is missing from constructive dialogue, however. In 
this sense, arguments in constructive dialogue have only a quasi-legal character. They are therefore 
not legal arguments in the full sense but rather what I shall call ‘partly legal, partly dialogical’ in 
nature.  
 Nevertheless, while the identification of this ‘partly legal, partly dialogical’ character 
should be sufficient for our current goal of conducting a practical analysis of legal argumentation 
raised in this process, the nature of constructive dialogue is, all things considered, more legal than 
dialogical. One of the main arguments that cast doubt on the legal character of IHRL in general 
and its examination process in particular is that constructive dialogue only results in non-binding 
observations (including recommendations). However, I shall argue that this process does count as 
law-enacting for the following reasons. First, these observations, although non-binding, are issued 
by authoritative bodies (i.e. international human rights treaty bodies) generally constituted by 
renowned experts. Second, these observations are decisions taken on the basis of hearing the other 
party on allegations made by that very committee (although in a different role). Third, although 
they do not carry legal certainty in the sense of enforcement as explained above, these decisions 
impose an obligation on the state in question. This obligation stems partly from the international 
consensus voiced by the treaty bodies, partly from the procedures built into the process, and partly 
from the state’s own agreement to being bound by the treaty in the first place. Under the current 
development of the international human rights machinery, it is true that state commitment to IHRL 
cannot be obtained by coercion. Nevertheless, the fact that constructive dialogue, as the main 
substantive treaty monitoring mechanism, not only refers to valid law and acknowledges the 
defeasibility of the arguments underpinning such references but also 1) adheres to the criterion of 
expediency by taking international relations between sovereign states into account, 2) provides 
legal certainty in the sense of ushering in authoritative recommendations, gradually building up an 
acquis from which no party to the treaty can easily free itself without loss of credibility in the 
international arena, and 3) provides sufficient grounds for arguing that this process, in and of itself, 
enacts law. This understanding of the fundamental characteristics of IHRL in general and 
constructive dialogue in particular, however, does not mean that the latter is only legal. Therefore, 
I submit that constructive dialogue is partly legal, partly dialogical; although it is fundamentally 
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legal, these two features are interdependent. Against this background, we may now analyse both 
aspects of constructive dialogue. 
In the following sections, I first apply legal justification types to the arguments in 
constructive dialogue. This will help us to decide on the route for determining the legal 
justifiability of the arguments in the light of valid law. When legal justification reaches its limits 
(such that no binding judgement can be issued), I subject the arguments to the applicable and 
necessary rules of dialogical justification. This is, as I shall argue, to guarantee the constructiveness 
of the arguments.  
 
1.3 Applying legal justification types to constructive dialogue: The route to determining 
legal justifiability 
In this section, I first revisit the basic legal argument justification types articulated by Neil 
MacCormick. These justifications can be divided into two categories, namely internal justification 
(1.3.1) and external justification (1.3.2). According to Robert Alexy, ‘[i]nternal justification is 
concerned with the question of whether an opinion follows logically from the premises adduced 
as justifying it’,89 whereas ‘[t]he correctness of these premises is the subject-matter of external 
justification’.90 I then explain the sense in which these justification types can be used to help to 
determine the legal justifiability of the arguments in constructive dialogue (1.3.3).  
 
1.3.1 Internal Justification 
With internal justification, a legal statement is justified according to the rules of modus ponens—
a rule of syllogistic logic passed down from antiquity. In this form of deduction, the given law is 
treated as the major premise, the facts as the minor premise, and the verdict as the conclusion. In 
this sense, the syllogistic approach treats law as self-evident, cognitively operable knowledge.91 
Its adapted modern legal version can be expressed as follows:  
 
If OF then NC,  
OF,  
                                                 
89Alexy, above (n 72) 221. 
90 ibid. 
91  Massimo La Torre, ‘Theories of Legal Argumentation and Concepts of Law: An Approximation’ (1998) EUI 




(In this formula, OF denotes operative facts, and NC denotes normative consequences.)  
 
This means that if an argument follows a legal norm (‘If OF then NC’) and provides the empirical 
statement (OF), then its conclusion (NC) is considered justified given both the legal norm and the 
empirical statement.93 
There are at least three reasons to take the internal justification of a legal argument 
seriously in today’s context. Firstly, this form of justification promotes the universalisability of 
legal norms.94 Universalisability in the legal context is the principle of treating like cases alike. 
For instance, as Hare elaborates, ‘[i]f a person says that a thing is red, he is committed to the view 
that anything which was like it in the relevant respects would likewise be red’.95 In this sense, 
internal justification secures the equality of law. Secondly, because internal justification relies on 
the logic of deduction, any external premises—those premises ‘which do not derive from positive 
law’—are ‘brought out into the open’.96 In other words, by scrutinising internal justification, the 
areas where external justification is needed are revealed. Thirdly, when invoking a legal text as a 
basis for a specific claim in a concrete situation, one will inevitably reason by way of legal 
syllogism, albeit (usually) in a more informal way.97 Therefore, an argument can be justified only 
if it is syllogistically valid. In sum, the classic legal syllogism still plays an irreplaceable role in 
justifying legal arguments. 
However, the conclusion of a syllogism is only as convincing as its premises.98 This means 
that the legal syllogism alone is not a sufficient tool for analysing legal arguments. First of all, the 
form of the legal syllogism prescribes that it must start from a normative statement as its major 
premise. This means that it presupposes a political or normative order, the validity of which may 
remain to be established. Second, since the law is composed of human language, which is often 
vague and ambiguous, interpretation is needed to give law concrete meaning. This process of 
interpretation cannot be captured in the form of a syllogism. Third, syllogisms per se cannot 
                                                 
92 MacCormick (n 76) 32. In Alexy’s theory, the legal syllogism comes in both simple and more complicated forms. 
See Alexy (n 72) 221–30. 
93 For a different description of the legal syllogism, see Alexy (n 72) 2, 222.  
94 ibid 228.   
95 R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford University Press 1965) 10. 
96 Alexy (n 72) 228. 
97 ibid 122. 
98 MacCormick (n 76) 76. 
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determine whether the norm (as the major premise) is applicable to the case at hand.99  Put 
differently, because the major sources of defeasibility in legal reasoning are non-deductive, they 
cannot be revealed (let alone settled) through internal justification, which relies primarily on the 
syllogistic model. It is for this reason that external justification is of primary concern when it comes 
to the justification of legal arguments. 
 
1.3.2 External justification 
In Rhetoric and the Rule of Law, Neil MacCormick argues that there are four types of questions 
that together exhaust the possibilities for challenging legal reasoning from a non-deductive (and 
therefore external) perspective, namely the problem of proof (or fact), the problem of 
classification, the problem of interpretation, and the problem of relevance. These are, he argues, 
the four (and only four) types of problem concerning legal reasoning that ‘require in principle non-
deductive, that is, rhetorical or persuasive, reasoning to resolve them’.100 In this sense, these four 
types of problem exhaust the possibilities when it comes to non-deductively attacking and 
defeating a legal argument.  
The ‘problem of proof’ arises when the existence of the alleged instance (‘OF’) has yet to 
be proven. It involves the claim that no instance of ‘OF’ as alleged in the indictment or pleadings 
has been proven to have existed (or at least not up to the required standard of proof).101 It therefore 
involves questioning the empirical statement in the proponent’s argument.102 The ‘problem of 
classification’ arises when the alleged facts cannot be properly characterised as an instance (‘OF’) 
in the sense proper to the law. 103  Charges based on this problem question the categorical 
judgements about empirical facts made by the proponent. The ‘problem of interpretation’ raises 
the question of whether the argumentation involves a misreading of the relevant provisions of the 
law.104 When it is raised, what is challenged is the proponent’s reading of the law. The ‘problem 
                                                 
99 La Torre (n 91) 14; MacCormick (n 76) 69. 
100 MacCormick (n 76) 43.  
101 Ibid. 
102 The word ‘proponent’ refers to the party that must defend its argument, while ‘opponent’ refers to the party that is 
on the attack.  
103 When this second possibility, as MacCormick further indicates, includes a value expression or standard (e.g. 
‘reasonable’, ‘fair’, ‘equitable’, etc.), it can also be considered as a problem of evaluation. Ibid 43. There is also 
another understanding of ‘problem of classification’, which views classification as evaluation. In this case, a standard 
of judgement (such as ‘reasonable’, ’fair’, ‘just’, ‘proportionate’, etc.) is introduced into the legal text, and the 




of relevance’ asks the question ‘whether there is a rule dealing with the alleged facts’.105 In other 
words, it concerns whether the relevant norm (‘whenever OF then NC’) can be properly read off 
the adduced materials, as the proponent alleges.106 
As for the role of these four types of problem in legal reasoning, MacCormick provides a 
thoughtful elaboration, which is worth quoting in full:   
 
In the end, it is not the legal syllogism that alone determines the outcome of the case. Some or all of the 
terms in the statute will have to be interpreted, and the facts of the case must be interpreted and evaluated 
to see if they really count, if they really fit the statute. Reasons can and should be given for preferred 
interpretations that are decisive in a case … The reasons for reading the syllogism in a certain way are, 
it may be said, the real reasons of the case.107    
 
On the flip side, these four types of problem are also four categories of external justification for 
legal arguments, as each type of problem requires a corresponding type of justification. They can 
therefore be called arguments of fact, arguments of classification, arguments of interpretation, and 
arguments of relevance. 
  
1.3.3 Applying legal justification types to arguments in constructive dialogue 
I noted earlier that the arguments in constructive dialogue share two main features with legal 
arguments in the courtroom: they are based on valid law and they are defeasible. By contrast, the 
arguments in constructive dialogue do not possess the third feature of courtroom arguments to the 
extent that they are not constrained by binding judgements. From the first characteristic, their being 
regulated by positive law (i.e. international human rights treaties), it follows that the rules of legal 
syllogism as well as the types of external justification are applicable. Due to its quasi-legal nature, 
however, the arguments in constructive dialogue will always be open to the argumentative moves 
of attacking and defeating. Here in particular, the absence of ultimate discretion is conspicuous. In 
constructive dialogue, an argument can never be deemed ‘justified’ in the sense that a final decision 
(justification) has been reached. In this regard, we need to introduce another concept to make the 
analysis more suitable to the nature of the arguments in constructive dialogue. That is, instead of 
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using ‘justified’ as a benchmark for judging an argument, I propose that we use the term 
‘justifiable’ as an analytic criterion. The latter purports to express both the intentional attitude of 
commitment on the part of the parties to justify their claims and a degree of success they may 
achieve in pursuing this commitment without ever achieving it in full. Put differently, certainty 
regarding the justifiability of an argument on the basis of the given law will come in different 
degrees. In constructive dialogue, because of the non-binding nature of its decisions, any legal 
argument is non-justified in the sense of never being completely justified by binding authoritative 
judgement. A ‘justifiable’ argument, by contrast, satisfies all the applicable justification rules 
while remaining exposed to the possibility of being attacked and defeated in the future.  
In what way the types of legal justification can be used to help to determine the legal 
justifiability of arguments in constructive dialogue? To answer this question is, in a way, to 
investigate the sense in which types of legal justification can be applied to the arguments in 
constructive dialogue. The justification rules found in each justification type can then be used to 
determine the justifiability of the arguments in constructive dialogue as well. 
 Firstly, the internal justification associated with legal syllogisms is applicable to the 
arguments in constructive dialogue. This is because the basic form of the arguments in constructive 
dialogue is still a syllogism—such arguments use specific articles from international human rights 
treaties as norms, confronting them with alleged violations of the relevant articles and reaching 
conclusions by way of deduction. Internal justification is therefore relevant.  
As for external justification, the most important tools in determining the legal justifiability 
of arguments in constructive dialogue are interpretation rules. This is because each type of external 
justification is ultimately about settling interpretation. With regard to the problem of proof, the 
facts must be interpreted in order to determine whether they count as operative facts (OP) in the 
particular case at hand. For the problem of qualification (or classification), one must interpret the 
given law to decide whether this is a situation that falls within the ambit of the statute.108 The 
problem of interpretation by definition concerns the preferred interpretation of the law. As for the 
problem of relevance, whether a given norm can be drawn from the adduced materials as being 
relevant to the empirical facts depends on the interpretation of both the law and the operative facts, 
as well as their relationship. This is to say that each external justification type eventually comes 
back to the question of deciding on the best interpretation. This is particularly the case when it 
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comes to constructive dialogue. Because of the absence of binding judgements, any meaningful 
result of this process must be based on how the problem of interpretation is settled. In fact, this is 
precisely the point made by many scholars from CLS. According to them, it is because such 
questions cannot be settled that international law in general becomes a (more) political forum. This 
also shows that determining interpretation rules for IHRL is of the utmost importance when it 
comes to determining the legal justifiability of arguments in constructive dialogue. In other words, 
determining interpretation rules lies at the heart of justifying arguments in constructive dialogue 
from an external point of view. The question of how to determine interpretation rules for IHRL 
will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
 
1.4 The dialogical nature of constructive dialogue: Criteria of constructiveness 
Thus far, I have argued that the arguments in constructive dialogue are quasi-legal in nature. 
Therefore, the legal justification types are applicable to them. However, since human rights treaty 
bodies do not issue binding judgements, the decisions made by the committee members do not 
constitute the final say; states always have the chance to provide counter-arguments. This is to say 
that, in the absence of binding judgements, merely applying legal argument justification would 
leave too wide a margin for an argument to be considered justifiable (as some scholars have put 
the worry, ‘anything goes’). Nonetheless, since the whole process is partly legal, partly dialogical, 
when we take the applicable dialogical rules into consideration, the margin is considerably 
narrowed. 
Alexy has argued that legal reasoning is a special case of practical reasoning.109 Under this 
thesis, it may seem to some that both general rules of practical reasoning and the rules of dialogue 
should be taken as the basis of legal reasoning. In principle, I subscribe to this view as well. 
However, the problem dealt with in the current discussion is not about the rules that could be 
applied to justify the given arguments, but about understanding the current human rights treaty 
body mechanism in terms of such rules in order to see whether and how they lend justifiability to 
the argumentative discourse before the committees. In other words, it is not about arriving at 
criteria for perfect reasoning in theory but about the threshold for determining a justifiable 
argument in practice. In practice, not all of the general practical and dialogical rules are 
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intentionally applied in the process of argumentation. Rather, most of the general rules function 
like common sense, driving the process without being explicitly thematised. The arguer (or the 
adjudicator) only consults them from time to time. In comparison, the dialogical rules identified 
in this discussion are those that I suggest should be applied intentionally. In this sense, they are 
considered constraints on the arguments in constructive dialogue in addition to being criteria of 
legal justifiability.  
 The dialogical essence of the process can be grasped by its name, i.e. ‘constructive 
dialogue’. As the term suggests, the entire process is first and foremost a dialogue. Secondly, it 
has a concrete normative goal—it is meant to be constructive.  
The goal of constructive dialogue, as articulated by the OHCHR, is: 
 
 to engage with the State party … with the aim of assisting the Government in its efforts to implement 
the treaty as fully and effectively as possible. The notion of constructive dialogue underlines the view 
that the treaty bodies are not judicial bodies (even if some of their functions are quasi-judicial) but rather 
are bodies created to monitor the implementation of the treaties.110  
 
This view confirms the quasi-legal nature of the process while also emphasising its practical focus. 
According to the UN, the goal of constructive dialogue is to ‘assist the Government [of a state 
party] … to implement the treaty as fully and effectively as possible’. However, without binding 
judgements and enforcement mechanisms, assisting in the implementation of a treaty can only be 
achieved in the form of dialogue. That is to say, assisting with treaty implementation is the primary 
goal of constructive dialogue. Hence a constructive argument is an argument that assists in treaty 
implementation.  
The next logical step is to map the practical goal of assisting treaty implementation onto 
the dialogical goal of being constructive. Although it is clear that conducting a constructive 
dialogue alone cannot guarantee treaty implementation, what it might achieve is the clarification 
and identification of what stands in the way of implementing a given treaty, which may further 
contribute to that treaty’s being implemented. In order to clarify or identify what stands in the way 
of implementing a given treaty, it is important for the engaging parties to communicate within the 
same dialogue type. According to Walton and Krabbe, there are six general types of dialogue, 




depending on what is being pursued: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information, 
and eristic.111 ‘Each dialogue type constitutes a separate normative model of argumentation’112 
and therefore serves a particular normative goal. The goal of persuasion is to resolve or clarify an 
issue, that of inquiry is to prove (or disprove) a hypothesis, and that of negotiation is to reach a 
reasonable settlement that both parties can live with. Information-seeking dialogue is undertaken 
for the sake of exchanging information. Deliberation dialogue is undertaken to decide on the best 
available course of action. Finally, eristic is undertaken to reveal the deeper basis of a conflict.113 
In this regard, a good and therefore constructive argument ‘contributes to a goal of the type of 
dialogue in which that argument was put forward’.114  
Moreover, when the party with the burden of argument puts forward an argument that 
serves its dialogical goal, the burden of argument shifts to the responding party. The responding 
party then either adjusts the practice or adopts a counter-argument. In the latter case, the counter-
argument should also serve its dialogic goal. And the dialogue goes on. Therefore, the dialogue 
will indeed be furthered if both parties’ arguments serve their dialogical goals. Moreover, it is 
precisely when both parties put forward arguments that serve their dialogical goals but that cannot 
be accepted by the other side that the obstacles to treaty implementation and compliance are 
revealed. 
Therefore, arguments that serve a given dialogical goal can ultimately assist in clarifying 
or identifying obstacles to implementation and can be viewed as assisting the implementation of 
treaties, and hence as being constructive, while arguments that do not serve the goals of their 
dialogical type are considered non-constructive. In information-seeking dialogue, for instance, the 
party with the burden of argument must provide the information in question; in an inquiry dialogue, 
it must establish the evidence to prove or disprove the hypotheses. In these cases, if an argument 
fails to serve the goals of its dialogue type, it stalls the dialogue and is therefore considered non-
constructive. This is why it is essential to develop not only legal but also dialogical criteria for 
justifying the arguments in constructive dialogue. In other words, by applying dialogical criteria 
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to determine whether an argument in constructive dialogue falls into one of the dialogue types and 
serves its dialogic goal, we can diagnose impediments to the implementation of human rights law. 
This is also to say that the bottom line of serving one’s dialogical goals is to shift the burden 
of dialogue/argument. In an information inquiry dialogue, for instance, the committee usually 
initiates the inquiry. The burden is on the state. If the state provides the required information, the 
burden shifts to the committee. The committee must either end the discussion or question the 
state’s source of information by citing other sources and argue why this source is indeed a better 
one. The burden then shifts back to the state. The state will either accept the information provided 
by the committee or offer a counter-argument on the quality of the sources. In this case, if one 
party does not accept the other party’s source of information and does not provide an argument 
concerning the quality of the sources, that party will be viewed as stalling the dialogue, and its 
arguments will therefore be viewed as non-constructive. On the other hand, if both parties remain 
in the same dialogical type and cannot accept each other’s arguments, the obstacles will then be 
revealed. In the case of an information inquiry, the dialogue usually stalls at the point where the 
state does not accept the committee’s source of information, and vice versa. This is probably due 
to a lack of procedure for weighing different sources of general information in the current human 
rights mechanism.115  
In sum, it is by serving their dialogical goals that arguments in constructive dialogue 
advance in a way that ultimately clarifies and identifies the obstacles to treaty compliance and 
implementation, therefore assisting in treaty implementation. Because of their quasi-legal status, 
the arguments in constructive dialogue are always open to defeat. In the absence of a binding 
judgement, applying the legal justification alone can only identify the justifiability of the argument 
relative to the given law, while leaving room for a loop of argumentation between the two parties. 
Therefore, by identifying the normative concerns of constructive dialogue and assessing the 
arguments against the criterion of ‘constructiveness’, this loop of argumentation can be redirected 
towards a more constructive result. This will ultimately help to improve the human rights 
monitoring system in general.  
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1.5 Conclusion: The Janus face of constructive dialogue 
This chapter argues that constructive dialogue has a quasi-legal nature. Accordingly, the arguments 
in constructive dialogue have a dual function: they are meant to justify legal reasoning and to be 
constructive (that is, to assist treaty implementation). These two functions are inter-dependent. On 
the one hand, to justify legal reasoning is to clarify the permissions and prohibitions under the 
treaty. This is the ground of treaty implementation. On the other hand, due to the lack of binding 
judgements, the arguments are only ‘justifiable’ in relation to the given law. Hence the normative 
goal of being constructive consists in moving the dialogue forward. This means that only 
arguments that are both legally justifiable and dialogically constructive are good arguments in the 
context of constructive dialogue.   
Dialogue theory has long involved two approaches, namely the descriptive approach and 
the normative approach. The descriptive approach answers the question of ‘how the phenomenon 
can be observed empirically and, when observed, why it takes place’.116 On the other hand, the 
normative approach aims to ‘establish standards of good argumentation in distinct, theoretically 
conceived types of context’117 and points to the higher goal that a dialogue tries to achieve. 
Nonetheless, as modern dialogue theories are inclined to agree, the two approaches are usually 
inseparable. This is also evidenced in this discussion. The analytic tools developed in this chapter 
not only describe the entire process but also capture its normative goal. 
From this perspective, in Part II of this research, I focus on China’s arguments as presented 
in the context of constructive dialogue with five human rights treaty supervisory committees. 
Arguments that are both legally justifiable and constructive further contribute to the debates (such 
as universality vs. particularity) regarding IHRL. Meanwhile, arguments voiced by China and the 
committees that are either non-justifiable or non-constructive will also be considered. With these 
arguments, the question is whether they have changed over time, and if so, in what direction. 
Tracing the changeability of non-justifiable or non-constructive arguments brings to light the 
relationship between China and the treaty bodies over time from the perspective of 
institutionalisation. 
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In his famous paper on institutionalisation in the context of international organisation, 
Keohane gives the term institutionalisation the following definition:  
 
institutionalization in an international organization will be regarded as the process by which the 
international organization becomes differentiated, durable, and autonomous. Differentiation refers to 
development of organizational distinctiveness from its environment … Durability can be defined as the 
tendency of an organization to persist over time. Autonomy implies that the organization’s norms and 
patterns of behavior significantly affect the outcomes of its political process.118 
 
He further elaborates the term ‘autonomy’ as follows:  
Autonomy for international organizations means the development of political organizations and 
procedures that are not simply expressions of the interests of particular states or other international 
actors. An autonomous international organization has some degree of independence in making its own 
decisions without dictation from outside actors; the outputs of the system do not merely reflect inputs 
from the environment but also bear the mark of the system's value … Thus autonomy is enhanced by 
the process whereby the organization becomes ‘valued for itself, not as a tool but as an institutional 
fulfillment of group integrity and aspiration’.119 
 
In this sense, a legally justifiable and dialogically constructive argument precisely 
represents the last dimension of institutionalisation in Keohane’s terminology, i.e. autonomy. To 
put forward a legally justifiable and dialogically constructive argument is to trace the value of the 
legal system and to maintain ‘group integrity and aspiration’ rather than merely ‘reflect[ing] inputs 
from the environment’. Therefore, evaluating constructive dialogue by investigating its legal 
justifiability and dialogical constructiveness provides us with a perspective from which to observe 
the institutionalisation process of international human rights treaties. More specifically, 
investigating constructive dialogue between human rights treaty bodies and China by questioning 
both the legal justifiability and dialogical constructiveness of the arguments, especially over a 
longer period of time (more than one reporting period), shall be able to reveal the direction of 
institutionalisation: the more legally justifiable and dialogically constructive the arguments 
become, the more institutionalised China will be.  
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Nonetheless, before we jump into the sea of arguments between China and human rights 
treaty bodies, two guiding ideas must first be established. These are the rules of interpretation 
regarding international (human rights) treaties (Chapter 2) and the vantage point for justifying 









Chapter 2 Treaty Interpretation and Legal Justifiability  
 
Introduction 
‘There is no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer approaches with more trepidation than 
the question of interpretation’.120 This quote from Sir Arnold McNair clearly shows the difficulty 
and anxiety associated with the topic of treaty interpretation. From a collective point of view, it 
also explains the phenomenon of ‘extensive doctrinal dispute’ on this topic.121 With this noted, 
this chapter tries to explore the similarities and differences among the various schools of treaty 
interpretation – and, more importantly, the rationale behind these views – in order to find a 
practical approach to determining legal justifiability regarding the interpretation of legal arguments 
in constructive dialogue.  
Chapter 1 laid out the main reasons for viewing interpretation as an intrinsic and essential 
part of determining the legal justifiability of an argument. That is, interpretation is the ultimate 
problem to be solved in each external type of legal argumentation, which means that every legal 
justification rule eventually comes back to the question of determining the best interpretation.122 
In the discussion in this chapter, I approach the importance of interpretation for legal justifiability 
under international law from a different angle. The issue here is: can we determine whether legal 
justifiability is indeed shattered by the ‘indeterminacy’ of law, as some scholars from the Critical 
Legal School have claimed? This would be the case if there were no way to decide which 
interpretation(s) to turn to regarding a given law.123 The flip side is therefore that being able to 
determine the appropriate interpretation(s) of a given law is a necessary condition for determining 
the legal justifiability of an argument. 
In this chapter, I first reflect on the idea that determining the justifiability of a legal 
argument is not a feasible task due to what has been called the problem of the indeterminacy of 
law. Through the lens of the relationship between the justifiability of legal arguments, the problem 
                                                 
120 Arnold D. MacNair and Arnold Duncan MacNair, The Law of Treaties (The Clarendon Press 1961) 364. 
121 Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1984) 114. 
122 See Chapter 1. 
123 Here I do not want to deny that there can be more than one ‘right answer’ in a given context. However, this does 
not lead to the assertion of ‘indeterminacy’ and its corollaries, ‘relativism’ and nihilism. As Kratochwil convincingly 
points out, the flip side of ‘indeterminacy’ (as ‘determinacy’) is not ‘uniqueness’. In this sense, attacking the fact that 
there can be more than one right answer under a given law does not support the idea that the law is ‘indeterminate’. 
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of the indeterminacy of law, and the interpretation of law, I suggest that, contrary to the above 
concern, such justifiability is indeed feasible. It depends on interpretation according to the given 
law and the concrete situation (2.1). I then focus on the rules for interpreting international treaties, 
i.e. Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and outline 
three approaches to treaty interpretation embodied in the VCLT rules, namely the textual approach, 
the intentional approach, and the teleological approach (2.2). After investigating the VCLT 
interpretation rules, and inspired by Radbruch’s conception of law, I propose a perspective for 
approaching the rules of treaty interpretation, as well as a principle for applying them in practice. 
I will show that the criticism that the VCLT rules are too abstract and all-encompassing (and 
therefore not practically useful) is mistaken (2.3). I then discuss the applicability of the VCLT 
interpretation rules to IHRL (2.4). The main task of this chapter is therefore to explore a practical 
approach to applying the interpretation rules in the context of IHRL in order to further the ongoing 
discussion on determining the legal justifiability of an argument in the context of IHRL.   
 
2.1 Justifiability, indeterminacy, and the interpretation of law  
The problem of the indeterminacy of law is said to challenge the justifiability of legal arguments. 
This problem is regarded as the main weakness of the systemic conception of law and has been a 
focus of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) in particular. According to CLS, the contradictions between 
different rules or different orders of principles make ‘both the notion of one “correct” judicial 
decision, and the idea of definite rule guidance for decisions in general, rather fanciful’.124 These 
contradictions arise when choosing between specific rules and more general standards, between 
different (and often contradictory) doctrines, and between ‘rules [that] express the ideals of self-
reliance and individualism’ and ‘standards [that] favour substantive justice, and possibly 
altruism’.125  
The ‘indeterminacy’ at work in a legal argument can be found at different levels. At the 
deontic/constitutive level, ‘indeterminacy’ occurs when there is no rule to clarify preferences 
between different choices, in which case the system is seen as indifferent to them. At the normative 
                                                 




level, a clash of different norms is the main source of indeterminacy. At the semantic level, 
indeterminacy is almost inevitable due to the profound ambiguity of human language.126 
Recognition of the indeterminacy of law is hardly new. It is the attitudes and approaches 
that different scholars take towards the problem that prompt us to explore the potentials and 
boundaries of legal justifiability. For instance, ‘optimists’ like Dworkin suggest that it is necessary 
to hold on to the presupposition that there is one right decision even in ‘hard cases’,127 although 
this one right decision depends on the judge’s legal and political philosophy.128 In other words, in 
Dworkin’s theory, a judge’s political view plays an integrated and even determinant role when it 
comes to finding the best interpretation and thus making the right decision. Against this approach, 
CLS generally holds that it is impossible to decide on the justifiability of legal arguments since 
different arguments can be supported by different grounds, and there is no rule to guide us in 
choosing between them. Martti Koskenniemi, whose work has tackled legal argumentation in 
international public law, therefore takes a more ‘pessimistic’ view, asserting that as far as 
international public law is concerned, states can always ‘cherry-pick’ either ‘ascending’ arguments 
(those that draw justification from state practices and distance themselves from theories of natural 
justice) or ‘descending’ arguments (normative arguments that create distance between law and 
state behaviour) that suit their political agendas, whereas little guidance is provided by law for 
making choices or adjudicating controversies.129 Such indeterminacy inevitably leads to stalemate, 
rendering international law useless. In response to this view, Kratochwil argues that the problem 
of indeterminacy (especially the semantic one) can be reduced by bringing pragmatic 
considerations into play.130 Hence, although he refutes the hope for ‘one right answer’, he puts 
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emphasis on the context of interpretation, where some interpretations are indeed better than 
others.131  
It is further seen that people’s attitudes toward the indeterminacy of law correlate with their 
stances on the interpretation of law. That is to say, if one argues that ‘anything goes’ in 
international law when it comes to interpretation, as Koskenniemi seems to hold, one is bound to 
believe that indeterminacy is the essential character of international law. Some will even say that 
there is hardly any ‘law’ left in that sense. A person who holds not that ‘anything goes’ but that 
‘quite a bit goes’ 132  may think that although indeterminacy is not a dominant quality or 
overwhelming problem, the chances of reaching a justified decision are still slim. If, like 
Kratochwil, one thinks that there are better interpretations in a given context, one may hold that 
the indeterminacy can be relieved by bringing pragmatic considerations into play.133 Those who 
submit to the ‘one right answer’ thesis may even agree that there is no such thing as the 
‘indeterminacy of law’ after all. Therefore, one’s approach to the interpretation of law marks one’s 
position on the spectrum of the indeterminacy of law. The gist of the debate can therefore be 
summarised as follows: on the one hand, the justifiability of a legal argument is said to be 
challenged by the problem of the indeterminacy of law. On the other hand, the perception of this 
indeterminacy correlates with one’s approach to the interpretation of law. This relationship is 
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One aspect of Kratochwil’s view should be underscored here: 
 
Far from drawing us into the vortex of ‘relativism’, the recognition of plural possibilities on the one 
hand, and the need to justify particular choices on the other is the basis for ‘pluralism’ and orderly 
change, which are the central goods a legal system is supposed to preserve. That these goals often 
conflict is hardly news. However, this conflict in no way implies the nihilistic or existential conclusion 




This view is important for the ongoing discussion because it questions the very presumption that 
this debate has taken for granted: the notion that the indeterminacy of law is a problem, a fault, 
and a threat to a legal system. Questioning this presumption prompts us to reconsider the very 
essence of the relationship among the plural possibilities of interpretation, concerns about the 
indeterminacy of law, and the justifiability of legal argumentation, as depicted above. One possible 
alternative is the view that although the plural possibilities of interpretation may appear to be a 
problem of indeterminacy, they are in fact the conditions for reaching a justifiable legal decision 
or argument. This is because the indeterminacy of law only becomes a problem (in other words, a 
fault or threat) for a legal system when there is no rule for determining whether a specific 
interpretation is legitimate or justifiable, which is not the same as a rule for determining the (one 
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and only) best interpretation in a given situation. Put differently, as Kratochwil rightly points out, 
the flip side of ‘indeterminacy’ is not ‘uniqueness’ but determinacy.135 In this sense, the fact that 
there may be more than one right answer under a given law does not entail that the law is 
‘indeterminate’. 136  Moreover, there are other forms of logic that can be used in legal 
argumentation. As Scott Brewer indicates, these other forms include induction, inference to the 
best explanation, and analogy.137 Therefore, it is possible that, based on different tools of logic, 
there can be different arguments, all of which can be legitimate and logically valid. In this sense, 
the fact that there is no rule for deciding on the one and only best interpretation does not mean that 
the indeterminacy of law is a problem and that it makes the justifiability of legal arguments 
unfeasible. This does not mean, however, that ‘anything goes’ in legal argumentation, that all 
possible interpretations are justifiable (and therefore allowed), or that there is no way to weigh two 
interpretations in a concrete context. There are rules for determining which interpretations are 
justifiable, and choosing a particular interpretation depends on the specific context and the 
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The revised diagram means that although more than one interpretation can be justifiable (hence 
the indeterminacy), the justifiability of a legal argument ultimately depends on interpretation 
according to the given law and context. The indeterminacy of law does not get in the way of (or 
become a problem for) determining the justifiability of legal arguments.  
Moreover, while I agree that context plays an important role in constraining (if not 
determining) a justifiable choice between different possible/plausible interpretations, the selection 
of which features of the context are relevant and which are not is, at the end of the day, a legal one. 
In this sense, the political open-endless should eventually be tamed by legal instruments in the 
domain of international law. It is on this very point that my view departs from CLS.  
I am aware that entirely resorting to judicial prudence (or the virtue of jurists) may not be 
a satisfying answer, since it seems to give a theoretical question a practical solution. Nevertheless, 
I do hold that judicial prudence is an essential ingredient in determining what counts as appropriate 
interpretation and justifiable argumentation in a given context. As one scholar notes, means of 
interpretation are like a toolbox; jurists can choose which one fits best in a concrete situation in 
order to come to a justifiable outcome.138 What I wish to argue further in this chapter, however, is 
that this deliberation must only occur within the constraints set by the general rules and strongholds 
found in that legal system. These general rules and strongholds of legal interpretation filter out 
any unjustifiable arguments, while those that remain are put in the hands of lawyers and jurists, 
who determining which elements are ‘salient’ and ultimately bringing out the best interpretation 
in the context, all things considered. The latter part (resorting to judicial prudence) is arguably a 
prerequisite for any legal decision, while the former part establishes the threshold for any 
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discussion’s being ‘legitimate’ under the given legal order. In this sense, it is the former part 
(exploring the general rules or strongholds of legal interpretation) that is at issue in the following 
discussion.     
        In sum, indeterminacy is simply an aspect of law that can be (and has been) tackled by various 
legal systems throughout human history. When it comes to the justifiability of legal arguments, 
what is at issue are the rules and boundaries for establishing justifiable interpretations rather than 
finding the one and only best interpretation. In the next two sections, I will consider the rules of 
interpretation for international treaties and argue not only that there are indeed boundaries for 
delineating justifiable interpretations but also that they have practical value and can guide practice.    
 
2.2 Treaty interpretation: An art or a science?   
The dispute on treaty interpretation, as Sinclair puts it, can be perceived from the standpoint of 
viewing treaty interpretation as a spectrum.139 At one end of the spectrum, treaty interpretation is 
treated as an art, whereas at the other end it is considered a science.140 Those who hold that treaty 
interpretation involves mastery of an art deny that there is any rule or principle that governs it. In 
their opinion, the ‘application (of such rules and principles) is merely an ex post facto 
rationalisation of a conclusion reached on other grounds or serves as a cover for judicial 
creativeness’.141 Those who treat treaty interpretation as a science believe that there are general 
rules that guide the universal application of treaties (as far as their jurisdiction goes). Nonetheless, 
few scholars have followed either of these ends to their extreme: on the one hand, as a human 
linguistic practice, treaty interpretation can never be perfectly scientific;142 on the other hand, if 
we view treaty interpretation as an art that relies exclusively on the skills and virtues of the 
interpreter, we risk sacrificing one of the most fundamental characteristics of the rule of law, i.e. 
legal certainty. In this sense, referring to treaty interpretation as an ‘art’ or a ‘science’ should be 
understood more loosely, as a metaphorical way of formulating the question ‘To what extent can 
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treaty interpretation be guided by universal rules?’ The answer to this question constitutes a 
standpoint for approaching treaty interpretation. 
Although descriptions vary, it is largely agreed that there are three schools of treaty 
interpretation: the textual (or objective) school, the intentional (or subjective) school, and the 
teleological (or object and purpose) school. The textual school ‘centres on the actual text of the 
agreement and emphasises the analysis of the words used’. 143  On this approach, treaty 
interpretation is an objective process in the sense that its primary goal is to ascertain the meaning 
of the text.144 The intentional school ‘looks to the intention of the parties adopting the agreement 
as the solution to ambiguous provisions’.145 Hence, the primary goal of this school is to ascertain 
the intentions of the contracting parties.146 As for the third school, it holds that the object and 
purpose of the treaty should be ‘the most important backcloth against which the meaning of any 
particular treaty provision should be measured’.147 In other words, the teleological school calls on 
the interpreter to decide on the purpose and object of a treaty in the first place and to then ‘interpret 
it so as to give effect to that object and purpose’.148 Although each school draws on different 
sources for determining the interpretation, none of them entirely abandons rules and principles of 
interpretation or denies that there can be deviation when interpreting according to certain rules. It 
is therefore fair to say that each of the three schools locates interpretation somewhere between the 
‘art’ and the ‘science’ ends of the spectrum.  
Although all three schools have roots that extend long before the adoption of the 1969 
VCLT,149 the 1969 VCLT is still the first and only attempt thus far150 to give treaty interpretation 
a set of universal codified rules. Therefore, further discussion of the two articles on treaty 
interpretation in the VCLT (i.e. Articles 31 and 32, hereafter referred to as the VCLT rules) is 
necessary.151 The drafting of the VCLT involved the work of four Special Rapporteurs. Although 
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these Special Rapporteurs held different views on the interpretation of treaties, they demonstrated 
a common concern for codifying the rules for treaty interpretation.152 For instance, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock informed the ILC members at the 726th meeting that ‘[the subject] was a vast and 
difficult one and he was anxious not to penetrate too deeply into the realm of logic and what might 
be described as the art of interpretation’.153 Likewise, a member of the ILC at the time commented 
that ‘the interpretation of documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science’.154 These ‘art-
prone’ comments do not mean that the VCLT rules take the ‘art’ approach to interpretation. To the 
contrary, in the ILC’s commentary, the Commission also stated that ‘the text must be presumed to 
be an authentic expression of the intention of the parties; … in consequence, the starting point of 
interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the 
intention of the parties’.155 Although both the Commission and the Special Rapporteurs recognised 
that it was almost impossible to reach certainty from a set of interpretation rules, they also made 
clear that there should be a limited margin for ad hoc interpretation (or even judicial invention). 
In fact, this standpoint is well represented in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. The following, 
therefore, analyses these two Articles, in order to further elaborate the position of the VCLT’s 
interpretation rules.    
 
Article 31 establishes the general rules of interpretation and reads as follows: 
 
31.1 A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
31.2 The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes: 
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a. Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b. Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
31.3 There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
a. Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; 
b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
c. Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
31.4 A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.   
 
In the context of this research, several elements included in Article 31 require further elaboration: 
 
 ‘Good faith’ 
The principle of good faith flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda.156 It refers primarily 
to ‘the good faith of the parties to the treaty’.157 That is to say, this rule guarantees that ‘[w]here a 
third party is called upon to interpret the treaty, his obligation is to draw inspiration from the good 
faith which should animate the parties if they were themselves called upon to seek the meaning of 
the text which they have drawn up’.158 In this regard, the principle of good faith represents the idea 
that derives from the intentional school of interpretation.  
 
 ‘Ordinary meaning’   
To read a treaty text in accordance with its ‘ordinary meaning’, as outlined in Article 31, is not to 
read that text literally or to subject it to pure grammatical analysis.159 Rather, this term states that 
‘the true meaning of a text has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which 
normally and reasonable flow from the text’.160 In Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice’s view, this 
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principle also implies the ‘principle of contemporaneity’, according to which ‘the terms of a treaty 
must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or which would have been 
attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the time when the treaty was 
originally concluded’.161 Although the principle of contemporaneity has been challenged by the 
ECtHR in a recent decision,162 the principle of ordinary meaning is clearly an important part of the 
general rules of treaty interpretation and resonates with the textual school of interpretation. 
 
 ‘Object and purpose’ 
There has been some ambiguity and controversy with regard to the application of the phrase ‘object 
and purpose’ in treaty interpretation. According to the original wording of Article 31, the phrase 
‘object and purpose’ is used within the context of searching for the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a text. 
Moreover, given how the phrase is put (‘In the light of its object and purpose’), Sinclair even 
suggests that the reference to the object and purpose of a treaty is ‘a secondary or ancillary process 
in the application of the general rule on the interpretation’.163 However, although there is concern 
that the ‘emergent purpose’ in terms of which the object and purpose are deemed to develop over 
time may increase the risk of judicial legislation and compromise legal certainty,164 there is a 
tendency to resort to the notion of objects and purposes in treaty interpretation in human rights 
supervisory bodies.165  In some situations, emphasis on the object and purpose of treaties has even 
trumped the principle of contemporaneity.166 There are several possible reasons for the prevalent 
use of ‘object and purpose’ rules in human rights supervisory bodies. One is that, unlike other 
international treaties in which the object and purpose are either vaguely articulated or diluted by 
contracting parties’ different intentions, human rights treaties usually have clearer and more 
focused goals, namely to protect the human rights at issue. It is therefore easier to identify the 
relevant objects and purposes and to use them as a source for interpretation. Another, probably 
more important, reason is that, compared to other international treaties, human rights treaties have 
a normative agenda. Human rights supervisory bodies may therefore consider it important to 
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protect this normative core, whereas other international courts or tribunals do not have this concern 
(or do not take it to be paramount). Nonetheless, this element, with its increasing importance, 
clearly creates room for a teleological approach to treaty interpretation.     
 
 ‘Context’ 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 31 are about the context of interpretation and state that attention 
should be paid to any agreement, instrument, subsequent agreement, or subsequent practice that 
relates to the treaty between the parties. Article 31.3 (c) also mentions that any relevant rules of 
international law applicable to the relations between the parties should also be taken into 
consideration. 
On the one hand, referring to the context of treaty interpretation, including the principle of 
relevant international rules, indicates a systematic reading of international law (which shall be 
understood in contrast to fragmentation).167 On the other hand, it also represents the intentional 
approach to treaty interpretation in that the contracting parties’ agreements, instruments, and 
subsequent practices are commonly used to establish their intentions.   
Article 32 elaborates on supplementary means of interpretation and reads as follows: 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:  
Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
It is clear from the text that the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion are 
important in treaty interpretation. However, the fact that they are included in Article 32 as 
‘supplementary means’ also shows that their permissibility should be conducted in ‘carefully 
controlled circumstances’.168 Although some scholars suggest that Articles 31 and 32 should be 
taken as a set of rules, and thus that Article 31 should not be treated as more important than Article 
32, it is still important to bear in mind that according to Article 32, the meaning resulting from 
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reading into the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the conclusion should not lead to 
results that contradict the results of applying Article 31.169 
To sum up, the VCLT interpretation rules are informed by all three schools of 
interpretation. This ‘all-encompassing’ approach has been criticised for its attempt to compromise 
the three schools and for its vagueness on the relative priority of the different rules (and thus for 
its supposed uselessness in practice). In the first article of Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On, for instance, Jan Klabbers argues that, among 
other drawbacks,  
 
the rule(s) of Articles 31 and 32 are … a compromise between various approaches which itself goes 
back to a compromise concerning the various distinct activities that treaty interpretation signifies—and 
it will be obvious that not too much ought to be expected from Articles 31 and 32 as such. While it goes 
too far to suggest that ‘anything goes’ under these provisions, still, ‘quite a bit goes’ would be a fairly 
accurate synopsis.170  
 
He ultimately recommends the ‘virtuous’ approach to interpretation, which involves reviving a 
particular element of treaty interpretation: ‘reference to the virtues – the good faith – of the 
interpreter’,171 i.e. an emphasis on the ‘virtuous reading’, rather than ‘virtuoso technique’, when it 
comes to treaty interpretation.172  
Is this all-encompassing VCLT approach simply a compromise between different schools 
of interpretation, and therefore practically useless? Here, I disagree with the critics. My view is 
that the VCLT interpretation rules capture the intertwined relationship between the three 
approaches to interpretation, and thus that unpacking this relationship is key to applying the VCLT 
rules. This is to say not only that the raison d’être of the VCLT interpretation rules goes deeper 
than a mere compromise between the different schools but also that these rules are in fact 
practically applicable. To gain a better understanding of this idea, I take inspiration from Gustav 
Radbruch and his theory of the antinomies of the idea of law.   
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2.3 A practical approach to applying VCLT interpretation rules  
In his work on legal philosophy,173 Radbruch proposed that the essence of the rule of law was 
constituted by equality, expediency, and legal certainty (as shown in Diagram 2.3). In his view, 
equality belongs to distributive justice (the principle of treating like cases alike and different cases 
differently), expediency addresses the purpose of the law, and legal certainty requires that the law 




It is probably no coincidence that the three schools of interpretation represent each of the elements 
of Radbruch’s theory, respectively. The textual school embodies the equality element. This is 
because this school emphasises that the original treaty text should be taken as it is. The ordinary 
meaning of the text should be treated as the general backdrop against which any interpretation is 
made. This objective perspective is the basis for guaranteeing that equals are treated equally. The 
intentional school’s approach resonates with legal certainty. The intentional approach focuses on 
the authority of the interpretation by resorting to the intentions of the contracting parties (such as 
travaux préparatoires, subsequent state practice, and so on). In other words, this approach implies 
that by investigating the contracting parties’ intentions, certain interpretations are given authority 
and therefore should be considered correct. In this sense, this approach also constrains judicial 
legislation and invention. The teleological school, as the third pillar, represents the expediency 
aspect given that it focuses on the purpose and object of the treaty when it comes to its 
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interpretation. Therefore, there is a triangular relationship between the three schools of 
interpretation that corresponds to Radbruch’s original formula, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
Diagram 2.4 
       
In his work, Radbruch further explains the relationship between these three elements. On 
the one hand, these three elements contribute to each other. Equality requires expediency as the 
vantage point from which the substance of equality can be decided; expediency demands legal 
certainty since expediency is subject to disagreements between individuals and therefore cannot 
sustain a legal order. On the other hand, they also undermine each other. Expediency ‘is bound to 
individualize as far as possible’, and thus ‘every inequality remains essential’,175  while legal 
certainty demands positivity without regard to either equality or expediency.176 Hence, these three 
elements—namely equality, expediency, and legal certainty—are relative to each other, ‘yet at the 
same time they contradict one another’.177 This relationship also applies to the three schools of 
interpretation and is represented in the way that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are constructed: 
all three schools are embodied in the two articles, while the absence of any rule to determine 
priority means that the three schools are in constant tension in their application. This relation is 
evident in court decisions on human rights issues. In Golder v The United Kingdom, for instance, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decided whether Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), on the right to a fair trial, provided for a right of access to 
court, with the following reasoning: on the one hand, the Court ‘not only rejected the view, 
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defended by the United Kingdom, that lack of an explicit provision in the text constitutes a reason 
against granting an unenumerated right. It also stressed that the question whether to grant an 
unenumerated right is not a question whether we should stick to the actual text or read words into 
the text’.178 On the other hand, the Court also ‘felt confident that “the object and purpose” of the 
ECHR contains the ideal of the rule of law which leaves no ambiguity (which triggers resort to 
supplementary means under Article 32 VCLT)’.179 Hence it is seen from this case that the Court 
made its decision by taking all three elements into consideration while inclining toward the 
teleological reading over the other two approaches. This shows that rather than simply viewing the 
VCLT rules as a compromise, it is probably more accurate to view them as a fair representation of 
the relative but contradictory relationship among the three schools of interpretation. The difference 
between these two sorts of understanding is that the former views the VCLT rules as vague 
abstractions with limited practical meaning, whereas the latter views them as a way of representing 
the complex nature of treaty interpretation, in which case none of these elements should be 
neglected. Therefore, I consider that the ‘cocktail’ approach represented in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT is not a weakness but a faithful way of representing the relationship between the 
different elements of treaty interpretation.  
Following this logic, I shall propose a practical way of viewing treaty interpretation under 
the guidance of the VCLT rules: That is to view treaty interpretation as a manoeuvre among the 
three elements, namely equality (as suggested by the textual school), certainty (as proposed by the 
intentional school), and expedience (as represented by the teleological school). It is the 
interpreter’s job to master the balance among these three elements. That is to say, it is also in the 
interpreter’s power to manoeuvre among the three elements. It is probably fair to say that until 
human language and the (international) legal order achieve logical perfection, there will always be 
room to manoeuvre within and argue about treaty interpretation.  This does not mean that the 
power lies solely in the hands of the interpreter, however, or that all arguments are acceptable. The 
bottom line is that no interpretation should contradict any of the three elements and be supported 
by at least one particular approach. This is, as I suggest, a practical way to apply the VCLT 
interpretation rules while preserving the value of judicial prudence. In fact, this approach also 
resonates with the ultimate principle of interpretation: pacta sunt servanda. In this regard, I agree 
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to some extent with the virtuous approach suggested by Klabbers. In my view, however, this 
approach is already embodied in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Moreover, bearing in mind the 
virtue of judicial prudence (or applying the principle of pacta sunt servanda) when interpreting a 
treaty does not mean that interpretation is simply a matter of art, over which the interpreter 
exercises complete control. The interpreter’s power resides in his or her ability to manoeuvre 
among the three elements. Nevertheless, the interpretation must never contradict any one element 
or ignore these three elements altogether. Hence, just like any other legal practice, treaty 
interpretation is a craft; neither pure art nor pure science, it comes with bottom-line rules and 
practical skills.          
 
2.4 Is IHRL a special case?  
One question that must be considered before we close the present discussion concerns the extent 
to which the VCLT interpretation rules can be applied to IHRL. Casting this question in a more 
relatable form that has been discussed intensively by international legal scholars, especially those 
concerned with the fragmentation of international law, is IHRL a special case within international 
law?  
The main argument for the view that IHRL is a special case of international law and that 
the VCLT does not apply to IHRL can be summarised as follows: first and foremost, unlike the 
other international treaties, which often contain inter-state obligations, the obligations generated 
by IHRL are mostly non-reciprocal. 180  Based on this understanding, in his paper ‘Legal 
Differentiation and the Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law’, Matthew 
Craven argues that our understanding of IHRL should extend beyond our conventional 
understanding of ‘international legal relations’, which is contingent on states’ consent and 
reciprocity, whereas IHRL is something else in the sense that it ‘not only serve[s] to place certain 
limits upon the nature and scope of governmental authority but also contribute[s] to the 
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development of a justifiable basis for that authority’.181 Therefore, the VCLT rules apply ‘from 
time to time’. Resorting to jus cogens obligations is an even further step.182 In general, the view 
that IHRL is a special case of international law is largely based on the idea that because IHRL has 
special features that traditional international law does not, it falls out of the purview of the VCLT. 
Therefore, the rules and principles that are applicable to general international law as codified in 
the VCLT do not automatically apply to IHRL.  
Over the past decades, there has been much discussion on the possible lex specialis status 
of IHRL. In Human Rights Committee General Comment no. 24 (1994/52), for instance, the 
Committee made a controversial case for the special status of human rights treaties, claiming that 
the human rights regime should be treated differently than traditional international law and falls 
outside of the VCLT framework. This claim is reframed by Special Rapporteur on reservations to 
treaties Allan Pellet in his second report as follows: ‘do, or should, certain treaties escape 
application of the Vienna regime by virtue of their object? Should the answer be yes, to what 
specific regime or regimes are, or should, these treaties be subject with respect to reservations?’183 
As a response, Pellet rejects the special case claim. One of the main arguments given in this report 
specifically concerns the argument regarding the ‘non-reciprocal’ nature of human rights treaties: 
 
Indeed, while it is clear that human rights treaties display these characteristics in a particularly 
striking way, it must also be recognized that they are not unique in doing so. The same is true 
of most environmental protection or disarmament treaties and, in a broader sense, all 
“normative” treaties by which the parties enact uniform rules which they undertake to 
apply.184  
 
Therefore, Pellet argues, IHRL should not be considered a special case when it comes to applying 
the VCLT rules.  
In her empirical research on the rules of human rights interpretation as applied by UN treaty 
bodies (i.e. HR Committee, CAT, CERD), Brigit Peters investigates the rules found in the views 
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rendered upon individual communications within the treaty bodies and compares them with the 
VCLT interpretation rules. Her conclusion is along the lines of Pellet’s opinion: the treaty bodies 
generally follow the rules of the VCLT.185 The interpretations of human rights treaties may have 
shown more focus (than other international treaties) on the contemporary context and state 
consensus186 which, nevertheless, does not go beyond the bounds of the VCLT rules. Therefore, 
the study shows that an integrated approach to the VCLT and IHRL is the method preferred by 
international human rights treaty bodies. 
In sum, the claim that IHRL is a special case in international law and therefore lies beyond 
the purview of the VCLT rules has yet to be proven. If most IHRL obligations are still essentially 
based on states’ consent to be bound,187 and if international human rights treaty bodies do not 
openly question the applicability of the VCLT rules, it suffices to say that the VCLT in general, 
and the VCLT interpretation rules in particular, are still applicable to IHRL. 
 
2.5 Summary 
The present chapter is meant to serve not as a comprehensive study of the VCLT treaty 
interpretation rules but rather as a proposal for the reconciliation of the three schools of treaty 
interpretation and for its practical applicability.  
As universal rules of treaty interpretation, Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT serve as an 
overarching guideline for interpreting IHRL. While some may hold that Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT are too abstract and compromised, and therefore not useful in practice,188 in truth they 
represent the delicate balance among the three approaches to treaty interpretation (i.e. the textual, 
intentional, and teleological approaches). This also implies that there is room for states to argue 
for alternative interpretations when it comes to international law in general. Such room is rather 
limited, however, as it is confined by the relevant textual, intentional, and teleological readings of 
the conventions at stake. This is because, as I have proposed in this chapter, if an interpretation 
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argument is to be justifiable, it cannot contradict any of the three approaches to interpretation and 







Chapter 3 The Issue of Particular Reasoning 
 
Introduction 
The remainder (Part II) of this study does not cover all of the arguments found in the constructive 
dialogue between China and human rights treaty bodies; instead, it focuses on a specific type of 
argument, which I refer to as particular reasoning. The idea of the particular, almost always 
coupled with the idea of the universal, has a history that traces back to the beginning of Western 
philosophy, appearing in Aristotle’s discussion on kath’ hekasta (of a particular), as opposed to 
katholou (universal, as ‘of a whole’).189 In this sense, universals and particulars are opposite 
categorical propositions,190 where the former can serve as a predicate while the latter cannot. 
‘Particular reasoning’, as used in the legal context, is derived from this understanding. 
In the legal context, universals are usually presented as rules or principles. Formally, 
universals as rules or principles correspond to universal quantification (for all subjects x, statement 
P(x) holds). 191  In this sense, universality is intrinsically linked with one of the essential 
characteristics of the rule of law—equality, which occurs when equals are treated equally under a 
given rule or principle. Particular reasoning, on the other hand, involves taking particular facts or 
circumstances into consideration when applying universal rules and principles. One may argue 
that, in this sense, almost all legal reasoning (or at least all legal reasoning worth discussing) 
involves particular reasoning, for one of the main tasks of legal argumentation is to bring the 
particulars of the case out into the open. In this regard, for the purposes of the present study, a 
more articulated and tailored account of particular reasoning is provided as follows: particular 
reasoning argues that, because of particular facts or circumstances, presupposed universal rules or 
principles do not apply automatically or should be open to alteration. On this account, the particular 
reasoning considered in this study can also be viewed as a defensive argumentation strategy, 
which, by appealing to particular circumstances, argues for exclusion or deviation from a certain 
rule or principle (i.e. the universal). 
                                                 
189 The current study will not enter into the rich philosophical discussion of this issue and will instead focus on its 
implications in the legal context. 
190 See Michele Abrusci et al., 'Universal vs. Particular Reasoning: A Study with Neuroimaging Techniques' (2013) 
21 Logic Journal of IGPL 1017.  
191 This form of logic is usually denoted as x P(x). 
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The choice to rely on this account of particular reasoning is based on two considerations. 
First, this is the definition most scholars adopt when dealing with particular reasoning in the legal 
context.192 By confirming this understanding of particular reasoning, this study fits well with the 
main discussion of particular reasoning and its justification in law. Second, in the context of IHRL, 
this account of particular reasoning is often used to argue for a so-called relativistic point of view 
regarding human rights rules and principles. In other words, a relativistic point of view regarding 
human rights rules and principles is almost always put in this form of particular reasoning. By  
focusing on this account of particular reasoning in the context of IHRL, this study will be able to 
reflect on one of the most debated issues in human rights studies—the universality vs. the relativity 
of human rights.  
The main aim of this chapter is to explore (in a preliminary way) the relationship between 
‘the universal’ and ‘the particular’ in the context of IHRL. To this end, I first sketch the contours 
of the universality vs. relativity debate on human rights (3.1). I then expound on the method of 
justifying particular reasoning in the legal context in general and in the context of IHRL in 
particular, which will have further implications for the rule for determining the justifiability of 
particular reasoning in the context of IHRL (3.2). Finally, I introduce the four topics that will be 
investigated more thoroughly in Part II of this study (3.3).  
 
3.1 A good old debate on human rights: Universal or particular? 
The question whether human rights are universal or relative (particular)193 has troubled human 
rights scholars for decades. Four main opinions have been put on the table thus far: the first two 
argue for either the universal or the relative character of human rights, the third tries to find a ‘mid-
way’ between these and aims for reconciliation, and the fourth recommends that we abandon the 
whole universality vs. relativity debate altogether. In this section, I briefly introduce each of these 
approaches and then propose my own approach to this debate. 
For the sake of consistency, I will first introduce (and dismiss) the approach that 
recommends the abandonment of the whole debate. This approach does address the question of 
                                                 
192 See Zenon Bankowski and James MacLean, The Universal and the Particular in Legal Reasoning (Edinburgh 
Centre for Law and Society series 2006).  
193 In this context, I take the relative position to be equal to the particular position. This is because saying that some 
propositions on human rights are relatively true has the same effect as saying that some particular facts or 
circumstances exclude some subjects from some propositions.   
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where the debate can possibly go wrong;194 however, abandoning the debate, burying the question, 
and attempting to direct attention to other ‘practical’ approaches is likely to render this question 
an elephant in the room, all the more obvious and salient. The reason for keeping the debate 
relevant is that, as ‘one of the most invoked concepts in contemporary political discussion’,195 the 
basic character of human rights—the question of whether they are universal or relative—underpins 
almost all other arguments concerning human rights. ‘Practical’ approaches must be undertaken 
from a certain vantage point, which inevitably returns to this very question. Therefore, although 
dismissing the whole debate may seem to (temporarily) relieve the pressure, the question of the 
universality vs. the relativity of human rights will eventually rear its head once again (presumably 
sooner than later) and must be dealt with at some point. The other three approaches do indeed deal 
with this question. 
In ‘The Relative Universality of Human Rights’, Jack Donnelly identifies different types of 
universality and relativity arguments in human rights discourse. I borrow his categories to describe 
the second and third approaches. Within the approach that argues for the universality of human 
rights,196 various kinds of universality are cited. First is historical or anthropological universality, 
which is associated with the idea that the concept of human rights can be traced back to ancient 
history (not only in Europe but also in Asia and Africa).197 Next is functional universality, which 
is connected to the idea that human rights are ‘attractive remedies for some of the most pressing 
systemic (modern)198 threats to human dignity’.199  Following this, there is international legal 
universality, which is endorsed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and IHRL 
in general.200 Finally, there is overlapping consensus universality, which is connected to Rawls’s 
theory of overlapping consensus and focuses on the practical preference for human rights in the 
                                                 
194 Randall Peerenboom, 'Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about "Values in Asia"' (2002) 
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law Research Paper Series, Research Paper No 02-23; M. Goodhart, 
‘Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 183.  
195  Amartya Sen, 'Elements of a Theory of Human Rights' (2004) 32 Philosophy and Public Affairs 315. 
196 Donnelly also distinguishes between conceptual and substantive universality. Although it was relevant in the 
original context, however, this differentiation overlaps with the other universality schools. To avoid confusion, I 
therefore do not mention these two types of universality in this section. Donnelly makes his thoughts on the various 
approaches clear in his paper: he approves of functional universality, international legal universality, and overlapping 
consensus universality while criticising historical/anthropological universality and ontological universality. For the 
purposes of the current discussion, I shall deliberately skip over these judgements.   
197 Jack Donnelly, 'The Relative Universality of Human Rights' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 284. 
198 Bracket added. 




current international context,201 and ontological universality, which is associated with the idea that 
human rights have ‘[a] single trans-historical foundation’.202 Although these are different views of 
universality, they do have something in common: by providing varying grounds for the 
universality of human rights, they posit a link between the universality of human rights and their 
legitimacy.203  
As for the approach that argues for the relativity of human rights, there are three main types 
of argument involved in the debate: the cultural relativism argument, the self-determination and 
sovereignty argument, and the post-colonial/critical argument. Cultural relativism is probably the 
most common argument for relativity.204 This idea demands ‘respect for cultural differences’ and 
claims that human rights norms are relative to different cultural traditions. Hence ‘practice is to be 
evaluated … by the standards of the culture in question’.205 The self-determination and sovereignty 
argument advocates non-interference and non-intervention in states’ practices when it comes to 
human rights issues by invoking protection of self-determination and international legal 
sovereignty into international law.206 The post-colonial/critical argument, addressing the context 
of globalisation, bases its tenets on ‘the civilizationally asymmetrical power relations embedded 
in the international discourse’207 and advocates a critical approach in order to prevent ‘imperial 
humanitarianism’.208 Apart from some forms of extreme cultural relativism (which is seldom the 
main focus of the debate), relativistic arguments generally do not aim to challenge the legitimacy 
of the idea of human rights in general, but rather pose the following question: given cultural, 
political, and structural particularities, in what sense (post-structural arguments) and to what extent 
(cultural relativism and sovereignty arguments) can the relativity of human rights be justified over 
and against abstract universal norms? 
                                                 
201 ibid 289–91. 
202 ibid 292. 
203 In the debate between Donnelly and Goodhart, Goodhart points out this connection, while Donnelly expresses his 
objection. See Jack Donnelly, 'Human Rights: Both Universal and Relative (A Reply to Michael Goodhart)' (2008) 
30 Human Rights Quarterly 194. However, I do think this connection is at work (implicitly or explicitly) in each of 
the universality arguments. 
204 Donnelly (n 197) 293. 
205 The cultural relativism idea presented here is a ‘substantive normative doctrine’, as Donnelly puts it in his paper. 
Another stream of cultural relativism—methodological cultural relativism—has been held by certain anthropologists 
as a way of guarding against the invasion of modern Western values. However, since this point of view has rarely 
been mentioned in human rights debates, I have decided not to include it in the current discussion (ibid 294). 
206 ibid 296–97. 
207 ibid 297. 
208 ibid 298. 
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This question is captured in a sense by the last approach—that is, the approach that advocates 
reconciling these two characterisations of human rights and finding an (all-encompassing) 
solution. Representative of this group is Donnelly’s relative universality approach. He argues that 
‘human rights are (relatively) universal at the level of the concept’, while for ‘particular rights 
concepts … relativity is not merely defensible but desirable’.209 This reconciling perspective has 
been used to argue for the possibility of the co-existence of human rights systems and the states or 
regions that usually invoke relativism arguments on this matter.210 This idea to some extent echoes 
the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ concepts in ethics.211 However, this ‘relatively universal’ 
approach implies that the more ‘particular’ a human right concern, the more ‘relative’ that right 
becomes—an idea which, however plausible at first glance, is logically implausible (as I will argue 
in the next section).212  
Nonetheless, the approach I shall propose goes along with the last group in the sense that I 
also presuppose the co-existence of the two characterisations of human rights (at least as far as 
legal argumentation is concerned). Unlike Donnelly’s view, however, on my view, the debate over 
the universality or the relativity of human rights, as far as legal argumentation is concerned, must 
be justified from the side of universality. This means that justified (or justifiable) particular legal 
reasoning is universalised (or universalisable) particular reasoning. I will further elaborate on this 
point in the next section. Here, it suffices to note that this approach differs from most of the 
approaches that fall under the last category in a number of respects. First, I situate this debate in 
the context of IHRL. Given not only the universal implications of the UDHR but also the fact that 
all UN member states have ratified at least one of the core international human rights 
instruments,213 this context does not change the overall focus of the debate but rather gives it a 
more defined scope and concreteness. Second, by situating the entire debate in the context of 
IHRL, I will not be responding to the ontological aspect of the question, i.e. the question of whether 
(or in what sense) human rights are universal or relative. Instead, I take an epistemic approach to 
this debate. Finally, reconciliation is neither the method nor the purpose of this approach. Given 
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210 See Declan O'Sullivan, 'Is the declaration of human rights universal?' (2000) 4 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 25. 
211 See, for instance, Alfred Jules Ayer and Ted Honderich, Language, Truth and Logic (Palgrave Macmillan 2004).  
212 This holds at least as far as human rights law is concerned. 
213 ‘There are nine core international human rights treaties … [A]ll UN Member States have ratified at least one core 




that there are both universal and relative elements in international human rights instruments and 
that the debate about the universality vs. the relativity of human rights has created much confusion 
when it comes to justifying these two kinds of approaches, the aim of this study is to establish the 
criteria by which the justifiability of these arguments can be determined in the context of IHRL.  
 
3.2 Justifying particular reasoning in the legal context: A vantage point  
To justify a particular reasoning, Neil MacCormick submitted that:  
There is[]no justification without univerzalisation; motivation needs no universalization; but 
explanation requires generalization. For particular facts—or particular motives—to be justifying 
reasons they have to be subsumable under a relevant principle of action universally stated.214  
In this section, I elaborate on this view of justifying particular reasoning and its practical 
implications.  
 
3.2.1 Justifiable particular reasoning is universalisable 
The justifiability of particular reasoning in the legal context depends on whether such particular 
reasoning can be justified in the form of universals. This insight has been argued eloquently by 
Neil MacCormick in his Rhetoric and the Rule of Law.215 MacCormick argues that in order for 
particular reasoning to be deemed justifiable, it must be able to apply to all cases that bear the same 
particulars. That is, justifiable particular reasoning must be universalisable.  
Moreover, MacCormick also points out that universals qua rules or principles in the legal 
context are defeasible universals, which means that as far as legal rules or principles are concerned, 
there is always room for raising particulars that require revision of the rules, principles or their 
application. Nonetheless, once such particulars are acknowledged as exceptions to the relevant 
rules or principles, they become universalised exceptions. To make this point, MacCormick uses 
the conjoined twins example, stating that no matter how ‘most unlikely to be repeated’ the case is 
(the case is described in the judgement as ‘very unique’), it is still considered a type case.216 That 
is to say, if in the future another case happens to satisfy all the relevant particulars stated in this 
                                                 
214 Neil Maccormick, ‘Particulars and Universals’, in Zenon Bankowski and James MacLean (eds) The Universal 
and the Particular in Legal Reasoning (Ashgate 2006), 19.  
215 The point concerning the distinction between particulars and universals is argued in Chapter 5 of Rhetoric and the 
Rule of Law. 




case, the same judgement should be passed. This understanding of universal and particular 
reasoning—taking universalisability as a criterion for the justifiability of particular reasoning—is 
well explained in MacCormick’s own words as follows: 
 
This is so, even if one wisely allows for the ever-present possibility of unforeseen events and 
circumstances requiring one to revise hitherto accepted near-certainties. If ‘particularism’ is understood 
as no more than a position that insists on this openness to evaluate new cases and circumstances when 
these arise, then it is acceptable. But this is openness to new particulars within a justifying schema of 
defeasible universals, and each new exception once acknowledged becomes itself a universalized 
exception.217   
 
Put differently, the borderline between particulars and universals must be drawn on the 
side of the universals. Only particulars that are universalisable are justifiable particulars. This is 
also the standpoint I will be taking when determining the justifiability of particular reasoning in 
the context of IHRL.  
  
3.2.2 Implications for the universalisable particular thesis 
Particular reasoning can be represented in the form of a legal syllogism as follows:  
 
Whenever OF then NC; 
OF (p); 
[Implicit or explicit rule: Whenever OF (p) then not NC]; 
Therefore, not NC. 
[OF denotes operative facts; NC denotes normative consequences; OF (p) denotes particular operative 
facts.] 
 
By putting particular reasoning into syllogistic form, we can identify at least three implications 
that are relevant to the current discussion.  
First, not all particulars are significant when it comes to particular reasoning—only those 
that are universalisable. This point is significant because it explains how particulars can entail 




‘universals’. If we examine the origins of these terms—which trace back to ancient Greece, to 
Aristotle—a potential problem is revealed. According to its definition, a universal is considered ‘a 
repeatable item, something common to many things. Hence a universal is located in the many 
places in which these things are located’. A particular, as the antithesis of a universal, is ‘a non-
repeatable item; it has a unique occurrence or location, in the case of spatio-temporal particulars, 
a unique location in space and time’. 218  These seemingly plausible and intuitive definitions 
challenge our ‘universalisable particular’ justification rule; since particulars are unique and non-
repeatable, they cannot be ‘universalisable’. However, particular reasoning does not (and should 
not) include all relevant particulars that make the given subject unique (and therefore ‘particular’); 
rather, it merely brings out the features that are salient in the given context. Those features explain 
why the given subject is particular enough and therefore permitted to deviate from the universal 
rule. In this sense, such particular reasoning can be universalisable.  
Second, there are two ways to construct a chain of justifiable particular reasoning, which 
can be put in the form of a syllogism as follows:  
 
(1) Whenever OF then NC; 
OF (p); 
[Implicit (or explicit) rule: Whenever OF (p) then not NC]; 
Therefore, not NC. 
 
(2)  Whenever OF then NC; 
 OF (p); 
 [Implicit or explicit rule: Whenever OF (p) then not NC]; 
Therefore, not NC. 
Whenever OF (p), then NC (p); 
Therefore, NC (p).     
[NC (p) denotes particular normative consequences.] 
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It is clear that although formulas (1) and (2) are both logically correct and legally 
justifiable, they entail significantly different burdens of argument. In formula (1), the reasoning is 
considered justifiable until the opponent makes a justifiable counter-argument. It is therefore a 
defensive move that does not further the dialogue. In formula (2), on the other hand, the arguer 
voluntarily takes up the burden of argument, which moves the dialogue forward by explicating the 
salient features that make the given subject a particular case that should be allowed to deviate from 
the relevant universal rules. Therefore, although both cases can be legally justifiable, only the 
second is considered constructive. 
Third, deciding whether such particular reasoning is justifiable involves deciding whether 
the implicit or explicit rule of universalisability is valid. In other words, deciding whether 
particular reasoning is justifiable involves deciding whether cases that have the same salient 
features are permitted to deviate from the universal rules in a given legal system.  
In sum, a particular is by definition ‘unique’ and ‘non-repeatable’. However, this does not 
affect the justification rule by which it can be shown that a piece of particular reasoning is 
universalisable. This is because particular reasoning need not (and should not) identify every 
feature that makes the subject a particular; rather, it must only articulate the ‘salient’ feature(s) that 
explain(s) why the particular should be excluded or should deviate from the universal rules or 
principles. The ‘universalisability’ therefore lies in the fact that the ‘salient’ feature as articulated 
in the particular reasoning should be universalisable in the sense that any subject that shares that 
feature should also be excluded or allowed to deviate from the given rule or principle. To decide 
whether such reasoning is justified is to decide whether the rule that indicates the universalisability 
of the salient feature is justified. Constructive particular reasoning must also take up the burden of 
argument and move the dialogue forward (as in formula 2).  
 
3.3 Particular reasoning in the constructive dialogue between China and the five human 
rights treaty bodies: An overview  
This section further sets out the framework for analysing the particular reasoning found in the 
constructive dialogue between China and human rights treaty bodies and introduces four topics 
that will be the focus of later chapters (Part II). I first revisit the taxonomy of external legal 
arguments (3.3.1). This discussion on the taxonomy of legal argumentation refers to Neil 
MacCormick’s Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). It provides guidance and a framework for 
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selecting, identifying, and organising the particular reasoning found in the constructive dialogue 
between China and the core international human rights treaty bodies (3.3.2).  
 
3.3.1 The taxonomy of external legal arguments revisited 
Imagine the following scenario. A delegation from Nambia219  is presenting at a constructive 
dialogue session of the CRC Committee. The committee members are concerned that Nambia has 
an imbalanced gender ratio in primary schools, with female attendees making up only 30 percent 
of the total students. The committee members argue that this situation violates Articles 2 and 28 
of the Convention on the principle of non-discrimination and children’s right to education. The 
state’s delegation does not agree with the committee’s judgements, however, arguing that Nambia 
has not violated its treaty obligations. What could their possible arguments be?  
 
A. The delegation may deny the data presented by the committee members and claim that a more 
accurate statistic shows that female students in fact make up more than 30 percent of total 
students. 
B. The delegation could point out that there are different types of primary schools in Nambia. The 
committee only takes certain types into consideration. When taking other types of primary 
schools into account, the gender ratio is more balanced. 
C. The delegation could argue that the gender ratio in the school cannot be used as an indicator 
of whether the country is protecting children’s right to education and non-discrimination. An 
equal right to education means that when the relevant conditions are equal, the chances of 
receiving education are equal. Hence the state holds a different (and therefore particular) 
interpretation of the right to education that deviates from the committee’s. 
D. The delegation could argue that the fact that only 30 percent of primary school attendees are 
female does not mean that girls do not have an equal right to education. This is a constitutional 
right held by every citizen, but putting this right into practice is a different issue. Therefore, 
Articles 2 and 28 are not relevant to this discussion. 
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E. The delegation could argue that, given that Nambia is a developing country, gender equality 
with regard to education takes time. Nambia has already taken certain measures to improve the 
situation, but it cannot guarantee that the gender gap will be closed in the short term.  
 
The above scenarios are concrete examples of different types of external argument that, according 
to MacCormick, exhaust the non-deductive ways in which a legal argument can be defeated. As 
we have seen, included in these four types are fact arguments, classification arguments, 
interpretation arguments, and relevance arguments. As for the last scenario, it mainly concerns the 
interpretation of Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, which concerns progressive implementation. It is 
singled out as a separate scenario due to its importance to economic, social, and cultural rights as 
well as relativistic argumentation. If this observation holds true, these five types of argument can 
be used as a comprehensive framework for analysing legal arguments, serving not only as a 
taxonomy for categorising and organising the empirical data but also as a lens through which to 
select arguments for further investigation.  
The hypothetical Nambia case is in fact also an example of particular reasoning used under 
each external legal argumentation type:  
 
1. Scenario A: to deny the validity of the data is to offer a particular fact as a ground for refuting 
the committee’s judgement.  
2. Scenario B: by pointing out certain particular circumstances, namely that there are different 
types of primary schools in Nambia, the delegation challenges the classification of ‘primary 
school’ as used by the committee.  
3. Scenario C: the delegation holds a particular interpretation of the right to education that 
deviates from the committee’s interpretation. 
4. Scenario D: by arguing that the implementation gap is beyond the purview of the committee, 
the delegation offers its particular reasoning to challenge the relevance of the rules of the 
Convention at issue.  
5. Scenario E: by claiming ‘developing country’ status, the delegation asks for a margin of 
discretion with regard to implementing social and cultural rights.  
In what follows, I will use the above taxonomy as a lens through which to select, categorise, 
and organise the particular reasoning at work between China and human rights treaty bodies in 
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constructive dialogue, which I will first outline in the next section of this chapter and further 
investigate in Part II of this study.220 
 
3.3.2 The four topics that will be investigated further in Part II 
Having established a basic understanding of particular reasoning in the legal context, including the 
vantage point of its justification and taxonomy, it is now time to introduce the particular reasoning 
that will be investigated in detail in the second part of this book. Four topics will be studied: core 
definitions, substantive reservations, sovereignty, and the implementation gap.   
The arguments on core definitions in the given Convention concern cases in which China 
and the committee members disagree on the interpretation of core definitions in the relevant human 
rights treaties and in which China invokes particular reasoning, arguing for exclusion or deviation 
from the committee members’ interpretation. Chapter 4 enquires into whether those arguments are 
justifiable. The focus is on integrating the core definitions into domestic law as codified in Article 
1 of CAT, CEDAW, CERD, and CRC.   
The arguments on substantive reservations concern cases in which China makes a 
substantive reservation upon entering into a human rights treaty and in which China justifies this 
reservation by invoking particular reasoning. These reservations have also been challenged by the 
committee members in several cases. In China’s response, the arguments invoking particular 
reasoning are either reiterated or elaborated. Although reservations to international treaties is a 
highly technical issue, Chapter 5 tries to approach it from an argumentation perspective in general. 
Special attention is paid to the interplay between the universal and the particular in this context.  
The sovereignty arguments are themselves particular reasons. By invoking sovereignty (or 
its variations), China has claimed that certain human rights rules either do not apply to it or should 
be adapted. This is one of the most debated examples of particular reasoning when it comes to 
human rights law. Chapter 6 will give this issue a closer look.  
Last but not least, particular reasoning has also been largely used in the context of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. This is mostly due to the generally asserted ‘progressive’ 
rather than ‘immediate’ characteristic of these rights, which is codified in the controversial Article 
2 (1) of the ICESCR. Among other ambiguously worded stipulations, this article indicates a 
                                                 
220 For the original wording of these arguments, see Annex.  
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method for ‘progressively’ working towards the full realisation of the rights recognised by the 
treaty. Particular reasoning, which is usually used to support the so-called ‘implementation gap’ 
(as seen in scenario E), has been common in constructive dialogue within the CESCR and other 
treaty bodies that concern economic, social, and cultural rights, especially among developing 
countries. Chapter 7 investigates the question of how wide the margin ought to be (and actually is) 
when it comes to establishing an implementation gap with regard to economic, social, and cultural 
rights and tries to put both China and the committees’ arguments into perspective.  
The reasons for focusing on these four topics are as follows. First, they represent the issues 
with regard to which most particular reasons and arguments are found (on both sides). As indicated 
at the beginning of this study, not all statements are arguments, and not all arguments invoke 
particular reasoning. In fact, a large proportion of the discourse in constructive dialogue has the 
aim of exchanging information and stating facts. These four issues, however, are ones that both 
China and the committees have systematically put forward in their arguments, with a focus on 
particulars. 
Secondly, from the perspective of international human rights treaties, these four issues 
cover the most important aspects of treaties, namely core definitions, reservations, jurisdiction 
(scope of the mandate), and implementation. In other words, although many other issues could 
have been discussed with regards to international human rights treaties, these four topics 
sufficiently depict the scope of the relevant treaties and the contours of the relationship between 
international treaties and their state parties. 
Thirdly, in terms of the analytical framework mentioned above, these four topics also 
correspond to the different types of external legal argumentation. Although it is possible for there 
to be more than one argumentation type within each topic, a dominant type can be identified in the 
first three topics: arguing about core definitions involves interpreting a given treaty; the question 
of whether a reservation made by a state is valid is a classification problem; and arguments about 
sovereignty concerning a treaty and its supervisory committee’s mandate involve determining their 
relevance. Furthermore, the arguments about implementation gaps are largely based on the 
interpretation of Article 2 of the ICESCR, the classification of the core obligations, and the 
relevance of the given treaty to the situation at hand. Therefore, it is a combination of the external 
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types of legal argumentation. In short, the four topics that are discussed in Part II of this study 
embody each external legal argumentation type and their combinations.221  
Finally, the choice of focus is also due to practical considerations. Had I adopted a 
taxonomy that only focused on arguments that are themselves particular reasons (for instance 
cultural relativism arguments, sovereignty arguments, or post-colonial arguments), I would have 
found that those particular reasons are used to support arguments that fall under different topics. 
For instance, cultural relativism has been used by China in the context of topics related to treaty 
interpretation, reservations, and implementation gaps. Determining the justifiability of the cultural 
relativism argument would thus involve taking into account the full range of perspectives 
concerning interpretation, reservations, and economic, social and culture rights. Likewise for the 
sovereignty arguments. Taking this on would have been complex and redundant, to say the least. 
In sum, the four topics studied here a) are the issues that most often prompt particular 
reasoning in the constructive dialogue between China and the core international human rights 
treaty bodies, b) offer essential perspectives from which to depict the relationship between China 
and the treaties at issue in this study, c) are examples of each of the external legal reasoning types 
and their combinations, and d) are based on practical considerations such as avoiding redundancy.  
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter is the final chapter of Part I and completes my account of the theoretical approach 
and method that I will be adopting in my investigation of the justifiability of particular reasoning 
in constructive dialogue between China and five human rights treaty bodies. The importance of 
discussing the justifiability of particular reasoning becomes clear when we consider long-held 
debates on the universality vs. the relativity of human rights. Following Neil MacCormick’s 
arguments concerning universal and particular reasoning in the legal context, I have argued that, 
contrary to ‘relative universality’, the proper standpoint for justifying particular reasoning is 
‘universalised or universalisable particularity’. This means that the general rule for determining 
the justifiability of particular reasoning in the legal context lies in its universalisability. Although 
this is a fundamental understanding regarding the justification of particular reasoning, this insight 
                                                 
221 Factual arguments, as a specific empirical argumentation type, will not be discussed separately in this study, for 
that the justifiability of a factual argument does not depend in a significant way on interpretation of the treaty, but 
mainly about the fact finding and establishing methods, procedures, and capabilities of the given treaty. Therefore, it 
is beyond the purview of this research.   
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alone cannot get us to the point of deciding whether an instance of particular reasoning is indeed 
justifiable (although it can be used to decide whether an instance of particular reasoning is not 
universalisable, in which case such reasoning is not justifiable). Hence, the first three chapters 
must be read as a whole in order to get a grip on justifying particular reasoning in the context of 




Summary of Part I: Justifying Particular Reasoning in Constructive Dialogue  
 
This study attempts to establish a practical approach to determining the justifiability of particular 
reasoning in the context of constructive dialogue within international human rights treaty bodies 
and to apply it to the constructive dialogue between China and five human rights treaty bodies. 
The first part of this inquiry comprises the first three chapters.  
Chapter 1 asks what counts as a ‘good argument’ in the context of constructive dialogue. I 
suggest that legal argumentation in constructive dialogue is partly legal, partly dialogical. 
Accordingly, the legal arguments found in constructive dialogue should be justified against two 
criteria, namely legal justifiability and dialogical constructiveness. In practice, dialogical 
constructiveness depends on whether the arguer takes up the burden of argument and successfully 
shifts it to the other party (the opponent). As for legal justifiability, I argue that the external 
justification of a legal argument mainly comes down to interpretation. This holds in particular in 
the context of international (human rights) law. Given that general enforcement is relatively 
limited in international (human rights) law compared to domestic legal instruments, the key task 
of justifying a given legal argument ultimately comes down to evaluating the interpretation of the 
given law.  Whenever the justifiability of an interpretation is at issue, I will apply the practical 
approach proposed in Chapter 2. That is, a justifiable interpretation cannot be in conflict with the 
text as codified, the shared intentions of the drafters222 and the purposes and objects of the legal 
order. In addition, it should be supported by (at least) one of these. In Chapter 3, I focus on 
particular reasoning in legal arguments and discuss a vantage point for determining the 
justifiability of particular reasoning in this context. As I argue, justifiable particular reasoning is 
universalisable particular reasoning.  
When we take all three chapters together, we get the whole picture of the theoretical 
foundation of the second part of this study. In short, when determining the justifiability of 
particular reasoning in the constructive dialogue between China and the treaty bodies, we should 
ask the following: is the relevant particular reasoning universalisable? Are the interpretations 
justifiable? And is the argument constructive? Only when the argument satisfies all these criteria 
can it be considered justifiable.  
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Chapter 4 Particular Reasoning on Interpretation in the Constructive Dialogue 
between China and International Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the particular reasoning found in interpretation arguments made by 
China in front of core international human rights treaty bodies. By ‘interpretation arguments’, I 
mean arguments that solely concern the interpretation of the relevant convention in a direct and 
strict sense. In other words, the issues dealt with in this chapter are solely about the interpretation 
of a given convention. As shown in Chapter 2, inquiry into interpretation is one of the most 
important elements in determining an argument’s legal justifiability. Therefore, investigations into 
the justifiability of a legal argument will inevitably touch upon the issue of interpretation. This 
chapter will not discuss topics that have been argued for by reference to a certain interpretation, 
however; instead, it will focus on topics that are themselves interpretation disputes. For example, 
if in a CEDAW constructive dialogue session the committee members criticise the Chinese 
government for not having enough female officials, the interpretation of ‘discrimination against 
women’ as in Article 1 of the Convention can be invoked and interpreted in different ways in order 
to support either side’s arguments. In this scenario, however, different interpretations of 
‘discrimination against women’ merely serve as one aspect of the debate, whereas the question of 
whether there is a sufficient number of female officials also involves other forms of reasoning, 
such as reasoning about reasonableness. Hence, in this case, interpretation of ‘discrimination 
against women’ alone cannot determine the legal justifiability of the relevant arguments. By 
comparison, if the issue at hand is whether the definition of ‘discrimination against women’ in 
Chinese law is compatible with the term codified in the CEDAW, then the relevant arguments will 
be interpretation arguments in and of themselves, for their main concern is interpretation per se. 
In other words, when it comes to the arguments examined in this chapter, the interpretation of a 
given convention is not a means but the end of the discussion.   
Two issues are discussed in this chapter: Article 1 of the CAT (4.1) and the state’s 
obligation towards North Korean border-crossers (4.2). Under each topic, both China and the 
committees’ arguments are first reconstructed chronologically. I then analyse the legal 
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justifiability of these arguments by referring to the relevant provisions of the conventions. The 
criteria for justifiable interpretations as proposed in Chapter 2 will be used as a benchmark for 
determining the legal justifiability of the interpretation arguments in this chapter. Recall the 
criteria: a justifiable interpretation is an interpretation that does not contradict textual, intentional, 
or teleological readings of the given law and is supported by at least one of these.  
In addition, over the past decades, human rights treaty bodies have issued numerous 
General Comments (or General Recommendations, in the case of CEDAW), which in most cases 
aim to clarify specific state party obligations under the conventions. The General Comments are 
therefore pertinent to the committees’ stances on these matters. As arguably the most authoritative 
interpretation,223 there is good reason to use the General Comments as a source when interpreting 
the treaties. Some scholars have also suggested that the General Comments may either reflect or 
trigger subsequent agreements and practices of the parties, as in Article 31 3(b) of the VCLT.224 
However, there are also opinions that cast doubt on both the normative role and the quality of the 
General Comments. Regarding the General Comments adopted by Human Rights Committee, for 
instance, McGoldrick argues that some General Comments are better than others in terms of 
representing ‘valuable indications of the content of the respective rights and steps that States 
parties could or should undertake to ensure the implementation of those rights’.225 Other critics 
highlight the inconsistency and lack of general method of the General Comments, which, it is 
claimed, undermine their legitimacy.226 All things considered, then, it would seem as though a 
comprehensive search for an authoritative interpretation of the treaties must refer to the General 
Comments as a source while remaining careful not to give them the same importance as the textual, 
intentional, and teleological readings of the original treaties. Especially in cases where the General 
Comments are found to contradict the readings of a given convention or to add new obligations 
that are not specified in the original convention, they should be subject to further investigation into 
their own justifiability. 
                                                 
223 See Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Oxford University Press 1998) 91. 
224 Georg Nolte, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-judicial 
Proceedings’, in Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (Oxford University Press 2013) 381. 
225 Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press 1994) 94. 
226 See Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Treaty Body and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 905.  
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As for the constructiveness of the arguments, since responsibility for keeping the dialogue 
constructive is given to the side that bears the burden of argument, the main criterion for 
determining the constructiveness of the arguments is whether the side bearing the burden of 
argument has changed its former unjustifiable arguments and come up with a different one, thus 
shifting the burden of argument. This also means that not all arguments, but only those topics that 
have been argued consecutively in more than one session, can be assessed in terms of their 
constructiveness. 
 
4.1 On Article 1 of the CAT 
Article 1 of the CAT, which codifies the definition of torture, reads as follows: 
 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting 
in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental 
to lawful sanctions. 
2. This Article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which 
does or may contain provisions of wider application.227 
 
The interpretation of Article 1 has been discussed since China’s first national session in the 
CAT in 1990 and up until the latest session in 2015. Several concerns have been raised during 
these dialogues. First and foremost is the request by the committee to incorporate the definition of 
Article 1 into Chinese domestic law, which follows discussions on the scope of torture in Chinese 
domestic law compared to the scope as codified in Article 1. In addition, China invoked particular 
reasoning to defend its views on the ‘seriousness’ of torture. Furthermore, China raised concerns 
about whether involuntary disappearances should be examined under the CAT. These issues, 
although closely related, concern different aspects of Article 1 of the CAT. The arguments under 
each issue will therefore be investigated separately.   
                                                 




4.1.1 Incorporating the definition of torture into domestic law 
Since the text of the CAT does not directly require that states incorporate the definition of torture 
as codified in Article 1 into their domestic law, the focus of justifying arguments is placed on the 
intentional and teleological aspects of the Article. During one of the earliest national sessions in 
1990, committee member Mr. Chanet mentioned that ‘no specific definition of torture had been 
included in Chinese legislation so as to ensure that torture was an offence under criminal law’.228 
As a response, the Chinese delegation argued that the ‘[d]efinition of torture varied, so that what 
in the Chinese view was positive might be considered negative elsewhere’.229 This response, as 
one of the earliest arguments China had expressed to international human rights treaty bodies, 
simply claimed that China was ‘playing a different game’. This is therefore not only an argument 
of relevance but also a form of particular reasoning. In other words, by claiming that it constituted 
a particular case, China argued that it could hold a different definition of torture than the 
committee’s definition, and thus that Article 1 was not relevant. It should be self-evident that the 
argument does not refer to the textual or teleological interpretation of Article 1 since the Chinese 
delegation neither explained their understanding of Article 1 nor turned to the purpose and object 
of the Convention. As for the intentional approach, although the Chinese delegation expressed 
their different point of view regarding torture, they did not establish this intention during the 
drafting of the Convention, nor did they invoke the subsequent agreements or state practices to 
support their statement. Moreover, they did not argue that this intention was shared by other states. 
In addition, this particular reasoning is not universalisable, for if other state parties were entitled 
to their own views on torture, there would be no ground for the existence of the CAT in the first 
place. This argument therefore failed to respond by appealing to either a textual, an intentional, or 
a teleological reading of Article 1. It is thus not a justifiable argument.  
In the 1993 session, the committee reiterated its request that Article 1 be incorporated into 
domestic law by further arguing that because there was no definition of torture in Chinese domestic 
law, it was difficult to establish accurate statistics on the situation with regards to torture,230 
                                                 
228 Committee Against Torture, Fourth session, Summary Record of the 51st Meeting (CAT/C/SR.51), 4 May 1990), 
para 36. 
229 ibid para 50. 
230 Committee Against Torture, Tenth session, Summary Record of the Third Part (Public) of the 145th Meeting 
(CAT/C/SR.145/Add.2) (20 July 1993), para 17;  Committee Against Torture, Sixteenth session, Summary Record of 
the 251st Meeting (CAT/C/SR.251) (5 June 1996), para 8. 
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especially psychological torture.231 Moreover, the lack of a clear definition meant that acts of 
torture were not generally punished.232 As a response, the Chinese delegation listed several articles 
in the Chinese Penal Code233 and argued that ‘[t]orture as such was defined in China’s Penal Code 
as a criminal activity’.234 Therefore, China changed its previous argument and argued that the 
definition of torture was included in Chinese domestic law but diffused into different provisions.  
In the 1996 session, the Chinese delegation provided three further justifications for Chinese 
practice with regards to incorporating the definition of torture into the domestic law. The first was 
that ‘[a]lthough China’s domestic legislation did not incorporate the definition of torture appearing 
in Article 1 of the Convention, its domestic legislative provisions designated various forms of 
torture as criminal offences. Consequently, China was in a position to implement the Convention 
effectively and honour its obligations thereunder’. 235  The second justification was that ‘the 
National People’s Congress had to approve the accession of China to international legal 
instruments. Once approved, such an instrument was binding upon the Government, which was 
obliged to incorporate its provisions into domestic law, the international instrument always taking 
precedence in the event of any discrepancy. When, however, China entered reservations to an 
international instrument, the relevant provisions were not binding. That general principle held 
good for the Convention against Torture’.236 The third justification was that ‘[i]n addition, the 
Criminal Law, which contained a definition of torture that complied with Article 1 of the 
                                                 
231 Committee Against Torture, Tenth session, Summary Record of the Third Part (Public) of the 145th Meeting 
(CAT/C/SR.145/Add.2), para 17. 
232 ibid para 48. 
233 ‘Chapters IV and VIII of the Penal Code contained specific provisions guaranteeing the protection of individuals 
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Convention, prohibited and penalized torture. Since the Convention did not, however, set out 
punishments for particular acts of torture, the relevant organs were obliged to rely on domestic 
legislation for the determination of appropriate sentences. Hence the absence of the word “torture” 
from Chinese domestic law’.237 The overarching point, as the Chinese delegation pointed out, was 
that although Chinese domestic law did not use the word ‘torture’ as in Article 1 of the Convention, 
it was nevertheless a punishable crime according to its domestic law. Therefore, China had not 
violated its treaty obligation. 
China did change its argumentative strategy, from arguing for relevance by invoking 
particular reasoning in the 1990 session, to arguing that it had incorporated the definition of torture 
but in a diffused manner in 1993, to the 1996 argument that although it did not mention the term 
‘torture’ in particular or put it directly into its domestic law (because the definition of torture as in 
Article 1 was diffusely incorporated into different domestic Chinese laws and international 
instruments took precedence over domestic laws when there was a discrepancy), it had in fact 
complied with Article 1.  
As a response, the committee also adjusted its arguments, from requesting that Article 1 be 
incorporated to comparing the scope of torture outlined in Article 1 against that in the relevant 
Chinese domestic laws. In the committee’s opinion, ‘[China’s] various prohibitions applied only 
to the practice of torture to extort confessions, whereas the definition in Article 1 was much 
broader’.238 This shift of focus on the committee’s side was partly due to the aforementioned 
change in China’s arguments and partly due to the insufficient state practices undertaken to comply 
with the committee’s request that CAT Article 1 be incorporated into national laws. According to 
one commentary,239 only a small number of state parties have directly incorporated Article 1 into 
their criminal codes.240 This inadequacy with regard to state practices may be due to the fact that 
the CAT definition ‘was not precise enough for defining a criminal offence’.241 As the commentary 
further points out, because ‘[m]ost governments … simply ignored the need to bring their domestic 
criminal law in line with the definition of torture contained in Article 1’, ‘the Committee has 
increasingly criticized the failure of governments to implement the CAT definition of torture’, 
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especially since 1994.242 Nonetheless, the committee also noted that ‘a national definition of 
torture does not literally have to follow the wording of Article 1, but it must at least adequately 
cover the CAT definition’.243 In this sense, China’s argument that due to the abstract character of 
Article 1 the original definition must be adapted in line with definitions that are more suitable to 
domestic criminal charges is, as confirmed by the committee, compatible with the committee’s 
own understanding. Moreover, China argued that the scope of Article 1 was covered by China’s 
domestic law. This argument, if proven, is also in line with the views of the committee. However, 
this claim was challenged by the committee members. 
The committee members were concerned that the scope of torture in Chinese domestic law 
was much narrower than in Article 1 because the relevant offences only involve obtaining 
confessions from accused persons under torture,244 the provisions only apply to public servants in 
the strict sense of the term, 245  and the provisions do not take psychological torture into 
consideration.246 
In its response to the Concluding Observation (2008), China replied in detail about the 
scope of torture in Chinese domestic law. The response is worth citing in full: 
 
[U]nder the Chinese law, punishable acts of torture include both acts that cause physical pain, such beating 
or assaulting with instruments of torture, and acts causing mental pain, such as ill-treatment, humiliation 
and other means. For example, Article 43 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that ‘it shall be strictly 
forbidden to extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other 
unlawful means’. Of these, ‘threat’ is typically a way of causing mental suffering. The phrase ‘other 
unlawful means’ includes any means that can cause physical and mental pain. Article 238 of the Criminal 
Law stipulates that anyone who unlawfully detains another person or deprives another person of his/her 
personal freedom by other means commits a crime. If a person is found to have assaulted or insulted another 
person, a heavier sentence shall be imposed. Under Articles 247 and 248 of the Criminal Law, the crimes 
of extorting confessions by torture, violence and ill-treatment of detainees include those committed by use 
of violence and also by use of abuse, humiliation and other means or causing severe mental suffering. A 
public servant who has caused another person mental suffering by humiliating, slandering, illegally 
searching, illegally intruding into a citizen’s home, illegally depriving he or her of his or her freedom of 
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religious belief or infringing the customs of ethnic minorities, when performing official duties, he/she shall 
be punished according to law.
247 
 
As seen from China’s arguments above, the ‘punishable acts of torture’ found in China’s 
domestic law so far include extorting confessions by torture, corporal punishment or ill-treatment 
of prisoners, and unlawful detention. ‘[A]cts causing mental pain’ are also considered torture. 
Emphasis was indeed put on extorting confession by torture.  
From the travaux préparatoires of the CAT, one of the main discussions concerning Article 
1 is how to distinguish torture from cruel or inhumane treatment (which is defined in Article 16 of 
CAT). At the end of this discussion, it was concluded that ‘the requirement of a specific purpose 
seems to be the most decisive criterion which distinguishes torture from cruel or inhuman 
treatment’.248 ‘This interpretation is based on the case law of the European Commission of Human 
Rights and has been confirmed, e.g. by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Delalic et al.’249 Article 1 lists 
the purposes of torture as follows: extracting a confession, obtaining from the victim or a third 
person information, punishment, intimidation and coercion, and discrimination. As the 
commentary further points out, these listed purposes can be considered common denominators of 
the purposes of torture and should therefore be understood in the narrow sense.250 The other side 
of the coin is that protecting victims of torture and acknowledging their powerless is ‘the essential 
criterion which the drafters of the Convention had in mind when they introduced the legal 
distinction between torture and other forms of ill-treatment’.251  
In terms of the scope of torture as covered in Chinese domestic law, which includes the 
extortion of confession from torture, the punishment or ill-treatment of prisoners, and unlawful 
detention, torture occurs only once one has been detained. Compared to the above intentional and 
teleological reading of Article 1, the scope of torture should not be confined to cases of detention. 
Therefore, the scope of torture on China’s understanding (judging from its arguments) does fall 
short of the scope laid out in Article 1. Nonetheless, this is not because the scope of torture on 
                                                 
247 CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2, 19–20. 
248 Nowak (n 239) 74, italics added. 
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China’s understanding only covers ‘obtaining confession’, as the committee members suggested. 
That is, from China’s arguments, its understanding of the scope of torture is broader than the 
committee claimed, while still not ‘adequately cover[ing]’ the definition as in Article 1.   
As for the committee’s other concern that the provisions only apply to public servants, the 
delegation argued that ‘China’s Criminal Law is applicable to all criminal acts of torture, 
irrespective of the identity, intent or purpose of the perpetrators’.252 However, the examples that 
China used to elaborate its point indeed mostly concerned state officials, with the exception of the 
provision that if an ‘ordinary person commits an act of torture abetted by or with the consent or 
tacit consent of a government official or a person exercising authority in an official capacity, under 
the provisions of the Criminal Law relating to joint offences, the ordinary person shall be 
considered to be an accomplice and the applicable charges shall be brought against the government 
official’.253 
According to the wording of Article 1, it is said that ‘[torture is] inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity’. Hence, it is compatible with China’s arguments. Moreover, according to the 
travaux préparatoires, the drafters intended to strike a balance between the traditional view that 
‘States can only be held accountable for human rights violations committed by State actors’, as 
laid out in the 1975 Declaration and original Swedish draft of the Convention, and the opinion that 
the definition should also cover private individuals and ‘the non-State actors who exercise 
authority over others and whose authority is comparable to government authority’.254 According 
to the record, the ‘working group agreed on a US compromise proposal which extended state 
responsibility to the consent or acquiescence of a public official. Since the delegations could not 
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agree on a definition of the term “public official”, the Austrian proposal to add the phrase “or other 
person acting in an official capacity” was adopted’,255 which was inserted in order to meet the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s concern that ‘certain non-State actors whose authority is 
comparable to governmental authority should also be held accountable’. 256  Therefore, the 
provisions mentioned by China that concern state officials, in connection to those who ‘commit[] 
an act of torture abetted by or with the consent or tacit consent of a government official or a person 
exercising authority in an official capacity’ are in line with textual, intentional, and teleological 
readings of the Convention. Hence, they are justifiable.  
In sum, China’s early, particular reasoning–based argument concerning the relevance of 
the definition of torture is a non-justifiable argument. Nonetheless, China has developed its 
argument on incorporating CAT Article 1 into its domestic law over the past decades. The 
committee’s main concerns include the worry that the scope of torture under China’s domestic law 
is much narrower than in Article 1 and that the domestic provisions only concern public servants. 
With regard to the former, the scope of torture in China’s domestic law is indeed narrower than in 
Article 1. However, the committee’s arguments did not correctly identify the difference. The 
committee members even requested that China change its domestic law by introducing a single 
definition of torture in order to make the committee’s investigation less complicated.257 This 
request seems unreasonable, since no such requirement can be read from the textual, intentional, 
or teleological aspects of the Convention. China did not respond to these requests. As for the latter, 
it turns out that China’s arguments are indeed justifiable. However, the further development of 
China’s arguments on incorporating CAT Article 1 into domestic law has shifted away from 
particular reasoning. China did not claim at that point that it had a different view on incorporating 
the definition of torture into its domestic law, on the scope of torture, or on the role of public 
servants. When it comes to the two issues discussed below (i.e. distinctions with regard to the 
seriousness of torture and the classification of involuntary disappearance), however, China did 
insist on its own understanding of Article 1, which was said to deviate from the committee’s 
interpretation.  
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As for the constructiveness of the argument, China did change its argument with regard to 
incorporating the definition of torture into its domestic law, and the burden of argument shifted to 
the committee (since the committee did not correctly identify the scope of torture codified in 
China’s domestic law, it still bears the burden of argument); hence it is considered constructive. 
When it comes to the scope of torture, since China did elaborate its argument in the later session, 
the burden to point out the differences regarding the scope of torture in China’s domestic laws and 
in Article 1 fell on the committee. As mentioned above, the committee did not correctly point out 
such differences. Therefore, the burden of argument remains on the committee’s side, and the 
committee’s argument on this topic is not constructive. As a result, the discussion has not moved 
forward, as there has been no further response from China. For the committee’s concern about the 
provisions’ applying to civil servants, the fact that the committee has not made any further inquiries 
on this topic thus far may suggest that both sides have reached a consensus (even in the sense of 
agreeing to disagree).258   
 
4.1.2 Distinctions based on the ‘seriousness’ of torture  
 
China’s report distinguishes between cases of torture on the basis of whether they are minor, 
serious, or especially serious. In its comment, the committee argued that,  
 
[i]n connection with the use of torture, the State party’s report spoke of ‘serious or especially serious 
cases’ defined in the light of certain criteria, such as cases leading to serious injury or mental 
derangement. But torture was by definition a serious crime, and no degree of seriousness could be 
established in respect of it. The delegation ought to explain why only cases covered by the said criteria 
were considered serious or especially serious.
259 
 
As a response, China provided the following counter-argument:  
 
Concerning the distinction made by judicial bodies between acts of torture constituting minor, serious 
or particularly serious offences, all acts of torture were prohibited and punished under Chinese law. 
Given its cultural and legal specificity, however, China believed that minor offences were part of 
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administrative law and should consequently be subject to administrative punishment ... In Chinese law, 
that procedure was consistent with the principle of proportionality. As a matter of fact, the practice was 
that procuratorates carried out the preliminary investigation when complaints and information 
concerning acts of torture were referred to them. Only cases that were sufficiently substantiated would 
then be registered, investigated and prosecuted if criminal responsibility was assigned. In the case of 
relatively minor offences with less serious consequences, the procuratorate would make 
recommendations to the competent departments with a view to the imposition of disciplinary and 
administrative punishments.260 
 
The above arguments invoked a relative point of view by referring to the particularities of 
China’s cultural and legal tradition. However, this argument contradicts both the teleological and 
the intentional readings of the article. As the committee members commented, torture is a serious 
crime by definition and therefore cannot be further subdivided on the basis of ‘seriousness’. To 
prevent torture as understood in the Convention is to prevent all forms of torture. Hence, to say 
that there could be a torture case that counts as ‘a minor offence’ and be subject to administrative 
punishment contradicts the purpose and object of the Convention. Moreover, according to the 
travaux préparatoires, the ‘severity’ of torture is one of the essential elements for establishing 
whether torture has occurred.261 In this sense, the ‘seriousness’ distinction also contradicts the 
intentional reading of the Convention. Therefore, China’s argument on distinguishing between 
types of torture on the basis of seriousness is not justifiable. 
 
4.1.3 Involuntary disappearance   
The debate on involuntary disappearance (also called enforced disappearance) concerns the 
mandate of the CAT, which is mostly set out in Article 1. According to the argument given by the 
Chinese delegation, although China recognised that there was a connection between enforced 
disappearances and torture, it insisted that such cases ‘did not fall under the same international 
instruments or within the purview of the same bodies in the United Nations human rights 
system’. 262  In China’s view, the mechanism that should serve as a platform for discussing 
involuntary disappearance is not the CAT committee but the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED), for this Convention takes enforced 
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disappearance as its ‘specific mandate’. China further argued that ‘bodies in the United Nations 
human rights system … [are] comprised [of] various mechanisms, each with its own specific 
mandate to be respected’. This argument might be based on the fact that China was not a party to 
the CED. Thus, by arguing that the CAT’s jurisdiction was limited, China was arguing that the 
topic of involuntary disappearance did not apply to it at all. However, the CAT committee did not 
agree with China’s argument and instead argued the following: 
 
On the subject of forced or involuntary disappearances, the Committee thought that such facts certainly 
fell within the purview of the Convention; in particular, it could be argued that the families of the persons 
who had disappeared were victims of maltreatment within the meaning of the Convention … He was 
surprised that China should think the question of forced disappearances lay outside the purview of the 
Convention. Article 1 of the Convention referred to any act by which severe pain or suffering was 
inflicted, and it was difficult to see how forced disappearances escaped that definition. Disappearance 
occasioned by persons acting in the exercise of their official duties could cause intense suffering; the 
victim had the impression that he or she did not exist, and felt that those who had made him/her 
disappear could dispose of him/her as they wished. It was desirable that the delegation should say 
something on the subject, the more so as, according to some reports, the State party was itself involved 




The key to determining the justifiability of both sides’ arguments first lies in whether 
involuntary disappearance counts as torture, as codified in CAT Article 1. If the answer is positive, 
then by definition it should be discussed under the CAT. Second, there is also the question of 
whether the fact that involuntary disappearance is a specific mandate of another Convention means 
that it lies outside the purview of the Committee against Torture.  
As to the first question, it seems that most opinions within the UN human rights treaty 
machinery do consider involuntary disappearance to be torture. In Article 1 of the Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, it is clearly stated that enforced 
disappearance may amount to torture:  
 
Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected thereto outside the protection of the law 
and inflicts severe suffering on them and their families. It constitutes a violation of the rules of 
international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to 
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liberty and security of the person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.
264  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Sir Nigel Rodley, has also argued the following:  
 
Prolonged incommunicado detention in a secret place may amount to torture as described in article 1 of 
the Convention against Torture. The suffering endured by the disappeared persons, who are isolated 
from the outside world and denied any recourse to the protections of the law, and by their relatives 
doubtless increases as time goes by.265 
 
This view was again confirmed by the UN Working Group: 
 
The very fact of being detained as a disappeared person, isolated from one’s family for a long period is 
certainly a violation of the right to humane conditions of detention and has been presented to the Group 
as torture.266 
 
It is thus clear that involuntary disappearance, as the committee members argued, is considered a 
form of torture and should therefore be subject to the CAT. Moreover, this understanding also 
implies that the relationship between the CAT and the CED corresponds to the relationship 
between the lex generalis and the lex specialis. This insight sheds lights on the second question of 
whether involuntary disappearance still falls under the mandate of the Committee against Torture 
despite the fact that it is regulated by the CED. China’s argument was that because the CED had a 
specific mandate over involuntary disappearance, the issues of involuntary disappearance should 
therefore only be discussed within the CED. This is a misunderstanding of the relationship between 
the lex generalis and the lex specialis. The fact that more than one treaty can regulate the same 
case does not mean that the treaty that stands as the lex generalis automatically loses its 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in cases of disagreement between the two treaties, the principle lex 
specialis derogat legi generali generally holds. This is not the case at issue, however. Moreover, 
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the essence of China’s argument concerns the assumed self-contained nature of human rights treaty 
regimes. As explicitly pointed out in the Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission on Fragmentation of International Law,267 however, ‘[a] limited jurisdiction does not 
… imply a limitation of the scope of the law applicable in the interpretation and application of 
those treaties’.268  
In sum, the Committee against Torture should not have any technical difficulty in including 
involuntary disappearance in its treaty mandate. Therefore, China’s arguments are not justifiable.  
 
4.2 On the state’s obligation towards border-crossers from the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea) 
Before delving into the topic of DPRK border-crossers, it should be pointed out that the landscape 
of discussions about refugees has changed and expanded drastically due to the ‘refugee crisis’ in 
Europe since 2015. Despite the ever more complicated refugee situation, the arguments that are 
dealt with in this section occurred long before this recent development. Moreover, the issue of 
DPRK border-crossers – a longstanding problem – must be put in its own context. Therefore, in 
the present section I shall refrain from discussing the recent, overwhelming issues that have been 
sparked by these developments and will instead focus on the arguments and sources given by China 
and the committees with regard to DPRK border-crossers in particular.   
The issue concerning people fleeing from the DPRK and entering Chinese territory was 
mentioned in all five committees. All committees acknowledged the opinions of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and considered these people asylum seekers 
or refugees. In this sense, China’s treatment of these people (i.e. returning them to the DPRK) 
violated several human rights treaty obligations, including the principle of ‘non-refoulement’, 
female refugee’s rights, children refugee’s rights, and the non-discrimination principle. On China’s 
side, however, the Chinese delegation also kept its arguments consistent when addressing these 
committees, claiming that North Koreans were entering China for economic reasons and therefore 
did not meet the criteria for being refugees as set out in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (hereafter referred to as the 1951 Convention) and its Protocol. China argued that they 
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should therefore be treated as illegal immigrants and that their repatriation was in compliance with 
international practices.269 In this case, there are two main arguments from China’s side: first, that 
people from the DPRK do not count as refugees according to Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 
Convention, and second, that China has a right to decide on that status. In terms of the former, the 
Chinese delegation elaborated its viewpoint in the CAT 2008 session as follows: 
 
With regard to the status of North Korean migrants, the Chinese delegation recalled the definition 
contained in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, pursuant to which the term 
‘refugee’ applied to any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, was outside the 
country of his nationality and was unable or, owing to such fear, was unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country. The North Korean nationals mentioned by Ms. Gaer had unlawfully entered 
China for economic reasons and had not requested political asylum. They were not therefore refugees 
in the sense of the 1951 Convention.270   
 
On these grounds, recommendations based on treating DPRK ‘immigrants’ as ‘refugees’ or 
‘asylum-seekers’ were rejected by the Chinese delegation. This was reiterated in the 2006 CEDAW 
session,271 the 2001 CERD session,272 and the 2005 CRC session.273 This argument also leads to a 
second question: who decides on refugee status? According to UN human rights committees, it 
was the UNHCR’s mandate to decide who can be categorised as a refugee.274 According to China, 
however, it was claimed in the 2006 CEDAW session that, ‘[a]s a party to the Convention, China 
had the right to distinguish between refugees and non-refugees in accordance with the provisions 
of the Convention. The right to determine who was a refugee was ‘the prerogative of the State 
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party and not of UNHCR’.275 Therefore, China not only put forward a particular classification of 
DPRK border-crossers that deviated from the committees’ opinions but also claimed that the 
committees’ opinions are not relevant in this case.   
Based on the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, refugee protection must be provided to 
political asylum seekers. In the case of North Korea, the majority of border-crossers are driven by 
food shortages and extreme poverty in North Korea.276 In 2005, Refugee International found that 
only two out of every sixty-three migrants in China who had left North Korea had left for political 
reasons.277 From this perspective, China’s argument does hold some water when it comes to the 
assertion that most of those who leave North Korea and enter into China do so for economic 
reasons and that they therefore do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 Convention and its 
Protocol, according to which refugees must have a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. 
278 
One member of the Committee against Torture raised the question of whether North 
Koreans who had fled to China might nonetheless count as refugees sur place.279 That is, although 
border-crossers from North Korea may have left for non-political reasons, once they left North 
Korea it is plausible that they developed a well-founded fear of persecution upon return, in which 
case they may now be considered refugees sur place.280 Although there is no record of China’s 
counter-argument on this topic, according to the UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 2011, the description of refugees sur place is still 
largely in line with the criteria for being a refugee from the 1951 Convention: ‘[A] person becomes 
a refugee “sur place”’, according to the Handbook, ‘due to circumstances arising in his country of 
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origin during his absence’, such as when ‘diplomats and other officials serving abroad, prisoners 
of war, students, migrants workers and others have applied for refugee status during their residence 
abroad and have been recognized as refugees’,281 or ‘as a result of his own actions, such as 
associating with refuges already recognized, or expressing his political views in his country of 
residence’.282 Given that those who leave North Korea may face penalties if they return to their 
home country, a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ could be established in such a case. In this 
sense, there is room to argue that border-crossers from North Korea should be considered refugees 
sur place. China’s lack of response is therefore viewed as unconstructive, and the burden of 
argument remains on China’s side.  
A further contextual element should be mentioned in this case. This concerns the 
Constitution of the Republic of Korea and Article 3 of the Nationality Act of the Republic of Korea, 
according to which North Koreans are entitled to citizenship in the South.283 Moreover, the South 
Korean government has a longstanding policy of accepting and resettling refugees from the 
DPRK.284 Therefore, refusal to recognise North Korean border-crossers as refugees in principle 
will not result in a breach of the 1951 Convention according to its Article 1 A (2), paragraph 2, on 
dual or multiple nationality, given that the people concerned may be expected to avail themselves 
of the protection of another country where they can assert citizenship rights.  
As for the question of who determines who will be given the status of refugee, it is stated 
in the UNHCR 2011 Handbook that ‘the determination of refugee status … is left to each 
Contracting State to establish the procedure that it considers most appropriate’.285 Therefore, from 
China’s standpoint, there is room to argue not only that border-crossers from North Korea are not 
refugees but also that China has the right to determine that status. Nonetheless, ‘establishing the 
procedure’ cannot be read as entirely equal to ‘deciding’. With regards to the former, state parties 
must guarantee equality in the decision-making process. As some committee members have 
pointed out, the fact that China has recognised Indonesians as refugees while rejecting the claims 
of people from North Korea may trigger concern about the equality of the procedure.286  
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More importantly, no matter what their status, border-crossers from the DPRK are covered 
by the principle of non-refoulement, which is codified not only in Article 33 of the 1951 
Convention but also, and more relevantly to this context, in Article 3 of the CAT. In the latter, the 
relevant provision applies not only to refugees but to all who ‘would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture’. Moreover, ‘Article 3 CAT guarantees an absolute right which is not subject 
to any exclusion or limitation clause’.287 Therefore, under Article 3 of the CAT, those who have 
left North Korea have a right to non-refoulement, regardless of whether they are considered 
refugees under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol.  
This is to say that although China’s arguments on the non-refugee status of border-crossers 
from North Korea may have its ground in the 1951 Convention and its protocol, China’s arguments 
do not hold under Article 3 of the CAT. In fact, the committee members have also pointed out the 
lack of attention given to Article 3 of the CAT in China’s arguments,288 which, according to the 
record, did not receive a direct response from the Chinese delegation.289  
Therefore, all things considered, China’s arguments concerning its obligations to DPRK 
border-crossers are neither justifiable nor constructive.  
 
4.3 Summary 
This Chapter has investigated the justifiability of arguments provided by China to international 
human rights treaty bodies. As proposed in the first part of the dissertation, two dimensions of 
justifiability are considered: legal justifiability and constructiveness. This chapter discusses 
interpretation arguments and focuses on two main issues: the definition of torture as laid out in 
Article 1 of the CAT and the state’s obligations toward DPRK border-crossers. Among these 
topics, incorporating the definition of torture into domestic law and the state’s obligations toward 
DPRK border-crossers can be scrutinised both in terms of their legal justifiability and in terms of 
their constructiveness. 
With regard to incorporating the definition of torture into domestic law, China initially used 
an argument of relevance that did not refer to either textual, intentional, or teleological elements 
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of the interpretation of the Convention and was therefore unjustifiable. However, China has 
changed its initial argument and now holds that the definition of torture as laid out in Article 1 of 
the CAT has been diffusely incorporated into different provisions of Chinese domestic law. As 
discussed above, this argument does not contradict textual, intentional, or teleological readings, is 
further supported by the intentional approach to the interpretation of the CAT, and is therefore 
justifiable. Nonetheless, the scope of torture in China’s domestic law is indeed narrower than the 
definition in Article 1; therefore, the claim that China’s domestic law fully covers the scope of 
torture as laid out in the Convention is false. Although this difference was not correctly pointed 
out by the committee members, China’s argument is still considered legally unjustifiable. As for 
the discussions on distinguishing between cases of torture based on their ‘seriousness’ and on 
‘involuntary disappearance’, China’s arguments turned out to be unjustifiable here as well. With 
regard to the former, China argued that its legal and cultural traditions were grounds on which to 
determine the seriousness of torture. This argument does not hold up; not only is it not supported 
by either of the three approaches, but it contradicts both textual and intentional readings of the 
Convention. As for the latter, China argued that involuntary disappearance was out of the purview 
of the Convention and therefore should not be discussed in the CAT session. This argument is not 
justifiable given that it contradicts general rules of international law. As for China’s arguments on 
its obligations towards North Korean border-crossers, China treated this as a classification problem 
under the 1951 Convention and argued that these people did not qualify as refugees and were 
instead to be considered economic immigrants, and that therefore deportations did not violate 
China’s obligations. This argument on its own is justifiable under the 1951 Convention. However, 
the state obligation is much broader under Article 3 of the CAT, namely the principle of non-
refoulement, for which no record of China’s further comments can be found. It therefore seems 
that in the last case, China strategically confined its discussion to the 1951 Convention rather than 
the CAT to justify its practice. The argument cannot be justified as an acceptable interpretation of 
the CAT. 
Among the above topics, two re-occur in the different sessions and across different 
committees and are therefore subject to assessment in terms of their constructiveness. The first 
topic is that of incorporating the definition of torture into domestic law. The other is the state’s 
obligation towards DPRK border-crossers. With regard to incorporating the definition of torture 
into domestic law, China’s argument did change from one of relevance to one of interpretation. 
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Moreover, when it comes to arguments of interpretation, not only did China provide different 
arguments according to the committee’s former comments, but these arguments were legally 
justifiable. Therefore, on this topic, China’s arguments are constructive overall. However, China’s 
arguments on its obligations towards DPRK border-crossers have not changed over the past 
decades and have been consistent across different committees. Particularly in light of the fact that 
China did not respond to the comment that its obligations should be determined not only under the 
1951 Convention but also under Article 3 of the CAT on the principle of non-refoulement, its 




Chapter 5 China’s Particular Reasoning on Making Reservations to 
International Human Rights Treaties 
 
Introduction 
China has made two substantive reservations290 to core elements of IHRL: one to Article 8.1 (a) 
of the ICESCR, and the other to Article 6 of the CRC. Both reservations have been challenged by 
their respective committees, and China has likewise offered arguments for retaining its 
reservations. One of China’s main arguments for its reservation to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR 
was as follows:  
 
[W]hen China had ratified the Covenant, the provisions of its Constitution, the prevailing trade union 
and the labour laws and its historical and national circumstances had necessitated a reservation to 
article 8, paragraph 1. The All China Federation of Trade Unions was highly effective in conveying 
the recommendations of its members to Government and monitoring the authorities’ work, ensuring 
respect for the rights of trade union members.291  
 
As for its reservation to Article 6 of the CRC, China argued that it should fulfil its obligations 
under Article 6 of the CRC only to the extent that the Convention was consistent with the 
provisions of Article 25 of the Constitution (concerning family planning) and with the provisions 
of Article 2 of the Law of Minor Children.292 Both arguments were intended to establish China’s 
standing as a ‘particular case’. China appealed to its own Constitution and domestic laws, its 
historical path, and its economic and social situations to argue that because it constitutes a 
particular situation, it ought to be excluded or allowed to deviate from these provisions—hence 
the reservations.  
          The first part of this chapter expounds on the sources for determining the justifiability of 
arguments for making reservations to a treaty. It investigates the traditional rules for making 
reservations, the VCLT provisions on reservations to treaties, the particular concerns of human 
rights treaty regimes, and the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties. Taken together, these 
                                                 
290 The term ‘substantive reservations’ is used here in order to differentiate these reservations from ‘procedural 
reservations’. The former are reservations regarding substantial clauses of a given Convention, while the latter concern 
procedural clauses. This chapter focuses on the former.  
291 E/C.12/2014/SR.17, para 38. 
292 CRC/C/SR. 298, para 14, CRC/C/SR. 1062, para 27, CRC/C/SR. 1083, para 23. 
110 
 
sources cover the textual, intentional, and teleological aspects of making reservations to treaties 
and therefore establish a reasonable parameter for determining the justifiability of arguments for 
reservations. The second and third parts assess China’s arguments for the above two reservations. 
The concluding section reflects on China’s relations with human rights treaty regimes through the 
lens of argumentation for reservations.  
 
5.1 Regulating reservations to treaties: Developing a balance between the particular and the 
universal  
The process of regulating reservations to treaties has always been a struggle between maintaining 
the integrity of the treaty texts and protecting the particular interests of the contracting parties. 
Different international legal regimes have expressed their opinions on this topic. The most 
important of these include the International Court of Justice’s (hereafter the ICJ’s) advisory 
opinions on the Genocide Case (1951), the VCLT 1969, General Comment No. 24 (52) on the 
reservation to the ICCPR issued by the Human Rights Committee (hereafter the HR Committee), 
and one of the most current developments—the ILC’s opinion on reservations to treaties, i.e. the 
Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties. Not all of these views on reservations to treaties, 
made by different international legal regimes, have equal importance. However, they do represent 
the positions of the most relevant international legal regimes on making reservations to treaties. 
Therefore, the decisions about making reservations to treaties issued by these regimes can be taken 
as parameters for the justification of reservations. Moreover, the ongoing dialogue among these 
regimes on this topic demonstrates a developing understanding of this issue. In this regard, the 
recent ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties by special rapporteur Alain Pellet will 
be given more attention in what follows. This is not only because it is one of the most recent 
developments on making reservations to treaties, but also because in this voluminous report Pellet 
studies, discusses, and answers some of the most controversial issues regarding making 
reservations to treaties, which on the one hand largely enriches the debates on this topic and on the 
other hand narrows the scope of controversies by clarifying unclear issues, filling the gaps, and 
providing practical guidelines for dealing with reservations to treaties. Moreover, given that the 
report has been adopted by the ILC, in particular regarding the reservations clauses in the VCLT, 
this report is arguably the most important source for determining the justifiability of arguments in 




5.1.1 International practice in making reservations to treaties prior to the VCLT 
The traditional general rule governing reservations to treaties was the ‘unanimity rule’, which 
stipulated that a reservation can only be admitted when all other contracting parties accept it, 
expressly or tacitly, and usually before the signing of the treaty.293 Where unanimous acceptance 
is not obtained, the reserving party has the choice either to withdraw its reservation or to refrain 
from becoming a party to the treaty. 294  The unanimity rule was considered the established 
customary rule of international law before the First World War. It was also supported by the 
League of Nations.295 This restrictive approach reflects a contractual view of the nature of treaties 
and is meant to guarantee, as far as possible, the unity of the relevant treaty regime and the integrity 
of the treaty’s text.296 However, this emphasis on unity was largely challenged by the ICJ in its 
advisory opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case.   
The Genocide Convention (1948) contains no provision governing reservations. Therefore, 
in 1951, the UN General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ about certain 
reservations that had been made to the Convention. In its requests, three significant questions 
concerned the permissibility of reservations.297 As a response, the Court ruled by seven to five and 
issued the following opinion: 
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On Question I: 
That a State which has made and maintained a reservation which has been objected to by one or more 
of the parties to the Convention but not by others, can be regarded as being a party to the Convention if 
the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State cannot 
be regarded as being a party to the Convention. 
On Question II: 
(a) That if a party to the Convention objects to a reservation which it considers to be incompatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is not a party to the 
Convention; 
(b) That if, on the other hand, a party accepts the reservation as being compatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention, it can in fact consider that the reserving State is a party to the Convention. 
On Question III:  
(a) an objection to a reservation made by a signatory State which has not yet ratified the Convention can 
have the legal effect indicated in the reply to Question I only upon ratification. Until that moment it 
merely serves as a notice to the other State of the eventual attitude of the signatory State; 
(b) an objection to a reservation made by a State which is entitled to sign or accede but which has not yet 
done so is without legal effect.298 
 
An important aim of this advisory opinion was to have as many parties to the Convention 
as possible, which broadening permission for reservations would help to achieve.299 The core of 
this advisory opinion on reservation permissibility is the ‘compatibility test’. This approach, which 
deviated substantially from the traditional restrictive rule, was initially criticised for being 
fundamentally subjective and therefore uncertain in its application and unworkable in practice.300 
Nonetheless, around the same time, the UN General Assembly also invited the ILC to study the 
question of reservations to multilateral conventions as part of its work on codification of the Law 
of Treaties. This process, which began in 1951 and was concluded in 1966, coincided with the 
process of rapid decolonisation and an increase in the number of new states—which were also 
potential parties to multilateral conventions.301 Against this background, the ILC found that the 
traditional restrictive rules had become impractical (if not impossible) and was inclined toward the 
more flexible approach proposed by the ICJ. The compatibility test approach used in the ICJ 
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Genocide Case advisory opinion was ultimately favoured by the ILC, which stated that ‘the 
difficulty with the compatibility test lay not so much in the test itself, but in the process by which 
it is applied. Yet when a test is so very difficult to apply, the process is crucial’.302 It was therefore 
this flexible approach, rather than the traditional rule, that was incorporated into the final text of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention.   
 
5.1.2 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) on reservations to treaties 
Article 2.1 (d) of the VCLT defines a reservation as follows:  
 
[A] unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that State.
303  
 
Section 2 of the Convention provides further information, including the conditions under which 
reservations may be formulated (Article 19), accepting and objecting to reservations (Article 20), 
the legal effects of reservations and of objections to reservations (Article 21), the withdrawal of 
reservations and of objections to reservations (Article 22), and procedures regarding reservations 
(Article 23). In this section, instead of providing an all-encompassing review of the provisions on 
reservations under the VCLT, I focus on two issues, namely the criteria for the permissibility of a 
given reservation and the legal effects of reservations, which are covered by Articles 19, 20, and 
21 of the Convention. I have chosen this focus not only because these two issues are the most 
controversial and widely debated but also because they are closely related to international human 
rights treaties and to the assessment of China’s arguments under the ICESCR and the CRC. 
 
Article 19: Formulation of reservations. This article, which governs the permissibility of 
reservations to multilateral conventions, reads as follows:  
 
‘A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation 
unless: 
a. The reservation is prohibited by the treaty; 
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b. The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, 
may be made; 
c. In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty.304 
 
Article 19 authorises the formulation of reservations subject to three exceptions. A reservation is 
permitted if it is not explicitly (Article 19 [a]) or implicitly (Article 19 [b]) prohibited by the treaty, 
or not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 19 [c]). Hence Article 19 (c) 
confirms the compatibility test approach laid down by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention.305 The problem raised here is one of the most debated 
controversies regarding reservations: should the compatibility test be subject to the judgement of 
each contracting state, or should it be treated objectively, as in the criteria set out in Articles 19 (a) 
and (b)? The subjective character of the compatibility test laid down in the ICJ advisory opinion 
should not be overemphasised. According to the advisory opinion, the reserving state can remain 
a party to the Convention when one or more contracting states object to the reservation ‘if the 
reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention; otherwise, that State 
cannot be regarded as being a party to the Convention’. In this sense, it seems that ‘the 
compatibility test should be applied objectively, even if in most cases the test has to be applied by 
states rather than by a court’.306 However, this interpretation of the ICJ advisory opinion does not 
fully solve the above question. For instance, when a contracting state objects to a reservation on 
the grounds of the compatibility test while other contracting states hold different opinions, how is 
a decision on the permissibility of the reservation to be made? 
 
Article 20: Acceptance of and Objection to Reservations. Article 20 (1) indicates that if a treaty 
expressively allows a certain kind of reservation, this kind of reservation does not require the 
acceptance of other contracting states. Article 20 (2) affirms that the traditional unanimity rule is 
applied in cases where there are only a limited number of negotiating states and where the entirety 
of the treaty is an essential condition of each party’s consent to be bound. Article 20 (3) states that 
where a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organisation, the acceptance of the 
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competent organ of that organisation is required. Article 20 (4) concerns the cases that fall outside 
of Articles 20 (1), (2), and (3), unless the treaty provides its own reservation rules: 
 
(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty 
in relation to that other State if or when the treaty is in force for those States; (b) An objection by another 
contracting State to a reservation does not preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting 
and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State; (c) An act 
expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and containing a reservation is effective as soon as at 
least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation. 
 
Article 20 (5) specifies that acceptance can be either explicit or tacit, where the latter is assumed 
if no objection is raised within a specific period. Therefore, the combined effect of Articles 20 (4) 
(b), (c) and 20 (5) is that the reserving state will become a party to a treaty unless all other 
contracting states: ‘(1) object to the reservation and (2) explicitly object to the reserving State 
becoming a contracting State’.307 This threshold is set so high that it is almost impossible for a 
reserving state not to become a party to the treaty. In other words, under normal circumstances, a 
reserving state will become a party to the treaty regardless of whether there are objections from 
some other contracting states.  
 
Article 21: Legal Effects of Reservations and of Objections to Reservations. The controversy over 
the permissibility of reservation continues in Article 21, which regulates the legal effects of 
reservations and objections to reservations: 
    
1. A reservation established with regard to another party in accordance with article 19, 20, and 23:  
a. Modifies for the reserving State in its relations with that other party the provisions of the treaty to which 
the reservation relates to the extent of the reservation; 
b. Modifies those provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State. 
2. The reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other parties to the treaty inter se. 
3. When a State objecting to a reservation has not opposed the entry into force of the treaty between itself and 
the reserving State, the provisions to which the reservation relates do not apply as between the two States to 
the extent of the reservation. 
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Article 21 (1) outlines the legal effects of reservations that have been established with regard to 
another party. The term ‘established’ can be understood in the sense of being legally effective in 
relation to another party to the extent that the reservation is ‘not prohibited by Article 19, has not 
been objected to by another party in accordance Article 20 and meets the procedural requirements 
of Article 23’.308 Article 21 (3) regulates the legal effects of reservations with regard to objecting 
states, provided the relevant objecting state does not oppose the entry into force of the treaty 
between itself and the reserving state. However, the VCLT does not explicitly indicate the legal 
effect of an impermissible (in other words, prohibited) reservation, which raises the question of 
whether the reserving state is bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation. 309 
Moreover, it seems that, according to Article 21 (3), for non-reciprocal treaties (as for most human 
rights treaties), the legal effect of an objection would be de facto the same as acceptance, which 
means that objections to reservations to non-reciprocal treaties would be made in vain.  
These unsettled issues concerning the permissibility and legal effects of reservations 
become more salient when it comes to international human rights treaties. In 1994, the HR 
Committee adopted a General Comment (24/52) to express its opinion on reservations to the 
CCPR, in which it approached the above issues from a human rights perspective.  
 
5.1.3 Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) 
The HR Committee adopted General Comment No. 24 (52) on 2 November 1994 to address the 
issue of reservations to the CCPR, which touched upon some unsolved issues under the VCLT and 
emphasised the special characteristics of human rights treaties in general. Because the content of 
this General Comment was rather controversial, it stirred up the debate on reservations to treaties 
under the VCLT. Two questions, among others, were raised in the General Comment: (1) Do 
human rights treaty bodies or other such monitoring organs have the authority to determine the 
permissibility of reservations? And, perhaps more importantly, (2) should human rights regimes 
be treated differently, and therefore fall outside the scope of the VCLT framework? With regard 
to the first question, the General Comment indicates that the Committee ‘has the legal authority to 
make determinations as to whether specific reservations are compatible with the object and 
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purpose of the Covenant’.310 With regard to the second question, the Committee believed that the 
subjective approach taken in the VCLT (as in ‘its provisions on the role of State objections in 
relations to reservations’311) is ‘inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human 
rights treaties’.312 The basis for the above answers, elaborated by the Committee, is the non-
reciprocal nature of human rights treaties. It stated that because human rights treaties ‘are not a 
web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations’, but rather concern the ‘endowment of 
individuals with rights’, the objections from contracting states may be ambiguous, as are the 
attitudes of the non-objecting states.313 Moreover, the Committee determined the legal effect of 
impermissible reservations: ‘such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the 
Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation’.314  
However, it seems that the Human Rights Committee’s approach was not met with 
generally positive responses from state parties. For instance, France and the US insisted that ‘the 
Vienna regime is applicable also to impermissible reservations’.315 It nevertheless brought out the 
controversy of unsolved problems regarding reservations to treaties under the VCLT, especially 
regarding the permissibility of reservations to non-reciprocal multilateral treaties, the legal effects 
of impermissible reservations, and who has authority to determine this. As Shaw puts it: ‘the 
controversy with regard to this (General Comment 24/52) included the issue as to the powers of 
the committee and other such monitoring organs as distinct from courts which under their 
constituent treaties had the competence to interpret the same in a binding manner’.316 In a way, 
HR Committee General Comment 24 (52) prompted, rather than settled, more in-depth discussion 
on reservations to treaties in international law. In 1993, the ILC put reservations to treaties on its 
agenda. After 17 reports and 18 years, special rapporteur Alain Pellet handed out an over 600-page 
Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (hereafter ‘the Guide’ or ‘Guidelines’), which is by 
far the most comprehensive and up-to-date work on this issue. Responding to the human rights 
regime’s ‘special case’ perspective was one of the main tasks of the Guide. In his second report, 
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Pellet specifically discussed this issue,317 concluding that the Vienna regime is ‘well balanced, 
flexible, and adaptable’ enough for ‘all kinds of treaties’,318 including human rights treaties.319 
Eventually, in the formal Guide, guideline 3.1.5.6 is adopted to cover all ‘reservations to treaties 
containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations’, which does not designate human 
rights treaties as ‘special cases’, as General Comment 24 (52) had it. It is recognised that on the 
one hand the Guide accommodates the human rights–inspired critique of the Vienna regimes; on 
the other hand, it does not give special standing to human rights regimes per se.320 That is to say, 
against HR Committee General Comment 24 (52), the ILC report holds that reservations to human 
rights treaties shall still be discussed under the VCLT rules. In the next section, I investigate the 
Guide more closely, with a focus on its implications for human rights treaties.  
 
5.1.4 The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: Current developments in 
reservations to treaties 
The Guide not only interprets and elaborates reservations provisions under the VCLT but also 
builds upon the wealth of actual post-Vienna treaty practice and further develops the VCLT 
reservation rules by filling in the gaps and clarifying the ambiguities.321 Therefore, the Guide is 
important for comprehending the original VCLT reservation rules and the Convention’s current 
stance. 
Since the Guide is a non-binding instrument, it is necessary to first explain its legal effects. 
To what extent can we resort to the Guide when settling issues about reservations to treaties? It is 
made clear in the beginning of the Guide that it is ‘a soft law instrument mixing … hard rules with 
soft recommendations’.322 Some scholars suggest that we treat it as a ‘toolbox’ in which the 
stakeholders can find answers to practical questions raised by issues concerning reservations under 
the VCLT.323 However, the ‘soft’ character of the Guide does not on its own mean that its content 
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is ‘soft’. In fact, some parts of the Guidelines are taken as binding rules because ‘they have 
acquired (independently of the Conventions and, a fortiori, of the Guide) the status of customary 
rules’.324 That is, although the Guide is a non-binding instrument, a considerable part of its content 
does build upon binding and customary rules and should therefore be treated as binding. Hence we 
must distinguish between those guidelines that reflect the lex lata and those that have been 
formulated de lege ferenda.325     
Part 1 of the Guide addresses definitions. Although there are few controversies regarding 
the definition of a reservation, there are some unsettled issues. One of these concerns the 
distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations, on which the VCLT remains 
silent. Part 2 concerns the procedures for formulating reservations, interpretative declarations, the 
withdrawal and modification of reservations and interpretative declarations, as well as objecting 
to and accepting reservations. The more difficult but important issues are dealt with in Parts 3 and 
4. Part 3 is about the permissibility of reservations and interpretative declarations. Part 4 concerns 
the legal effects of reservations and interpretative declarations. Part 5 concerns the succession of 
states. 
For criteria for the permissibility of a reservation, especially on the ‘impenetrable notion’ 
of ‘object and purpose’ in Article 19 (c) of the VCLT, the Guide again confirms the compatibility 
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test approach and, more importantly, considers it an objective assessment as far as objectivity can 
be reached in international law.326 The Guide not only provides a general account of the phrase 
‘incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty’ (Guideline 3.1.5) but also suggests a 
general method for determining the object and purpose of a treaty (Guideline 3.1.5.1) and how to 
conduct the compatibility test in specific situations (Guidelines 3.1.5.2–3.1.5.7). Hence, Part 3 of 
the Guide not only develops practical guidance for conducting the compatibility test but also 
stipulates that Article 19 (c) shall be conducted objectively, not according to the individual state’s 
stance (Guideline 3.3.3). This is a significant clarification for assessing arguments for reservations. 
Regarding the concerns of human rights regimes, Part 3 also indicates that treaty monitoring bodies 
have the competence to assess the permissibility of reservations (Guideline 3.2.1). However, such 
competence ‘has no greater legal effect than that of the act which contains it’.327 
Let us turn to the legal effects of reservations. According to the Guidelines, Articles 20, 
21, and 22 are only applicable to reservations that are permissible under Articles 19 and 23, which 
raises the question: what is the legal effect of an impermissible reservation? According to 
Guideline 4.5.1, a reservation that does not meet the conditions of formal validity (Article 23) and 
permissibility (Article 19) is null and void and therefore devoid of any legal effect.328 As for the 
status of parties who make invalid reservations, it depends on the intention expressed by the 
reserving state in the sense that it has a choice either to be bound by the treaty without the benefit 
of reservation or not to be bound by the treaty;329 ‘In the absence of a clearly expressed position 
in this regard, there is a rebuttable presumption that the reserving State intends to remain a 
party’.330 Guideline 4.2.5 deals with the legal effects of established reservations331 in the context 
of human rights treaties. 332  Under this guideline, because ‘the treaty itself is not based on 
reciprocity of rights and obligations between the parties, a reservation can produce no such 
reciprocal effect’, 333  which would otherwise be given under VCLT Article 21, para. 1 (b). 
However, the Guide does not offer much of a breakthrough in this case. The problem here remains 
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that an objection to non-reciprocal provisions ‘produces in concrete terms the same effects as an 
acceptance’.334 In other words, the treaty relations that hold between reserving states and accepting 
states are the same as those that hold between reserving states and objecting states.335 However, 
the Guideline does emphasise that acceptance and objection have entirely different meanings: the 
former ‘is tantamount to agreement, or at least to the absence of opposition to a reservation’, while 
the latter ‘expresses disagreement and purports to protect the rights of its author much as a 
unilateral declaration (protest) does’.336 Moreover, Guideline 4.3.8 considers the notion of an 
objection with ‘super-maximum’ effect. This occurs when ‘the author of the objection affirms that 
the treaty enters into force in its relations with the author of the reservation without the latter being 
able to benefit from its reservations’. 337  It is important to note that objections with ‘super-
maximum’ effect relate only to reservations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of 
a treaty (and are therefore considered invalid), whereas accepting or objecting to a reservation 
relates only to valid reservations. The former is, nevertheless, an important notion, for it allows 
for an objection with ‘super-maximum’ effect to an impermissible reservation as a ‘unilateral 
declaration[] … through which the author expresses its disagreement with the reservation’.338 This 
is, in fact, a subjective reaction to the objective criteria of permissibility. 
In sum, the Guideline does move the discussion on reservations to treaties forward and has 
an important impact on human rights treaties in particular. This impact to some extent resolves the 
unsettled issues mentioned in the previous section. Although there are still (if not always) questions 
that remain unsettled and controversial, the Guideline does provide important insights into the 
delicate balance between objective criteria qua universals on the one hand and subjective 
participation and recognition from states qua particulars on the other. More importantly, at its 68th 
session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 68/111  (16 December 2013), in which the 
Assembly ‘welcomed the successful completion of the work of the Commission on the topic, took 
note of the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, including the guidelines, the text of 
which was annexed to the resolution, and encouraged its widest possible dissemination’.339 This 
shows not only that the Guideline is a more comprehensive and up-to-date effort to develop a 
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textual and teleological reading of reservations to treaties under the VCLT but also that it has been 
widely acknowledged and accepted in the international community, which makes it the most 
suitable source for deciding on the justifiability of China’s arguments for maintaining its 
reservations to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR and Article 6 of the CRC.   
 
5.2 China’s reservation to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR  
The arguments for making, maintaining, and objecting to reservations in constructive dialogue 
mainly concern the permissibility of the relevant reservations. Therefore, assessing the 
justifiability of these arguments involves examining the extent to which they make a justifiable 
case for the permissibility of the relevant reservations. This raises two interrelated questions: first, 
is the relevant reservation permissible? Second, are the arguments justifiable?  
 
5.2.1 China’s reservation to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR 
China’s reservation to ICESCR Article 8.1 (a) reads as follows: 
 
The application of Article 8.1 (a) of the Covenant to the People’s Republic of China shall be consistent with 
the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Trade Union Law of the People’s 
Republic of China and Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China.
340 
 
The Article itself reads as follows: 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure: 
 
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules 
of the organization concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests. No 
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public order or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.341 
 





As noted at the beginning of this chapter, in the latest session in 2014 the Chinese 
delegation argued that the reasons for maintaining its reservation are the provisions of its 
Constitution, the prevailing trade union and labour laws, and its unique historical and national 
circumstances. 342  In addition, according to the Chinese delegation’s argument from earlier 
sessions, 
 
China’s Trade Union Act provided for the establishment of a single All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
across the country. Trade unions in various industries and regions were the component parts of the Federation, 
although they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy concerning their activities. Although it was illegal to 
organize a trade union outside the context of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Government 
resolved attempts to do so through dialogue; no punishment had ever been meted out to trade union organizers 
… 
 
The Government was encouraging trade unions to play a more active role in ensuring safe working conditions 
in private companies and those owned by local authorities, where the unions were less active in safeguarding 
workers’ rights than in State-owned enterprises. Trade unions had participated in drafting legislation on safety 
at work and on the prevention of occupational illness, and had been instrumental in establishing safety 
inspection committees.343 
 
Given the definition of a reservation under the VCLT,344 China’s statement on Article 8.1 (a) does 
constitute a reservation in the sense that it is meant ‘to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’.345 China’s statement limits the 
effect of Article 8.1 (a) of the Covenant and confines it to what is allowed under China’s domestic 
laws, namely the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the Trade Union Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, and the Labour Law of the People’s Republic of China. In other 
words, it modifies the individual’s right to form and join a trade union as granted in Article 8.1 (a) 
of the Covenant. It should also be noted that since there is no provision or General Comment on 
reservations under the ICESCR, reservations to the Covenant should therefore be assessed against 
the relevant provisions of the VCLT. 
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5.2.2 The justifiability of China’s arguments for its reservation to Article 8.1 (a) of the 
ICESCR 
According to the VCLT, the most relevant provision in this case is Article 19 (c) on the 
permissibility of reservations that fall outside the scope of the cases mentioned in Articles 19 (a) 
and (b). As discussed at length above, however, the ‘purpose and object’ test as outlined in Article 
19 (c) is too ambiguous to be applied directly in practice. We must therefore resort to the Guide. 
Guideline 3.1.5.5 concerns making reservations on the grounds of domestic law and reads as 
follows:  
 
A reservation by which a State or an international organization purports to exclude or to modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty or of the treaty as a whole in order to preserve the integrity 
of specific rules of the internal law of that State or of specific rules of that organization in force at the 
time of the formulation of the reservation may be formulated only insofar as it does not affect an 
essential element of the treaty nor its general tenour.346 
 
This is to say that China can formulate a reservation that aims to preserve the integrity of specific 
rules of its domestic law insofar as that reservation does not affect essential elements and the 
general tenour of the ICESCR. In other words, in order to know whether China’s reservation is 
justifiable, the key is to assess whether the right included in Article 8.1 (a) of the Covenant, i.e. 
the right to form and join trade unions, is an essential element of the Covenant or relevant to its 
general tenour. To this end, Guideline 3.1.5.1 provides a general method for determining the object 
and purpose of a treaty.347 In its commentary, it also mentions the method adopted by the ICJ for 
the same purpose.348 Both methods emphasise that the title and preamble of a treaty, along with 
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the preparatory work, are essential for determining its purpose and object. In addition, when it 
comes to international human rights treaties the rights and obligations are usually in the substantive 
provisions and are interdependent. Guideline 3.1.5.1 should thus be read together with 3.1.5.6, 
which considers the case of reservations to treaties containing numerous interdependent rights and 
obligations: 
 
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty containing numerous 
interdependent rights and obligations, account shall be taken of that interdependence as well as the 
importance that the provision to which the reservation relates has within the general tenour of the treaty, 
and the extent of the impact that the reservation has on the treaty. 
 
In its commentary, Guideline 3.1.5.6 is broken down into three elements: (1) the interdependence 
of the rights and obligations; (2) the importance of the provision to which the reservation relates 
and its relation to the general tenour of the treaty; and (3) the extent of the impact of the reservation 
on the treaty.349 To elaborate, the first element emphasises  
 
the goal of achieving global realization of the object and purpose of a treaty and aims at preventing the 
dismantling of its obligations, that is, their disintegration into bundles of obligations, the individual, 
separate realization of which would not achieve the realization of the object of the treaty as a whole.350  
 
The second element recognises that ‘certain rights protected by these instruments are less essential 
than others—in particular, than the non-derogable ones’. One of the most important criteria for 
assessing the importance of a particular provision is whether it falls under the ‘general tenour’ of 
the treaty.351 The third element indicates that ‘even in the case of essential rights, reservations are 
possible if they do not preclude protection of the rights in question and do not have the effect of 
excessively modifying their legal regime’.352 Hence, according to the Guidelines, there is still 
room for states to make reservations to the provisions of international human rights treaties 
regarding substantial (even essential) rights and obligations: the reserving state must prove, 
                                                 
—From its overall tenour’ 
(Commentary to Guideline 3.1.5.1, A/66/10/Add.1, 362–3). 
349 Commentary to Guideline 3.1.5.6, A/66/10/Add.1, 389. 
350 Commentary to Guideline 3.1.5.6, para (7), 389. 
351 ibid para (8). 
352 ibid para (9). 
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however, that the rights that have been reserved do not prevent the achievement of the object of 
the treaty as a whole, especially with regard to non-derogable rights, and, in the case of reservations 
regarding essential rights, that the way in which the reserving state has made its reservation does 
not preclude the protection of rights and does not excessively modify the legal regime.  
At the time of writing this chapter, the CESCR has not adopted a General Comment on 
Article 8. Therefore, a task to situate Article 8.1 (a) in the context of the Covenant must be 
undertaken. This is because, since the way China has constituted its reservation regarding Article 
8.1 (a) precludes the protection of such a right, it can only be permissible if that right is not non-
derogable or as not affecting the general tenour of the ICESCR.  
Given the complex nature of the economic, social, and cultural rights provided for in the 
Covenant, the Committee has developed the concept of ‘minimum core obligations’ to help states 
to achieve the objects of the Covenant by fulfilling the minimum core standard. This concept has 
been variously equated with a presumptive legal entitlement, a non-derogable obligation, and an 
obligation of strict liability.353 The Maastricht Guidelines state that ‘a State party in which any 
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health 
care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, violating 
the Covenant’.354  In  General Comment No. 3, the CESCR states that under the concept of 
‘minimum core obligation’, ‘a State party in which any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or 
of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant’.355 In this regard, it seems that the right regulated in Article 8.1 (a) is not usually 
included in the minimum core obligations. This idea is further confirmed in the following 
commentary: 
 
a specific human right to form and join a trade union is perhaps not as fundamental to human dignity as 
certain ‘survival’ rights under the ICESCR, such as rights to food, water, housing, health care or social 
security; nor is it as formative of life chances or personal identity as rights to education or culture… 
                                                 
353 Katharine G. Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 
33 Yale International Law Journal 113, 115. 
354 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22–6, 1997, 
para 9. 
355 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para 1, of the Covenant), 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, para 10. 
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To describe trade union rights as innate to human dignity, or as a universal feature of the human 
condition, is … ahistorical … [The right to form and join a trade union—] unlike food, water, housing 
and so on—[is] not [itself] an integral or universal part of human existence or experience.356 
 
As indicated in its travaux préparatoires, the right to join and form trade unions as listed 
in Article 8 derives from the more general right to freedom of association, which can be found in 
Article 22 of the ICCPR.357 This point was also mentioned in one of the Committee members’ 
inquiries during the constructive dialogue with the Chinese delegation, in which he stated that ‘the 
committee would like to know whether the Government would consider withdrawing its 
declaration under article 8, paragraph 1 (a) of the Covenant in respect of freedom of association’.358 
As some explanations of the choice of minimum core obligations have suggested, the Committee 
is under pressures to ‘operate meaningfully with respect to the Covenant while not impacting other 
substantive treaty regimes’. That is, ‘core obligations allow the committee to claim its own 
jurisdictional turf’.359 Certain rights—such as the right to work, which is mainly regulated in the 
conventions of the International Labour Organisation (hereafter the ILO)—are therefore 
omitted.360 If this argument stands, it may also explain why the right to join and form trade unions, 
as derived from a more general right to freedom of association, which is codified in the ICCPR 
and also closely related to the ILO, is not usually mentioned when it comes to minimum core 
obligation under the ICESCR. 
In addition, according to Committee member Philippe Texier, the Committee had not 
discussed the issue of reservations to the Covenant because ‘the number of reservations relating to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was not large, and mainly 
concerned articles 6–8’.361 Article 6 is about the right to work, Article 7 concerns the right to enjoy 
just and favourable work conditions, and Article 8 is mainly about the right to join and form trade 
unions. It is therefore no coincidence that Articles 6–8 do not lie within the usual scope of the 
                                                 
356 Ben Saul et al. (eds), The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases, 
and Materials (Oxford University Press 2016) 490. 
357 Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Clarendon Paperbacks, OUP 1998) 261.  
358 E/C.12/2014/SR. 17. 
359 Young (n 353) 156–7. 
360 ibid. 
361 See Report of the Meeting of the Working Group on Reservations, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/5 (4 July 2006), para 8.  
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minimum core obligations as discussed above362 and that the Committee member considered the 
fact that most reservations of the ICESCR concern Articles 6–8 was not sufficient to call for further 
attention on reservation issue. Moreover, at the time of writing this chapter, among the Articles 
that concern substantive rights (Articles 6–15) under the ICESCR, only Articles 8 and 10 do not 
have their own General Comments that address the whole or part of the Article.363 This may also 
shed light on the Committee’s priorities.  
In a similar vein, some scholars also argue that, in the context of the ICESCR,  
 
impermissible reservations include general and broad reservations subjecting the Covenant to domestic 
law incompatible with the Covenant, or those extending to minimum core obligations which are non-
derogable, and thereby depriving the Covenant of its raison d'être.364 
 
In this sense, China’s reservation to Article 8.1 (a): a) is not a general or broad reservation 
and b) does not extend to minimum core obligations that are non-derogable. In sum, this 
reservation does not affect an essential element of the Covenant or its raison d’être. Hence, 
China’s reservation to Article 8.1 (a) is permissible. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily 
mean that China’s arguments for maintaining the reservation are justifiable.  
 
5.2.3 The justifiability of China’s arguments for its reservations to Article 8.1 (a) of the 
ICESCR 
 
China’s arguments for maintaining its reservations to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR can be 
represented as follows. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions is a product of Chinese history. 
Nevertheless, China will comply with its obligations in view of its particular situation.365 Although 
it is illegal to organise trade unions outside the context of the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions, which does infringe on the right to join and form trade unions as set out in Article 8.1 (a), 
                                                 
362 In General Comment No. 18 (2005), the Committee suggests that in relation to the right to work, ‘core obligations’ 
relate mainly to duties of nondiscrimination and equal protection of employment. See General Comment no. 18, 
E/C.12/GC/18, para 31.  
363 Some General Comments address only part of an Article. For instance, one of the most recent General Comments 
adopted by the CESCR, General Comment No. 22 concerning the right to sexual and reproductive health, is part of 
the matter under Article 12 regarding the right to health.  
364  Manisuli Ssenyonjo, ‘State Reservations to the ICESCR: A Critique of Selected Reservations’ (2008) 26 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 315, 357. 
365 Reservation on Article 8 (1) (a) of ICESCR, para 45. Translated from French.  
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illegal trade union organisers are not punished but dealt with through a process of dialogue.366 The 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions is meant to ensure safe working conditions, to participate 
in drafting legislation on safety at work, and to prevent occupational illness, all of which is meant 
to support the rights of workers.367 Finally, ‘[t]he reservation [does] not imply that the Covenant 
provisions were not respected. Nevertheless … [t]he possibility of withdrawing the reservation 
[will] … be given due consideration.’368  
In other words, China argued that although it had made a reservation to the right to join 
and form trade unions, there was good reason to believe that it provided this right to some extent 
on its own terms. This argument is in general justifiable insofar as it makes the case that the 
reservation could pass the objective and purpose test under the ICESCR. However, it should be 
noted that this particular reasoning, which resorts to China’s domestic law, culture, and history, 
only holds to the extent that the reservation neither conflicts with the object and purpose of the 
Covenant nor affects its essential elements or its general tenour. That is, the particular reasoning 
employed by China is only justifiable on the condition that the reservation is permissible; should 
the reservation itself be an impermissible one, the particular reasoning would not hold.  
As for the arguments from the Committee, first, one Committee member argued that 
China’s ‘declaration’ regarding Article 8.1 (a) was in fact a ‘reservation’.369  This point has also 
been established above. Second, the Committee expressed its regrets regarding China’s 
reservation. This latter point was stated without further elaboration. As one scholar notes, the 
strategy of refraining from elaborating on state parties’ reservations is in fact an attempt on the 
part of the Committee to avoid frustrating current state parties and to encourage future state parties 
to join the Covenant. 370  However, it seems that the Committee’s lack of argument on the 
justifiability of state parties’ reservations has blurred the line between permissible and 
impermissible reservations under the ICESCR, which is not constructive when it comes to 
conducting constructive dialogue and the Committee’s role in assessing reservations made by state 
parties.   
  
                                                 
366 E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005), para 27. 
367 E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005), para 33. 
368 E/C.12/2014/SR.17 (2014), para 38. 
369 E/C.12/2005/SR.6 (2005), para 24. 
370 Ssenyonjo (n 364) 329.  
130 
 
5.3 China’s reservation to Article 6 of the CRC 
Unlike the CESCR, the CRC does have its own provision for reservations (Article 51), which reads 
as follows:  
 
Article 51 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States the text of reservations made by 
States at the time of ratification or accession. 
2.  A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.  
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall then inform all States. Such notification shall take effect on the date on which it is received by the 
Secretary-General. 
 
This provision does not go beyond the scope of the VCLT, however, nor does it narrow its scope. 
Instead, it reaffirms the ‘compatibility test’ approach. Therefore, in this section, Article 51 of the 
CRC, together with the VCLT and the Guidelines, is used as the main source for assessing specific 
reservation practices.  
 
Regarding the Convention, China’s reservation reads as follows: 
  
[T]he People’s Republic of China shall fulfil its obligations provided by article 6 of the Convention 
under the prerequisite that the Convention accords with the provisions of article 25 concerning family 
planning of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and in conformity with the provisions of 
article 2 of the Law of Minor Children of the People’s Republic of China.
371 
 
Article 6 of the Convention reads as follows: 
 
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 2. States Parties shall ensure to 
the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child.372 
 
China has made a reservation to Article 6 of the CRC on the basis of the argument that the right to 
life should be consistent with China’s family policy, as laid out in the Constitution and the Law of 
Minor Children. In its General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of Initial Reports 





(1991), the CRC Committee identified the right to life, survival and development (Article 6), non-
discrimination (Article 2), the best interest of the child (Article 3), and respect for the views of the 
child (Article 12) as the four general principles of the Convention.373 In the General Guidelines for 
periodic reports adopted in 1996, the Committee reaffirmed these four general principles,374 which 
were again confirmed in the General Comment on the General Measures of Implementation of the 
CRC (2003).375 Article 6 of the CRC is thus an essential element of the Convention. Hence in this 
case, China has ‘a heavy onus to prove’376 that its reservation does not impair the raison d’être of 
the Convention.  
According to the summary records, in the 2005 session the Chinese delegation first argued 
that ‘owing to extremely high population growth and a number of economic and social constraints, 
China’s family planning policy was a necessity’,377 which explained the particular circumstances 
that made China’s reservation to Article 6 necessary. However, although it pointed out the 
particular situation that China was facing, this argument alone cannot justify a reservation to one 
of the essential articles of the Convention, as established in Guidelines 3.1.5.5 and 3.1.5.6. In 2013, 
the Chinese delegation argued that China’s reservation to Article 6 of the Convention ‘was not 
inconsistent with the respect for the right to life’, but ‘merely sought to clarify that China intended 
to fulfil its obligations under article 6, provided that they did not contravene the country’s family 
planning policy’.378 The delegation further pointed out that ‘the Law on the Protection of Minors 
defined the child as any person under the age of 18, which did not include foetuses’.379 Put 
differently, the delegation argued that China did respect the right to life of the child as listed in 
Article 6. Given China’s family planning policy, however, China only considered that right to 
apply after birth. In this sense, this argument tries to prove that China’s reservation to Article 6 
does not impair the raison d’être of the Convention, since China’s reservation does not impair the 
                                                 
373 UN Doc.CRC/C/5, para 13. See also Manfred Nowak, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the child: Article 6 The Right to Life, Survival and Development (Brill Nijhoff 2005) 14–15. 
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right to life of the child, provided that the category ‘child’ ranges from birth up to (but not 
including) the 18-year mark.  
This reservation brings out the controversy in Article 6 of the Convention concerning the 
definition of ‘child’. According to one CRC commentary, ‘since … the definition of the child in 
Article 1 of the CRC deliberately leaves open the starting point of childhood, it is left to the State 
parties to decide for themselves the conflicting rights and interests involved in issues such as 
abortion and family planning’.380 In addition, it states in particular that ‘Article 6 of CRC does not 
expressly determine the point at which the protection of the right to life begins. It is, however, 
clear from the travaux préparatoires of Article 6 of the CCPR that the life of the unborn child was 
not (or not from the moment of conception) to be protected’.381 In this regard, not only do China’s 
arguments seem to justify its reservation in the sense that the reservation does not impair the object 
or purpose of the Convention, but, more importantly, China’s reservation may not count as a 
reservation after all, for it does not exclude or modify the legal effect of Article 6.  
In fact, China did not refer to its claim a ‘reservation’ in the first place, but rather a 
‘declaration’. 382  Prior to the 1996 session, the Chinese delegation still referred to it as a 
‘declaration’, stating that ‘the declaration had been dictated by the economic and social situation 
in China and that steps would be taken in due course to adjust it’.383 However, although one 
Committee member pointed out that ‘article 6 of the Convention was open to a broad 
interpretation’,384 other Committee members who have commented on this matter have all referred 
to China’s declaration as a ‘reservation’.385 One Committee member in particular argued that 
‘China’s declaration on the implementation of article 6 of the Convention … was actually a 
reservation, in form as well as in substance’.386 
It is therefore important to clarify the distinction between a reservation and a declaration. 
The core element of a reservation, as defined in Article 2.1 (d) of the VCLT, is that it ‘purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that 
state’. 387  As for interpretative declarations, although they were discussed in the travaux 
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préparatoires of the VCLT, 388  the final text of the VCLT remains silent on the matter. 
Nevertheless, it was again brought up in the Guidelines, where ‘interpretative declaration’ is 
defined as ‘a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international 
organization, whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or 
scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions’.389 Hence, the difference between these two 
instruments lies in the ‘legal effect that its author purports to produce’.390  As also elaborated in 
the Commentary,  
 
the character of a unilateral statement as a reservation depends on whether its object is to exclude or 
modify the legal effect of the provisions of the treaty in their application to the author State or 
international organization; and the character of a unilateral statement as an interpretative declaration 
depends on whether its object is to specify or clarify the meaning or scope attributed by its author to a 
treaty or to certain of its provisions.391 
 
It is also important to point out that although there is no express definition of an interpretative 
declaration in the VCLT, the difference between reservations and interpretative declarations, as 
outlined in the Guidelines and the Commentary, is confirmed in judicial practices, such as in the 
Belilos Case and the Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.392 Therefore, it 
suffices to say that distinguishing between a reservation and an interpretative declaration involves 
deciding on the function of the statement, as the former modifies or excludes the legal effect of the 
reserved provision, while the latter specifies or clarifies the meaning or the scope of the reserved 
provision. Since Article 6 of the CRC does not necessarily include the right of the child from the 
point of conception, China’s statement regarding Article 6 is only meant to clarify the definition 
of ‘child’ and to specify that the scope of ‘child’ as codified in Article 6 should be in line with its 
family planning policy. In this sense, China’s statement is actually a clarification of the scope of 
the article. That is, it clarifies that this provision only applies to the child after birth in China. This 
is, by definition, an interpretative declaration rather than a reservation. However, China did not 
make any further arguments for its position on the declaration. Taking everything into 
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389 Guideline 1.2, A/66/10/Add.1. 
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consideration, China’s arguments for its ‘reservation’ to Article 6 of CRC are justifiable, while the 
comments from the Committee are not.   
 
5.4 Conclusion: Particular reasoning in the case of reservations 
When a state makes a reservation to a human rights treaty, it purports to exclude or modify the 
legal effect of some provision(s) of the treaty or the treaty as a whole to suit its particular interests 
or situation. It has been made clear in the VCLT and the Guidelines that this practice is allowed 
with certain limits, even within a human rights regime. Reservations, in this sense, represent a 
balance between the particular interests of the state and the universality and equality of the treaties. 
In other words, the reserving state can make a reservation in the subjective sense, meaning that it 
can make a reservation considering its subjective requests (i.e. its particular situation), and other 
contracting states can also have subjective reactions to this reservation (i.e. acceptance or 
rejection). Objective criteria have been (and continue to be) developed regarding the permissibility 
and legal effects of these particular statements. These criteria, in this sense, are meant to 
universalise the particulars. Because of these criteria, particulars are universalised and can 
therefore be subject to a judgement to decide whether they are justifiable. Therefore, the 
universalised particularity in the case of reservations has two levels of meaning: first, when a state 
makes a reservation to a treaty, that state shall nevertheless comply with the object and purpose of 
the treaty; second, the reservation is subjected to objective assessment. 
When a reservation to an international human rights treaty is assessed as invalid by the 
treaty body and a request for withdrawal is made, if the reserving state does not comply with the 
treaty body’s request or provide further argumentation on the permissibility of its reservation, the 
reserving state is not ‘playing the game by the rules’. However, as shown above, this is not what 
occurred when China made arguments for its reservations to the ICESCR and the CRC. Insofar as 
the CESCR has yet to provide a counter-argument, China’s reservation to Article 8.1 (a) of the 
ICESCR is permissible, and China’s arguments are justifiable, all things considered. China’s 
‘reservation’ to Article 6 of the CRC is a more complicated case: first, although China initially 
presented its claim as a ‘declaration’ concerning Article 6, it ultimately adopted the Committee’s 
assessment that it was a ‘reservation’. This process in a way shows China’s acceptance of the 
Committee’s competence to assess reservations. Secondly, although the Committee did not decide 
that China’s reservation to Article 6 was impermissible, it did request that China withdraw the 
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reservation. China, on the other hand, explained the scope of its reservation and showed its respect 
for Article 6 in general. In other words, China argued that its reservation was in line with the object 
and purpose of the Convention. Therefore, although Article 6 is one of the principal articles of the 
CRC and reservations to Article 6 do bear a heavy burden of proof, China justified the 
permissibility of its reservation by indicating that its reservation did not impair the raison d’être of 
the Convention. Thirdly, the situation was complicated by the fact that the Committee’s assessment 
was problematic. Nonetheless, the latter point is something of a technical matter residing in the 
application of the VCLT; although important, it does not significantly alter China’s relationship 
with human rights treaty bodies in terms of making reservations. China’s arguments for its 
reservations to Article 8.1 (a) of the CESCR and Article 6 of the CRC are both legally justifiable 
and dialogically constructive. 
Making a reservation involves making a particular case upon entering into a treaty. Making 
a particular case per se is not sufficient to justify a reservation’s permissibility, however. As the 
above analysis shows, the particular reasoning employed by China was not sufficient to justify the 
permissibility of its reservations. In other words, although China made reservations based on its 
particular situation, the permissibility of these reservations and the justifiability of its arguments 
depend not on how ‘particular’ its situation is but on the results of objective assessment, i.e. the 
compatibility test, as established in the VCLT and the Guidelines.  
Committees, on the other hand, have a responsibility to apply the compatibility test to the 
reservations made by state parties diligently. As discussed above, however, both the CESCR’s lack 
of arguments and the CRC Committee’s problematic definition make it difficult to assess China’s 
reservations and their supporting arguments, thus are considered as non-constructive. If, as some 
scholars have noted,393 the attitude taken by the Committees is attributed to the idea of motivating 
current state parties and encouraging future state parties to join the Convention, then it certainly 
fails short of expectation. On the one hand, the relevant committees have a responsibility to assess 
the permissibility and legal effects of reservations made by state parties; failing to carry out this 
task diligently means failing to treat current state parties universally and equally, as it blurs the 
line between permissible and impermissible reservations. On the other hand, if making a 
reservation that is incompatible with the purpose and object of a convention is what it takes to 
convince a state to join or stay in an international human rights treaty, then perhaps the treaty 
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regime is better off without that state. In short, when it comes to assessing state party’s reservation, 
there is certainly a reasonable expectation that calling for more and better engagement on the part 







Chapter 6 Particular Reasoning on Sovereignty in the Constructive Dialogue 
between China and International Human Rights Treaty Bodies  
 
Introduction 
As one of the most important concepts in the domains of international politics and international 
law, sovereignty is the subject of a complex and broad debate that easily exceeds the scope of this 
chapter.394 When it comes to a concept as rich and powerful as sovereignty, one can only hope to 
penetrate it from a certain angle. Sometimes, even choosing such an angle seems too ambitious a 
task given the context and length of the relevant discussion. Therefore, common ground must first 
be established so that the discussion can move forward and have the possibility of reaching a 
meaningful conclusion. 
The common ground of the present discussion, first and foremost, is that the Westphalian 
notion of sovereignty is a myth.395 This premise has at least the following three implications. First, 
the idea that the modern concept of sovereignty has a clear-cut ‘birthday’, supposedly when the 
Treaties of Westphalia were signed at the end of the Thirty Years War (1648),396 is historically 
inaccurate.397 Second, the theoretical origin of the principle of non-intervention is often utilised in 
an oversimplified manner. The origin of this external perspective on sovereignty is usually 
attributed to Vattel and his work Droit des Gens.398 However, as Vattel also offered a justification 
                                                 
394 Or, in Stéphane Beaulac’s words: ‘The word “sovereignty” is one of those powerful words which has its own 
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(2000) 2 Journal of the History of International Law 148; Osiander (n 395); Luke Glanville, ‘The Myth of 
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398  See Beaulac, ‘Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty’ (2003) 5 Journal of the History of 
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for intervening under certain circumstances,399 it suffices to say that even as a firm believer in and 
pioneer of promoting the principle of non-intervention, Vattel still left room for intervention as a 
‘last resort’ for humanitarian purposes.   
Third, having acknowledged that both the concept of Westphalian sovereignty and its corollary, 
the principle of non-intervention, are shrouded in a veil of historical and theoretical inaccuracy, it 
is worth pointing out here that the traditional notion of sovereignty involves circular logic. 
According to the classic definition, a sovereign power is supreme over its territory and therefore 
not subordinate to any other power.400 In this sense, sovereignty is in fact a linguistic sign that 
functions as a placeholder for the ‘supreme power at the apex of the pyramid of authority’.401 
However, if we assume that a sovereign power is the highest power in a legal order (in the 
normative sense),402 we would then seem to require another, higher norm that grants this power, 
which is impossible if the sovereign itself is to serve as the highest power. Hence the petitio 
principii. This observation implies that sovereignty—like money and marriage—is an institution 
that is what human society makes of it. This is not to say that sovereignty can be interpreted by 
any subject as he or she wishes, but that the notion of sovereignty is the result of the shared 
intentions (or commitments) of international societies.403 In this sense, this concept has always 
been and will remain subject to further development.  
With these three grounds laid out above, the following discussion focuses on the question 
of determining the justifiability of the argument that invokes sovereignty under the IHRL. By 
invoking sovereignty under the IHRL, the state in fact argues that because it is only subject to its 
own judgement on this issue, it should be excluded or allowed to deviate from the relevant rules 
                                                 
399 These exceptions include: ‘if the prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a legal right to resist 
him,—if tyranny becoming insupportable obliges the nation to rise in their own defence,—every foreign power has a 
right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance’ and in the case of civil war when neither party 
within a nation has been able to bring about peace. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of Law of 
Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Soveriegns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and 
Nature of natural Law and on Luxury (Edited and with an Introduction by Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, 
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008) 290, 648-49. See Jennifer Pitts, ‘Intervention and sovereign equality: legacies of Vattel’, in 
Stefano Recchia and Jennifer M. Welsh (eds), Just and Unjust Military Intervention: European Thinkers from Vitoria 
to Mill (Cambridge University Press 2013) 146. 
400 Or in Jean Bodin’s terms, ‘the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a 
Common-wealth’.  See Beaulac (n 394) 107.  
401 ibid 117. 
402 ibid 41. 
403 For the account of shared intention that is referred to here, see Margaret Gilbert, ‘Shared Intention and Personal 
Intentions’ (2009) 144 Philosophical Studies 167. For the idea that an institution is what society makes of it, see John 
Searle, Making the Social World (Oxford University Press 2010).  
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or principles. In this sense, it employs particular reasoning. In the first section of this chapter (6.1), 
I will consider an account of sovereignty that aligns with the codification of the United Nation 
Charter, which is one of the main sources for justifying the sovereignty argument in international 
law. The second section (6.2) discusses the particular situation of a state’s joining an international 
(human rights) treaty, where the sovereignty argument functions as a buffer for the state. This 
section approaches the question by turning to another source—the relevant rules of the VCLT. The 
third section (6.3) explores the shared intentions of the international community with regard to 
human rights issues by focusing on the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), as 
well as the concept of RtoP, in order to determine the current international consensus on the 
relationship between sovereignty and human rights. A short conclusion will be given regarding the 
justifiability of sovereignty arguments based on international law shared intentions, and the 
purpose and object discussed thus far. The fourth part (6.4) turns to the case of China and analyses 
the justifiability of the sovereignty arguments found in the constructive dialogue between China 
and international human rights treaty bodies. China’s approach to the sovereignty issue in general 
will also be discussed. The conclusion (6.5) addresses the element of objectivity in the notion of 
sovereignty in the context of the international legal order.     
  
6.1 The account of sovereignty in the Charter of the United Nations 
Following the logic that ‘the notion of sovereignty is what states make of it’, sovereignty as an 
artefact has always been (re)created to adapt to the relevant social context. The notion of 
sovereignty in its traditional Westphalian sense and its corollary non-intervention sense has also 
been challenged to some extent by international legal systems and practices. Therefore, in order to 
discuss the justifiability of the sovereignty arguments in international human rights treaties, an 
understanding of sovereignty that can go beyond the ‘Westphalian myth’ is needed. Nevertheless, 
this cannot be just any understanding but must be one that is in line with the current international 
legal order(s) and practices. The Charter of the United Nations (hereafter the Charter or the UN 
Charter), perhaps the most important codification of the current international legal and political 
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order (some scholars may even hold it to be the Constitution of the international legal order),404 is 
therefore considered the essential source for providing this understanding.  
The account of sovereignty provided in the Charter is mainly included in Article 2, which 
as a whole is considered to contain the ‘principles’ of the Charter. Among the seven paragraphs of 
Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 7 are particularly related to the notion of sovereignty. 
 
6.1.1 Article 2(1) of the Charter: Sovereignty as equality 
Article 2 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, 
shall act in accordance with the following Principles: 
1.  The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members. 
 
Article 2 paragraph 1 is about the principle of sovereign equality, which is also a vantage point for 
understanding sovereignty according to the Charter. It is first worth noting that although Article 2 
as a whole is described in terms of ‘principles’, which by definition articulate fundamental rules, 
purposes and objects rather than entailing rights and obligations, within Article 2 only Article 2(1) 
is in fact a ‘principle’ in this sense.405 In other words, ‘[o]nly Art. 2(1) can be said to possess the 
character of a mere, though important, principle’.406 This insight in a way supports the view that 
Article 2(1) provides a vantage point for an account of sovereignty based on the Charter.  
The key element of Article 2(1) is the concept of sovereign equality. Starting from a textual 
reading of the terminology, during the drafting of the Charter the subcommittee voted to keep this 
terminology on the assumption that the notion of sovereign equality conveys the following 
understandings: 
1. That states are juridically equal; 
2. That they enjoy the rights inherent in their full sovereignty; 
                                                 
404 For instance, see Bruno Simma et al. (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edition, Oxford 
University Press 2002). Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
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3. That the personality of the state is respected, along with its territorial integrity and political 
independence; 
4. That the state should, under the international order, comply faithfully with its international 
duties and obligations.407 
This understanding of sovereign equality was later confirmed in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations),408 with a slight addition.409 On this reading, there are in fact two perspectives involved 
in this term: the relationship between the sovereign member states, and the relationship between 
the organisation (the UN) and the sovereign member states.  
The sovereign equality between sovereign member states is a form of legal equality. It is 
important to note that this is ‘equality before law’, not ‘equality in law’,410 for the permanent 
members of the Security Council do have a privileged status compared to other sovereign member 
states.411 Nevertheless, according to the Declaration on Friendly Relations, ‘[a]ll States enjoy 
sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international 
community’.412 In this context, ‘equal rights are the sovereign rights equally enjoyed by states, as 
defined by international law or, more exactly, the constitution of the international community’.413 
In other words, in the legal order codified by the UN Charter, every state, regardless of its size or 
other characteristics, equally enjoys the rights that are granted by international law as equal 
subjects of the law.414 Hence sovereign equality also refers to legal equality. Moreover, the status 
of legal equality can be further explained in terms of having ‘the same legal personality’. That is 
                                                 
407 See Report of Rapporteur of Sub-committee I/1/A to Committee I/1: Chapter II, June 1, 1945; Simma ibid 77. 
408 It is said that because of its careful preparation and adoption by consensus, the Friendly Relations Declaration of 
1970 (Annex to GA Res. 2625 (XXV)) can be relied on almost as a text that enjoys binding force: ‘the Declaration … 
set out principles which the General Assembly declared to be “basic principles” of international law’ (The Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Action In and Against Nicaragua, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1986), 14 et seq. at 
107. See also Simma ibid 80, footnote78. 
409 Compared to the report from the subcommittee, in the Friendly Relations Declaration it is added that ‘[e]ach State 
has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems’ under the term of 
sovereign equality.  
410 Simma (n 404) 65. 
411 ibid.  
412 A/RES/25/2625. 
413 Simma (n 404) 85 
414 ibid.  
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to say, sovereign equality refers to the states’ possession of the same legal personality.415 As 
Crawford comments,  
 
[t]he sovereignty of states represents the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which 
governs a community consisting primarily of states having, in principle, a uniform legal personality … 
If states (and only states) are conceived of as sovereign, then in this respect at least they are equal, and 
their sovereignty is in a major aspect a relation to other states (and to organizations of states) defined 
by law.416  
 
In this sense, as codified in Article 2(1) of the Charter, the notion of sovereignty as sovereign 
equality equates to this notion of a uniform legal personality in the context of the international 
legal order. Following the logic of equality, i.e. ‘treating like cases alike’, this means that all 
sovereign states in the current international legal order should be treated equally under the law. 
As for the latter perspective on the relationship between international organisations (such 
as the UN) and sovereign states, in Simma’s Commentary there appear to be deviating opinions, 
which I take to be significant. Not only do these different opinions reveal different stances on this 
important principle, but they can also function alongside each other to bring us to a more 
comprehensive understanding.  
Earlier in the Commentary, we read that:  
 
The principle of sovereign equality laid down in para. 1 as a basis for the UN expresses the fact that the 
latter wishes to confirm in principle, rather than change in any way, the fundamental character of 
contemporary public international law as a co-operative body of law. The UN is not an organization 
superior to the member States in the sense that, by the very fact of their membership, the latter have 
given up their sovereignty. They remain sovereign States because the imitations on their sovereignty in 
connection with UN membership are based on a treaty arrangement, i.e. they are brought about by 
agreement and are not of such an extent that they would affect the core of the member State’s 
constitutional authority.417   
 
                                                 
415 Simma ibid 65, italics added. 
416 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 447, 
italics added. 
417 Simma (n 404) 65. 
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The above paragraph can be compared with later arguments in the Commentary on the 
same issue, according to which ‘sovereignty [is] meant to exclude legal superiority of any state 
over another, but not to exclude a greater role of the international community played vis-à-vis all 
its members’,418 and according to which ‘sovereignty cannot mean complete independence or 
absolute power over internal matters’.419 
On the one hand, as the former opinion suggests, member states maintain their sovereignty 
when entering the organisation. In other words, the UN is not a supranational organisation (e.g. 
compared to the EU). On the other hand, as the latter view argues, this does not mean that such 
sovereignty is absolute under any circumstances. According to the Charter and Commentary, the 
fault line lies in Article 2(7) on defining domestic jurisdiction and non-intervention, which 
stipulates that ‘[w]hat follows from the sovereignty remaining with the member States pursuant to 
para. 1 is the prohibition in para. 7, addressed to the Organization, on intervening in matters that 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State’.420 This brings us to discussion of 
Article 2(7) of the Charter. 
 
6.1.2 Article 2(7) of the Charter: Sovereignty as domestic jurisdiction free from 
intervention 
Article 2(7) of the Charter reads as follows: 
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.  
 
This article sets out an important logic of sovereignty, which can be simplified as the 
conditional ‘if domestic jurisdiction, then non-intervention’. This account has two main elements, 
namely ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and ‘non-intervention’. In this sense, if a state has sovereignty over 
a given matter, this means that it has domestic jurisdiction over that matter and hence that 
intervention is impermissible. 
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419 ibid 150. 
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Let us start with the term ‘domestic jurisdiction’. The meaning of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ 
is controversial and therefore subject to further debate. This is largely due to the fact that, apart 
from the option of addressing to the ICJ in a specific case and procuring an advisory opinion, there 
is no authority to determine its meaning, which in fact was a decision made at the San Francisco 
Conference. A committee report states the following:  
 
In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the Organisation, it is inevitable 
that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. This 
process is inherent in the functioning of any body which operates under an instrument defining its 
functions and powers. It will be manifested in the functioning of such a body as the General Assembly, 
the Security Council or the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, it is not necessary to include in 
the Charter a provision either authorising or approving the normal operation of this principle.421 
 
This means that ‘any organ of the United Nations confronted in a given case with a plea of 
domestic jurisdiction will have to take a decision on its applicability and, thus, to establish some 
form of practice in dealing with such issues’.422 In other words, the United Nations has initially in 
principle delegated the power to interpret ‘domestic jurisdiction’ to individual organisations and 
states on an ad hoc basis. 
Having said that, the Permanent Court’s decision on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality 
Decrees case (1923) provides an important understanding of ‘domestic jurisdiction’. The Court 
stated that ‘[t]he question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a 
State is an essentially relative question; it depends on the development of international 
relations’.423 Although this near-century-old decision does little more than decide that ‘domestic 
jurisdiction’ is a term that will develop according to international practices, this observation ‘has 
been and is still accepted by most authors as the leading pronouncement on the question of what 
                                                 
421 Report of the Rapporteur of Committee at San Francisco Conference IV/2 (PC/LEG/22). On the importance of this 
report, see Pollux ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’ (1946) 23 BYIL 73–4; Dan Ciobanu, Preliminary Objections 
Related to the Jurisdiction of the United Nations Political Organs (Martinus Nijhoff 1975) 154–5; and Tetsuo Satö, 
Evolving Constitutions of the International Organizations: A Critacal Analysis of the Interpretative Framework of the 
Constituent Instrument of International Organizations (Kluwer Law International 1996) 164. 
422 Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and International Law: 
In Search of a Sense of Community (Intersentia 2006) 27. 





constitutes “domestic jurisdiction” under the UN Charter’.424 The implication of this judgement is 
that ‘domestic jurisdiction’ does not refer to a certain sphere that is ‘clearly defined, irreducible, 
or in any way inherently removed from the international sphere’,425 but rather ‘circumscribes areas 
which, taking into account the situation at issue, are not even prima facie affected by rules of 
international law’. 426  It also implies that some matters that used to be regulated by states 
themselves may later become the subject of international regulation—‘either through the 
emergence of rules of customary international law or through the process of treaty making’.427 In 
short, states’ domestic jurisdiction is subject to change over time. 
Let us turn to the concept of non-intervention. This term further prompts the following 
question: ‘if a matter falls essentially within the jurisdiction of a State, is the corresponding 
prohibition on the United Nations “intervening” absolute or relative?’428 This question implies 
that, like ‘domestic jurisdiction’, the term ‘intervention’ allows for different interpretations. There 
are in general two groups of opinions: those that read this term in the narrow sense and those that 
read it in the broad sense. The narrow sense of ‘intervention’ entails a more relative prohibition on 
UN interventions in established domestic jurisdictions. The principal proponent of this 
interpretation is Lauterpacht, who, in his famous Hague Lectures on the International Protection 
of Human Rights, provides the following definition of intervention:  
 
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal connotation. It signifies dictatorial 
interference in the sense of action amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies a 
peremptory demand for positive conduct or abstention—a demand which, if not complied with, involves 
a threat of or recourse to compulsion in some form.429 
 
It follows from this definition that ‘any form of action falling short of dictatorial 
interference would be permitted, even if the matter had been found to be essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a State’.430 Lauterpacht’s views greatly influenced debates in the United 
Nations at the time. For example, in the dispute concerning the treatment of Indian people in the 
                                                 
424 Simma (n 404) 157. 
425 ibid. 
426 ibid, italics added.  
427 ibid.  
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429 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The International Protection of Human Rights’ (1947) 70 Recueil des cours 19. 
430 Gutter (n 422) 30–31. 
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Union of South Africa (1949), the representative of India quoted extensively from Lauterpacht’s 
work.431 
However, this narrow understanding of non-intervention has also been criticised on the 
grounds that it ‘hardly left any field of application for Art. 2(7)’ since ‘[t]he UN organs … only 
have powers of recommendation’.432 In this sense, a broader interpretation is gradually accepted 
in the later debate and in international practices. In the Declaration on Friendly Relations, the term 
‘intervention’ refers not only to ‘armed intervention’ but also to ‘all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural 
elements’. 433  In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ made a judgement that was in line with the 
Declaration: 
  
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters on which each State is permitted, 
by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, 
social and cultural system and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses 
methods of coercion in regard to such choices which must remain free ones. The element of coercion 
which defines and indeed forms the very essence of prohibited intervention is particularly obvious in 
the case of intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect 
form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State.434 
 
In this case, the Court held a broad view on intervention and a restrictive view on the UN’s 
power over states’ domestic matters.  
At this point, another perspective should be brought out in the discussion. This is the 
distinction between intervention and interference. There is definitional overlap between these two 
terms. In a way, interference can be understood in terms of the broader sense of intervention, 
whereas intervention refers to the narrower/stricter sense of interference. In this sense, intervention 
refers to using force (directly or indirectly) to coerce a state, whereas interference refers to 
becoming involved with a state’s free choices with regard to its political, economic, and cultural 
affairs and foreign policy making. Arriving at a clear-cut distinction between these two terms is a 
                                                 
431 See Lawrence Preuss, ‘Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and matters of domestic 
jurisdiction’ (1949) 74 Recueil des cours, 616–7. Also see Gutter ibid 30. 
432 Simma (n 404) 152. 
433 GA Res 2625 (XXV) 24 Oct 1970.  
434  ICJ, Reports of Judgements. Advisory Opinions and Orders: Case Concerning Military and paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (27 June 1986) 107, para 205. 
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difficult task. One of the reasons is that the criteria for these terms are still open to discussion. 
Nevertheless, situating a specific case according to these two terms is useful; while the threshold 
for intervention has become higher over the past decades, other mechanisms under the term 
‘interference’ have been further developed. The scope of ‘domestic jurisdiction’ therefore also 
changes depending on what case is at issue. Returning to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, for 
instance, it was once generally accepted that the term ‘intervention’ was to be understood in a 
broad sense.435  On this reading, many forms of interference are forbidden under the clause, 
including, for example, diplomatic démarches and the adoption of critical recommendations. 
However, the proceeding discussions on whether a certain topic falls within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state is permissible. It has been observed that in ‘several cases States have tried, 
by invoking para. 7[,] to prevent even the discussion of certain topics by the Organization, but 
those attempts have, generally speaking, been unsuccessful’.436 According to current UN practices, 
‘the placing of an issue on the agenda, its discussion and the adoption of General Recommendation, 
i.e. of recommendations which are not addressed to one particular State, do not constitute 
intervention contrary to para. 7’.437 Moreover, it is also observed that ‘in practice, the UN has 
developed the consistent tendency to limit the scope of domestic jurisdiction by reference to human 
rights and the maintenance of peace and security’.438  
In this sense, Article 2(7) helps to pave the way for the account of sovereignty that prevails 
in the current international legal order. Not only is this article mainly in line with the current 
mainstream understanding of sovereignty, but it also captures its two essences—domestic 
jurisdiction and non-intervention—so that the word sovereignty can stop being a myth and can 
instead be grounded in concrete legal terms that discussants actually grasp and reflect upon. 
Furthermore, these elements, namely domestic jurisdiction, intervention, and interference, are the 
variables of the concept of sovereignty. In other words, the evolution of the concept of sovereignty 
(as far as international law is concerned) can be understood as a result of the changing meanings 
of these variables. The meaning of sovereignty can in this regard (and with this account) evolve 
accordingly. 
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6.2 The effects on sovereignty of states’ entering into treaties: A reading of the VCLT 
Alongside the Charter, the VCLT is another important source for understanding sovereignty in the 
current international legal order, for it provides an overarching perspective for approaching the 
notion of sovereignty with regards to international treaties. It is worth noting that, although the 
VCLT only entered into force in 1980 (which is later than some of the international human rights 
treaties discussed in this study), a large part of the VCLT is also a codification of customary 
international law,439 which can therefore be applied to international treaties in general.   
Taking both the characteristics of international human rights treaties and the VCLT into 
consideration, there are three elements in the VCLT that can help us to approach the notion of 
sovereignty in the context of a state’s entering into an international (human rights) treaty: the 
principle of consent to be bound (Preamble), the principle of pacta sunt servenda (Art. 26), and 
the relationship between domestic law and international treaties (Art. 27). 
 
• The principle of consent to be bound 
 
The principle of consent to be bound is embodied in Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the 
Convention, which reads as follows: 
 
Noting that the principles of free consent and of good faith and the pacta sunt servanda rule are 
universally recognised. 
 
Although this principle is not explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the Convention, it is 
implicitly contained in Articles 1, 2 subpara 1(b), 6, 11, and 16.440 According to this principle, 
‘(u)nless and until a State consents to be bound, a treaty cannot create rights and obligations for 
that State’.441 In this sense, the principle implies a contractual view of international treaties in 
                                                 
439  See Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1984) 
5–10. Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009) 1–27. 
440 Villiger ibid 48. 
441 ibid 176. Although it should be borne in mind that this is a treaty-making scenario, there is also the scenario of 
customary laws, which are deemed to be binding regardless of any specific expression of consent from a specific state. 
This scenario will be discussed below.  
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which ‘consent infers consensus, i.e., the concurrence of wills with a view to performing a 
contractual act’.442 On this view, a sovereign state can withhold its consent and maintain its 
sovereignty with regard to rights and obligations codified in a treaty. On the flip side, it also means 
that once a state has given its consent to be bound by a treaty, it has expressed its commitment to 
abiding by the treaty. In the latter scenario, not only will the state be expected to comply with the 
provisions of the treaty when the treaty enters into force, but it must also ‘refrain itself from acts 
which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force provided such 
entry into force is not “unduly delayed”’.443 
 
 The principle of pacta sunt servanda 
 
Following the principle of consent to be bound, the principle pacta sunt servanda, which is also 
included in Paragraph 3 of the Preamble, is further elaborated in Article 26:  
 
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. 
 
This principle seems to have been ‘applied since time immemorial’ and is today viewed as ‘the 
cornerstone of international relations’.444 It emphasises what is perhaps the most salient aspect of 
the relationship between sovereign states and international treaties, i.e. the binding and obligatory 
nature of the latter.445 In other words, once a state expresses its consent to be bound by a treaty, it 
must carry out its treaty obligations in good faith.446 Applying this principle to the sovereignty 
argument in international human rights treaties, this means that the relevant state party must 
interpret and perform its treaty obligations both in their spirit and according to their letter.447 
Therefore, this principle also coincides with the textual reading of sources and with the purpose 
and object conditions for determining the legal justifiability of an argument. Moreover, this 
principle suggests that ‘if a party to a treaty does not perform it, that will, to the extent of the non-
performance, be a breach of its international obligations to the other party or parties’.448 
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 Article 27, Internal law and the observance of treaties 
 
Article 27 of the Convention reads: 
 
[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a 
treaty. 
 
This rule was added to the ILC Draft at the 1969 Vienna Conference (73 votes to two, with 24 
abstentions).449 It is the corollary of Article 26, pacta sunt servanda. Following the principles of 
consent to be bound and pacta sunt servanda, Article 27 can be seen as a further step toward 
putting the relationship between sovereign states and international treaties into perspective. That 
is, states cannot invoke their own internal laws (including the provisions of their constitutions)450 
to evade their treaty obligations. 451  In this sense, Article 27 establishes a hierarchy among 
international treaties and domestic laws (with the former having priority over the latter). 
In sum, when the principle of consent to be bound, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
and Article 27 of the VCLT are read together, we see that there are limits to justifiably using 
sovereignty qua domestic jurisdiction as an argument for non-compliance with international 
treaties in general, and with international human rights treaties in particular. 
 
6.3 Shared intentions of the international community: The Vienna World Conference on 
Human Rights and the concept of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
In this section, I articulate shared intentions of the international community regarding the 
relationship between sovereignty and human rights by delving into the Vienna World Conference 
on Human Rights and the concept of RtoP.  
                                                 
449 The high number of abstentions, however, also shows ‘the hesitations of some States to recognise the supremacy 
of international law over municipal laws and powers’. See Villiger (n 439) 371. 
450 ‘[A] State cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent 
upon it under international law or treaties in force.’ Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin 
or Speech in the Danzig Territory (Advisory Opinion) (1932) PCIJ Series A/B no. 44, 24. 
451 Villiger (n 439) 371. 
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6.3.1 The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights (1993) 
Apart from taking signing and ratifying international human rights treaties as a way of expressing 
states’ consent, there are other events that can also work as channels for expressing states’ 
intentions. International human rights conferences are probably the most representative occasions 
for this purpose. In this section, I focus on the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights 
(hereafter the Vienna Conference) for the following reasons: first, this Conference can be viewed 
as representative when it comes to the quantity of participants. It was attended by the 
representatives of 171 States, 2 national liberation movements, 15 United Nations bodies, 10 
specialized agencies, 18 intergovernmental organizations, 24 national institutions, 6 Ombudsmen, 
11 United Nations human rights and related bodies, 9 other organizations, 248 non-governmental 
organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, and 593 other non-
governmental organizations. 452  Therefore, the result of this conference can be taken as the 
consensus at large with regards to the issues reflected in its final Declaration. Secondly, this 
conference was initiated in 1989, immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This means 
that it was the first time following the long period of the Cold War that state leaders from all over 
the world gathered together and tried to reach consensus on issues related to human rights, despite 
the ideological battles that had haunted the UN in previous decades. This does not mean that 
consensus was naturally and easily achieved, however. On the contrary, the obvious gaps between 
West and East, North and South, revealed themselves not only in regional meetings but also during 
the Conference, which leads to the third point. This is the fact that although the Vienna Conference 
initially aspired to achieve consensus on human rights issues that was compatible with the 
optimistic atmosphere of world politics after the Cold War, it also encountered highly reluctant, 
dissident opinions from the representatives from the East and the South. In the words of the then 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the conference encountered ‘the fundamental 
dialectical conflict between the universal and the particular, between identity and difference’.453 
In this sense, after numerous changes made during the preparatory work, the final Declaration of 
the Conference is not only an impressive achievement of world politics on human rights issues at 
that time,454 but also a valuable document that illustrates the extent to which states could commit 
                                                 
452 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), 9, para 17. 
453 A/CONF.157/22, 3. 
454 Some scholars think that the Conference’s achievements were quite limited. See Kevin Boyle , ‘Stock-taking on 
Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993’ (1995) XLIII Political Studies 79.  
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themselves to certain interpretations of human rights following the Cold War. Last but not least, 
regarding the particular issue of sovereignty and human rights, the changes that took place from 
the report of the Asian regional meeting to the final Declaration in a way reveal the extent to which 
the Asian states’ intentions were adapted during the World Conference, eventually allowing them 
to reach progressive interpretations on this matter. With the above considerations in hand, in the 
following section I focus on the evolution of the sovereignty principle from the Asian regional 
meeting report to the Declaration of the Vienna Conference.455 
In 1993, representatives from Asian countries gathered together in Bangkok and held a 
regional preparation meeting for the World Conference. In its report, also known as ‘The Bangkok 
Declaration’, the principle of sovereignty is addressed in several paragraphs of the Preamble as 
follows:   
 
Reaffirming the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference 
in the internal affairs of States.456 
… 
5. Emphasize the principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as non-
interference in the internal affairs of States, and the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political 
pressure; 
 
6. Reiterate that all countries, large and small, have the right to determine their political systems, control 
and freely utilize their resources, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.457 
 
The above three paragraphs not only reiterate the principle of sovereign equality as laid out in the 
UN Charter but also connect it with non-interference (note that in the Charter, the wording is ‘non-
intervention’), non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure, and states’ right to 
determine their political systems, economic resources, and development. This standpoint did give 
sovereignty a strong presence in the discourse on human rights. If the above principles regarding 
sovereignty are held, the international mechanism for protecting human rights will be rather 
limited.  
                                                 
455 It is worth noting that because the Declaration is not an international treaty, the interpretation rules of the VCLT 
are not applicable. I shall therefore only turn to the texts as a source for the interpretation. 
456 A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59, 3. 
457 A/CONF.157/ASRM/8, A/CONF.157/PC/59, 4, italics added. 
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In the preparatory document for the Conference, Consideration of the Final Outcome of 
the World Conference, Taking into consideration the Preparatory Work and the Conclusions of 
the Regional Meetings,458 the above paragraphs concerning the sovereignty principle were adapted 
into the following two principles: 
 
Principle 3: 
… It is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.459 
… 
Principle 4: 
The processes of promoting and protecting human rights, which are a legitimate concern of the international 
community, are to be understood in the framework of respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and political independence of States.460 
 
Principle 3 makes clear that political, economic and cultural systems cannot be used as excuses 
when it comes to a state’s failure to ensure human rights protection and fundamental freedoms, 
which, as is emphasised, is ‘the duty of States’. In Principle 4, in contrast to the Bangkok 
Declaration, only the principles of states’ sovereign equality (instead of ‘respect for national 
sovereignty’), territorial integrity, and political independence (instead of ‘non-interference with 
domestic affairs’) are mentioned. Moreover, these principles are understood as the context for 
promoting and protecting human rights, not the other way around (as the Bangkok Declaration has 
it).   
In the follow-up document Report of the Preparatory Committee, Annexes II Part II, 
‘Decisions adopted by the Preparatory Committee for the World Conference on Human Rights at 
its fourth session’,461 Principle 4 from the above report was further adapted: 
 
Paragraph 4 
The processes of promoting and protecting human rights, should be conducted in conformity with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and international law.462 
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459 A/CONF.157/PC/82, 5. 
460 ibid.  
461 A/CONF.157/PC/98. 




Here, the phrase ‘the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political 
independence of States’ is eliminated altogether and replaced with an even broader expression, 
namely ‘the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law’. In this 
expression, the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence are 
taken to have equal weight with other principles and purposes included in Articles 1 and 2 of the 
UN Charter, as well as other principles and purposes enshrined in international law in general. 
Moreover, unlike most other paragraphs in this report, no alternative, further negotiable 
expressions (versions) of this paragraph are included. Although this does not mean that this 
paragraph was not open to further discussion, it does shed light on the standpoint of the Preparatory 
Committee on this matter.  
In his Opening Address at the World Conference,463 Boutros Boutros-Ghali raised three 
concerns: namely the imperative of universality, the imperative of guarantees, and the imperative 
of democratisation. Under the second concern, he devoted several paragraphs to elaborating at 
length on the relationship between sovereignty and human rights. He first pointed out that the issue 
of human rights demands a new perspective for considering the international order and 
sovereignty, which should give rise to ‘a new legal permeability’, to ‘cooperation and coordination 
between states and international organizations’, rather than a viewpoint that prioritizes ‘absolute 
sovereignty’ and ‘political intervention’.464 He then recognised that states are in the best position 
to guarantee human rights.465 However, in those cases where states fail to protect individual’s 
rights, ‘the international community—that is to say, international organizations, whether universal 
or regional—must take over from the States that fail to fulfil their obligations’. This viewpoint, as 
he argued, ‘does not harm our contemporary notion of sovereignty’. He further stated that 
sovereignty cannot be used as the ultimate argument when the states at issue are in fact 
undermining fundamental human rights. In other words, sovereignty, in his view, is contingent 
upon the protection of human rights.466 He concluded this argument by pointing out that ‘States 
                                                 
463 14 June 1993, A/CONF.157/22. 
464 A/CONF.157/22, 12 July 1993, 8. 
465 ibid. 
466 ibid 8–9. 
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must be convinced that the control exercised by the international community ultimately results in 
the greatest respect for their sovereignty and spheres of competence’.467  
In line with Boutros-Ghali’s view on sovereignty and human rights, not only is the 
sovereignty principle not mentioned in the Preamble to the Declaration of the Vienna Conference, 
but the whole issue of sovereignty is confined under the right to self-determination. The relevant 
text reads as follows:  
 
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
… 
In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be 
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a 
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.468 
 
In the Declaration, the phrase ‘territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States’ is used in a very limited context: (i) it is used under the general context of the 
right to self-determination; (ii) it is used under the further condition that states ‘conduct[] 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’; 
and (iii) it emphasizes that the government is to represent ‘the whole people belonging to the 
territory without distinction of any kind’. Hence, representative functions of the government and 
the principle of non-discrimination are also enshrined in the texts. This is to say that, with regard 
to the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, the Declaration of the Vienna 
Conference does not take the position of the Bangkok Declaration. Instead, it situates territorial 
integrity and sovereignty in the context of the right to self-determination and further limits it with 
the spirit of democracy and the principle of non-discrimination. 
According to the Declaration of the Vienna Conference, sovereignty therefore has rather 
limited standing with regard to human rights issues.  This is in line with the conclusions I drew 
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earlier from the reading of the VCLT rules. Put differently, the view that sovereignty arguments 
can be used as a buffer for states in the context of international human rights treaties is supported 
neither by the rules of the VCLT nor by the joint intentions expressed in the Declaration of the 
Vienna Conference. This intention was further confirmed through the initiation of the concept the 
Responsibility to Protect.    
 
6.3.2 The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) 
In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
issued a report titled the Responsibility to Protect. The Commission was asked to respond to the 
following question: ‘when, if ever, is it appropriate for states to take coercive—and in particular 
military—action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other 
state?’ In the report, the answer was the following: ‘sovereignty is based on the ability and 
willingness of governments to accept the Responsibility to Protect their own citizens. Failing that, 
the international community has a right to intervene’.469 Hence, instead of taking sovereignty to 
be the prerogative of states (as the traditional Westphalian notion suggests), the concept of RtoP 
primarily anchors sovereignty in a state’s responsibility to protect its citizens. In other words, the 
notion of RtoP implies that if ‘a state legitimately protects its citizens, then [and only then] it is in 
full right of its sovereign power’.470   
Followed by the ICISS report, the 2005 World Summit in New York, which is considered 
one of the largest gathering of world leaders, addressed this issue in particular. The Summit 
adopted the World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1). Later, the results of the Outcome were 
affirmed by Resolution 1674 through the Security Council.471  
According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, RtoP is applied in cases of ‘genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity’,472  and its main goal is to stop mass 
atrocities. RtoP challenges the traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty and grounds the 
                                                 
469 Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time 
(Oxford University Press 2011) 11–12.  
470 ibid 12.  
471 This resolution was debated for six months in the Security Council. See Genser and Cotler (n 469) 15. 
472 In the ICISS report, the scope is much broader, including ‘situations of state collapse, and the resultant exposure 
of the population to mass starvation and/or civil war; and overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where 
the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring 
or threatened’. See The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and state 
Sovereignty, 33. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
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possibility of the international community’s stepping in when states fail to protect their own people 
from serious human rights violations. 473  In this sense, ‘RtoP is revolutionary because it 
acknowledges for the first time in a global declaration that there are limits on the UN Charter’s 
prohibition against international involvement in what goes on inside the sovereign state’.474 As 
Anne Peters notes, RtoP is ‘(a) big step … which definitely ousted the principle of sovereignty 
from its position as a Letztbegründung (first principle) of international law’.475  
In sum, the concept of RtoP and the World Summit in 2005 again confirmed and reinforced 
the tone that was set in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (especially in its 
Declaration)—the notion that the concept and priority of sovereignty are subject to change (or at 
least fine-tuning), especially when it comes to human rights.  
 
6.3.3 A brief conclusion: Can sovereignty arguments be justified in the context of 
international human rights treaties? 
The principle of sovereign equality and its corollary, non-intervention (which some may interpret 
in a broader sense as non-interference), are indeed two of the principles codified in the UN Charter 
and followed by the international community. However, whenever a state enters into an 
international human rights treaty, according to the rules of the VCLT, that state should comply 
with the obligations listed in the treaty in good faith. Moreover, in the context of international 
human rights treaties, it was shown in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the 2005 
World Summit that the meaning and priority of sovereignty has been challenged and subject to 
change for human rights purposes (among other things). Furthermore, the purpose and object of 
international human rights treaties is to guarantee the protection of human rights. Therefore, the 
brief conclusion here concerning the use of sovereignty arguments in the context of international 
human rights treaties is that there is little room for states to use sovereignty arguments as a 
justification for breaching their treaty obligations. 
          Having said that, there are nevertheless ‘grey areas’ when it comes to determining the 
relationship between sovereignty and international human rights treaties, often due to the 
ambiguous way in which states’ obligations are articulated in treaties. To put it differently, what 
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counts as states’ treaty obligations (and as non-compliance) is often the key issue in determining 
how far a state can invoke sovereignty to defend itself in an argument. In this sense, it would be 
overly optimistic to assume that all of the sovereignty arguments found in constructive dialogue 
can easily be dismissed. This can be seen in those cases where China invoked sovereignty 
reasoning before human rights treaty bodies.  
 
6.4 Sovereignty arguments in the constructive dialogue between China and international 
human rights treaty bodies 
In this section, I first analyse how the Chinese delegation has invoked sovereignty in its arguments 
in constructive dialogues. I then make a further comment on the reasons that have driven the 
Chinese government to maintain its position on sovereignty in international practices in general 
and in international human rights law in particular. 
 
6.4.1 Chinese sovereignty arguments in human rights treaty bodies 
In international human rights treaty bodies, Chinese delegations have invoked sovereignty in their 
arguments by referring to sovereignty as national unity and territorial integrity or sovereign 
equality. In terms of the former, most arguments were made before the CERD committee (and one 
argument was made before the CRC committee). In terms of the latter, the most-debated topic is 
the State Secrets Law.  
 
6.4.1.1 Sovereignty as national unity and territorial integrity  
In the constructive dialogue under the CERD committee, China has often cited its constitution, 
which stipulates the following:   
 
 all nationalities … are equal. The State … upholds and develops ties of equality, unity and mutual 
assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against or oppression of any nationality 
are prohibited, as are any action injurious to ethnic unity or causing ethnic divisions.476  
 
This statement indicates China’s general position when invoking its sovereignty arguments 
regarding the ICERD, which can be concluded as a two-pronged argument. On the one hand, China 
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insists that all nationalities in China are equal. On the other hand, China also attaches this position 
to the protection of national unity and territorial integrity. This is a consistent position that China 
has held since its first national report under the ICERD in 1985 up to the latest follow-up document 
submitted in 2009. To reflect on this position, some Committee members have raised concerns 
about its impact on the rights of minority groups. For instance, one Committee member in a 2001 
session argued that ‘the movement towards national unity might have an adverse effect on the 
rights of individual groups’.477 The Chinese delegation did not respond to this concern. Instead, 
the delegation continued to emphasise national unity and territorial integrity regarding the treaty.478 
This position was applied to a more controversial topic in the case of two incidents in the 
Autonomous Regions in 2008 and 2009. 479  In response to the committee’s inquiry into the 
incidents, the Chinese delegation made the following statement:  
 
There was evidence that the two incidents had been premeditated and masterminded by separatists 
abroad and carried out by separatists within China with a view to promoting ethnic hatred, disrupting 
harmonious development in ethnic minority areas and undermining national unity and territorial 
integrity. The violent crimes perpetrated were also serious breaches of the purposes and principles of 
the Convention and had been widely condemned by Chinese people of all ethnic groups. The 
Government had taken prompt action to halt those criminal activities and to protect citizens’ right to life 
and property. Public order had been quickly restored and unity among ethnic groups preserved.480      
 
On the one hand, the Chinese delegation emphasised that preserving national unity and 
territorial integrity was an important justification for the Chinese government’s reaction to the 
incidents. On the other hand, they also noted that the incidents involved violence against citizens’ 
lives and property. The government therefore took action against the criminals, a decision which 
was not based on considerations of race.  
As I have argued above, sovereignty arguments have limited weight in justifying breaches 
of human rights treaty obligations. It follows that deciding on the justifiability of these sovereignty 
arguments comes down to the states’ obligations under the ICERD. The purpose and object of the 
ICERD is to ‘eliminat[e] racial discrimination throughout the world in all its forms and 
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manifestations and [to] secur[e] understanding of and respect for the dignity of the human 
person’.481 The first part of the Convention lists seven articles concerning rights and obligations. 
These concern eliminating distinctions and discriminatory treatment based on race, colour, 
national or ethnic origin.482 In the above case, the Chinese delegation argued that the two incidents 
in the minority areas were crimes perpetrated by separatists. Therefore, they were not considered 
cases of discrimination against a particular ethnic minority group.483 In other words, China argued 
that it had not violated its treaty obligations regarding non-discrimination under the ICERD, and 
this argument stands as long as no further counterargument is provided by the Committee. This is 
not to say, however, that this sovereignty argument (the appeal to the protection of ‘national unity 
and territorial integrity’, as the Chinese delegation put it many times in its argument) is justifiable 
per se. Rather, it is to say that the argument as a whole is justifiable, all things considered. In this 
regard, the two-pronged argumentative tactic seems to work effectively in terms of ‘slipping in’ 
China’s national unity and territorial integrity policy. However, as one Committee member voiced 
the concern that ‘the movement towards national unity might have adverse effect on the rights of 
individual groups’. 484  Another Committee member also specified, ‘[w]hile the State party 
appeared to blame the unrest on separatists set on undermining its unity and territorial integrity … 
the Committee’s sole concern was the implementation of the Convention’s prohibitions against 
racial discrimination’.485 In other words, the two-pronged argumentative strategy not only ‘slipped 
in’ China’s position on national unity and territorial integrity but also shielded China from inquiry 
into the implementation of prohibitions against racial discrimination. China did not answer 
whether the national unity and territorial integrity policy would indeed have a negative impact on 
the equality of nationalities. It may be expected that, without further input from China, it will be 
difficult for Committee members to point out whether there has been a breach of treaty obligations 
on the part of the state. In this sense, China’s argument is not constructive.             
In a less controversial case regarding minority children, the Chinese delegation first 
emphasised racial equality under Chinese law and denied the existence of the suppression of ethnic 
                                                 
481 ‘International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Adopted and opened for 
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groups. It followed that the ‘behaviour aimed at[] disuniting the nation [i]s prohibited’.486 It then 
mentioned several policies and measures taken to boost the economy and education in minority 
areas. Finally, national unity was again emphasised as the purpose of its policy.487 This reasoning 
once again uses a two-pronged argument. On the one hand, the Chinese delegation indicated the 
importance of racial equality in Chinese law and the policies it had put in place to reinforce such 
equality, arguing that there had been no breach of their treaty obligations. On the other hand, they 
stated that behaviour that could threaten national unity was prohibited. This prompts further 
questions. What kind of behaviour is prohibited, and what are the relevant prohibition measures? 
Answers to these questions are key to determining the justifiability of the arguments in question; 
should this prohibition breach the state’s treaty obligations, this kind of argument would not be 
justified. However, there is no further information available about the Committee’s requests on 
this topic. 
In sum, those of China’s arguments concerning sovereignty that refer to national unity and 
territorial integrity are justifiable, all things considered. However, they are not constructive in the 
sense that the two-pronged argument scheme is used as a shield, while the inquiries that could take 
the dialogue forward are not acknowledged. As a result, dialogue on these topics remains in a 
stalemate.  
 
6.4.1.2 Sovereignty as sovereign equality: On the State Secrets Law   
The topic of the State Secrets Law has been given much attention by the CAT Committee and has 
also been mentioned by the CEDAW and CRC Committees. The Committees’ arguments can be 
summarised as follows: the State Secrets Law488 (a) prevents the disclosure of information that is 
essential to the Committee’s ability to ascertain whether the state party has been meeting its treaty 
obligations;489 (b) ‘provides that the determination as to whether a matter is a State secret lies with 
the public body producing this information’;490 and (c) may deny detainees’ access to lawyers.491 
In China’s responses, sovereignty has been referred to as the foundation of its position. Before the 
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CEDAW Committee, the Chinese delegation stated that ‘data could only be made public if it was 
in the public interest and did not threaten State sovereignty or national security’.492 In the CAT 
Committee, in its follow up report in response to the concluding observation in 2008, China argued 
that although ‘China’s legal system differs from that of the West, the ultimate goal of determining 
whether or not a matter constitutes a State secret is to safeguard national security and interests 
…’, 493  emphasising that ‘the Government requires that its citizens guard State secrets in 
accordance with the law, as do Governments of all other countries in the world’.494  
As to the first point made by the Committees, China responded that ‘information on 
“detention and custody and ill-treatment … violations of the law or codes of conduct by public 
security organs” … does not constitute State secrets as defined by law’. As for the failure to provide 
information requested by the Committees, China attributed this to the ‘vast size, population and 
uneven level of development among regions, and the fact that human and other resources are 
limited’.495 Therefore, China did not use the sovereignty argument to justify its failure to provide 
the requested data and information. Nevertheless, China still invoked particular reasoning.496  
In terms of the second point, China argued that its legal system was different from those of 
Western countries.497 The State Secrets Law provided an ‘error-correct system’:  
 
Under that system, if the organ or unit which determined the degree of confidentiality has found that its 
decision is inconsistent with the relevant provisions governing the scope of secrets, it shall promptly 
correct the mistake. The organ above it or the security department concerned shall also promptly notify 
the organ or unit which made the erroneous determination and shall demand an immediate correction.498  
 
In this sense, China argued that there is a systemic problem. Unlike the first argument, this 
argument does invoke sovereignty. The underlying logic here is that because China has a different 
system than other countries, the problem that the Committee has pointed out, namely that ‘the 
determination as to whether a matter is a State secret lies with the public body producing this 
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information’,499 is thus not considered a problem. However, China’s claim that it has a different 
system does not automatically refute the Committee’s criticism. On the contrary, the way in which 
the Chinese delegation describes the system simply confirms the Committee’s point. In this sense, 
the burden of argument is still on China’s side, although China has already dismissed it. Therefore, 
this argument is not constructive. 
As for the third point, China answered as follows:  
 
The Criminal Procedure Law provides that a criminal suspect in a case involving State secrets may hire 
a lawyer only if he/she obtains approval from the investigating body … in practice, the public security 
bodies allow criminal suspects to employ a lawyer so long as this does not lead to leakage of State 
secrets. It is illegal for case-management officers to reject lawyers’ requests to meet with their clients 
on the grounds of the need for confidentiality.500  
 
Although the delegation claimed that a lawyer cannot be denied access to his or her client on 
grounds of confidentiality, the delegation did not answer whether a suspect can be denied the 
opportunity to hire a lawyer on the same grounds, which is a different question from the former. 
Therefore, the burden of argument is again not met. Without further information, this argument is 
not constructive. 
Considering the justifiability of sovereignty arguments in defence of the State Secrets Law 
in general, having state secrets is indeed within a state’s domestic jurisdiction, which is also in line 
with the principle that every sovereign state is entitled to independence and autonomy in the sense 
of uniform legal personality. This equality, as discussed above, is the foundation of the current 
international legal order. Classifying certain data as state secrets need not be viewed as directly 
breaching treaty obligations under the relevant provisions. Nevertheless, because the data that has 
been classified as state secrets might be the very data that could be used to establish a breach of 
treaty obligation, there is a possibility that such conduct may defeat the purpose of the given treaty. 
On the other hand, China’s arguments would also seem to suggest that, according to the State 
Secrets Law, sovereignty as national security is used as a benchmark for disclosing national data. 
When national security is also at issue, it constitutes a purpose beyond protecting human rights. In 
other words, although it is not the purpose of the relevant human rights treaties, guaranteeing 
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national security also needs to be given proper consideration. Hence, a balance of purposes is 
needed to mitigate the state’s domestic legal order and the IHRL. This is to say that although it is 
a state’s right to protect its own security and to classify certain data as state secrets, it is in the 
mandate of the human rights Committees to take a case-by-case approach to scrutinizing the 
compatibility of protecting certain types of data and the particular rights that are protected by the 
given Convention. In this sense, given that different purposes are at issue, the principle of 
proportionality501 needs to be considered.  
In sum, there are different ideas at work when China uses sovereignty arguments, namely 
sovereignty as national unity or territorial integrity and as sovereign equality in the international 
legal order. Arguments based on sovereignty as national unity or territorial integrity are usually 
unjustifiable if the state indeed breaches its human rights treaty obligations. This is evident in the 
development of the sovereignty clause in the UN Charter, the VCLT rules, and the relevant world 
conferences, such as the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the 2005 World Summit. 
On the other hand, when a given sovereignty argument also involves considerations of national 
security, this means that different purposes (security vs. certain human rights) are at stake and that 
the balancing of these purposes must be achieved under the principle of proportionality. In this 
situation, the state has the right to table the security argument and the balancing act in the 
constructive dialogue, which should further be subject to investigation and inquiry by the relevant 
human rights Committee. In cases where sovereignty is viewed as sovereign equality and where 
the argument is that every state has (and should have) certain sovereign rights, this argument must 
be balanced by the purpose of the treaty, and such balance should also be scrutinised by the 
Committee. Therefore, in cases where competing values are at issue, given the lack of 
constructiveness of China’s arguments it is nearly impossible for the Committee to decide on the 
legal justifiability of its arguments. In other words, without knowing which measures China has 
taken, the Committees cannot decide whether they are justifiable.    
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6.4.2 China’s general position on sovereignty in international law  
Since returning as a member of the UN in 1971,502 the Chinese government has maintained a 
consistent position on invoking sovereignty arguments in international human rights treaty bodies 
and other international organisations. This position, as some scholars have pointed out, is in line 
with the traditional Westphalian position, as exemplified by Max Huber in the Island of Palmas 
case (1928) and the PCIJ Lotus case. According to this position, sovereignty is associated with 
exclusive control over territory and the independence and legal personality of states. This view of 
sovereignty is also considered the classic positive position. In fact, some say that China ought to 
be considered the ‘last bastion of Westphalia’.503 Even the current Chinese Judge in the ICJ Xue 
Hanqin is aware of the controversy associated with this position. She states that although she is 
‘fully aware that in the contemporary discourse of international law, advocacy of respect for 
sovereignty may not be a very popular theme to begin with’,504 ‘[o]ftentimes China’s adherence to 
the principle of sovereignty is simply misinterpreted in the West as a disregard of the development 
of international law, or worse still, considered an excuse to evade its international 
responsibility’.505 
          It is evident from the above discussion that China usually combines sovereignty arguments 
with other arguments (such as arguing for no treaty obligation violation or developing country 
status) in international human rights treaty bodies. In those cases, it is the latter that is justifiable 
rather than the sovereignty argument. This raises the question of why the Chinese government 
insists on invoking sovereignty in its international practices. Two Chinese ICJ Judges’ opinions 
on sovereignty may shed light on this question. 
Former Chinese ICJ Judge Wang Tieya has opined on the reason for the Chinese 
government’s reluctance to develop its position on sovereignty. In his view, this is 
 
not only because China has bitter experiences of its sovereignty being ruthlessly encroached upon by 
foreign powers in the past, but that it also has the conviction that the principle of sovereignty is the only 
main foundation upon which international relations and international law can be established and 
                                                 
502 On 25 October 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to recognise the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations, while expelling the Republic of China 
(RoC). 2578 (XXVI).  
503 Yongjin Zhang ‘Ambivalent Sovereignty: China and Re-imagining the Westphalian Ideal’ in Trudy Jacobsen et al. 
(eds) Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Routledge 2008) 101. 




developed. The Chinese put emphasis on sovereignty because it is the hard-won prize of their long 
struggles for their lost sovereignty. They take sovereignty as a legal barrier protecting against foreign 
domination and aggression.506  
 
This idea is furthered by the current Chinese ICJ Judge Xue Hanqin. From her point of view, China 
believes in sovereignty as one of the most fundamental values in the current international legal 
order.507 This position, in her opinion, also represents the views of other post-colonial countries.508 
In other words, due to its long history of struggling for sovereign rights, its identity as a newly 
established sovereign state, and its inherited mistrust of the international legal system, China has 
established a position of treating sovereignty as the most fundamental principle in the international 
legal and political order. In addition, China has kept its foreign policies and practices in line with 
this ‘mind one’s own business’ approach to sovereignty. 509  Its Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence foreign policy emphasises ‘mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence’.510 Although some scholars argue that the Chinese interpretation 
of the Five Principles and the notion of sovereignty enshrined within them have not always been 
consistent,511 they are nevertheless the fundamental principles that guide Chinese foreign affairs. 
In 2009, then Chinese President Hu Jintao reiterated the importance of the Five Principles before 
the UN General Assembly.512 As for international practices, for instance, China does not accept 
the compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ and is not yet a party to the Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. China has also made reservations to all of the dispute settlement 
clauses in all of the human rights treaties it has joined, and it does not accept any of the individual 
petition procedures in these treaties. In its pleading before the ICJ proceedings on the declaration 
                                                 
506 Wang, T.Y, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law: International law in China: historical 
and contemporary perspectives (Volume 221, Nijhoff, Leiden/Boston 1990) 290, italics added. 
507 Xue (n 504). 
508 ibid. 
509 This does not mean that China does not support joint actions taken by the international community or international 
legal regimes (e.g. climate change agreements and the WTO). What it means, rather, is that China does not interfere 
in other countries’ domestic affairs without its consent and treats this standpoint as a guiding principle of its foreign 
policy.  
510 See: http://en.people.cn/92824/92845/92870/6441502.html. 
511 See Wim Muller, ‘China’s Sovereignty in International Law: from Historical Grievance to Pragmatic Tool’ (2013) 
1 China-EU Law 35, 44–5. 
512 Statement by H.E. Hu Jintao, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the General Debate of the 64th Session 
of the UN General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2009. 
167 
 
of the independence of Kosovo, China stated that, ‘[a]s the most important subjects of international 
law and as members of the international community, sovereign States stand on territory as their 
foundation and the exclusive domain for the exercise of their sovereignty’.513       
By maintaining a consistent position on protecting the principle of sovereignty, which also 
includes invoking sovereignty arguments before international human rights treaty bodies, China 
has therefore made it clear that it views the principle of sovereignty as being of the utmost 
importance in the current international legal and political order. This position, in China’s view, 
should at least be taken into consideration by other states and international actors and should have 
an impact on the current international legal and political order.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: Objectivity in the sovereignty argument  
Stéphane Beaulac has eloquently opined on the power that resides in the notion of sovereignty:  
 
Sovereignty provides an ultimate example of a word which, far from meaning anything by itself, 
constitutes an organic instrument carrying great social power. This linguistic sign, while both 
representing and creating reality through the human mind within the shared consciousness of society, 
has undoubtedly constituted a forceful political tool and a rhetorical weapon, similar to construction 
tools such as hammers and nails or to destruction weapons such as shells and nuclear bombs.514    
 
Acknowledging the power of this linguistic artefact, in this chapter I have focused on the 
constraints that are placed on it. As Beaulac observes, the power of language resides in the fact 
that words both represent and create reality. In this chapter, I have argued that although sovereignty 
is what states make of it, it cannot follow that states can interpret the notion of sovereignty any 
way they wish. Especially when it comes to international law, even when it comes to a linguistic 
artefact like sovereignty, there is some measure of objectivity. Such objectivity resides in the 
codification of international laws, in the shared intentions (or commitments) expressed by the 
international community, and in the purpose and objects of the given legal order. Specifically, the 
Charter of the United Nations describes sovereignty as a unified form of legal personality that 
refers to a domestic jurisdiction free from intervention. This account is an important first step 
towards the objectivity of this concept insofar as it provides the word ‘sovereignty’ with legal 
                                                 
513 CR 2009/29, 7 Dec 2009, para 16.  
514 Beaulac (n 394) 30. 
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substance. This objectivity is further provided by the (customary) rules codified in the VCLT and 
confirmed by the shared intentions among the international community, expressed during the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna and later at the World Summit on the subject of 
RtoP. Consequently, with regard to the view that the principle of sovereignty is the most important 
principle in the current international community and a buffer for protecting states’ sovereign rights 
when joining international human rights treaties, in this chapter I have argued that such arguments 
have limited weight. The room for manoeuvre lies in the interpretation of state obligations under 
a given treaty. This means that in normal circumstances, if it has been established that a human 
rights treaty obligation has been breached, a sovereignty argument in support of this breach will 
not be justifiable. 
China’s position on sovereignty has a long tradition that can be explained by historical and 
political factors. China has maintained its position on sovereignty and has invoked it in 
international affairs over the past decades. In a way, this ‘consistency’ contributes to the non-
constructiveness of the arguments provided by China in constructive dialogues before treaty 
bodies. The non-constructiveness of Chinese arguments in constructive dialogue has also made it 
difficult to determine their justifiability. Moreover, it can be inferred that this consistent position 
on sovereignty reveals China’s intention to have an impact on the international legal and political 
order by preserving the relevance of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. As discussed in this 
chapter, however, when the codification of the relevant international laws, shared international 
commitments, and the purpose and object of human rights treaties all point away from Westphalian 
sovereignty, China’s (individual) efforts to preserve Westphalian sovereignty are likely to fall 
short.  
Chapter 7 Particular Reasoning on the Implementation of State Obligations 
with Regard to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Constructive Dialogue 
between China and International Human Rights Treaty Bodies  
 
Introduction 
Particular reasoning on the implementation of state obligations under ICESCR is the last (but 
certainly not the least) important example of the dynamics at work between the universal rules of 
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IHRL and the particular reasoning offered by China.515 I focus on states’ economic, social, and 
cultural rights obligations because the very nature of these rights embodies the tension between 
the universality and the particularity of human rights, especially when it comes to the 
implementation of states’ IHRL obligations.  
    The universal demand concerning economic, social, and cultural rights derives from the 
assumption that these rights are fundamental to a human being’s survival and the preservation of 
human dignity in society, whereas the particularity comes from the recognition that the satisfaction 
of these rights is to a large extent contingent on the resources available in that society. For instance, 
according to Article 11 of the ICESCR, everyone has a right to adequate food (among other things). 
From the wording of this article, the right to adequate food is a universal right. However, it is also 
acknowledged that the fulfilment of this right requires a number of resources (such as financial 
support, human resources, and infrastructure, to name a few) that some societies do not have. In 
other words, the preconditions for fulfilling this right cannot be presumed. This is where particular 
reasoning usually comes into the picture, the aim of which is to explain and justify lack of 
implementation in the given situation. The tangled relationship between universality and 
particularity regarding economic, social, and cultural rights is evident in the travaux préparatoires 
of the ICESCR, where the drafters of the ICESCR compared it with its sister covenant, the 
ICCPR.516 This relationship continued to be the focus of later General Comments issued by the 
committee. Moreover, this relationship has been codified in one of the most important (yet also 
controversial) provisions of the ICESCR, i.e. Article 2 (1), which regulates the nature of state party 
obligations under the Covenant and which will be discussed further in the next section. Here it 
suffices to say that it would be too easy to assume that the rights codified in the ICESCR are the 
same in nature as the rights codified in the ICCPR and should (or could) be articulated in the same 
fashion as the latter. In fact, I view Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR as rightly recognising that the 
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights does require a closely cooperative social 
context and must therefore be treated contextually and progressively. That is to say, the tension 
between universality and particularity regarding the implementation of economic, social, and 
                                                 
515 It should be noted that recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights is not only to be found in the ICESCR 
but also codified in other international human rights treaties, such as CERD, CEDAW, and the CRC. Therefore, 
although this chapter focuses on the texts of the ICESCR, which is the main embodiment of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, it also refers to the other provisions of the core international human rights treaties when relevant.  
516 See Matthew Craven, The International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on Its 
Development (Clarendon Paperbacks 1995) 7. 
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cultural rights must be acknowledged in the first place (as in Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR), for this 
is a precondition for achieving a possible solution. Moreover, the implementation of these rights 
is usually not an ‘on/off’ affair, but rather more like a continuum, where the ‘degree’ of 
implementation is usually at the centre of the debate. In this sense, arguments for the universality 
and the particularity of human rights are naturally and innately intertwined in this context. In other 
words, finding the balance between universality and particularity (rather than focusing on one or 
the other) is crucial to determining the legal justifiability and constructiveness of arguments 
regarding the implementation of states’ ICESCR obligations. 
This chapter focuses on topics in relation to which China has used particular reasoning in 
arguments regarding the implementation of its ICESCR obligations. These topics include China’s 
‘developing country’ status and its impact on China’s implementation of ICESCR, gender equality, 
and the collection and reporting of disaggregated statistics. I start with an analysis of Article 2 (1) 
of the ICESCR. I then investigate each topic by first reconstructing the relevant arguments and 
then identifying the main theses of the discussion. I then turn to the relevant provisions of the 
Conventions and their interpretations, which serve as a basis for identifying the fine line between 
the universal standards and particular contexts that relate to the given issue. Relevant General 
Comments will also be introduced, followed by a close look at how they have transformed the 
terrain of the debates.  
 
7.1 The nature of state parties’ obligations under Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR 
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR codifies the nature of state parties’ obligations under the Covenant in 
general. Therefore, it is the most relevant source for the current discussion. 
 
Article 2 (1): 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
of available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 




The first thing to note about Article 2 (1) is that the wording of the article has long been criticised 
for its vagueness and uncertainty, 517  which is thought to hamper the implementation of the 
Covenant. As Craven points out: ‘It is … a fairly unsatisfactory article, with its convoluted 
phraseology in which clauses and sub-clauses are combined together in an almost intractable 
manner, making it virtually impossible to determine the precise nature of the obligations’.518 One 
of the results of this vagueness, as he further elaborates, is that ‘most commentators focus merely 
upon the phrase “with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights”, while 
ignoring for the most part the other phrases that accompany it’.519 
In order to give Article 2 (1) a more concrete ground, at its fifth session in 1990 the 
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereafter CESCR) adopted one of its earliest 
General Comments—General Comment No. 3 on the nature of state parties’ obligations (Article 
2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), which was intended to give more clarity to this provision. In this 
General Comment, the committee adopted a binary approach to clarifying the states’ obligations 
under the Covenant. This approach is also seen in the Limburg Principles on the Implementation 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as most 
commentaries from the time. This approach is to distinguish immediate realisation obligations 
from progressive realisation obligations. The former are obligations that states should take up 
immediately, regardless of the economic, social, and cultural context, whereas the latter are subject 
to a wider margin of discretion and may be fulfilled over a longer period of time. Since General 
Comment No. 3 is meant to distinguish between immediate realisation obligations and progressive 
realisation obligations, one could also say that the Committee approaches economic, social, and 
cultural rights from a universal and objective stance, while leaving room for accommodating 
particularities.  
In the following sections, I investigate the committee’s definition of immediate realisation 
obligations from three perspectives: a) immediate realisation obligations as opposed to progressive 
realisation obligations; b) immediate realisation requests within progressive realisation 
obligations; and c) progressive concerns within immediate realisation obligations. Taken together, 
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these three perspectives provide a more or less comprehensive basis for understanding the 
committee’s binary approach to economic, social, and cultural rights.   
 
7.1.1 Immediate realisation obligations as opposed to progressive realisation obligations  
Based on General Comment No. 3, states’ immediate realisation obligations concerning economic, 
social, and cultural rights can be grouped as follows. 
Firstly, the committee has set out those provisions in the ICESCR that are ‘capable of immediate 
application by judicial and other organs in many national legal systems’.520 These provisions 
include Article 3 (on the equal rights of men and women), Article 7 (a)(i) (on equal pay for equal 
work), Article 8 (on the right to form and join trade unions), Article 10 (3) (on the prohibition 
against child labour), Article 13 (2)(a) (on compulsory and free primary education), Article 13 (3) 
(on the liberty of parents or legal guardians to choose schools for their children), Article 13 (4) (on 
the liberty of establishing schools or education institutions), and Article 15 (3) (on respect for the 
freedom indispensable to scientific research and creative activity). The General Comment further 
argues that ‘any suggestion that the provisions indicated are inherently non-self-executing would 
seem to be difficult to sustain’.521 Hence, the obligations mentioned above, according to the 
committee, should be integrated into the domestic legal systems of the state parties immediately, 
and absence of relevant legislation counts as non-compliance. 
Secondly, the committee has confirmed the existence of a minimum core obligation. It is 
said that ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party’.522 It goes on to note that 
‘a state party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education 
is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant’.523  
Unlike the first group, however, the minimum core obligations are to some extent 
contingent upon the resources available to the states. Therefore, two questions arise: first, are 
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minimum core obligations subject to the states’ own standards? Second, are minimum core 
obligations subject to ‘progressive realisation’? To answer the first question, although it is noted 
that the resources available within a given country should be taken into consideration, the words 
that the Committee used to describe this term, such as ‘any significant number of individuals’, 
‘essential foodstuffs’, ‘primary health care’, ‘basic shelter and housing’, ‘most basic forms of 
education’, etc., are meant to establish the absolute minimum standards that are necessary for the 
basic survival of a human being in any society. In this sense, categorising the ‘minimum core 
obligation’ as a subjective term, governed by states’ own standards, is not plausible. In the 
committee’s own words, ‘if the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être’.524 This point was re-
emphasised in the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which emphasised that ‘[s]uch minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the availability of 
resources of the country concerned or any other facts and difficulties’.525 In addition, minimum 
core obligations are viewed as paramount to the Covenant. If this kind of obligation is subject to 
states’ own standards, the raison d'être of the Covenant will indeed be put into question. Therefore, 
the answer to the first question is negative.  
Let us turn to the second question. It is not difficult to see that even for the minimum 
standard of living essentials, for various reasons (e.g. lack of financial support, resource deficits, 
social conflict, etc.) some states may still fall short of realising these conditions. That is to say, a 
state may fail to meet its minimum core standards involuntarily. In this case, the committee says 
that the state party ‘must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are 
at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’.526 Put 
differently, in justifying failure to meet minimum core standards, the burden of proof is on the 
states, while it is up to the committee to decide whether such failure is indeed justified given the 
particular circumstances and efforts that have been made by the states. In this sense, this type of 
obligation does not fall under the umbrella of ‘progressive realisation’ in that its implementation 
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should be carried out first and foremost, whereas failure to do so must be justified, and the burden 
of proof is on the state parties.527 
Third is the obligation to take legislative measures. Taking legislature measures is 
mentioned in particular in Article 2 (1) and confirmed in General Comment No. 3. It is said that 
‘in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in some cases may even been indispensable’. 
The committee also notes that in the fields of combating discrimination, health, education, ‘as well 
as in respect of the matters dealt with the article 6 to 9, legislation may also be an indispensable 
element for many purposes’. Taking legislative measures, as the committee implicitly suggests 
both in Article 2 (1) and in General Comment No. 3, can (and should) be undertaken in a relatively 
short amount of time and to some extent independently of the economic situation of the society at 
issue. In other words, state parties have little room to justify lack of legislation in a given field 
when relevant legislative measures are requested by the committee.  
 
7.1.2 Immediate realisation requests within progressive realisation obligations 
Although states are granted more leeway in the fulfilment of progressive realisation obligations 
compared to immediate realisation obligations (in the sense of the speed and measures with which 
they do so), this is by no means to say that state parties can decide whether or when to fulfil those 
obligations at liberty. Moreover, the committee, along with other commentators, delimits 
immediate realisation requests by rights that are considered subject to progressive realisation. 
Firstly, there are some restrictions that are added to progressive realisation obligations. 
Therefore, refraining from overstepping these restrictions should be considered an immediate 
realisation request. First and foremost, deliberately retrogressive measures are, in most cases, 
prohibited under the Covenant.528 Secondly, where there is a resource deficit or constraints, it is 
the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups of society that must be prioritised via the adoption 
of the relatively low-cost targeted programmes.529 Last but not least, states must guarantee that the 
‘maximum available resources’ have been adopted to satisfy economic, social, and cultural rights. 
                                                 
527 Sepúlveda (n 517) 367.  
528 As the committee elaborates, ‘any deliberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the most careful 
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529 CESCR General Comment No. 3, para 12. For example, in its concluding observations concerning Iraq in 1995, 
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In addition to the above restrictions concerning progressive realisation obligations, fully 
realising economic, social, and cultural rights must be held in mind as the ultimate goal of 
justifying each step that states take, and ‘lack of resources in itself would not allow states to defer 
indefinitely taking the necessary action to give effect to the obligations under the Covenant’.530 In 
other words, steps towards the full realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights must be taken 
within the reasonably short time following the Covenant’s entry into force for the states 
concerned.531 According to General Comment No. 3, para. 2, such steps must be ‘deliberate, 
concrete, and targeted’ at the full realisation of the rights under the Covenant. States cannot 
postpone taking the relevant steps indefinitely.532 
Furthermore, the term ‘by all appropriate means’ is usually considered to be the place 
where the margin of discretion is derived.533 However, even this phrase cannot be interpreted as 
entirely subjective:  
 
The phrase ‘by all appropriate means’ must be given its full and natural meaning. While each state party 
must decide for itself which means are the most appropriate under the circumstances with respect to 
each of the rights, the ‘appropriateness’ of the means chosen will not always be self-evident. It is 
therefore desirable that states parties’ reports should indicate not only the measures that have been taken 
but also the basis on which they are considered to be the most ‘appropriate’ under the circumstances. 
However, the ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains 
one for the committee to make.534   
 
The above interpretation makes clear that the ‘appropriate means’ that states take towards the full 
realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights are subject to the states’ own judgements. 
Nevertheless, states should provide information regarding the basis on which they consider the 
relevant measures to be ‘appropriate’. In addition, the committee reserves the right to determine 
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whether such measures are indeed appropriate in the given context. Moreover, according to 
Craven, there are some requests that states must meet immediately with regard to ‘taking 
appropriate means’, which are derived from textual, methodological, and substantive concerns in 
relation to the Covenant. From the textual perspective, there are certain provisions in the Covenant 
that stipulate the method that should be adopted to achieve the full realisation of the given rights. 
These provisions include Articles 6 (2), 11 (2), 12 (2), 13 (2), and 15 (2).535 When it comes to these 
provisions, it is not up to the states to decide on the appropriate means. From a methodological 
perspective, firstly, disaggregated statistics are required to identify vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups that do not enjoy specific rights.536 This means that it is the first step that states should take 
when evaluating their situation regarding the Covenant. Secondly, states should establish national 
‘yardsticks’ or ‘benchmarks’ to set out goals for progressive realisation obligations considering 
the national contexts and available resources,537 whereas it remains to the committee to assess 
whether such national ‘yardsticks’ or ‘benchmarks’ satisfy the requests under the Covenant. 
Finally, a coherent national policy is required to overcome problems and to realise economic, 
social, and cultural rights under the Covenant.538  
 
7.1.3 Progressive concerns within immediate realisation obligations 
For the committee and most commentators, it is common to point out the immediate realisation 
requests within progressive realisation obligations. This is in line with the observation that the 
committee intends to take a universal and objective stance regarding economic, social, and cultural 
rights. Nonetheless, it should be noted that immediate realisation obligations are also to some 
extent contingent on particular contexts, and therefore some concerns relating to progressive 
realisation need to be addressed. Firstly, when it comes to some of the immediate realisation 
obligations explicitly listed in General Comment No. 3, such as providing free education and basic 
living standards, they require basic resources as a precondition for their realisation. Secondly, with 
regards to taking legislative measures, the legislation process usually demands a thorough study 
of the situation, financial support and budget reallocation, as well as political and social 
(re)arrangements. These administrative, political, and legislative procedures require considerable 
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time and resources. Therefore, they are not as ‘immediately realisable’ as the Covenant and the 
General Comment suggest. Given these considerations, the progressive aspects should also be 
taken into account when it comes to immediate realisation obligations.  
In sum, given the vagueness and openness of the wording of Article 2 (1), it was necessary 
for the committee to further explain the nature of the state parties’ obligations under the Covenant 
(as in its General Comment No. 3). The committee adopted a binary approach, which distinguishes 
between immediate realisation obligations and progressive realisation obligations. However, 
although the committee and the commentators have made an effort to clarify the immediate 
obligation requests against and within the rights that are subject to progressive realisation, the line 
between these two types of obligation is not straightforward. It is therefore appropriate to 
acknowledge that there are both immediate and progressive aspects to the majority issues related 
to states’ obligations under ICESCR. With this in mind, let us move on to the topics in relation to 
which China has employed particular reasoning in its argumentation.  
7.2 Developing country status arguments 
The basic point of China’s arguments regarding its developing country status is that because it is 
still considered a developing country, it asks the committee ought to take its current status, national 
efforts, and progress toward the implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights into 
consideration, allowing for a certain margin of discretion in acknowledgement of this status.539 
China’s arguments concerning its status as a developing country and the impact of this 
status on its implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights are mainly found in its 
justification for the poverty of minority people, people living in rural areas, and the health of 
women living in poorer parts of Western China, including its high maternal mortality rates. In the 
case of poverty in minority and rural areas, for instance, the Chinese delegation listed the Chinese 
government’s ‘National “8–7” War on Poverty Plan’ as a measure it had taken to deal with the 
situation. According to the plan, the government commits:  
 
(a) to support poor homes in creating stable conditions on the basis of which to overcome their food and 
clothing problems; (b) to step up construction of basic facilities in poor areas; (c) basically to resolve 
problems with the supply of potable water for people and livestock, and to provide road connections between 
most impoverished villages and markets for farm produce and manufacturing centres; (d) to supply 
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electricity to the great majority of poor homes; and (e) to overcome the prevailing backwardness in 
education, culture and health, and achieve a universal basic standard of education while eradicating illiteracy 
among the young and active adult population … as well as promote vocational skills education and skills 
training for adults; to improve medical and sanitation conditions so as to prevent or reduce the incidence of 
endemic disease; and to contain population growth within the nationally stipulated range. 
   
As a result of adopting the plan, China claims that  
 
By the end of 2001, the majority of poor people living in rural areas were properly fed and clothed, 
while some remaining poor areas with hostile environments or fragile ecosystems were beginning to 
approach a state of sustainable development.540   
 
The right to food and basic living standards for the most vulnerable is considered an 
immediate realisation obligation given both minimum core obligations and the principle of giving 
priority to the most vulnerable groups. Nonetheless, as noted above, there are also progressive 
aspects even in the immediate realisation obligations that, when properly justified, should be given 
a margin of discretion. In this case, providing food and basic living standards to the least developed 
areas of China requires resources. In China’s arguments, the Chinese government issued a national 
plan to tackle this problem, which has had positive results. This form of argumentation is in line 
with the basic requirements under Article 2 (1). Moreover, the arguments also took the dialogue 
in a constructive direction. Therefore, in the absence of further counter-arguments, it can be 
considered justifiable and constructive.  
The second case concerns the poor health conditions and high maternal mortality rates of 
women living in the western parts of China. The delegation provided the maternal mortality 
statistics for these areas, information on the factors that contribute to this situation (which include 
economic difficulties, lack of qualified health workers, and lack of health care facilities), and the 
relevant national plans that have been made to tackle this problem.541 These national plans include 
the China Women’s Development Programme (2001–2010), the China Children’s Development 
Programme, the Tenth 5-Year Plan, and the development strategy for the West for the 
implementation of policies and strategies aimed at improving women’s health in poor areas. The 
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delegation also mentioned international cooperation for solving this problem.542 However, the 
delegation left out the results of these plans and cooperative efforts. Without results as indicators, 
it is difficult to tell whether these measures have been effective and appropriate. Therefore, 
although the Chinese delegation stated that China had taken steps to improve women’s health and 
reduce the high maternal mortality rate in western parts of the country, which is in line with the 
states’ obligations under the Covenant, it did not provide sufficient information to the committee 
to justify the effectiveness of those measures and to determine whether the state has fulfilled its 
obligations. Hence, although it can be viewed as constructive in the sense of providing information 
about the relevant measures, this argument is not justifiable given the lack of important 
information.  
Turning to the committee’s side, as a general response to China’s requests in the 2005 
Concluding Observation, the CESCR outlined the following: 
 
C. Factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant 
11. The committee, while recognizing the sizeable population in the vast expanse of the territory of the 





It seems that although the committee recognised the size of China’s population and territory and 
did not refute China’s status as a developing country, it did not treat China’s developing country 
status as one of the ‘significant factors and difficulties’ that impedes the state’s capacity to 
effectively implement the Covenant. In other words, the committee did not agree that China’s 
developing country status should be factored in when it comes to its implementation of the 
ICESCR obligations. 
According to the arguments provided by the Chinese delegation, however, firstly, 
‘[a]lthough China’s total economic volume is already ranked among the largest in the world, its 
per capita level is still ranked below 100 in the world’.544 Secondly, the arguments state that there 
is an imbalance between urban and rural areas and different regions of China. In addition, ‘the per 
capita resource occupancy rate is low, and economic and social development is still constrained 
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by such bottlenecks as resources, energy and the environment’. Moreover, ‘based on China’s 
current poverty alleviation standard (per capita annual income of RMB 1,196), there are still 35.97 
million people in the impoverished population’.545 Therefore, according to this argument, the lack 
of resources and structural imbalances imply that, as a developing country, China may indeed need 
more time and resources to implement its economic, social, and cultural rights obligations. In this 
regard, the committee should either 1) recognise that the conditions identified by the delegation 
are indeed factors and difficulties that could have impeded the state’s capacity to effectively 
implement the Covenant and grant a margin of discretion with regard to certain aspects 
accordingly, or 2) elaborate on why China’s developing country status does not constitute an 
impediment to implementing its treaty obligations. In the latter case, the burden of argument is on 
the committee. Therefore, the above arguments on the part of the committee to simply dismiss 
China’s claim to being a developing country that lacks the necessary resources to implement its 
treaty obligations is not constructive. Moreover, although the committee did not acknowledge 
China’s developing country status arguments in the 2005 session, China re-raised this argument in 
the 2014 session with few adjustments. This also shows that the dialogue regarding China’s 
developing country status and its impact on China’s implementation of its treaty obligations has 
not moved forward since the 2005 national dialogue session.    
 
7.3 Arguments on gender equality 
Arguments concerning gender equality can be found in constructive dialogue in both the CESCR 
and the CEDAW Committee. In this section, the dialogues are approached as follows. The first 
step is to summarise the general attitudes held by both China and the committees on the gender 
equality issue, which serve as a vantage point for the analysis (7.3.1). The next step is to identify 
the main sources, especially relevant General Recommendations, as the baseline for justifying the 
arguments (7.3.2). The third step is to investigate each topic by inquiring whether these arguments 
are justifiable. The constructiveness of the dialogue will also be discussed (7.3.3–7.3.5).   
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7.3.1 General attitude on gender equality 
China’s general attitude on gender equality can be encapsulated in the following arguments. These 
arguments can be taken as China’s basic position in defence of its gender policy.  
In its State Report in the 2014 ICESCR session, China elaborated its position on gender 
equality, invoking particular reasoning: 
 
Owing to the constraints and limitations of such factors as levels of economic and social development, 
especially in the process of economic structural adjustment, and establishing and perfecting the socialist 
market economic system, China’s promotion of gender equality and women’s development faces a 
number of new circumstances and new problems: social stratification of women’s groups is becoming 
ever more complex, and the demands of women’s life, development and protection of rights and 
interests have diversified; there are relatively marked imbalances between women’s development in 
different regions, different social strata and different groups; outdated gender-unequal customs and 
practices that have survived from China’s history and traditional culture have still not yet been 
completely eliminated, and violations of women’s rights and interests still exist to different degrees in 
some regions. 
 
To meet the above challenges, China will continue to carry out thoroughly the basic national policy of 
gender equality, protecting the rights and interests of women in accordance with the law, implementing 
the target requirements of the Women’s Development Programme, and making efforts to promote equal 
enjoyment of rights by men and women in respect of politics, economics, culture, society and family 
life.546  
 
This argument is largely in line with China’s position in the CEDAW Committee. As early as its 
1999 session, China indicated its position as follows: 
 
China is a developing country, hampered by its level of economic and social development as well as by 
traditional attitudes. In real life, Chinese women’s equal rights to political participation, employment 
and education as well as in marriage and family life have yet to be fully realized. Disrespect for and 
discrimination against women, and even violations of their rights and interests, are not uncommon, and 
the overall talents and abilities of China’s women also need further improvement.547  
 
In the 2006 State Report, China again stated the following: 
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Given the constraints stemming from varying levels of economic and social development, the influence 
of traditional modes of thought, and especially the numerous new phenomena, characteristics and 
problems emerging as a result of the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy, 
the full realization of equal rights for Chinese women in the political, economic, cultural, social and 
familial spheres will continue to be a lengthy process. It therefore remains a long-term and arduous task 
for the Chinese Government and the society as a whole to further improve the social environment for 
women’s development, overcome obstacles and eliminate discrimination against women in all its forms. 
The Chinese Government and the entire Chinese people together will make unremitting efforts to that 
end.548 
 
China was a feudal society for a long time, so thoroughly changing the old ways men and women behave 
in social and cultural settings and overcoming misconceptions based on gender discrimination is a long 
and arduous challenge. At present, women’s participation at the decision-making level in the media is 
still low; elements of gender discrimination and stereotyping persist in media content; some movies, 
TV programmes, advertisements and print media still distort, derogate and even insult the image of 
women; and the public lacks sensitivity to or critical awareness of gender discrimination in the media.549 
 
Although the situation had improved significantly as a result of those efforts, China remained a 
developing country with a population of over 1.3 billion and a modest level of productivity and 
education. There were still many difficulties and problems to be resolved in the lives and work of 
Chinese women and in the protection of their rights. Women took little part in high-level decision-
making. Discrimination against women occurred in employment. The education and health of women 
needed to be improved. It would be a fairly long process to progress from de jure equality to de facto 
equality. The Government was committed to pursuing a scientific development concept, building a 
harmonious society and implementing the National Programme for Development 2006-2010, which 
would create new opportunities for Chinese women. With support and help from the committee and 
with promotion and facilitation by the international community, China would achieve more impressive 
accomplishments in the implementation of the Convention.550 
 
On the other hand, the CEDAW Committee has repeatedly emphasised that China has not adopted 
(sufficient) temporary measures to increase gender equality, especially in the area of political 
participation. In the 1999 CDEAW session, one committee member commented that, ‘[d]espite 
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the Government’s efforts, traditional attitudes towards women persisted and there had been little 
progress in establishing a new culture of equality’.551 In the Concluding Observation of the same 
session, the committee expressed the following: 
 
The committee urges the Government to adopt temporary special measures within the meaning of article 
4, paragraph 1 of the Convention to increase the number of women at the higher echelons of 
Government. The women’s talent bank of the All China Women’s Federation should be used 
extensively to increase the percentage of women in all public bodies. The Government should also 
encourage gender-balance in the composition of village committees.552 
 
In sum, China’s general approach to addressing the issue of gender equality was to explain the 
difficulties it faced, which include its developing country status, traditional social and cultural 
stereotypes, and the ongoing process of economic restructuring. These are all examples of 
particular reasoning, which implies that in China’s view, a margin of discretion regarding the 
implementation of gender equality policies should be granted. The committee, however, was not 
satisfied with these measures, especially the temporary special measures that China claimed to 
have taken. Therefore, the committee did not agree that China had fulfilled its state obligations on 
this issue. In this sense, in order to further grasp the key issues in the debate, it is necessary to 
investigate the provisions on state obligations to implement temporary special measures in the 
context of gender equality.  
 
7.3.2 Provisions and General Recommendations on temporary special measures 
Adopting temporary measures was first and foremost addressed in Article 4 of CEDAW, which 
reads as follows:  
 
Article 4  
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between 
men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no 
way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be 
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.  
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2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in the present 
Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.  
 
The original wording codifying temporary special measures in Article 4 is written from a negative 
perspective. That is, it states that temporary special measures used to accelerate de facto gender 
equality are not a type of discrimination and shall be terminated when the objectives of equality 
have been achieved. Article 4 (2) indicates that maternity protection measures should not be treated 
as discrimination or as temporary special measures and should be permanent. Therefore, according 
to the text of Article 4, there seem to be no positive obligations on states to implement temporary 
special measures. However, this is not the current position taken by the CEDAW Committee.   
In one of its earliest General Recommendations—General Recommendation No. 5, 
adopted in 1988—the CEDAW Committee stated that because ‘there is still a need for action to 
be taken to implement fully the Convention by introduction measures to promote de facto equality 
between men and women’, it recommended that ‘state parties make more use of temporary special 
measures such as positive action, preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women’s 
integration into education, the economy, politics and employment’.553 Therefore, in spite of its 
initial negative approach to temporary special measures as mentioned in the Covenant, the 
committee encouraged states to adopt more temporary special measures. If this General 
Recommendation can be taken as a first step toward bridging the negation approach represented 
in the original text of Article 4 and toward a more positive request in practice, then General 
Recommendation No. 25 is a leap in this direction. General Recommendation No. 25, which was 
adopted at the thirtieth session in 2004, focuses on Article 4 (1) on temporary special measures. 
Beginning with the aim of achieving not only de jure but more importantly de facto equality 
between men and women,554 the committee stated that ‘pursuit of the goal of substantive equality 
also calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming underrepresentation of women and a 
redistribution of resources and power between men and women’.555 Following this point of view, 
which differs from the original wording of Article 4 (1), General Recommendation No. 25 
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emphasises ‘equality of results’ as ‘the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality’.556 It 
further states that ‘the application of temporary special measures in accordance with the 
Convention is one of the means to realize de facto or substantive equality for women, rather than 
an exception to the norms of non-discrimination and equality’.557 In its paragraph 24, it interprets 
CEDAW Article 4 (1) as being ‘in conjunction with articles 1, 2, 3, 5, and 24’ and as ‘need[ing] 
to be applied in relation to articles 6 to 16’. It stipulated that Article 4 (1) shall be understood as 
being included in ‘all appropriate measures’. Moreover, ‘states parties are obliged to adopt and 
implement temporary special measures in relation to any of these articles if such measures can be 
shown to be necessary and appropriate in order to accelerate the achievement of the overall, or a 
specific goal of, women’s de facto or substantive equality’.558 The committee also elaborated on 
specific state obligations regarding temporary special measures, including the burden of 
justification for failure to adopt temporary special measures, adopting legislative measures, and 
other measures regarding temporary special measures.559 Therefore, it suffices to say that the 
committee is now taking a positive approach to temporary special measures. In other words, it 
considers adopting temporary special measures a positive obligation on state parties. It is also 
important to note that, in General Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of state parties 
under Article 2, the committee mentions temporary special measures in particular and views them 
as falling under the obligation to fulfil.560 This again confirms that the committee’s view on 
temporary special measures has evolved, shifting from negative to positive state obligations. In 
short, given the General Comments issued by the committees over the past decades, state parties 
are now under a positive obligation to take temporary special measures regarding gender equality.  
In this regard, the particular reasoning that China has adopted, outlining its relatively low 
level of economic and social development, its long feudal history and traditional culture, and its 
economic restructuring, cannot be justified if no temporary special measures are observed on the 
relevant topics (as the committees have stated) and if China does not offer further arguments 
justifying its failure to adopt these temporary special measures. In other words, given the 
development of the committee’s stance on temporary special measures, the state parties’ obligation 
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to take temporary special measures now constitutes a positive, immediate, and even core obligation 
(as addressed in General Recommendation No. 28) under CEDAW. Failure to fulfil this obligation 
therefore puts a heavy burden of proof on states. In the case of China, the arguments for its general 
position on gender equality, as shown above, cannot be deemed justifiable in this context, 
especially since the committee has pointed out in General Recommendation No. 25 that ‘such 
failures may not be justified simply by averring powerlessness, or by explaining inaction through 
predominant market or political forces’.  
However, although the committee has decided to interpret Article 4 (1) in a positive way,561 
taking temporary special measures is by no means a black and white issue. The Special Rapporteur 
of UNCHR once raised his concern on the issue of affirmative preference:562 
 
Affirmative preference is the most controversial form of affirmative action … Discrimination takes 
place through the rationing of social goods and this will mean that some members of other groups will 
no longer be considered for these social goods which are now only in limited supply.563  
 
One commentator also opined that setting quota systems, as a form of affirmative action, is more 
controversial than redistributing social resources (e.g. advising, training, housing, and supplying 
food) to benefit disadvantaged groups, in that they may serve to ‘disadvantage other vulnerable 
groups that have similar claims to equality of opportunity’, which may even contribute to ‘hostility 
and resentment between social groups’ or fail to ‘take into account the fundamental element of 
individual choice’.564 However, these legitimate considerations seem to have little impact on the 
committee’s approach to pressing states to take temporary special measures.  
Obliging state parties to take temporary special measures (such as setting quotas for 
women’s participation in economic, political, and social life) may have a rapid and positive effect 
when it comes to changing gender stereotypes and inequalities in a given society. Nevertheless, as 
indicated above, there are concerns and difficulties that must be addressed when it comes to taking 
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temporary special measures, which have not received sufficient attention (or justification) from 
the committee. Moreover, in spite of the obstacles that may be encountered, taking temporary 
special measures, especially setting quotas, also requires extensive and inclusive social debate, as 
well as financial and political rearrangements and commitments. Therefore, although temporary 
special measures may indeed have a direct impact on society, these measures also require a 
conducive economic, social, and cultural context. This is to say that by setting temporary special 
measures as a positive, immediate, and core obligation on the part of state parties, the committee 
leaves little room for states to defend their actual inability to adopt these measures. The 
committee’s stance, in my view, is a step too far in the universal and objective direction, which 
may have a negative impact on the interaction between the committees and state parties. In other 
words, not only should the justifiability of the General Recommendations be subject to further 
investigation, but they may also hamper the constructiveness of the dialogue between state parties 
and committees, which is to some extent observed in the constructive dialogue between China and 
the CEDAW Committee.  
The following discussion will consider four specific issues regarding gender equality in 
relation to which China has advanced arguments that use particular reasoning. These four topics 
are: women’s representation in (high-level) politics, women’s employment, domestic violence, 
and women’s health. 
 
7.3.3 Arguments concerning women’s representation in (high-level) politics565 
 
7.3.3.1 Provisions on women’s participation in political and public life 
The relevant provisions on women’s participation in political and public life are found in Article 
7, which reads as follows: 
 
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the political and public 
life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right:  
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;  
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office 
and perform all public functions at all levels of government;  
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(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations concerned with the public and political life of 
the country.  
 
Temporary special measures are not mentioned in particular in the text of Article 7. 
However, as General Recommendation No. 25 establishes, taking temporary special measures is 
considered under the category of ‘all appropriate measures’ and therefore should be undertaken 
under Article 7. This view is also confirmed in General Recommendation No. 23, adopted in 1997 
on women’s political and public life. 
According to General Recommendation No. 23, not only is the CEDAW to be understood 
in a liberal democratic context and as closely linked with the interpretation and realisation of the 
ICCPR, 566  but it also establishes the state parties’ obligation to introduce temporary special 
measures regarding women’s participation in political and public life. 567  The committee has 
clarified the temporary special measures that can be applied in order to implement Articles 7 and 
8 of the CEDAW, including:  
 
recruiting, financially assisting and training women candidates, amending electoral procedures, 
developing campaigns, directed at equal participation, setting numerical goals and quotas and targeting 
women for appointment to public positions such as the judiciary or other professional groups that play 
an essential part in the everyday life of all societies.568 
 
Moreover, with regard to women’s participation in public policymaking in particular, the CEDAW 
committee stated that:  
 
States parties have a responsibility, where it is within their control, both to appoint women to senior 
decision-making roles, and as a matter of course, to consult and incorporate the advice of groups which 
are broadly representative of women’s views and interests.569  
 
Measures concerning women’s participation in policymaking, especially participation in senior 
cabinet and administrative positions and as members of government advisory bodies, include the 
following:  
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adoption of a rule whereby, when potential appointees are equally qualified, preference will be given to 
a woman nominee; the adoption of a rule that neither sex should constitute less than 40 per cent of the 
members of a public body; a quota for women members of cabinet and for appointment to public office; 
and consultation with women’s organizations to ensure that qualified women are nominated for 
membership in public bodies and offices and the development and maintenance of registers of such 
women in order to facilitate the nomination of women for appointment to public bodies and posts. Where 
members are appointed to advisory bodies upon the nomination of private organizations, state parties 
should encourage these organizations to nominate qualified and suitable women for membership in 
these bodies.570 
 
The committee’s opinions on women’s participation in political and public life is therefore 
in line with the development of its stance on temporary special measures in general. As one 
commentator indicates, because the committee ‘seems to be of the opinion that low overall 
representation of women indicates a violation of Article 7’ and constitutes grounds for ‘ask[ing] 
the state party to comply with or enhance compliance with Articles 7 and 8’, it can be concluded 
that ‘a minimum threshold of representation is an immediate obligation of the state’. Nonetheless, 
‘the obligation to reach parity in political life is seen as a goal to be implemented gradually’. 
Therefore, ‘it is sufficient for the state to prove that all appropriate measures are being taken to 
increase the ratio of women. The evaluation of the appropriateness of the measures lies with the 
committee’.571 
 
7.3.3.2 The justifiability and constructiveness of the arguments 
According to China’s arguments, it has achieved de jure or formal equality between men and 
women when it comes to participation in public and political life. The problem arises when de 
facto equality is taken into consideration, given that the ratio of female members in both high-level 
politics and local village committees is rather low. This issue has been raised in several sessions 
over past decades, in both the CESCR and the CEDAW Committee. In the 2005 CESCR session, 
the Chinese delegation noted that ‘women accounted for 24 per cent of the members of the National 
People’s Congress … [and that] there was at least one female cadre in the administrations of the 
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31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions’.572 However, the policy of having ‘at least 
one women in local government leadership at the county level and above’ mentioned in the State 
Report fell short of the requirements of the CESCR.573 The committee’s criticism was not accepted 
by the Chinese delegation on the grounds that because ‘the number of leadership positions was 
rather small, that quota was already significant’. Hence, it seems that China considered itself to 
have already met the threshold of the minimum standard, whereas the committee held otherwise.  
In the CEDAW session, the committee members stated that ‘attributing the situation to 
gender stereotypes was inadequate’574 and that ‘numbers and quotas should be established’.575 
However, this comment was again not sufficiently acknowledged by the Chinese delegation, who 
explained that with regard to the ‘fairness of the elections’, ‘there was no special provisions for 
gender in (villagers’ committee) elections’. The delegation further appealed to gender stereotypes 
(the ‘lower status of women in rural areas’) as a reason for the lower representation of women in 
the villagers’ committee. In addition, the delegation informed committee members that ‘the draft 
law would ensure that at least one woman was represented on each committee’.576 So far, China’s 
arguments seem to be un-constructive, given that the delegation still resorted to gender stereotypes 
and China’s developing country status as reasons for the low representation of women in politics—
reasons which were clearly rejected by the committee members in the earlier sessions. Moreover, 
the ‘at least one women’ principle has repeatedly shown up in different contexts regarding different 
levels of political representation, which is far from ‘adequate’ in the view of the committees. In 
the 2014 CEDAW session, the Chinese delegation mentioned that ‘women currently accounted for 
over 40 per cent of the members of the National People’s Congress’.577 However, the delegation 
did not address any intention to adopt further legislative measures, especially regarding quota 
setting. 
In sum, the dialogue on women’s participation in public and political life, especially 
regarding de facto equality and quota settings, has not moved forward over the past decades. 
Although China has refrained from appealing to gender stereotypes to explain the low 
representation of women in its latest CEDAW session, which can be considered progress, it is still 
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reluctant to set a more ambitious quota (more than ‘at least one female’). Since it has been 
established in the General Recommendations that states have a positive obligation to ensure 
women’s equal participation in political and public life, adopting temporary special measures in 
the form of quota setting is required. China’s ‘at least one female’ provision certainly falls short 
of ‘the minimum threshold of representation’. In this sense, China’s continuing reluctance to set a 
reasonable quota without further justification is not justifiable. 
 
7.3.4 Women’s employment 
7.3.4.1 Provisions on the equal right to work  
The most relevant provision regarding women’s equal right to work under the CEDAW is Article 
11, which reads as follows:  
 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in 
particular:  
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;  
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for 
selection in matters of employment;  
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, job security and all 
benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive vocational training and retraining, including 
apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and recurrent training;  
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in respect of work of 
equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;  
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity 
and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;  
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including the safeguarding of 
the function of reproduction.  
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to 
ensure their effective right to work, states Parties shall take appropriate measures:  
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of 
maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;  
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits without loss of former 
employment, seniority or social allowances;  
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(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to enable parents to combine 
family obligations with work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through 
promoting the establishment and development of a network of child-care facilities;  
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work proved to be harmful to 
them.  
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be reviewed periodically in the 
light of scientific and technological knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary. 
 
The General Recommendation that is relevant to Article 11 is General Recommendation No. 13 
(1989) on equal remuneration for work of equal value. In this document, the committee 
recommended the following: 
 
1. In order to implement fully the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against 
Women, those states parties that have not yet ratified ILO Convention No. 100 should be encouraged to 
do so;  
2. They should consider the study, development and adoption of job evaluation systems based on gender-
neutral criteria that would facilitate the comparison of the value of those jobs of a different nature, in 
which women presently predominate, with those jobs in which men presently predominate, and they 
should include the results achieved in their reports to the committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women;  
3. They should support, as far as practicable, the creation of implementation machinery and encourage 
the efforts of the parties to collective agreements, where they apply, to ensure the application of the 
principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value.578  
 
7.3.4.2 The justifiability and constructiveness of the arguments 
The main concerns voiced by the committee were about the disproportionate effect on women of 
economic restructuring and guaranteeing equal pay for work of equal value, as set out in ILO Equal 
Remuneration Convention (No. 100). The main point of China’s argument is that China was going 
through an economic restructuring period, which had an adverse effect on women in particular. 
Moreover, it attributed this problem to ‘private businesses, and jointly funded, foreign-funded and 
jointly operated enterprises’, which failed to protect women’s rights in the workplace.579 This 
argument, however, revealed that the state party had failed to implement the obligation to protect 
                                                 
578 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 13: Equal remuneration for work of equal value, 1989. 
579 CEDAW/C/SR. 419, para 21. 
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under Article 11 of the CEDAW and is therefore not justifiable. In its 2014 session, this argument 
was replaced by an argument addressing measures that have been taken to tackle this problem, 
including, among others, providing ‘employment information, career guidance, job referrals and 
other public services in relation to employment to different women’s groups’.580 Provided they are 
sufficient (which is for the committee to decide), the measures mentioned form a justifiable 
argument. That is, China has improved its arguments on this issue over time, and therefore its 
contributions can be considered constructive. 
As for equal remuneration for work of equal value, the Chinese delegation pointed out that 
there were relevant provisions on ‘equal pay for equal work’ in its Labour Law, the Labour 
Contract Law, and the Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women. The committee 
stated, however, that lack of legislation on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value was 
the reason for China’s persistent and widening gender gap on this matter.581 Failure to adopt 
legislation on the principle of equal pay for work of equal value is prima facie not justifiable. This 
is because the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, according to the wording of Article 
11 (d), as well as General Recommendation No. 13, para 1, is the main obligation under Article 
11 on the equal right to work. In addition, the obligation to take legislative measures is an 
immediate realisation obligation. Thus, any particular reasoning that runs against this principle 
must bear a heavy burden of proof. However, in this context, China did mention that it had enacted 
several relevant pieces of legislation. Hence, it is the Committee’s place to decide whether these 
legislative measures are sufficient (not to question their existence). In this sense, it seems that the 
committee did not consider these legislative measures sufficient, given their de facto impact. 
However, the committee did not address this concern explicitly. Therefore, the committee’s 
arguments are not constructive, for it still bears the burden of explaining why the relevant 
legislation as mentioned in China’s statement was not sufficient.  
 
7.3.5 Eliminating violence against women and protecting women’s health 
7.3.5.1 Relevant provisions 
There is no article in the text of the CEDAW that regulates eliminating violence against women. 
However, this topic was raised in its General Recommendation No. 12 (1989), which ‘require[s] 
                                                 
580 CEDAW/C/CHN/7–8, 41. 
581 CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7–8, para 36. 
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the States parties to act to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the family, 
at the work place or in any other area of social life’ and which 
 
[r]ecommends to the States parties that they should include in their periodic reports to the committee 
information about: 
1. The legislation in force to protect women against the incidence of all kinds of violence in everyday 
life (including sexual violence, abuses in the family, sexual harassment at the work place etc.); 
2. Other measures adopted to eradicate this violence; 
3. The existence of support services for women who are the victims of aggression or abuses; 
4. Statistical data on the incidence of violence of all kinds against women and on women who are the 
victims of violence.582 
 
A number of issues in relation to women’s health is also codified in Article 12 of CEDAW:  
 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care 
services, including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article, States Parties shall ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting 
free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation. 
 
Moreover, in its General Recommendation No. 24 (1999), the CEDAW Committee further 
clarifies the states’ obligations under Article 12 on women’s health. This includes state obligations 
with regard to reporting (especially on data disaggregated by sex), taking health measures that 
specifically address women, considering their needs and interests, and preventing discrimination 
in access to health services, among others. 
 
7.3.5.2 Arguments 
a) On eliminating violence against women 
In the 1999 CEDAW session, the Chinese delegation explained the factors that contribute to 
violence against women in China:  
                                                 




First, China had a long history as a feudal society, and patriarchal ideas still had some influence. Women 
victims mistakenly believed that being beaten by their husbands was a family stigma and endured the 
abuse in silence. In addition, there were still many women who did not have an independent income, 
and their fragile economic status and dependence left them powerless. Ideas about family life which had 
arisen during the transitional period had led in some cases to a lack of responsibility towards the family, 
which in turn had led to domestic violence. Finally, in remote rural areas, there were still cases of 
arranged marriages and mercenary marriages; it had been shown that domestic violence occurred more 
frequently in such marriages.583  
 
The delegation followed by listing the measures that had been taken to tackle this problem. It is 
said in 2014 session that the new legislation to combat domestic violence had been drafted and 
submitted to the National People’s Congress for consideration.584 
 
b) On protecting women’s health 
In the 2006 State Report, China stated that: 
 
The Chinese Government has also noted that in many rural areas, especially those with high rates of 
poverty, there remains a serious lack of health-care facilities and medical personnel, and huge inputs 
are needed to build the infrastructure required; this is a situation that is not easily changed in a short 
time. In the mountainous areas, the hinterlands and areas of high poverty, the lack of health knowledge 
and inaccessibility in terms of transportation result in relatively low rates of in-hospital births (45-65 
per cent), with comparatively high rates of maternal and infant mortality as a consequence. The 
incidence of HIV/AICS is also rising rapidly in China. There are still some people who cling to the 
traditional view of sons as being more advantageous or better than daughters, especially in areas of high 
poverty. Owing to the low level of productivity and the lack of information in those areas, changing 
such attitudes will take some time. With these obstacles in mind, the Government has formulated 
policies to increase inputs into rural health care, strengthen the training of rural health-care personnel, 
and promote education efforts regarding health and population issues. The efforts of all sectors of 
society will be needed in working towards a solution to these issues step by step.585 
 
                                                 
583 CEDAW/C/SR.419, para 42. 
584 CEDAW/C/SR. 1251, para 27.  
585 CEDAW/C/CHN/5–6, 48. 
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7.3.5.3. The justifiability and constructiveness of the arguments 
In the case of domestic violence and women’s right to health, China defended its position by 
adopting particular reasoning to explain the barriers and obstacles it faced with regard to these 
issues. Nonetheless, the Chinese delegation also supported these arguments with descriptions of 
the measures it had taken on each topic. Particular reasoning was used to argue for a possible 
margin of discretion considering the results of these measures rather than to defend non-
implementation. In addition, the committee did not express counter-arguments to China’s 
arguments. Therefore, weighing all arguments, my conclusion would be that in the case of adopting 
general social policies and legislation for combating violence against women and improving 
women’s health, China’s particular reasoning was justifiable and constructive.  
To sum up, China’s arguments on women’s representation in politics are not legally 
justifiable given that the General Recommendations have made taking temporary measures in this 
context a positive obligation, which China is reluctant to embrace. Nevertheless, by refraining 
from turning to gender stereotypes to explain the low representation of women in politics, China’s 
arguments were to some extent (up to the point of quota-setting) constructive. With regard to 
women’s right to work and equal pay for work of equal value, China’s arguments on both topics 
are justifiable thus far (pending rebuttal from the committee). With regard to women’s right to 
work, in its earlier sessions China attributed the problem of protecting women’s right to work to 
‘private business, and jointly funded, foreign-funded and jointly operated enterprises’. This 
argument revealed that the state party had failed to implement the obligation to protect, and it was 
therefore not justifiable. China did, however, improve its arguments in later sessions by outlining 
the measures it had taken on this topic. Therefore, China’s later arguments on this topic were 
justifiable and constructive. As for equal remuneration for work of equal value, China pointed out 
its relevant legislation on guaranteeing equal pay for work of equal value, whereas the committee 
insisted that there was a lack of legislation in this field without further elaboration. Therefore, 
according to the committee, China’s arguments were not justifiable, and the committee’s 
arguments were not constructive. Finally, regarding eliminating violence against women and 
protecting women’s health, China’s arguments via particular reasoning were both justifiable and 




7.4 Disaggregated statistics collection and reporting  
A lack of information in the form of disaggregated statistics in China’s reports has been of concern 
to several committees and was viewed as a failure to implement the relevant conventions. 
The Chinese delegation has expressed different arguments and attitudes to different 
committees regarding data collection. The arguments involving particular reasoning that hinged 
on the claim that China is a developing country were mainly invoked in the CAT. This argument 
has not changed much over the past decades.586 This reasoning, however, was not taken as the 
main argument in the other two committees when China’s data collection system and statistical 
information were also questioned. In the CEDAW Committee, the Chinese delegation listed its 
progress with regard to data collection and its publication system in the latest session,587 while in 
the CRC Committee, the main focus was on reliability rather than the absence of data.588 The 
committees’ arguments, on the other hand, were aligned in requesting that state parties collect and 
report the disaggregated data.589 This uniform standpoint across different committees is further 
revealed by the General Comments adopted by each committee on data collection and reporting.  
 
7.4.1 Sources on the state parties’ obligation to collect data  
The CAT committee    
 
In its General Comment No. 2 on the implementation of Article 2 by state parties, considering data 
collection, the CAT Committee stated that:  
 
23. Continual evaluation is therefore a crucial component of effective measures. The committee has 
consistently recommended that states parties provide data disaggregated by age, gender and other key 
factors in their reports to enable the committee to adequately evaluate the implementation of the 
Convention. Disaggregated data permits the states parties and the committee to identify, compare and 
                                                 
586 CAT/C/SR.846, para 3, CAT/C/SR.846, para 36. CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2, 20. It should be noted that the State 
Secrets Law and its relationship with the open information was discussed in the former chapter on the sovereignty 
argument. Therefore, it will not be repeated in the current chapter. Here, I will focus on the ‘developing country’ side 
of the arguments. 
587  CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8, para 35. 
588  CRC/C/SR.300, paras 39, 42. 
589 CAT/C/SR.146/Add.4, 2. CAT/C/SR.423/Add.1, paras 12 and 25. CAT/C/SR.844, para 31. CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, 
paras 2 and 17. CAT/C/CHN/CO/5, paras 6, 24, and 25. C.O A/54/38/Rev.1, para 267, page 28. 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6, paras 13, 14. 2014. CEDAW/C/SR.1251, para 21. CRC/C/SR.300, paras 38, 40, 41. 
CRC/C/SR.1062, para 15.  CRC/C/SR.1065, para 58. 
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take steps to remedy discriminatory treatment that may otherwise go unnoticed and unaddressed. states 
parties are requested to describe, as far as possible, factors affecting the incidence and prevention of 
torture or ill-treatment, as well as the difficulties experienced in preventing torture or ill-treatment 
against specific relevant sectors of the population, such as minorities, victims of torture, children and 
women, taking into account the general and particular forms that such torture and ill-treatment may 
take.590 
 
In its General Comment No. 3 on the implementation of Article 14 by state parties, the committee 
again articulated its position that disaggregated data collection and reporting belongs to the state 
parties’ obligation to monitor and report:  
 
45. States parties shall establish a system to oversee, monitor, evaluate, and report on their provision of 
redress measures and necessary rehabilitation services to victims of torture or ill-treatment. 
Accordingly, states parties should include in their reports to the committee data disaggregated by age, 
gender, nationality, and other key factors regarding redress measures afforded to victims of torture or 
ill-treatment, in order to meet their obligation as recalled in General Comment No. 2 to provide continual 
evaluation of their efforts to provide redress to victims.’591  
 
The committee followed by specifically addressing the form and type of data that should be collected and 
reported under this obligation.592 
 
The CESCR  
 
Article 16 of ICESCR reads as follows: 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit in conformity with this part of the Covenant 
reports on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance 
of the rights recognized herein.  
 
General Comment No. 1 (1989) on Reporting by State Parties reads as follows: 
 
                                                 
590 CAT General Comment No. 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, 24 January 2008, CAT/C/GC/2, para 
23. 
591 CAT General Comment No. 3: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment: implementation of article 14 by States parties, 13 December 2012, para 45  
592 CAT General Comment No. 3, para 46.  
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3. A second objective is to ensure that the state party monitors the actual situation with respect to each 
of the rights on a regular basis and is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, 
being enjoyed by all individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction. From the committee’s 
experience to date, it is clear that the fulfilment of this objective cannot be achieved only by the 
preparation of aggregate national statistics or estimates, but also requires that special attention be given 
to any worse off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which appear to be particularly 
vulnerable or disadvantaged. Thus, the essential first step towards promoting the realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights is diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation. The committee 
is aware that this process of monitoring and gathering information is a potentially time consuming and 
costly one and that international assistance and cooperation, as provided for in article 2, paragraph 1 
and articles 22 and 23 of the Covenant, may well be required in order to enable some states parties to 
fulfil the relevant obligations. If that is the case, and the state party concludes that it does not have the 
capacity to undertake the monitoring process which is an integral part of any process designed to 
promote accepted goals of public policy and is indispensable to the effective implementation of the 
Covenant, it may note this fact in its report to the committee and indicate the nature and extent of any 
international assistance that it may need. 
 
It is evident from General Comment No. 1 of ICESCR that, first, state parties have an 
obligation to collect and report the disaggregated statistics that reflect the situation of vulnerable 
or disadvantaged regions or groups. Secondly, in the case of the state’s use of particular reasoning 
(such as arguments about developing status) as a way of justifying its failure to collect 
disaggregated data, the state should: 1) require international assistance and cooperation, and 2), 
where international assistance and cooperation cannot help the situation, inform the committee of 
the nature and extent of any international assistance it may need.  
 
The CEDAW Committee  
 
In its General Recommendation No. 9 on statistical data concerning the situation of women, the CEDAW 
Committee stated the following:  
 
Considering that statistical information is absolutely necessary in order to understand the real situation 
of women in each of the states parties to the Convention,  
Having observed that many of the states parties that present their reports for consideration by the 
committee do not provide statistics,  
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Recommends that states parties should make every effort to ensure that their national statistical services 
responsible for planning national censuses and other social and economic surveys formulate their 
questionnaires in such a way that data can be disaggregated according to gender, with regard to both 
absolute numbers and percentages, so that interested users can easily obtain information on the situation 
of women in the particular sector in which they are interested.593 
 
In its more recent General Comment—General Comment No. 28 on the core obligations of states 
parties—it stated that it is the state parties’ obligation to collect and report disaggregated data: 
 
… states parties have an international responsibility to create and continuously improve statistical 
databases and the analysis of all forms of discrimination against women in general and against women 
belonging to specific vulnerable groups in particular.594 
… 
The policy must be action- and results-oriented in that it should establish indicators, benchmarks and 
timelines, ensure adequate resourcing for all relevant actors and otherwise enable those actors to play 
their part in achieving the agreed benchmarks and goals. To this end, the policy must be linked to 
mainstream governmental budgetary processes in order to ensure that all aspects of the policy are 
adequately funded. It should provide for mechanisms that collect relevant sex-disaggregated data, enable 
effective monitoring, facilitate continuing evaluation and allow for the revision or supplementation of 
existing measures and the identification of any new measures that may be appropriate.595 
 
In the same recommendation, the committee also indicated that collecting and reporting 
disaggregated data is the method by which state parties are to implement their core obligation: 
‘[d]eveloping and establishing valid indicators of the status of and progress in the realization of 
human rights of women, and establishing and maintaining databases disaggregated by sex and 
related to the specific provisions of the Convention’.596  
 
The CRC Committee 
 
In its General Comment No. 5, the CRC states the following:  
                                                 
593 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 9: Statistical Data Concerning the Situation of Women. 1989. A/44/38. 
594 General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 16 December 2010, CEDAW/C/GC/28, para 10. 
595 Ibid para 28. 




The general measures of implementation identified by the committee and described in the present 
General Comment are intended to promote the full enjoyment of all rights in the Convention by all 
children, through legislation, the establishment of coordinating and monitoring bodies - governmental 
and independent - comprehensive data collection, awareness-raising and training and the development 
and implementation of appropriate policies, services and programmes.597 
… 
in the light of the following articles in the Convention identified by the committee as general principles: 
Article 2: the obligation of states to respect and ensure the rights set forth in the Convention to each child 
within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind. This non-discrimination obligation requires 
states actively to identify individual children and groups of children the recognition and realization of 
whose rights may demand special measures. For example, the committee highlights, in particular, the 
need for data collection to be disaggregated to enable discrimination or potential discrimination to be 
identified.598 
… 
Collection of sufficient and reliable data on children, disaggregated to enable identification of 
discrimination and/or disparities in the realization of rights, is an essential part of implementation. The 
committee reminds states parties that data collection needs to extend over the whole period of childhood, 
up to the age of 18 years. It also needs to be coordinated throughout the jurisdiction, ensuring nationally 
applicable indicators. States should collaborate with appropriate research institutes and aim to build up 
a complete picture of progress towards implementation, with qualitative as well as quantitative studies. 
The reporting guidelines for periodic reports call for detailed disaggregated statistical and other 
information covering all areas of the Convention. It is essential not merely to establish effective systems 
for data collection, but to ensure that the data collected are evaluated and used to assess progress in 
implementation, to identify problems and to inform all policy development for children. Evaluation 
requires the development of indicators related to all rights guaranteed by the Convention. 
 
49. The committee commends states parties which have introduced annual publication of comprehensive 
reports on the state of children’s rights throughout their jurisdiction. Publication and wide dissemination 
of and debate on such reports, including in parliament, can provide a focus for broad public engagement 
in implementation. Translations, including child-friendly versions, are essential for engaging children 
and minority groups in the process. 
 
                                                 
597 General comment no. 5 (2003): General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
27 November 2003, CRC/GC/2003/5, para 9. 
598 ibid para 12. 
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50. The committee emphasizes that, in many cases, only children themselves are in a position to indicate 
whether their rights are being fully recognized and realized. Interviewing children and using children as 
researchers (with appropriate safeguards) is likely to be an important way of finding out, for example, 
to what extent their civil rights, including the crucial right set out in article 12, to have their views heard 
and given due consideration, are respected within the family, in schools and so on.599 
 
In sum, the committees mentioned above take a uniform and consistent approach to the 
state party obligation to collect and report disaggregated data. That is, the data collected and 
reported by state parties, e.g. via the State Reports, must be disaggregated, and this is also 
considered a core state obligation. The committees view disaggregated data collection and 
reporting as a core state obligation for the following reasons: first, disaggregated data collection is 
a necessary step in states’ acknowledgement of their current situations and in providing basic 
information for further effective monitoring. Second, it is also necessary for ensuring that the 
relevant committees have a relatively accurate picture of the situation and are able to provide their 
concluding observations accordingly. Third, for most obligations that are subject to ‘progressive 
realisation’, chronological disaggregated data is an important indicator for determining whether a 
state has indeed met the relevant requirements. Fourth, since it has been established that when the 
resources of the given state party are limited, priority should be given to vulnerable groups and 
regions, disaggregated data on the situations of vulnerable groups and regions is the only way to 
decide whether the states have fulfilled such obligations. In short, disaggregated data collection 
and reporting is a core state party obligation. This is the position taken by all international human 
rights treaty bodies. Therefore, the burden of argument is on the states if they do not provide such 
data. 
That being said, is this obligation an obligation to be realised immediately or 
progressively? Put differently, are state parties entitled to a margin of discretion when there is an 
implementation gap? It is recognised in CESCR General Comment No. 1 that collecting the 
disaggregated data takes time and resources.600 Given this consideration, it is fair to say that this 
obligation is a progressive realisation obligation. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, this 
does not mean that the state parties can postpone fulfilling this obligation without providing 
reasonable justification that is accepted by the committee. Moreover, when it comes to progressive 
                                                 
599 ibid paras 48–50.  
600 See CESCR General Comment No. 1 (1989), para 3. 
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realisation obligations, states must utilise the maximum resources available and take steps towards 
fulfilling their obligations. In addition, where there is a lack of resources, the given state should 
ask for international assistance. Therefore, only when states do ask for international assistance and 
prove that such assistance has not helped the situation may they have a margin of discretion with 
regard to implementing the relevant measures.  
 
7.4.2 The justifiability of the arguments and the constructiveness of the dialogue 
In the CAT Committee, China’s main argument for its failure to provide disaggregated data was 
that it was a developing country with limited resources and a large population, and that it did not 
have sufficient resources or time to collect and report the data as the committee had requested.601 
According to the above discussion, in order for this particular reasoning to be justifiable, China 
must prove that: 1) maximum effort has been devoted to improving the situation; 2) steps have 
been taken to fulfil the obligation; and 3) China has invited international assistance. Only if all 
three criteria are met will this particular reasoning be justifiable. However, not only were none of 
these points mentioned in China’s arguments, but China insisted on using consolidated rather than 
disaggregated data in cases such as collecting and reporting data on the death penalty (which 
should be easy to collect in disaggregated form as the number is relatively small). In this regard, 
China’s use of particular reasoning before the CAT Committee regarding its failure to provide 
disaggregated data is neither justifiable nor constructive. 
In the CEDAW session, in reply to the committee’s comments on the lack of disaggregated 
data, the Chinese delegation elaborated on the Chinese government’s efforts and progress in data 
collection and publication.602 In this case, the Chinese delegation tried to justify the situation by 
arguing that China has taken sufficient steps towards fulfilling its obligations, which should be 
viewed as compliance. This argument is therefore already a step forwards in terms of contributing 
to the constructiveness of the dialogue compared to China’s arguments before the CAT 
Committee, which showed little intention of improving the status quo. However, it is still for the 
committee to decide whether the progress mentioned was sufficient and the obligation fulfilled. 
After China’s report on its progress with regard to data collection, one committee member during 
the constructive dialogue pointed out that China had failed to provide statistics on things like the 
                                                 
601 CAT/C/SR.846, para 3. 
602 CEDAW/C/CHN/7–8, para 35. 
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incidence of rape and that there was a lack of transparency regarding information on women’s 
rights.603 Therefore, it seems that the committee members did not take China’s arguments to be 
justified in this case.   
Finally, in the CRC session, the committee’s main concern regarding the data provided by 
China was its reliability, for there appeared to be a large gap between the statistics provided in the 
State Reports and those provided by other sources.604 As a response, the Chinese delegation asked 
the committee to note that ‘all statistics were only relatively reliable’. Moreover, the Chinese 
delegation argued that China ‘had done its best’ to collect the data and that the national data 
collection system ‘would improve as the country developed economically’.605 This argument can 
be reformulated as follows: 1) China has made the maximum effort on the issue; and 2) it was 
asking for a margin of discretion regarding its data collection system due to its economic situation. 
Moreover, in the 2013 session, the Chinese delegation pointed to the annual evaluation of 
programme implementation and databanks as ways of collecting and reporting the relevant data. 
606  Regarding the justifiability of the arguments, however, although China claimed to have made 
the maximum effort, it had not proved that this was indeed the case, as the disaggregated data 
requested by the committee was still not made available, with no further justification. Therefore, 
this reasoning is not in itself sufficient to justify the lack of disaggregated data.  
To sum up, although they invoke different reasoning, China’s arguments on data collection 
and reporting in different committees are in general not justifiable. Nonetheless, the arguments in 
some committees appear to be more constructive than in others. Since the different committees 
have adopted similar approaches to the obligation to collect and report data, it is China’s attitudes 
that have varied across different committees. A plausible explanation is that China was more 
willing to collect and report on certain types of data than other types. Taking the above arguments 
into consideration, it seems that it is China’s intention to cooperate, rather than the committee’s 
stance, that has had a significant impact on the direction of the dialogue.  
 
                                                 
603 CEDAW/C/SR. 1251, para 21. 
604 CRC/C/SR. 1065, para 58. 
605 CRC/C/SR. 300, para 42 
606 CRC/C/SR.1834, para 2.  
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7.5 Conclusion  
This chapter investigates arguments that use particular reasoning and that concern failure to 
implement obligations regarding economic, social, and cultural rights. China has argued that due 
to its developing country status, it has not been able to fulfil these rights immediately and has 
asked the committee for a margin of discretion. The CESCR did not view China’s developing 
country status as an impediment to its implementation of the Covenant. As discussed above, the 
dialogue on this topic was not constructive, given that in later sessions China again brought up its 
developing country arguments with few adjustments, and the committee has still not responded. 
In this case, China’s arguments were justifiable given that no further counter-arguments were 
provided by the committee. Moreover, since the burden of proof is now on the committee, it seems 
that it was the committee’s stance that prevented the dialogue from moving forward.  
With regard to improving gender equality, China argued that because of factors such as 
economic restructuring, traditional patriarchal ideas and bias towards women, as well as poverty 
in remote rural areas, it had faced barriers to implementing gender equality nationwide and should 
therefore be granted a margin of discretion. Nonetheless, it can also be seen from China’s 
arguments that when it came to issues such as employment, domestic violence, and women’s 
health, the government appeared more willing to adopt measures to tackle the problems, whereas 
when it came to issues such as women’s participation in (high-level) politics, the government 
showed more reluctance to adopt measures. These different attitudes, in my view, are not random. 
China’s approach to tackling the former issues was to adopt general social policies that improve 
the situation of women, whereas the measures that the committee suggested to China as means of 
diminishing de facto gender inequality in political participation were temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto and substantive equality.607 In other words, it seems that the Chinese 
government was more willing to adopt general social policy measures than to take temporary 
special measures regarding women’s rights. Moreover, within the arguments regarding women’s 
participation in public and political life and employment, the Chinese government was inclined to 
                                                 
607 ‘States parties should clearly distinguish between temporary special measures taken under article 4, paragraph 1, 
to accelerate the achievement of a concrete goal for women of de facto or substantive equality, and other general social 
policies adopted to improve the situation of women and the girl child. Not all measures that potentially are, or will be, 
favourable to women are temporary special measures. The provision of general conditions in order to guarantee the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of women and the girl child, designed to ensure for them a life of 
dignity and non-discrimination, cannot be called temporary special measures’ (CEDAW General Recommendation 
No. 25, para 19). 
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guarantee gender equality of opportunity rather than equality of results. The former can be 
approached mainly in terms of de jure equality, while the latter requires de facto equality. That is 
to say, the committee’s push for the adoption of temporary special measures did not receive a 
positive response from China. This can be seen from the perspective of China’s refusal to take 
temporary special measures despite the fact that the committees had voiced such requests in the 
past decade. Meanwhile, given the high standards imposed on (and limited leeway given to) the 
state by the committee with regard to adopting temporary special measures, China’s particular 
reasoning was not justifiable. In this sense, both China’s position and the CEDAW Committee’s 
position obstructed constructive dialogue. 
As for collecting and reporting disaggregated statistics, this chapter argues that this 
obligation is a core obligation of state parties insofar as without this information it is impossible 
for committees to obtain a comprehensive and accurate picture of the situation, and even more 
difficult to provide useful and relevant concluding observations. China offered different arguments 
regarding statistics collection and reporting before different committees. In the CAT session, 
China appealed to its developing country status and showed little intention of further improvement. 
In the CEDAW session, China argued that it had made progress in data collection, which should 
be considered sufficient for fulfilling its treaty obligations. In the CRC session, regarding the 
committee’s doubts about the reliability of data, China argued that it had made the maximum effort 
to collect data and that the situation was constrained by its economic and developmental status. 
However, none of these arguments are justifiable in their given contexts. As for the 
constructiveness of the dialogue, China’s argument before the CAT Committee was least 
constructive, while those before the CEDAW and CRC Committees, although not justifiable, did 
contribute to the dialogue in general. Therefore, it is fair to say that China was willing to collect 
and report certain types of data and less willing when it came to others. In this case, the quality of 
the dialogue seems to depend more on China’s attitude than the committees’. In other words, it 
can be assumed that as long as China’s attitude towards (certain types of) data collection and 
reporting does not change, the dialogue will remain more or less where it is.  
When it comes to the implementation of states’ obligations with regard to economic, social, 
and cultural rights, the margin of discretion may seem rather wide at first glance. However, it has 
been shown in this chapter that this margin of discretion is rather limited and has been reduced as 
a result of the General Comments and new interpretations by the committees regarding states’ 
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implementation obligations over the past decades. In this sense, the committees have demonstrated 
their universal and objective stance toward implementing economic, social, and cultural rights. 
This stance is shown not only in the committee’s arguments in constructive dialogue with states 
but also in the development of their interpretations of the Conventions, for example in the General 
Comments. The tension between the committees’ universal stance and states’ particular arguments 
is evident when it comes to issues such as developing country status arguments and the adoption 
of temporary special measures. With these issues, while the committees have tended to take 
increasingly universal and objective stances, China has remained reluctant to accept the 
committees’ suggestions, and the dialogues have not been constructive in general. By contrast, 
when it comes to issues such as taking legislative measures against violence against women and 
adopting general social policies on women’s health and employment, the committees were more 
willing to grant a margin of discretion, while China appeared to be more accepting of the 
committee’s suggestions and willing to improve the current situation. This is to say that, although 
with some issues the committees have interpreted the Conventions in a more universal and 
objective way, which may seem to contribute to making decisions on the justifiability of the 
arguments, this does not necessarily contribute to the constructiveness of the dialogue. Moreover, 
with issues such as data collection and reporting, it is not the committee but China’s attitude that 
has had a greater impact on the direction of the dialogue. In this case, the unjustifiable reasoning 
was due not to the committees’ having set the bar too high but to the state party’s unwillingness to 
cooperate. These nuanced dialogical dynamics further prove that constructive dialogue between 
committees and state parties is not only defeasible (in the sense that the purpose of the dialogue is 
to decide which side has won or lost in a finite round of discourse) but also transcendental (in the 
sense that the point of the dialogue is also to seek consensus and cooperation among the 
interlocutors). In this regard, only arguments that are both justifiable and constructive would 




Chapter 8 Conclusion: Back to Basics (Legal Argumentation) As a Way 
Forward 
 
At the beginning of this study, I quoted Ann Kent, who claims that China is the ‘least likely to 
comply’ when it comes to international law. Putting aside the question of whether this statement 
is correct, this observation is clearly based on a specific understanding of ‘compliance’. On this 
understanding, compliance involves changing one’s behaviour to coincide with the rules or 
principles to which one has agreed. At first glance, understanding ‘compliance’ may be a well-
justified starting point for conducting such research. On closer inspection, however, it is almost 
impossible to apply the literal meaning of compliance to research on international law in general, 
and on IHRL in particular. This is because any such study faces the difficulty of identifying the 
‘motives’ behind a state’s behaviour. In other words, it is a difficult (if not impossible) task to 
pinpoint the real reasons for changes to state behaviour. This critique is hardly new. Nevertheless, 
it was for this reason that I decided to take a different route – one that bypasses the technical issues 
regarding compliance while still making a contribution to our understanding of the relationship 
between China and IHRL.  
Argumentation study thus comes into the picture. To justify an act is to persuade the other 
side (or sides) that it is right. This process of justification can be conducted under either moral 
norms or legal rules. In either case, a shared understanding of what constitutes the ‘right’ act is 
presupposed. This means that, once argumentation is at issue, we are entering the ‘motive’ part of 
the puzzle. That is, by analysing how states justify their actions, we can gain a better sense of why 
they do what they do. It would be naïve to assume that all of the justifications are given honestly 
and sincerely. Nevertheless, the term ‘lying’ presupposes that the ‘liar’ is fully aware of what is 
right (or wrong) in the situation, which is why the states at issue often pretend to do the right thing 
while strategically masking their own wrongdoing. In this sense, analysing how states justify their 
own actions indeed provides us with another layer of understanding when it comes to the 
relationship between states and treaty bodies – one that goes beyond merely depicting what those 
states do, but also what they think they should (or shouldn’t ) do. We are all too familiar with the 
adage that actions speak louder than words. However, since the legal world is fundamentally 
performative, utterances should be considered serious acts in and of themselves—acts which bear 
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performative force. Thus, I believe it is necessary to go back to the basics of law, to argumentation 
and its justification, in order to understand the performative force of IHRL.   
The decision to use China as a case study in this research was not arbitrary. China, a strong 
supporter of relativism regarding international legal norms, and a growing international political 
actor, is a perfect case for illustrating the dynamics between the international human rights treaty 
regime and its state parties and the performative force of IHRL.  
Against this backdrop, the first part of the study maps out the theoretical framework for 
determining the justifiability of particular reasoning in the context of constructive dialogue. In this 
part, I argue that constructive dialogue is a process with a dual function, i.e. it is partly legal and 
partly dialogical (although it is fundamentally legal, with the two elements inter-depending on 
each other). Based on this characterization, for an argument to be a good one in this context it must 
be legally justifiable and dialogically constructive. Regarding legal justifiability, the fundamental 
issue is the interpretation of the relevant articles of the treaty. After examining the theses of the 
three schools regarding treaty interpretation, and drawing inspiration from Radbruch’s ideas on 
the rule of law, I hold that Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT constitute a faithful representation of 
the three approaches to treaty interpretation that have gained prevalence in the current international 
public legal order. I further propose a practical method for applying these articles to justify treaty 
interpretation. That is, a justifiable treaty interpretation will not contradict either of the three 
approaches and must be supported by (at least) one of them.  
The second part of this study analyses the justifiability of particular reasoning in the 
constructive dialogue between China and five human rights treaty bodies on four key topics. 
Chapter 4 discusses incorporating the core definitions under the CAT into domestic law. I argue 
that while it is viewed as a positive change of argument on China’s part, the particular reasoning 
adopted by China is not justifiable. Nevertheless, the two cases (i.e. on incorporating the definition 
of torture and on the definition of DPRK border-crossers) that have been given continuous 
attention by China and the committees, and are therefore subject to assessment in terms of their 
constructiveness, are worth contemplating further. When it comes to interpreting and incorporating 
the definition of torture into domestic law, there is clearly a learning curve on China’s part with 
regard to understanding the Convention and presenting its own arguments under this legal order. 
As for the case on defining DPRK border-crossers, the fact that China intended to confine its 
arguments to the 1951 Convention rather than Article 3 of the CAT shows that it was attempting 
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to manoeuvre its way out of the principle of non-refoulement (under which its arguments are not 
justifiable) and to direct the discussion to the classification of refugees (wherein the arguments are 
judged with a broader margin of discretion in the given context). These two examples show not 
only that China has increased its understanding of its treaty obligations but also that it has 
developed strategies for justifying its own position under the given treaty.  
Chapter 5 investigates China’s substantive reservations to Article 8.1 (a) of the ICESCR 
and Article 6 of the CRC. I hold that both of the reservations and arguments made by China are 
justifiable, all things considered. However, the reason that these reservations and arguments are 
justifiable has little to do with the particular reasoning submitted by China and more to do with 
the compatibility between the reservations and the purposes and objects of the relevant 
Convention. China has also shown its willingness to cooperate by changing the word ‘declaration’ 
with regard to Article 6 of the CRC to ‘reservation’, as the committee suggested. (However, as I 
have argued, this is a problematic suggestion.) Therefore, when it comes to what is arguably one 
of the most technical issues in IHRL, China’s arguments are both justifiable and constructive, 
whereas we cannot say the same for the committees’ arguments. As we saw in Chapter 5, neither 
CESCR nor the CRC Committee responded to China’s arguments in a constructive manner.  
China has shown the most resistance when it comes to the relationship between sovereignty 
and the international human rights treaty regime. Chapter 6 illustrates although some arguments 
under this issue are justifiable, all things considered, they are not constructive in the sense that the 
two-pronged argument scheme is used to fence off most inquiries from the Committees. By further 
exploring the historical background of this position, I suggest that the reason for this reluctance is 
mainly that China wishes to preserve the relevance of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty to the 
current international (human rights) legal order by confirming its own position on this topic. While 
some may claim that this position reveals a fundamental mismatch and lack of cooperation 
between China and IHRL, I suggest that it may say more about China’s perception of international 
(human rights) law-making than about the intention on its part not to comply. By insisting on the 
Westphalian notion of sovereignty in the international arena, China hopes that more weight will 
be put on its sovereignty arguments. This logic is partly due to the tragic history of China’s 
colonisation by Western states on the putative basis of international law and treaties from the end 
of the 19th century until the middle of the 20th century and partly due to China’s perception that 
it is only bound to undertake its treaty obligations in the way it understands them, provided it 
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insists on this understanding publicly and consistently (which is a (mis)understanding of 
international customary law-making, and specifically of state practices as a source of international 
law).608 In this regard, to the extent that we only view China’s behaviour as a form of non-
compliance, we may overstep its own logic. That is, China does not think that it has committed 
itself to limiting its sovereignty under IHRL because it has publicly and repeatedly claimed 
otherwise.  
Finally, Chapter 7 depicts an even more complicated picture of China’s relationship with 
the ICESCR and other relevant provisions of IHRL regarding economic, social, and cultural rights. 
This chapter examines a case where China’s arguments may be justifiable but where the committee 
is not being constructive (the developing country argument), a case where the committee may have 
taken a step too far and made the state’s reasoning unjustifiable (the General Recommendations 
on the necessity of taking temporary measures regarding gender equality), and a case where China 
was un-constructive and refused to provide the requested data. This chapter shows that the delicate 
balance between states and treaty bodies can easily be shattered by either side’s not taking the 
other’s arguments seriously. The flipside of this observation is that making both justifiable and 
constructive arguments under IHRL takes no less effort than implementing treaty obligations and 
can make a real contribution to moving the examination process forward. In fact, these two sides, 
namely argumentation and implementation, are interdependent. On the one hand, states’ 
implementation in the field provides the evidence and materials for making the arguments. On the 
other hand, a well-formulated constructive argument reveals the obstacles to treaty 
implementation. In this sense, carefully examining the arguments from both sides can help to 
identify where the problems possibly lie. As shown in Chapter 7, the problem may not always lie 
in lack of willingness on the part of states. 
In the remainder of this conclusion, I will further elaborate on three implications of this 
study: first and foremost, the relationship between China and the international human rights treaty 
regime; second, a perspective from which to approach the debate on the universality vs. the 
relativity of human rights; and third, the (in)determinacy of international (human rights) law. I will 
conclude this study by emphasising the role of legal argumentation as the foundation of 
international human rights legal practice and study.  
                                                 
608 This understanding of international law making can be particularly seen from China’s reaction to the recent South 




1. China and the international human rights treaty regime  
When it comes to the overall interaction between China and the relevant human rights treaty 
committees, as well as between legal justifiability and the constructiveness of the arguments, the 
following emerges as a key observation: the committees have a greater impact on China than China 
has on the committees. Moreover, arguments voiced by the committees that are either legally non-
justifiable or non-constructive do prevent the constructive dialogue from moving forward. For 
instance, the dialogue on incorporating the definition of torture into domestic law was stalled at 
the point where the committee did not correctly identify the scope of torture codified in China’s 
domestic law. China’s ‘developing country status’ argument, which was dismissed by the CESCR 
without further justification, was reiterated by China in the following sessions. The problematic 
suggestion by the CRC Committee that the word ‘declaration’ ought to be changed to ‘reservation’ 
regarding Article 6, although accepted by China, did not prompt China to change its position 
regarding this arguably most important article of the CRC. On the other hand, when the 
committee’s arguments are legally justifiable and dialogically constructive (such as in the earlier 
sessions of the CAT, when the committee asked China to incorporate the definition of torture into 
its domestic law, and when the CDEAW Committee requested that China protect women from 
domestic violence), China’s responses were also more inclined to be constructive. However, this 
does not mean that as long as the committees keep their arguments legally justifiable and 
dialogically constructive, China will also be constructive. It is clear from this study that when it 
comes to certain topics, such as sovereignty and data collection, China has maintained its non-
justifiable position, regardless of the committees’ input. What this shows is that when it comes to 
topics on which China does not hold a strongly oppositional position, the legally justifiable and 
dialogically constructive arguments from the committees are very likely to make a positive impact 
on the process, whereas un-justifiable or non-constructive arguments do not have this effect, or 
even affect the process negatively.  
Moreover, my analysis reveals that the relationship between China and IHRL is rather 
complicated and may sometimes seem like it has reached an impasse. Nevertheless, this study 
shows that there is systemic dialogue between China and international human rights treaty bodies, 
which has generally improved over time (especially on China’s part). The fact that China has made 
an effort to offer justifiable or constructive arguments implies that it is adapting to the ‘rightness’ 
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of the rules and principles of IHRL. Even when China violates its treaty obligations, it tries to 
avoid being judged as non-compliant rather than simply shutting down the discussion and not 
‘playing the game’ (e.g. the North Korean border-crosser arguments). This adaption to the 
‘rightness’ of the regime is, in my view, a process of institutionalisation. In other words, despite 
its poor compliance record (as some scholars, NGOs, and states hold), China does consider itself 
subject to the international human rights treaty regime. 
However, this relationship does not run in the other direction. Whether China’s arguments 
are legally justifiable or dialogically constructive has little impact on the committees in general. 
In other words, the committees have shown little interest in China’s arguments. The two 
reservations that China made to the ICESCR and the CRC, for instance, both grounded in 
justifiable arguments, have not influenced the committees to reconsider their arguments against 
China’s reservations. The ‘developing country status’ arguments, as the basis for establishing 
China’s obligation to implement the ICESCR, also failed to attract much attention from CESCR.  
Since the process of constructive dialogue is partly legal, partly dialogical, taking the 
other’s arguments seriously is not only a basis for establishing and continuing the entire process 
but also significant to the ‘law-enactment’ that resides in this very process. China’s arguments in 
constructive dialogue have generally improved over time. This means that China is at least trying 
to ‘play the game’. However, a less constructive approach on the committees’ side may frustrate 
China’s willingness to further engage. Such frustration is clearly shown in China’s response to the 
CAT Committee after concluding the constructive dialogue.609  
 
2. The universality vs. the relativity of human rights  
Another implication of this study is that, as far as IHRL is concerned, relativism arguments have 
rather limited scope for justification. Throughout this study, I have investigated the kinds of 
particular reasoning that are justifiable when it comes to a given topic. One of my vantage points 
                                                 
609 China made a written comment regarding the concluding observations and recommendations of the CAT 2008 
session, in which it states: ‘Regrettably, the Committee members designated as country rapporteurs, displaying a 
strong bias against China, paid no heed to the facts and disregarded the detailed and accurate information and thorough 
explanations provided by the Chinese Government. … Such acts are contrary to the objectives of the Convention and 
violate its authority; they not only undermine the basis for cooperation between China and the Committee, but also 
damage the Committee’s image and credibility. The Chinese Government is deeply disturbed by this.’ 





is that in order for particular reasoning to be justifiable, it must be universalisable. An argument 
that deviates from this starting point is not justifiable in a legal context. 
When it comes to particular reasoning concerning interpretation, justifiable particular 
reasoning cannot conflict with either textual, intentional (shared rather than subjective intentions), 
or teleological readings of the law and must be supported by (at least) one of these. As for particular 
reasoning on making reservations to a given convention, it must be permitted by the given treaty 
and compatible with the purposes and objects of that treaty. The reasoning according to which 
sovereignty should be protected against IHRL in most cases cannot hold, for the codification of 
the relevant international laws, the shared commitments of the international society, and 
the purposes and objects of the international human rights legal order all direct away from the 
Westphalian notion of absolute sovereignty. This is based on the idea that since sovereignty is a 
myth created by a shared consciousness, what states make of it they can also decide either to 
maintain or to take away, but only collectively. Finally, when it comes to the implementation of 
treaty obligations, especially concerning economic, social, and cultural rights, it is intuitive to think 
that the margin of discretion should be quite wide. However, as shown in this study, this margin 
is also limited and has become even narrower over the past decades due to the new interpretations 
offered by international human rights regimes. Moreover, concepts such as ‘minimum core 
obligation’ and ‘immediate realisation obligation’ underline the universal and objective 
requirements upon state parties to promote and protect economic, social, and cultural rights. In 
sum, once a state enters into an international human rights treaty, it has limited grounds for arguing 
that because it has a different cultural background (cultural relativism), its own sovereignty 
concerns (sovereignty relativism), or suspicions about the ‘Western’ ideal of human rights (post-
colonialism relativism), it can simply opt out of its treaty obligations. 
Nevertheless, some cases of particular reasoning do hold. For instance, a state can make a 
reservation to a treaty based on its particular circumstances, but only insofar as this is permitted 
by the given treaty and the reservation is compatible with its purposes and objects. Also, when it 
comes to economic, social, and cultural rights, states do have more leeway to decide on their 
approach to implementing rights that are subject to progressive realisation (along with the pace at 
which they will do so). Failure to recognise these cases of justifiable particular reasoning may 
frustrate states’ willingness to engage with the treaty bodies and therefore hamper the effectiveness 
of the treaties.  
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This is an epistemic (rather than an ontological) approach to the debate on the universality 
vs. the relativity of human rights. That is to say, this study sets aside the question of whether human 
rights are universal or relative/particular. Instead, it puts the entire debate into the legal context 
and investigates shared consciousness qua codification, (shared) intention, and the purposes and 
objects of the legal order. Does this approach limit the original debate by putting it in a legal 
context? It probably does. Have I shifted what has traditionally been an ontological focus on the 
universality vs. the relativity of human rights to an epistemic inquiry into the justifiability of legal 
argumentation? Indeed I have. Nonetheless as the original debate was so fundamentally discordant, 
taking things ‘one step at a time’ is perhaps preferable. This is not to say that the debate on the 
universality vs. the relativity of human rights is unsolvable when taken in an ontological sense; 
rather, it is to say that before we reach that level of concord, it is perhaps desirable to move the 
debate a step forward even if only from an epistemic perspective. This leads us to the third 
implication of this research.  
 
3. (In)determinacy and objectivity in international (human rights) law 
In 1989, Martti Koskenniemi wrote arguably one of the most widely cited contemporary works on 
legal argumentation in international law, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International 
Legal Argument. In this book, he argues that to reach objectivity in legal argumentation under 
international law is to ensure concreteness and normativity simultaneously. However, the 
requirement that argumentation be concrete (in the sense of remaining close to state practices rather 
than theories of natural justice) and the requirement that it be normative (in the sense of creating 
distance between law and state behaviour) contradict each other and eventually cancel each other 
out. As a result, states (as well as other participants, such as lawyers and adjudicators) simply 
cherry pick either ascending (referring to concreteness) or descending (referring to normativity) 
arguments in the international legal context, which inevitably leads to stalemate in the sense that 
ascending arguments are always vulnerable to descending arguments, and vice versa, thus 
rendering international law useless. His conclusion is that ‘anything goes’ regarding argumentation 
in international law. Twenty years later, in The Politics of International Law, Koskenniemi 
reiterated this idea.610 As I have argued in this study, however, this assertion not only mistakes 
                                                 
610 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart 2011) 38–40. 
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‘determinacy’ for there being ‘one and only one best answer’ regarding international law611 but 
also confuses epistemic objectivity qua shared consciousness with subjective intentions.  
In this study, I agree with Kratochwil when I suggest that ‘indeterminacy’ is simply an 
innate characteristic of law—one which has been tackled by different legal systems throughout 
human history. The ‘detrimental’ kind of ‘indeterminacy’, as some CLS scholars suggest, only 
occurs when there is no rule in a legal system to determine which interpretation or argument is 
justifiable; a legal system can be determinate (or at least indeterminate in a non-damaging way) 
even if there is no rule to single out the ‘one and only best’ decision from the outset. In fact, in 
most legal systems, the ‘one and only best’ decision is reached only after the adjudicator has taken 
everything into consideration and has had his or her final say. As John Bell puts it, in legal 
judgement, ‘giving a decision is an act of authority... As long as the decision meets a threshold of 
justification …, it is not necessary to show that it is the only right answer’.612 As long as a legal 
system contains rules for deciding what counts as a ‘justifiable’ interpretation or argument, 
‘indeterminacy’ does not damage the core of a legal system. 
This is the case in international (human rights) law. The question at issue is not whether 
one should turn to state practices (‘ascending’) or to norms (‘descending’) to justify states’ actions, 
but where to draw the line between states’ treaty obligations as regulated by universal rules and 
the margin of discretion as put forward by states’ particular reasoning. To hold IHRL as law is to 
grant that it (the text of law) is the starting point of the discussion. In other words, the legislation 
process is complete once the text of law enters into force. It is true that with new interpretations 
and developing contexts, our understanding of a given law may change over time. However, such 
change should also have procedural or substantive legitimacy. Treating law as a starting point for 
discussion means that the justification of certain actions should essentially hinge on interpretation 
of the relevant legal texts. Thus the interpretation rules come into the picture. As shown in Chapter 
2, not only are there rules in international law for deciding on which interpretation is ‘justifiable’, 
but there is also a practical approach available when it comes to applying those rules. As I have 
discussed elsewhere,613 these treaty interpretation rules also enshrine a perspective of epistemic 
                                                 
611 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law 
(Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Cambridge University Press 2014). 
612 John Bell, ‘The Institutional Constraints on Particularism’, in Zenon Bankowski and James MacLean, The 
Universal and the Particular in Legal Reasoning (Edinburgh Centre for Law and Society series, Ashgate 2006) 49. 
613 Jingjing WU, ‘Particular Reasoning Versus Universal Human Rights: A Case of China’ (2016). OSSA 
Conference Archive.159. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/159. 
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objectivity. In short, parties cannot simply use their own (subjective) intentions to support 
arguments against interpretations that have been generated by the established rules. In this sense, 
to claim that because of the ‘indeterminacy’ of international law ‘anything goes’ in legal 
argumentation—a claim which reduces international law to little more than international politics—
is to throw the baby out with the bathwater.   
 
4. Final words: Why we should take argumentation (more) seriously in IHRL 
In recent decades, only a few researchers have bothered investigating legal argumentation 
regarding IHRL. Rather, much more focus has been put on the political aspects of it. It is certainly 
true that law and politics are intertwined in an institutional normative order such as IHRL. It is 
also true that, in the field of IHRL, politics has played an undeniable role in making, enforcing, 
and even resisting this legal order. Nevertheless, if we attend primarily to the political side of the 
story, we risk obscuring the legal nature of this normative order. Like any shared consciousness in 
human society, IHRL is only as legal as the international actors allow it to be. We have already 
come a long way to the extent that state parties (including China) and treaty bodies have a formal 
procedure for exchanging their arguments in dialogue based on IHRL and in a way that has ‘law-
enacting’ consequences. Nevertheless, if all the international actors were to become convinced that 
IHRL is nothing more than power politics among states and other international players, the 
‘correctness’ and institutional normative power of IHRL would eventually diminish. Therefore, in 
this study, I have decided to go back to basics by taking the legal characteristics of IHRL and 





Annex: Arguments in the summary records of constructive dialogue between 
China and human rights treaty bodies regarding particular issues614   
 
CAT Article 1 on definition of torture  
 
CAT/C/SR.51 (1990) [Committee] 36…she wished to point out that the content of the Convention must become part 
of positive internal law. Regrettably, no specific definition of torture had been included in Chinese legislation so as to 
ensure that torture was an offence under criminal law. 
 
CAT/C/SR.51 (1990) [China] 50…Definitions of torture varied, so that what in the Chinese view was positive might 
be considered negative elsewhere.  
 
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 17. He also raised the question of the incorporation of the definition of 
torture in domestic law and, taking up Mr. Burns’ argument, wondered how, if it were not so incorporated, it was 
possible, on the one hand, to establish statistics, and on the other, to punish psychological torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 48. He then went back to the fact that in Chinese law there was no 
definition of torture. Accordingly, acts of torture were not generally punished, and only offences consisting in 
obtaining confessions from an accused person under torture could be brought before the courts. 
 
CAT/C/SR.145/Add.2 (1993) [China] 12. Several members of the Committee had asked about the definition of the 
concept of torture in Chinese legislation and the mechanisms provided to punish persons responsible for acts of torture. 
In that connection, chapters IV and VIII of the Penal Code contained specific provisions guaranteeing the protection 
of individuals against any violation of their rights; more precisely, article 136 stipulated that any person found guilty 
of extorting confessions through torture, the definition of which corresponded to that appearing in article 1 of the 
Convention, was liable to a prison term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and, in particularly serious 
cases, to the death penalty. Article 143 of the Penal Code provided for a three-year prison term for any official who 
harassed or humiliated a prisoner, a prison term of three to six years if the ill-treatment caused injury or disability, and 
at least seven years’ imprisonment if the ill-treatment resulted in death. Article 145 of the Penal Code laid down a 
three-year prison term for anyone who inflicted mental torture on an individual. Under article 146 if an official was 
found guilty of such an offence, the penalty was a minimum of seven years’ imprisonment. Under article 188 members 
of the judiciary guilty of abuses of power were liable to up to 15 years’ imprisonment. Finally, in accordance with 
article 189 of the Penal Code, any staff member of a prison establishment who was found guilty of corporal punishment 
or ill-treatment of prisoners might be sentenced to up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Those were the applicable provisions 
of the Penal Code, but the Civil Code also contained provisions providing compensation for moral suffering. For 
example, article 101 of the Civil Code provided that citizens had the right to respect of their reputation and dignity 
and that any act of slander or delation was punishable by law. Article 105 guaranteed citizens the right to respect of 
their reputation and the right to compensation for injury to their reputation. Procedures were laid down for the 
investigation of crimes of torture. Chapter II of the Penal Code set out the procedure to be followed in investigating 
alleged offences, and chapter III set out the procedure for the trial in the criminal courts of persons charged with acts 
of torture. 
CAT/C/SR.251 (1996) [China] 5… Although China’s domestic legislation did not incorporate the definition of torture 
appearing in article 1 of the Convention, its domestic legislative provisions designated various forms of torture as 
criminal offences. Consequently, China was in a position to implement the Convention effectively and honour its 
obligations thereunder. 
 
CAT/C/SR.251 (1996) [Committee] 8. Although China had not yet adopted the general definition of torture contained 
in article 1 of the Convention, the Government felt that the various categories of acts of torture referred to in legislative 
or administrative provisions enabled it to comply with that article. However, in the recent amendments to the Criminal 
Procedure Law, the various prohibitions applied only to the practice of torture to extort confessions, whereas the 
                                                 
614 This annex mostly includes arguments found in the summary records of the constructive dialogue between China 
and human rights treaty bodies. It also includes some arguments in the State Reports and Concluding Observations if 
these arguments are discussed in the study. Some information inquiries and statements are also included if they provide 
necessary background for comprehending relevant arguments. 
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definition in article 1 was much broader. In the absence of a criminal classification, the question arose whether accurate 
statistics on the situation in regard to torture could be compiled. A precise definition of acts constituting the offence 
of torture was also important for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
 
CAT/C/SR.252/Add.1 (1996) [China] 6. Replying to a question that had been asked concerning the definition of 
torture in Chinese domestic legislation, he said that the National People’s Congress had to approve the accession of 
China to international legal instruments. Once approved, such an instrument was binding upon the Government, which 
was obliged to incorporate its provisions into domestic law, the international instrument always taking precedence in 
the event of any discrepancy. When, however, China entered reservations to an international instrument, the relevant 
provisions were not binding. That general principle held good for the Convention against Torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.252/Add.1 (1996) [China] 8. In addition, the Criminal Law, which contained a definition of torture that 
complied with article 1 of the Convention, prohibited and penalized torture. Since the Convention did not, however, 
set out punishments for particular acts of torture, the relevant organs were obliged to rely on domestic legislation for 
the determination of appropriate sentences. Hence the absence of the word "torture" from Chinese domestic law. 
 
CAT/C/SR.254 (1996) [Committee] 2.The failure to incorporate a crime of torture into the domestic legal system in 
terms consistent with the definition in article 1 of the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.416 (2000) [Committee] 14. The State party had attempted to incorporate provisions into its domestic 
legislation which reproduced the definition in article 1 of the Convention. However, on the one hand, those provisions 
appeared to apply only to public servants in the strict sense of the term and, on the other, a regulation dating from 
1999 stated that torturers could be prosecuted only if their victim was killed or seriously injured: psychological torture, 
in particular, was not taken into consideration. It would therefore be necessary to fill in those gaps, which were also 
incompatible with article 2 of the Convention. In that connection, he would like more information on the issue of 
whether the orders of a superior could be cited as an excuse for acts of torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.423/Add.1 (2000) [Committee] 18. The Committee recommends to the State party to incorporate a 
definition of torture into its domestic law that fully complies with the definition contained in the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 30. In connection with article 1 of the Convention, she requested the Chinese 
delegation to supply additional information on certain points which the definition of torture at present given in Chinese 
domestic law did not cover in a satisfactory manner, such as discrimination and mental suffering, in particular when 
inflicted by an agent of the police or any other person acting in an official capacity or at the instigation or with the 
express or tacit consent of such a person 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 62. The CHAIRPERSON recalled that the Committee strongly recommended 
that the definition of torture should appear in the text of a single law rather than in several texts. That made matters 
much easier for those responsible for applying the law. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [China] 5. Chinese legislation contained no specific definition of torture. All of the elements 
in the definition set forth in the Convention were, however, provided for under laws covering a variety of offences. 
The acts of torture punishable by law also included physical and psychological suffering induced by ill-treatment. 
Hence, article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibited not only torture but also the use of threat, blackmail 
and deception in order to obtain confessions. Under article 238 of the Criminal Code, humiliating treatment constituted 
an aggravating factor in the illegal deprivation of liberty. The ill-treatment mentioned in articles 247 and 248 of the 
Criminal Code also included humiliation, which could lead to serious mental suffering. In addition, the rules on the 
commencement of criminal proceedings for breach of duty and violation of rights in the course of official duties 
provided that gross breaches and violations that had a detrimental effect on the victim’s mental health must be 
investigated with a view to establishing the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators. The provisions of the current 
legislation were therefore fully consistent with the spirit of the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 42. Mr. MARIÑO MENÉNDEZ remarked that the Committee’s work was 
complicated by the fact that the State party’s legislation included a wide range of criminal offences covering the 




CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 32. While noting the State party’s assertion that all acts that may be described 
as “torture” within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention are criminally punishable in China, the Committee 
reiterates its previous conclusions and recommendations (A/55/44, para. 123) that the State party has not incorporated 
in its domestic law a definition of torture that fully complies with the definition contained in the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 33. The Committee is concerned that the provisions relating to torture refer 
only to physical abuse and do not include the infliction of severe mental pain or suffering. It is also concerned that 
article 247 of the Criminal Law, article 43 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
Provisions on the Criteria for Filing Dereliction of Duty and Rights Infringement Criminal Cases restrict the prohibited 
practice of torture to the actions of judicial officers and officers of an institution of confinement and do not cover acts 
by “other persons acting in an official capacity”, including those acts that result from instigation, consent or 
acquiescence of a public official. Moreover, these provisions do not address the use of torture for purposes other than 
to extract confessions (art. 1). 
 
The State party should include in its legislation a definition of torture that covers all the elements contained in article 
1 of the Convention, including discrimination of any kind. The State party should ensure that persons who are not 
judicial officers and officers of an institution of confinement, but who act in an official capacity or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official can be prosecuted for torture. The State party should also ensure that its legislation 
prohibits the use of torture for all intents and purposes. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2 (2008) [China] 16. Concerning the allegation in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the observations 
that “the State party has not incorporated in its domestic law a definition of torture that fully complies with the 
definition contained in the Convention” 
 
Although no law in China is exclusively devoted to the definition of torture, all aspects of torture as defined in the 
Convention are covered in the relevant Chinese laws. Chinese laws strictly prohibits and punishes any form of torture 
against anyone, regardless of the perpetuator’s intention or purpose and regardless of whether the act is committed 
with the consent, tacit or not, of an official or a public functionary. 
 
First, the allegation in the observations that the relevant Chinese laws “do not cover acts by ‘other persons acting in 
an official capacity’ ” is simply not true.  
 
China's Criminal Law is applicable to all criminal acts of torture, irrespective of the identity, intent or purpose of the 
perpetrators. Furthermore, Chinese legislation has provisions that specifically cover crimes committed by officials 
and persons in specific capacities. For example, article 238, paragraph 4, of the Criminal Law stipulates that if a public 
servant of a State organ commits the crime of unlawful detention by exploiting his/her office, he/she shall be punished 
severely. The provisions of article 247 of the Criminal Law concerning the crime of extorting confessions by means 
of torture and violence apply to judicial officers who obtain evidence by acts of torture. The provisions of article 248 
of the Criminal Law concerning the crime of ill-treatment of detainees apply to supervisors who commit acts of torture 
against detainees. The establishment of these specific crimes reflects the determination to severely punish crimes 
committed by government officials and to more effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens. 
 
Furthermore, China's policies and measures to prohibit torture are applicable to public servants in both the field of 
criminal justice and the field of administrative law enforcement. If an ordinary person commits an act of torture abetted 
by or with the consent or tacit consent of a government official or a person exercising authority in an official capacity, 
under the provisions of the Criminal Law relating to joint offences, the ordinary person shall be considered to be an 
accomplice and the applicable charges shall be brought against the government official. 
 
Secondly, under the Chinese law, punishable acts of torture include both acts that cause physical pain, such beating 
or assaulting with instruments of torture, and acts causing mental pain, such as ill-treatment, humiliation and other 
means. For example, article 43 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that “it shall be strictly forbidden to extort 
confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means”. Of these, “threat” 
is typically a way of causing mental suffering. The phrase “other unlawful means” includes any means that can cause 
physical and mental pain. Article 238 of the Criminal Law stipulates that anyone who unlawfully detains another 
person or deprives another person of his/her personal freedom by other means commits a crime. If a person is found 
to have assaulted or insulted another person, a heavier sentence shall be imposed. Under articles 247 and 248 of the 
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Criminal Law, the crimes of extorting confessions by torture, violence and ill-treatment of detainees include those 
committed by use of violence and also by use of abuse, humiliation and other means or causing severe mental 
suffering. A public servant who has caused another person mental suffering by humiliating, slandering, illegally 
searching, illegally intruding into a citizen’s home, illegally depriving he or her of his or her freedom of religious 
belief or infringing the customs of ethnic minorities, when performing official duties, he/she shall be punished 
according to law. 
 
In short, the provisions of China’s legislation dealing with the prohibition and punishment of torture are consistent 
with the relevant provisions of the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 18. Mr. Tugushi (Country Rapporteur) said that the definition of torture in the 
law of the State party was not fully compliant with the definition given in article 1 of the Convention. The definition 
should cover all the elements provided for in the Convention, including the reference to discrimination of any kind. 
What steps had been taken to adopt a definition that complied with article 1 of the Convention?  
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 20. Recent amendments to the State party’s criminal law did not address the 
definition of torture directly and, in its replies to the list of issues (CAT/C/CHN/Q/5/Add.2), the State party had 
reported that existing provisions of domestic law already covered all aspects of the Convention. Did the State party 
have any plans to make further amendments to its criminal law in order to broaden the scope of those provisions?  
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 22. The State party had reported that, where interrogation under torture was not 
conducted for the purpose of extracting confessions, criminal liability might be incurred under the relevant provisions 
of the criminal law covering, for example, intentional infliction of bodily harm or unlawful detention. Did the State 
party have any plans to broaden the definition of torture to include other acts that did not amount to extraction of 
confessions?  
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 70. The Chair said that the anti-torture provisions contained in Chinese 
legislation seemed complex and vague. He emphasized the need for a single definition of torture in order to prevent 
impunity.  
 
CAT/C/SR.1371 (2015) [China] 4. Mr. Xu Hong (China) said that, despite the cultural and linguistic issues that 
hindered the full incorporation of the Convention’s definition of torture into legislation, China endeavored to ensure 
that national law was in line with that instrument. The different elements of the definition were covered in various 
laws dealing with, for instance, the extortion of confessions and the use of corporal punishment or disguised corporal 
punishment. Protection had also been enhanced for vulnerable groups. Regarding the case of Liu Hong, the court had 
excluded the written records of four of the six continuous interrogations as evidence obtained through “fatigue 
interrogation”.  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (2015) [Committee] 7. The Committee notes that various provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Law and the Criminal Law, as amended in 2014, prohibit and punish specific acts that could be considered as torture. 
However, it remains concerned that those provisions do not include all the elements of the definition of torture set out 
in article 1 of the Convention. In particular:  
(a) While noting the provisions established to prohibit the extraction of confessions under torture or the use of violence 
to obtain a witness statement (article 247 of the Criminal Law), the Committee is concerned that the prohibition may 
not cover all public officials and persons acting in an official capacity. Moreover, the provisions do not address the 
use of torture for purposes other than extracting confessions from defendants or criminal suspects;  
(b) The crime of beating or ill-treating detainees, contained in article 248 of the Criminal Law, restricts the scope of 
the crime to the actions of officers of an institution of confinement or of other detainees at the instigation of those 
officers. It is also restricted to the infliction of physical abuse only.  
8. The Committee appreciates that the Supreme People’s Court recognizes as torture the use of other methods that 
cause the defendant to suffer severe mental pain or suffering (see para. 5 (a) above). However, it remains concerned 
that the Court’s interpretation applies to questions regarding exclusion of evidence rather than criminal liability (arts. 
2 and 4).  
9. The Committee reiterates its previous recommendations (see CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, paras. 32 and 33, and A/55/44, 
para. 123) and calls upon the State 3 party once again to consider including a comprehensive definition of torture in 
its legislation that is in full conformity with the Convention and covers all the elements contained in article 1, including 
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the purpose of discrimination. The State party should ensure that all public officials and any other person acting in an 
official capacity or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official can be prosecuted for torture. The Committee 
draws the State party’s attention to paragraph 9 of its general comment No. 2 (2007) on the implementation of article 
2 by State parties, in which it is noted that serious discrepancies between the definition in the Convention and that 





On ‘seriousness’ of torture  
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 58. In paragraph 66 of the report, mention was made of “serious and especially 
serious cases”. The fact of distinguishing between acts of torture according to their seriousness was in itself a source 
of legal insecurity and gave rise to problems in connection with the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 59… Furthermore, the fact of distinguishing serious and especially serious cases 
of torture amounted to setting aside cases which nevertheless constituted violations of article 1 of the Convention. 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 64. In connection with the use of torture, the State party’s report spoke of “serious 
or especially serious cases” defined in the light of certain criteria, such as cases leading to serious injury or mental 
derangement. But torture was by definition a serious crime, and no degree of seriousness could be established in 
respect of it. The delegation ought to explain why only cases covered by the said criteria were considered serious or 
especially serious. 
 
CAT/C/SR. 846 (2008) [China] 14… The seriousness of a case was determined on the basis of its circumstances. The 
most serious cases that were likely to involve the heaviest penalties were referred to an intermediate people’s court in 
the first instance. Appeals were considered by a higher people’s court, the decisions of which could be reviewed by 
the Supreme People’s Court, which systematically ruled on all death sentences. 
 
CAT/C/SR. 846 (2008) [China] 19. Concerning the distinction made by judicial bodies between acts of torture 
constituting minor, serious or particularly serious offences, all acts of torture were prohibited and punished under 
Chinese law. Given its cultural and legal specificity, however, China believed that minor offences were part of 





Involuntary/forced disappearance  
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 57… On the subject of forced or involuntary disappearances, the Committee 
thought that such facts certainly fell within the purview of the Convention; in particular, it could be argued that the 
families of the persons who had disappeared were victims of maltreatment within the meaning of the Convention.  
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 63. He was surprised that China should think the question of forced 
disappearances lay outside the purview of the Convention. Article 1 of the Convention referred to any act by which 
severe pain or suffering was inflicted, and it was difficult to see how forced disappearances escaped that definition. 
Disappearance occasioned by persons acting in the exercise of their official duties could cause intense suffering; the 
victim had the impression that he or she did not exist, and felt that those who had made him/her disappear could 
dispose of him/her as they wished. It was desirable that the delegation should say something on the subject, the more 
so as, according to some reports, the State party was itself involved in forced disappearances whereas it ought to be 
punishing the persons participating in such acts. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [China] 6. The Chinese delegation recognized the connection between enforced disappearances 
and torture. Such disappearances, however, did not fall under the same international instruments or within the purview 
of the same bodies in the United Nations human rights system, which comprised various mechanisms, each with its 
own specific mandate to be respected. The Chinese Government nevertheless supported the reform undertaken to 
strengthen coordination among those mechanisms in the interest of promoting and protecting human rights. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 42… In international practice and jurisprudence, enforced disappearance was 
classed as torture; even if a separate criminal offence was involved, the victim’s relatives still endured a form of 
torture. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 41. The State party should consider ratifying … the International Convention 







DPRK Boarder-crosser  
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 36. Turning to article 3 of the Convention, she noted that the State party indicated 
in its written replies that no refugee or asylum seeker had ever claimed that he or she risked being tortured on expulsion 
to another neighboring country. Additional information concerning the procedure in place for determining refugee 
status, as well as an explanation of why the Chinese Government refused to allow UNHCR access to the border with 
North Korea, where the estimated number of North Korea refugees varied between 30 000 and 300 000, would be 
welcome. In that connection it would also be useful to know on what grounds the State party referred to all the North 
Korean citizens in the Chinese border area as “clandestine immigrants”- a stigmatizing description – and claimed that 
they did not meet the criteria for obtaining refugee status, as they were all economic migrants. Persons who left the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Korea were exposed to criminal prosecution if they returned to their country of 
origin, and thus became “real” refugees. Did the State party recognize the concept of “refugee surplus”? 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [China] 10. China attached great importance to the protection of refugees; it fulfilled its 
obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol, to which it had acceded, 
and respected the principle of non-refoulement. Since 1978, it had catered to almost 300,000 Indochinese refugees. 
Its efforts, which had significantly contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, had been 
recognized by the Human Rights Council and the international community. The Government had always worked in 
cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which had an office 
in China and with which it had regular high-level exchanges. The Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. 
Feller, had visited China, where she had conducted in-depth talks on a wide range of subjects. With regard to the status 
of North Korean migrants, the Chinese delegation recalled the definition contained in the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, pursuant to which the term “refugee” applied to any person who, owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, was outside the country of his nationality and was unable or, owing to such fear, was unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country. The North Korean nationals mentioned by Ms. Gaer had unlawfully entered 
China for economic reasons and had not requested political asylum. They were not therefore refugees in the sense of 
the 1951 Convention. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had experienced serious economic difficulties and 
natural disasters that had prompted various individuals to cross the border illegally. China had always treated them in 
accordance with its domestic legislation and with international law in a humanitarian spirit. Its position was 
reasonable, legitimate and conducive to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, its policy differed 
little from that of other countries which, since 11 September 2001 in particular, had controlled immigration and 
organized the return of illegal migrants. The Chinese authorities were currently drafting a bill on refugees, in 
conjunction with UNHCR. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 60. Ms. GAER (Country Rapporteur) continued to ponder the definition of 
torture. On the subject of refugees, she said that the Committee was not concerned with the implementation of the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees but focused its attention on the matter of compliance with the obligation 
under article 3 of the Convention against Torture not to return a person to another State where he would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture… 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 22…In addition, the return of border-crossers and refugees from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is also an area of concern for the Committee with regard to vulnerable groups, 
as articulated below. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 26. The Committee is greatly concerned by allegations that many individuals 
have been forcibly returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, without any examination of the merits of 
each individual case, and subsequently been subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment by the authorities. The Committee notes with concern these individuals are referred to by the State party 
as “illegal immigrants” or “snakeheads” and that such labels presume that these individuals are not deserving of any 
protection. Similarly, persons extradited to and from neighbouring States do not benefit from legal safeguards against 
return despite the risk of torture. The Committee is further concerned by the failure of the State party to clarify how it 
includes in its national laws or practice the prohibition on returning a person to a country where he or she faces a 
substantial risk of torture, and hence how the State party ensures that its obligations under article 3 of the Convention 




Under no circumstances should the State party expel, return or extradite a person to a State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.  
 
When determining the applicability of its obligations under article 3 of the Convention, the State party should establish 
an adequate screening process for status determination in order to determine whether persons subject to return may 
face a substantial risk of torture, particularly in view of the fact that it is reportedly a criminal offence to depart 
unofficially from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and should provide the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees with access to the border region and persons of concern. In the light of the large 
numbers of citizens of the above State who have crossed into China, the State party needs to be more active in ensuring 
that the obligations of article 3 are fully met. The State party should also ensure that adequate judicial mechanisms for 
the review of decisions are in place and sufficient legal defence available for each person subject to extradition, and 
ensure effective post-return monitoring arrangements. 
 
The State party should provide data on the number of persons expelled or returned to neighbouring States. 
 
The State party should pursue its efforts to adopt appropriate legislation to fully incorporate into domestic law its 
obligation under article 3 of the Convention, thereby preventing any persons from being expelled, returned or 
extradited to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being 
subject to torture. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2 page 15 [China] (d) On the issue of “non-refoulement” of North Koreans who have entered 
China illegally 
 
The Chinese public security organs are bound by the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Control of the Entry 
and Exit of Aliens to investigate and process cases involving the illegal entry of aliens, which includes their 
deportation. In recent years, some North Koreans have illegally entered China for economic reasons. They do not meet 
the criteria of refugees set in Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. Their illegal entry has 
violated Chinese law and disrupted the normal order of entry into and exit from China. It is entirely legitimate and 
necessary for the public security organs to properly handle, in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, the 
illegal entry of aliens, including illegal entry by Koreans, in order to safeguard China's national security and maintain 
its entry and exit order procedures. 
 
As a party to Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol, China has always strictly observed the 
provisions of the Convention and its Protocol and has earnestly fulfilled its obligations under the Convention and the 
Protocol. The Chinese Government's selfless provision of refuge to more than 300,000 Indo-Chinese refugees for a 
long time amply demonstrates this statement. The Chinese Government has consistently carefully handled the illegal 
entry of Koreans in accordance with the domestic law, international law and humanitarian principles. Facts have 
proved that the Chinese approach is appropriate and effective, and in the interests of all parties. 
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 62. She enquired whether there was a refugee status determination procedure 
for persons who entered China illegally. Since the consideration of the country’s previous report, United Nations 
human rights bodies had received over 100 testimonies of North Koreans who had been forcibly repatriated from 
China. Testimonies of former prison guards had also been received, reporting torture, arbitrary detention and other 
crimes. Was China continuing the practice of forcible returns despite the mounting evidence of what happened to 
those people? How many North Koreans were forcibly repatriated each year? How many of them were women? Given 
the country’s obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its agreement with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), why did the Government not allow UNHCR 
representatives to screen persons crossing the border in the north-east of the country? It would also be useful to know 
why nothing was done to monitor what happened to those people, given the evidence of torture and abuse upon their 
return. Furthermore, she requested information on the number, sex and age of North Koreans who had been permitted 
to remain in China on humanitarian grounds since the entry into force of the Exit and Entry Administration Law in 
2013. How many of those people still remained in China and what was their status?  
 
CAT/C/SR.1371 (2015) [China] 1. Some of the illegal immigrants from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
were economic migrants and could not therefore be subject to the provisions of the Convention relating to the Status 
227 
 
of Refugees. Furthermore, China, like many other Member States, had expressed reservations concerning the 
Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK. An informative article entitled “Why do North Korean 
defector testimonies so often fall apart?” had been published in the British Guardian newspaper. While States parties 
must fulfil their obligations under the principle of non-refoulement, they should not allow it to be exploited by 
criminals to escape justice.  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (2015) [Committee] 46. While welcoming the adoption in 2012 of the Exit-Entry Administration 
Law (see para. 4 (b) above), the Committee remains concerned that, in the absence of national asylum legislation and 
administrative procedures, the refugee determination process has to be carried out by the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Committee is also concerned at the State party’s rigorous policy of 
forcibly repatriating all nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the ground that they have illegally 
crossed the border solely for economic reasons. In that regard, the Committee takes note of over 100 testimonies 
received by United Nations sources (see A/HRC/25/63, paras. 42-45), in which nationals of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea indicate that persons forcibly repatriated to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been 
systematically subjected to torture and ill-treatment. In the light of this information, the Committee regrets the State 
party’s failure to clarify, in spite of the questions raised during the dialogue, whether or not nationals of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea are denied access to refugee determination procedures in China through UNHCR, as 
reported to the Committee by various sources (art. 3).  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (2015) [Committee] 47. The State party should:  
(a) Adopt the necessary legislative measures to fully incorporate into domestic legislation the principle of non-
refoulement set out in article 3 of the Convention, and promptly establish a national asylum procedure, in cooperation 
with UNHCR;  
(b) Immediately cease forcible repatriation of undocumented migrants and victims of trafficking to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, and allow UNHCR personnel unimpeded access to nationals of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea who have crossed the border, in order to determine if they qualify for refugee status.  
48. The Committee reminds the State party that under no circumstance should the State party expel, return or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. In order to determine the applicability of the obligations that it has assumed under article 3 of the 
Convention, the State party should thoroughly examine the merits of each individual case, including the overall 
situation with regard to torture in the country of destination. It should also support effective post-return monitoring 
arrangements in cases of refoulement, including any conducted by UNHCR. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [Committee] 29. Noting that non-citizens, including asylum seekers and refugees, were 
not entitled to constitutional guarantees or enjoyment of their rights and freedoms, he expressed concern, in particular, 
about the position of North Korean women in China. Was the Chinese Government planning to adopt legislation to 
implement the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees in connection with the determination and protection 
of refugees, including female refugees? 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 41. Turning to the question of refugees, he said that China had acceded to the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the protocols thereto. From 1978 to 2006, China had provided 
effective asylum to about 280,000 Indochinese refugees, thus contributing to the safeguarding of peace and stability 
in the region. In providing for the settlement and protection of refugees, the Chinese Government also paid special 
attention to the need to protect the rights and interests of female refugees. China had not found any cases where the 
rights and interests of refugees had been violated. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 42. Referring to the situation of Korean women refugees in China, he said that 
there were many illegal aliens, including women, from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. They came to 
China as a result of natural disasters and for economic reasons and could not be regarded as refugees. Sex did not play 
a role in those migrations. Even though the people coming from DPRK were illegal aliens, China was doing its best 
to treat them well. Repatriation was also carried out according to the law, and there was no reason to say that their 
rights or interests were being violated. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 40. It appeared that many women from North Korea who entered China 
seeking better economic conditions were trafficked into marriage and lived in semi-slavery. They were unable to 
escape the situation because they had no official status in China and, if they did manage to flee, they went to South 
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Korea, which created another series of problems. According to the United Nations Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, it was the responsibility of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
to decide whether such women could be categorized as refugees; UNHCR should therefore be allowed access to the 
border area and to those women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 44. Ms. Shin asked whether the Chinese Government was willing to allow 
UNHCR to visit the border area between China and North Korea to find out if any of the women were eligible for 
refugee status. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 48. Mr. Xu Hong (China) said that, according to the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, individuals who entered another country for economic purposes were 
not refugees. As a party to the Convention, China had the right to distinguish between refugees and non-refugees in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention. Therefore the right to determine who was a refugee was the 
prerogative of the State party and not of UNHCR. However, China had always enjoyed an excellent collaborative 
relationship with UNHCR. In March 2006, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had visited China 
and held useful discussions with the authorities; also, members of UNHCR were already in the border area between 
China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Since he was not an expert on the issue, he was unable to 
provide a comprehensive reply, but, if necessary, would obtain further information for the Committee 
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (2006) [Committee] 33. While noting that the State party is also party to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, it is concerned at the lack of laws or regulations for the protection of women refugees 
and asylum-seekers. The Committee expresses particular concern at the situation of North Korean women, whose 
status remains precarious and who are particularly vulnerable to being or becoming victims of abuse, trafficking, 
forced marriage and virtual slavery. 
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/6 (2006) [Committee] 34. The Committee calls upon the State party to adopt laws and 
regulations relating to the status of refugees and asylum-seekers, in line with international standards, in order to ensure 
protection also for women. The Committee recommends that the State party fully integrate a gender-sensitive approach 
throughout the process of granting asylum/refugee status in close cooperation with the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. It specifically encourages the State party to review the situation of North Korean 
women refugees and asylum-seekers in the State party and to ensure that they do not become victims of trafficking 
and marriage enslavement because of their status as illegal aliens. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1468 (2001) [Committee] 66. Given that there was currently no legal or administrative provision 
governing the granting of asylum in China, she would like to know what stage had been reached in the preparation of 
the draft law on refugees mentioned in the report under consideration. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1468 (2001) [Committee] 79. He noted that China had been a party to the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees since 1982 but that it had not yet adopted relevant domestic laws. In practice, it seemed that 
refugees were treated in different ways depending on their country of origin, and that refugees from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea faced more difficulties than others. Lastly, China seemed to be opposed to the return of 
Chinese citizens who had fled the country with the help of criminal organizations. He wondered whether the country’s 
policy in that regard helped those criminal organizations to prosper, since trafficking in human beings was even more 
lucrative than drug trafficking, and whether China could consider relaxing that policy. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1469 (2001) [China] 3. With regard to the repatriation of North Koreans, large numbers of illegal 
economic immigrants had entered China, largely as a result of food shortages in North Korea and could not be 
considered refugees; their repatriation was therefore in compliance with international practice. 
 
His Government took illegal migration very seriously and had adopted an integrated approach which involved careful 
verification of the identity of migrants before repatriation. A series of procedures and mechanisms had been put in 
place. China accepted unconditionally any Chinese citizen whose identity had been verified. His Government had 
recently applied for observer status at the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
 
CERD/C/SR.1942 (2009) [Committee] 61. Noting that efforts were under way to examine the possibility of 
establishing a national human rights institution, he asked when such action might be taken. He further asked when the 
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Government might prepare a bill on refugees and asylum-seekers and whether the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees would be involved in the process. Was the State party intending to ratify the 1954 Convention relating 
to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness? 
 
CERD/C/CHN/CO/10-13 (2009) [Committee] 16. While noting that the State party is in the process of drafting a 
refugee law, the Committee reiterates its concern (A/56/18, para. 246) that asylum-seekers from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea continue to be systematically refused asylum and forcibly returned. (art. 5(b))  
 
The Committee recommends that the State party adopt legislation relating to refugee status as soon as possible. 
Bearing in mind its general recommendation No. 30, the Committee calls upon the State party to take all necessary 
legal and policy measures to ensure that all asylum-seekers have the merits of their individual cases considered by an 
independent and impartial authority. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 19. Regarding allegations of the removal of some Tibetan citizens to Nepal, it 
should first be noted that all 55 of China’s ethnic groups lived in harmony and enjoyed the right to participate in social 
life and the affairs of the State. With the support of the central Government, Tibetans enjoyed fully the right to religious 
belief and to the development of their traditional culture. In recent years, some Tibetans had succumbed to efforts to 
promote illegal emigration from China, and a number of separatists had fled to neighbouring countries in order to 
carry out terrorist activities. Such persons did not fall into the category of refugees. In dealing with neighbouring 
countries, China had always respected the principle that all countries were equal. As sovereign States, they could deal 
with the question of illegal immigration in whatever way they saw fit. 
 
E/C.12/1/Add.107 (2005) [Committee] 14. The Committee is concerned that non-citizens, including asylum-seekers, 
refugees and stateless persons, are excluded from the constitutional guarantees to the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
enshrined in the Covenant extended to all citizens in the State party. The Committee notes that some asylum-seekers 
are excluded by the refugee determination procedure of the State party, in particular those coming from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, who are regarded by the State party as economic migrants and are thus compelled to 
return to their countries. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1064 (2005) [China] 12. China paid particular attention to the protection of refugees, and had acceded to 
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol. A large number of Indo-Chinese refugees had 
settled in China at the end of the 1970s, and the Government was currently making efforts, in cooperation with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to resettle them. The question of the citizenship of the 
remaining refugees would not be addressed until the resettlement programme had been completed. In the meantime, 
they had been granted permanent residence permits, which gave them the same social protection and economic and 
social rights as Chinese citizens. Their children enjoyed the right to education, health care and social security. China 
had recently witnessed an influx of illegal economic migrants from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; those 
immigrants were not refugees and were therefore not treated as such. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (2005) [Committee] 80. The Committee notes the efforts made by the State party to allow the 
approximately 300,000 Indochinese refugees to settle permanently in mainland China. However, it is concerned that 
the children born in China of these former refugees are not granted Chinese citizenship. It is further concerned that 
children entering mainland China from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are categorically considered as 
economic migrants and returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea without consideration of whether there 
are risks of irreparable harm to the child upon return. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/2 (2005) [Committee] 82… (a) Amend legislation to allow children born in China of former 
Indochinese refugees in mainland China to obtain Chinese citizenship; 
(b) Ensure that no unaccompanied child, including those from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is returned 
to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm to the child, 
for instance through disproportionate punishment for violating immigration laws, in accordance with the Committee’s 
general comment No. 6 (2005) on unaccompanied minors… 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4 (2013) [Committee] 81. The Committee welcomes the State party’s pledge in 2011 to 
“endeavour to finally settle the Indochinese refugee issue”. The Committee, however, is particularly concerned that:  
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(a) Children entering mainland China from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are still categorically 
considered as economic migrants and returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea without consideration 
of whether there are risks of irreparable harm to the children upon return;  
(b) Children whose mothers are from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea lack legal identity and access to 
basic rights, particularly education, as they are not registered under the hukou system out of fear that their mothers 
would be identified and forcibly returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea;  
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(c) The State party failed to recognize the Kachin asylum seekers, including children, as refugees despite their 
circumstances and forcibly returned them to Myanmar in August 2012;  
(d) There is an absence of special reception procedures or facilities for unaccompanied and separated refugee and 
asylum-seeking children and that they lack access to health care, special care and protection. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4 (2013) [Committee] 83. The Committee recommends that the State party:  
(a) Respect the principle of non-refoulement and reminds it of its obligation under the Convention to ensure that no 
accompanied, unaccompanied or separated child, including those from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
is returned to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that she or he will suffer irreparable harm, 
and that this principle applies to all children and their families without distinction and regardless of nationality;  
(b) Ensure that Kachin child refugees and their families are provided with temporary protection in view of the ongoing 
conflict in northern Myanmar; it should also allow the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
free and unfettered access to Yunnan Province to conduct refugee status determinations;  
(c) Cease the arrest and repatriation of citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, especially children, 
and women who have children with Chinese men, and ensure that children of mothers from the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea have access to fundamental rights, including the right to identity and education;  
(d) Take immediate initiatives to meet the special needs and vulnerabilities of unaccompanied and separated children 







Reservation on Article 8 (1) (a) of ICESCR 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.6 (2005) [Committee] 24. M. TEXIER se félicite de l.importance, de la taille et de la qualité de la 
délégation chinoise. Concernant la déclaration du Gouvernement chinois sur l.article 8.1 du Pacte, il estime que 
l.existence d.une seule centrale légale constitue non pas une déclaration mais bien une réserve au Pacte. En outre, il 
constate que sur les 18 principales conventions de l.Organisation internationale du Travail (OIT), la Chine n.en a 
ratifié que quatre. Compte tenu des changements importants intervenus ces dernières années, surtout au niveau 
économique, qui rendent ces conventions, notamment celle sur le chômage, peut-être plus pertinentes, la Chine 
envisage-t-elle de ratifier un plus grand nombre de conventions de l.OIT? 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.6 (2005) [China] 45. En ce qui concerne l.article 8 du Pacte, M. Sha Zukang explique que pour des 
raisons historiques, il n.y a en Chine qu.un seul syndicat, issu du mouvement des travailleurs qui s.est développé 
parallèlement au mouvement communiste. Ce qui importe, cependant, c.est l.activité de ce syndicat, qui est la même 
que dans tous les autres pays, et non le nombre de syndicats. Quand la Chine a adhéré au Pacte, elle a présenté une 
déclaration explicative et non une réserve, bien que le Comité la considère peut-être comme telle, indiquant qu.elle 
respecterait les obligations qui sont les siennes compte tenu de sa situation particulière, l.essentiel étant que les 
travailleurs chinois soient satisfaits, ce qui est le cas. Compte tenu de l.évolution due à la mondialisation et au 
développement de l.économie de marché, la Chine pourra peut-être revenir sur cette déclaration à l.avenir, mais la 
question n.est pas à l.ordre du jour. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [Committee] 3. Mr. KERDOUN, referring to paragraph 73 of the initial report 
(E/1990/5/Add.50), asked how tripartite labour-relations coordination conferences worked and whether publicly and 
non-publicly owned enterprises were obliged to set up trade unions. What relationship did Chinese enterprises 
relocating abroad have with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions? What major challenges did the Federation 
face in terms of the employment system, the emergence of non-public enterprises, and irregular work. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [Committee] 26. The Committee regrets the State party’s prohibition of the right to organize 
and join independent trade unions in the State party. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 27. China’s Trade Union Act provided for the establishment of a single All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions across the country. Trade unions in various industries and regions were the component 
parts of the Federation, although they enjoyed a large degree of autonomy concerning their activities. Although it was 
illegal to organize a trade union outside the context of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Government 
resolved attempts to do so through dialogue; no punishment had ever been meted out to trade union organizers. Legal 
proceedings against persons who engaged in criminal activities under the guise of trade union organization had nothing 
to do with preventing trade union organization. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 33. The Government was encouraging trade unions to play a more active role in 
ensuring safe working conditions in private companies and those owned by local authorities, where the unions were 
less active in safeguarding workers’ rights than in State-owned enterprises. Trade unions had participated in drafting 
legislation on safety at work and on the prevention of occupational illness, and had been instrumental in establishing 
safety inspection committees. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 34. All workers enjoyed the right to join a trade union, pursuant to trade union 
legislation. Of the 300 million workers in the country, about 130 million were trade union members. State-owned and 
private companies that employed over 25 workers could establish unions. Workers in companies employing fewer 
workers had the right to join with workers in other companies for the formation of unions. Any workers who were 
recruited in China to work abroad had the right to form trade unions in accordance with Chinese legislation, or to 
maintain any links they had already established with a Chinese union. Those contracted abroad to work abroad had to 
abide by local laws. 
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 35. In accordance with the Trade Union Act, all migrant workers had the right to 
join trade unions. However, since a large number of migrant workers did not realize that trade unions played an 
important role in protecting workers’ rights, many of them had not joined unions. The unions were working to promote 




E/C.12/2014/SR.17 (2014) 38. Ms. Liu Hua (China) said that, when China had ratified the Covenant, the provisions 
of its Constitution, the prevailing trade union and labour laws and its unique historical and national circumstances had 
necessitated a reservation to article 8, paragraph 1. That reservation did not imply that the Covenant provisions were 
not respected. The All China Federation of Trade Unions was highly effective in conveying the recommendations of 
its members to Government and monitoring the authorities’ work, ensuring respect for the rights of trade union 
members. The possibility of withdrawing the reservation would, however, be given due consideration 
 
E/C.12/2014/SR.18 (2014) [China] 18. Mr. Ma Hezu (China) said that Chinese labour law provided for the right to 
engage in collective bargaining. In 2011 trade unions had established eight elements that should be taken into 
consideration during collective bargaining, such as the cost of labour, the consumer price index and the average wage 
in the industry concerned. The company’s profits were not a key factor in collective bargaining. 
 
E/C.12/2014/SR.18 (2014) [China] 21. The right to strike was not recognized under the law because resorting to such 
radical measures to resolve labour issues was perceived to conflict with national values and the public interest. 
Therefore, peaceful means of dispute settlement were encouraged. For example, the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security, in conjunction with trade unions, had set up an arbitration and mediation mechanism. 
 
Reservation to Article 6 of CRC  
CRC/C/SR.298 (1996) [China] 14. With respect to question 1, he cited the following declaration made by China upon 
ratifying the Convention: "The People’s Republic of China shall fulfil its obligations provided by article 6 of the 
Convention to the extent that the Convention is consistent with the provisions of article 25 concerning family planning 
of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and with the provisions of article 2 of the Law of Minor Children 
of the People’s Republic of China" (see doc. CRC/C/2/Rev.4, p. 14). He said that the declaration had been dictated by 
the economic and social situation in China and that steps would be taken in due course to adjust it. 
 
CRC/C/SR.298 (1996) [China] 39. Ms. ZHANG Honghong (China) explained that China had made a declaration, 
rather than a reservation in the strict sense of word, on article 6 of the Convention, and added that during the drafting 
of the Convention the Chinese Government had repeatedly stated that it was doing everything in its power to ensure 
that children enjoyed the right to life, development and happiness and that the health of the mother before childbirth 
was carefully monitored by the family planning services. China faced a problem of over-population which threatened 
to impede the economic and social development of the country. For that reason, measures had been taken to ensure 
both the welfare of Chinese citizens and respect for China’s obligations as a State party to the Convention. 
 
CRC/C/SR.299 (1996) [China] 43. Ms. WANG Fenglan (China) said that China advocated the use of modern 
contraceptive methods so that abortions could be avoided. However, in cases where contraception had failed, women 
had the right to have the pregnancy terminated if they so desired. Abortions were voluntary and carried out in 
conditions that guaranteed the absolute safety of the health of the woman. Abortions on the grounds of the sex of the 
unborn child were prohibited under article 37 of the Mother and Infant Health Protection Act. Disciplinary measures, 
including the withdrawal of medical licences, were taken against doctors found guilty of performing such abortions. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1062 (2005) [China] 26. Abortion was not used as a means of family planning, and pregnant women had 
the right to decide whether or not to have an abortion. There were strict regulations on abortion and measures to ensure 
the mother’s safety. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1063 (2005) [China] 39. Ms. Yao Ying (China) said that public assistance programmes and common 
methods of medically assisted procreation were available to couples who had difficulties conceiving. In fact, the one-
child policy had been adopted to address challenges unique to China, and a number of communities adopted a flexible 
approach to its implementation. If the current demographic trend was sustained, the population of China would reach 
1.5 billion by the middle of the century. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1063 (2005) [China] 40. New strategies were needed to bring family planning policies into line with 
present day realities. Therefore, studies were currently being carried out on the ageing of the population, demographic 





CRC/C/SR.1063 (2005) [China] 43. Surveys had shown that two spouses who had themselves been an only child 
wished to have two children, and that in major cities, especially in Beijing, 10 per cent of women, most of them white-
collar workers, had no children. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1063 (2005) [China] 48. Ms. Yao Ying (China) said that abortions must be voluntary and legal; any 
decision in the matter could only be taken with the informed consent of the person concerned. The Government firmly 
supported the code of ethics of the medical services, and voluntary determination of pregnancies was not considered 
a family planning method. The forced abortions carried out in certain regions were considered a criminal offence. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1833 (2006) [China] 23. Mr. Jia Guide (China) said that the State party’s reservation to article 6 of the 
Convention was not inconsistent with respect for the right to life. It merely sought to clarify that China intended to 
fulfil its obligations under article 6, provided that they did not contravene the country’s family planning policy. The 
Law on the Protection of Minors defined the child as any person under the age of 18, which did not include foetuses. 
The Law on Population and Family Planning and the Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care protected women’s 
right to use contraceptives in order to reduce the number of unwanted pregnancies. Abortions were strictly regulated 
and performed on the basis of the woman’s informed consent. In the event of conflict between domestic law and 
international instruments, the latter could, in principle, be applied, unless a reservation stipulated otherwise. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4 [Committee] III. Main areas of concern and recommendations  
A. General measures of implementation (arts. 4, 42 and 44 (para. 6) of the Convention)  
The Committee’s previous recommendations  
6. The Committee, while welcoming the State party’s efforts to implement the Committee’s concluding observations 
of 2005 on its second periodic report (CRC/C/CHN/CO/2), notes with regret that some of the recommendations 
contained therein have not been fully addressed.  
7. Recalling its previous recommendations, the Committee recommends that the State party take all necessary 
measures to address those recommendations that have not been implemented or not sufficiently implemented, and 
urges it to:  
(a) Immediately withdraw its reservation to article 6 of the Convention in order to promote and safeguard the inherent 






Sovereignty argument: on national unity and territorial integrity  
CERD/C/SR.1163 (1996) [China] 16. China had 56 nationalities which lived in harmony and whose equality and unity 
were guaranteed by the Constitution. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1468 (2001) [China] 3. Promoting equality, unity, mutual assistance and prosperity shared among all 
ethnic groups was a basic principle applied by the Government of China to manage relations between ethnic 
communities. That principle was enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1468 (2001) [Committee] 33. Mr. DIACONU said that the report of China answered most of the 
questions which the Committee had raised in 1996 when it had considered the country’s previous periodic report. He 
was struck by the emphasis in the report on national unity and the prohibition of all acts or programmes intended to 
create national divisions or undermine national unity, and by the collective approach of the Chinese authorities with 
regard to racial discrimination. That strategy was certainly important, given that China had 55 different ethnic minority 
groups representing 109 million people—just under 10 per cent of the total population—but he wondered nonetheless 
how the policies in place and the laws adopted to combat racial discrimination were applied when the victim belonged 
to a minority, and whether protection of the individual was sacrificed to objectives of a general nature. He would like 
to know how those general objectives were reflected in the protection of each individual against racial discrimination. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1468 (2001) [Committee] 63. Given that the law prohibited “any activities that might … offend the 
customs and habits of minority people or undermine national unity” and also “any programmes including anything 
that incites national division and undermines national unity”, she would like to know what punishments were imposed 
in the event of violation. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1469 (2001) [Committee] 44. Mr. de GOUTTES said that it was somewhat intimidating for a small body 
of experts to carry out an appraisal of so large a country with one of the world’s most ancient civilizations. 
Nevertheless, the Committee had its task to perform. In considering China’s seventh periodic report, it had voiced its 
concern about the apparent comparative benefits for members of the Han population in various autonomous regions 
and the possible risk of changing those regions’ demographic composition, and it had asked whether the authorities 
could re-examine practices that might lead to such change. At the previous meeting Mr. Diaconu had reiterated the 
Committee’s concern that the movement towards national unity might have an adverse effect on the rights of individual 
groups. A member of the Chinese delegation had referred to a forthcoming amendment to the law relating to national 
ethnic minorities, including measures to promote investment in autonomous regions. He would like to know in what 
ways, and to what extent, the legislation was intended to promote the interests of ethnic minorities. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1942 (2009) [China] 5. The Constitution guaranteed the equality of all ethnic groups, protected their 
legal rights, and prohibited discrimination against any group as well as acts that undermined the unity of nationalities 
or instigated their secession. The same principles were enshrined in the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and other 
relevant regulations. All ethnic minority groups enjoyed the right to participate equally in the management of State 
and local affairs, to use and develop their spoken and written languages, and to preserve or change their customs. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1942 (2009) [China] 15. Violent crimes involving beating, smashing, looting and arson had taken place 
in Lhasa and neighbouring areas of the Tibet Autonomous Region on 14 March 2008 and in Urumqi in the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region on 5 July 2009, resulting in the loss of many innocent lives and damage to property. 
There was evidence that the two incidents had been premeditated and masterminded by separatists abroad and carried 
out by separatists within China with a view to promoting ethnic hatred, disrupting harmonious development in ethnic 
minority areas and undermining national unity and territorial integrity. The violent crimes perpetrated were also 
serious breaches of the purposes and principles of the Convention and had been widely condemned by Chinese people 
of all ethnic groups. The Government had taken prompt action to halt those criminal activities and to protect citizens’ 
right to life and property. Public order had been quickly restored and unity among ethnic groups preserved. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1942 (2009) [Committee] 40. While the State party appeared to blame the unrest on separatists set on 
undermining its unity and territorial integrity, he noted that the Committee’s sole concern was the implementation of 




CERD/C/SR.1943 (2009) [China] 28. With regard to whether bilingual education could weaken the language and 
culture of minorities, he explained that the aim of bilingual education was to encourage the use of ethnic minority 
languages in parallel to Mandarin, and certainly not to eliminate minority languages in the long-term. The Uygur 
language, in both its written and oral forms, was used at the administrative and judicial levels, in newspapers and on 
radio and television throughout Xinjiang and was also one of the Government’s working languages. Ethnic minorities 
were encouraged to speak Mandarin in order to strengthen unity and exchanges among different ethnic groups, bolster 
the qualifications of ethnic minorities and accelerate progress and development in ethnic minority regions. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1943 (2009) [China] 64. He explained to Mr. Lahiri that the “one country, two systems” principle was a 
solution which made it possible to settle peacefully problems inherited from the past while reinforcing national unity 
and preserving territorial integrity. The application that had been made of the principle had been endorsed by 1.3 
billion Chinese and could not be modified by an individual proposal. History had shown that the strategy had helped 
all the minorities living in China to flourish and that it was not at all a source of discrimination. 
 
CERD/C/CHN/CO/10-13/Add.1 (2010) [China] The Chinese Constitution stipulates: “All nationalities in the People’s 
Republic of China are equal. The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds 
and develops ties of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities. Discrimination against 
or oppression of any nationality are prohibited, as are any action injurious to ethnic unity or causing ethnic divisions.” 
In practice, China’s public security authorities handle cases in strict accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, 
and there are no instances of administrative detention or reeducation through labour being applied “disproportionately” 





Sovereignty argument: on state secret  
 
CAT/C/SR.416 (2000) [Committee] 27. She noted that, according to paragraph 10(d) of the third periodic report, the 
Supreme People’s Court had issued provisions requiring all cases to be tried in open court except those involving State 
secrets or personal privacy and those concerning minors. The exceptions cited were a source of concern and raised the 
general issue of transparency of criminal justice procedures. For example, one nongovernmental organization deplored 
the fact that information on imprisonment and convictions or even records of court hearings were not systematically 
published and that official authorization was still required to attend a trial. Were those reports accurate? 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 33. It was desirable that the delegation should indicate whether the lack of 
information on widespread and continuing violations of the Convention, and particularly on the extent and nature of 
those violations, was due to restrictions imposed by the laws relating to State secrets. It would appear that the State 
Secrets Act applied not only to the divulgation of information concerning health and population, but also to that of 
statistics relating to detention and the criminal justice system. Further information on the procedure governing the 
classification of State secrets would be welcome, especially if that procedure allowed the denial of certain legal 
safeguards essential to the prevention of torture, such as access to legal counsel. The delegation was invited to say 
whether, in its view, the possibility of having recourse to such a procedure was compatible with the provisions of the 
Convention, especially since retroactive classification of State secrets, while it might not be authorized by law, was 
actually not uncommon in practice. In that connection, she referred to the case of Zhang Enchong, a housing rights 
lawyer, who had faxed a copy of a news article on protests by a group of displaced residents as well as his own account 
of police action – two documents in the public domain never previously classified as “State secrets” – and who had 
been tried for “illegally providing State secrets outside the country” and had served a three-year prison sentence. 
Would the delegation please explain why that did not, in its view, constitute a case of retroactive classification? 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 34. She thanked Mr. Li Baodong for his explanations on the subject of the law 
on lawyers adopted in October 2007, which the Committee had received favourably in that it seemed to facilitate 
detainees’ access to a lawyer. The law was, however, contradicted by article 96 of the 1997 Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which, in cases classified as “State secrets”, required detainees wishing to be assisted by counsel to apply 
for special authorization. The delegation was kindly requested to indicate where the two texts differed, and which of 
the two had precedence over the other. It might also indicate whether there existed a clear and univocal definition of 
“State secrets”, who was empowered to decide whether a case should be classified as such, and at what moment that 
decision was taken. It could also explain why certain cases had been classified as “State secrets” while the activities 
preceding the arrest and detention of the suspect had not been of a confidential nature, cite an example of a case where 
a decision classified under “State secret” had been annulled following an appeal by a detainee against that decision, 
and indicate whether that had occurred frequently or not. Lastly, could the delegation please state its view of the 
recommendation by the China Society for Human Rights Studies urging the State party to strengthen its work on 
classified statistics and to promote the improvement of its investigating techniques so as to change the stereotyped 
thinking patterns of law enforcement officials? 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [China] 13. Promulgated in 1988, the Law on the Protection of State Secrets contained clear 
provisions on the definition and scope of State secrets and on the relevant decision-making organs. Article 2 provided 
that State secrets concerned the security and interests of the State and article 9 provided for three distinct categories 
of State secrets on the basis of their degree of confidentiality. Such data was usually classified by the originating body 
or entity and any problems in that regard were dealt with by the departments responsible for keeping State secrets at 
the central, provincial, regional or municipal levels. Under article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when a case 
related to a State secret by virtue of its nature or on account of information used in pretrial procedures, the chosen 
defence lawyer must be duly approved by the competent authority in order to ensure that the secret was kept. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 36. Ms.GAER (Country Rapporteur) said that she gladly welcomed the 
information received but regretted that the delegation had tended to generalize instead of entering into the details of 
specific cases. She also regretted the lack of statistics, which the State party justified by its situation as a developing 
country. It was now almost 20 years since China had become a party to the Convention. Furthermore, contrary to other 
instruments affording protection to rights that were realized only gradually, such as social, economic and cultural 
rights, the Convention imposed on States an immediate obligation to end torture. In truth, the problem lay not so much 
in the lack of statistics as in the fact that they could not be published as a result of the Law on State Secrets. Article 2 
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of that Law, for instance, classed as confidential a large amount of the information that the Committee needed to know 
in order to ascertain whether the State party was meeting its obligations. It would nevertheless be useful if the 
delegation were at least to provide data on matters that were normally made public. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 42… With regard to the Law on State Secrets, the delegation should state whether 
a judicial authority was involved in the decision to classify a given piece of information as confidential and whether 
a lawyer whose file was withdrawn under that Law was replaced. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 45… Lastly, clearer explanations would be welcome on the subject of pretrial 
detention, the duration of which was evidently still too long, and on the Law on State Secrets, the complexity of which 
would appear to be beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens. 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [Committee] 47. The protection of State secrets was legitimate, provided that it did not restrict 
the rights of citizens. The difficulty therefore lay in striking the right balance between protection and the risk of abuse. 
It transpired from the replies of the State party that the body from which certain information originated had the first 
and last say concerning its degree of confidentiality and its classification as a State secret. A decision of that nature 
should not be entrusted to a single body, not least an administrative body. Statistics on the enforcement of the death 
sentence were among the information protected in that manner. Hence, in the event that, for example, a lawyer made 
use of such data to demonstrate to a court that the death sentence was more frequently imposed on certain categories 
of person, the question arose as to whether he could be accused of violating a State secret. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 (2008) [Committee] 16. While taking note of the oral information from the State party on the 
conditions of application of the 1988 Law on the Preservation of State Secrets in the People’s Republic of China, the 
Committee expressed grave concern over the use of this law which severely undermines the availability of information 
about torture, criminal justice and related issues. The broad application of this law raises a range of issues relating to 
the application of the Convention in the State party: 
(a) This Law prevents the disclosure of crucial information that would enable the Committee to identify possible 
patterns of abuse requiring attention, such as disaggregated statistical information on detainees in all forms of detention 
and custody and ill-treatment in the State party, information on groups and entities deemed to be “hostile 
organizations”, “minority splittist organizations”, “hostile religious organizations”, “reactionary sects”, as well as 
basic information on places of detention, information about the “circumstances of prisoners of great influence”, 
violations of the law or codes of conduct by public security organs, information on matters inside prisons; 
(b) This Law provides that the determination of whether a piece of information is a State secret lies with the public 
body producing this information; 
(c) This Law prevents any public process of determination as to whether a matter is a State secret and the possibility 
of appeal before an independent tribunal; 
(d) The classification of a case falling under the State Secrets law allows officials to deny detainees access to lawyers, 
a fundamental safeguard for preventing torture, and such denial appears to be in contradiction with the 2007 amended 
Lawyers Law (arts.2 and 19). 
 
The State party should review its legislation on State secrets with a view to ensuring that information, including 
statistics, relevant to the assessment of the State party’s compliance with the provisions of the Convention throughout 
its territory, including in the Special Administrative Regions, is available to the Committee.  
 
The State party should provide information on the criteria used to establish that a piece of information is a State secret 
and on the number of cases falling under the purview of the legislation on State secrets. 
 
The State party should ensure that the determination as to whether a matter is a State secret can be appealed before an 
independent tribunal. 
 
The State party should ensure that every suspect is afforded the right to have prompt access to an independent lawyer, 
where possible of their own choosing, including in cases involving “State secrets”. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2 (2008) [China] The Chinese Government believes that this allegation derives from 
misunderstanding based on a lack of knowledge of the Chinese legal system. The Chinese side wishes to elaborate on 
the specific issues raised in this paragraph. 
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(a) Concerning the allegation in the observations that “this Law prevents the disclosure of crucial information” 
The Chinese Government attaches importance to making information public and has taken effective measures to 
ensure its citizens’ access to information about their country and society, and their right to participation and 
supervision. For example, The Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Disclosure of Government 
Information formulated by the State Council establish the scope, ways and procedures for making public government 
information to ensure that such information usefully informs citizens' productivity, life and economic and social 
activities. At the same time, the Government requires that its citizens guard State secrets in accordance with the law, 
as do Governments of all other countries in the world. 
 
According to article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Preservation of State Secrets, "State secrets" 
refers to information on matters that have been established through proper legal procedures as having a vital stake on 
State security and national interest and are known only to a limited number of people for a given period of time. Article 
8 of the Law contains detailed description of State secrets. 
 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Preservation of State Secrets provides for the preservation of State 
secrets. However, information on “detention and custody and ill-treatment … violations of the law or codes of conduct 
by public security organs”, cited in the observations, does not constitute State secrets as defined by law. In practice, 
the public security organs throughout China abide strictly by the aforementioned Law where the scope of State secrets 
and their degrees of confidentiality are concerned. 
  
(b) Concerning the claim in the observations that the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Preservation of 
State Secrets “provides that the determination of whether a piece of information is a State secret lies with the public 
body producing this information” 
Under the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Preservation of State Secrets, State organs and units at all 
levels shall determine, in accordance with the provisions on State secrets and on the specific scope of classified 
materials, the degrees of confidentiality of all information on matters deemed to be State secrets. Chinese law gives 
secrets-generating organs and units the power to determine the scope and degrees of confidentiality of State secrets 
while establishing strict limits and procedures to ensure that such power is exercised properly. 
 
(c) Concerning the claim in the observations that [the Law on the Preservation of State Secrets] “prevents any public 
process of determination as to whether a matter is a State secret and the possibility of appeal before an independent 
tribunal” 
According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Preservation of State Secrets, the Chinese authorities 
concerned determine, in accordance with established procedures by law, whether or not a matter constitutes a State 
secret. In the event of a dispute as to whether a piece of information constitutes a State secret and the degree of 
confidentiality it should be assigned, the case may be submitted to the appointed authorities for a solution. 
 
The Measures of Implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on The Preservation of State Secrets 
also provides for an error- correction system. Under that system, if the organ or unit which determined the degree of 
confidentiality has found that its decision is inconsistent with the relevant provisions governing the scope of secrets, 
it shall promptly correct the mistake. The organs above it or the security department concerned shall also promptly 
notify the organ or unit which made the erroneous determination and shall demand an immediate correction. Thus the 
allegation in the observations concerning the procedures for determining State secrets does not conform to reality. 
 
Moreover detainees have the right to challenge decisions as to whether a matter constitutes a State secret, whereupon 
the State security department or the body of the provincial People's Government in charge of State secrets shall 
determine the validity of the challenge. 
 
Though China's legal system differs from that of the West, the ultimate goal of determining whether or not a matter 
constitutes a State secret is to safeguard national security and interests, regardless of whether the determination is 
made by executive or judicial means. The Chinese security departments at all levels have identified confidential 
information in strict accordance with the provisions of the law. There is no systemic problem in China in this regard.  
 
(d) Concerning the claim that “the classification of a case falling under the State Secrets law allows officials to deny 
detainees access to lawyers” 
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The Criminal Procedure Law provides that a criminal suspect in a case involving State secrets may hire a lawyer only 
if he/she obtains approval from the investigating body. This is to prevent disclosure of State secrets, and it is common 
international practice. In practice, the public security bodies allow criminal suspects to employ a lawyer so long as 
this does not lead to leakage of State secrets. It is illegal for case-management officers to reject lawyers’ requests to 
meet with their clients on the grounds of the need for confidentiality. If such officers are found to have rejected 
legitimate requests, they are held responsible for their conduct under the law. The Lawyers Law, as amended in 
October 2007, also contains provisions on meetings between lawyers and their clients. All these provisions help to 
ensure the timely intervention of lawyers in such cases and help to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the 
persons concerned. 
 
CAT/C/SR.1368 (2015) [Committee] 34. In general, the Committee had noticed that the State party frequently failed 
to provide the information requested in questions in the list of issues. Was that because the information was considered 
a State secret? He would like to know what kind of information was subject to disclosure under the Open Government 
Information Regulation (OGI): did it include information on police and procuratorial investigations, criminal detention 
and video recordings of conduct at detention centres?  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 [2015] [Committee] 30. Recalling its previous recommendations (see CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, paras. 
16 and 17), the Committee remains concerned at the use of State secrecy provisions to avoid the availability of 
information about torture, criminal justice and related issues. While appreciating the State party’s assertion that 
“information regarding torture does not fall within the scope of State secrets”, the Committee expresses concern at the 
State party’s failure to provide a substantial amount of data requested by the Committee in the list of issues and during 
the dialogue. In the absence of the information requested, the Committee finds itself unable to fully assess the State 
party’s actions in the light of the provisions the Convention. Furthermore, the Committee regrets that the same 
concerns raised in its previous recommendation with regard to the 1988 Law on the Preservation of State Secrets 
persist in relation to the 2010 Law on Guarding State Secrets. The Committee is also disturbed at reports that a 
significant amount of information related to torture and the actions of public security authorities under the Criminal 
Procedure Law remain out of the public domain owing to the State secrets exception of the Regulations on Open 
Government Information. Furthermore, it notes with concern the limited scope of the Regulations on Open 
Government Information to information about administrative actions by administrative organs, excluding matters 
within the criminal law system (arts. 12, 13, 14 and 16).  
31. The Committee calls for the declassification of information related to torture, in particular, information about the 
whereabouts and state of health of detained persons whose cases fall under the scope of the State Secrets Law. The 
State party should also declassify information on the numbers of deaths in custody, detainees registered, allegations 
of torture and ill-treatment and consequent investigations, administrative detention and death penalty cases. The State 
party should ensure that the determination as to whether a matter is a State secret should be the object of an appeal 
before an independent tribunal. 
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5/Add.1 [China] D. Regarding the Law on Guarding State Secrets, the declassification of 
information related to torture and the provision of relevant data (para. 31)  
13. Under the relevant provisions of the Law on Guarding State Secrets, information relating to torture does not fall 
within the scope of State secrets. Therefore, such information is not the subject of any declassification issues. If the 
case itself involves State secrets, information may only be declassified if either the period of secrecy established by 
the Law on Guarding State Secrets elapses or the conditions for declassification are fulfilled. This is based upon the 
need to ensure State security and public safety and is common practice in all countries of the world.  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5/Add.1 [China] 14. In the material in its response to the list of issues submitted prior to 
consideration of the report, the Government of China already provided some information on the number of people in 
custody and data about cases of torture brought to court and tried. However, owing to the country’s vast size, large 
population and uneven level of development among regions, and the fact that human and other resources are limited, 
the statistics produced by the regions are of different calibres. It is thus difficult in a short time frame to collect and 
synthesize detailed, analytical data. We will carefully study the recommendations of the Committee so as to improve 
the capacity and level of production of statistical data as quickly as possible.  
 
CAT/C/CHN/CO/5/Add.1 [China] 15. The Government of China attaches great importance to public access to 
information and has already adopted practical measures to guarantee the right of citizens to be informed about State 
and public affairs, fully making use of government data to serve their activities in production and in their lives and 
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inform their decisions relating to social and financial questions. The Regulation on the Disclosure of Government 
Information establishes that if citizens, legal persons or other organizations believe an administrative body has 
infringed upon their legal rights in its specific work related to the disclosure of government information, they are 
entitled to request an administrative review or to file an administrative legal action against it. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [Committee] 37. She urged the Government of China to consider reviewing the legal 
and regulatory framework relating to State secrets. Information should be available to policymakers in a transparent 
manner, so that targeted efforts could be made and benchmarks could be set in a disaggregated manner according to 
various categories of women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [Committee] 44. Finally, on the question concerning the definition of what constituted 
a State secret, he explained that Chinese laws contained clear-cut definitions. 
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8 (2014) [Committee] 20. The Committee notes the amendment of the Comprehensive 
Statistics System on the Status of Women and Children in 2012. However, it is concerned that some critical 
information required to assess the status of women is classified as a State secret under various security regulations, 
which unduly restricts access to information on women’s rights issues. The Committee is further concerned that the 
system of data collection and sharing remains too weak to enable adequate monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of the Convention.  
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/CO/7-8 (2014) [Committee] 21. The Committee recommends that the State party study the 
obstacles, including the impediments presented by the State party’s State secret law, to the collection, sharing and 
dissemination of sex-disaggregated data so that the impact and effectiveness of policies and programmes aimed at 
mainstreaming gender equality and advancing women’s human rights can be accessed by all stakeholders. In this 
regard, the Committee draws the State party’s attention to its general recommendation No. 9 on statistical data 
concerning the situation of women. 
 
CERD/C/SR.1942 (2009) [Committee] 33. Information before the Committee also suggested that the 1988 Law on 
the Preservation of State Secrets mainly affected members of ethnic minority organizations. During the current review 
of the Law, the State party should bear in mind that the rights to judicial review and access to a lawyer continued to 
apply, irrespective of the sensitive nature of offences covered by that Law. It should guard against the possible 
discriminatory application of the provisions concerned. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1833 (2013) [Committee] 19. It would also be helpful if the delegation could indicate whether steps had 
been taken to improve disaggregated data collection, and whether data on infanticide and the abduction of children 
from ethnic minorities were still classified as State secrets in mainland China. The delegation should also indicate 
whether there were plans to establish, in each of the State party’s three regions, independent human rights monitoring 
mechanisms with the authority to receive complaints from children. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4 (2013) [Committee] 15. The Committee reiterates its concern about the limited public 
accessibility to reliable and comprehensive statistical data in mainland China in all areas covered by the Convention 
(CRC/C/CHN/CO/2, para. 22). It is particularly concerned that due to laws and regulations on guarding State secrets 
in mainland China, disaggregated data and important statistics critical for effective implementation and monitoring of 
the Convention are often not available in the State party.  
 
CRC/C/CHN/CO/3-4 (2013) [Committee] 16. The Committee recommends that the State party review the secrecy 
laws and regulations in mainland China in order to ensure that information concerning children, particularly regarding 
violence against children, infanticide, child labour, juvenile justice, children with disabilities and children affected by 
migration, is systematically collected, made publicly available and discussed and used for the development of policies 
and plans on children’s rights. In this regard, the Committee further recommends that the State party establish in 






Developing country argument  
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/5-6 (2006) (p.58) [China] While focusing on modernizing China’s rural areas, the Chinese 
Government is also aware of the obstacles that still exist. China is a developing country with a population in excess 
of 1.2 billion; the rural population accounts for 63.91 per cent of the total population. Generally speaking, agricultural 
productivity is low and regional disparities are significant. In particular, the mountainous, arid, high-altitude and 
remote border areas in the central and western regions suffer from adverse natural conditions, insufficient 
infrastructure, low productivity and very limited access to information. Most of the poverty-stricken population live 
in these areas, and their level of education tends to be low. A large number of women are illiterate, and the traditional 
idea that sons are better than daughters is still prevalent, inhibiting women’s development. In addition, the acute 
disparity between China’s large population and its resources and level of economic development constitutes yet 
another obstacle to attempts by China’s rural areas to shake off poverty and embark on the path of modernization. A 
radical change in this situation will require long-term efforts.  
 
CERD/C/SR.1163 (1996) [China] 24. Despite those good results, the country was still developing, and pockets of 
poverty persisted. Minorities in particular, and virtually the entire poor population, often lived in areas in which harsh 
natural conditions were hardly conducive to building the infrastructure needed for a satisfactory transport system; 
education, and primary education in particular, left much to be desired, and on the whole, the mid-west regions were 
still not as developed as those along the eastern coast. With the ninth five-year plan, adopted in March 1996, it was 
expected that the gaps would gradually be bridged, especially as the measures to fight poverty would focus primarily 
on poor areas where national minorities lived. 
 
CRC/C/11/Add.7 (1996) [China] 147. As in many developing countries, acute respiratory infections are common 
among China’s children, pneumonia being the commonest source of death: every year, some 300,000 Chinese children 
aged 5 and under die of pneumonia. Hence pneumonia prevention and a reduction in pneumonia deaths are important 
and pressing tasks. 
 
CRC/C/11/Add.7 (1996) [China] 157. China still being a developing country with a relatively weak economic base, 
large differences in levels of development in the cities and the countryside persist, and thus there are still some 
problems associated with child health care, the most conspicuous of which is that the rural health care network is 
incomplete - there are evident gaps in medical facilities and so forth by comparison with the towns. These, added to 
disparities in living conditions, keep the incidence of disease among rural children relatively high, and standards of 
nutrition among children in some poor rural areas are below normal. 
 
CRC/C/11/Add.7 (1996) [China] 187. Education for girls is an important problem in efforts to establish universal 
primary education in many developing countries. China, as a developing country, had 2,610,000 school-age children 
in 1993 who had not enrolled in school, markedly more of them female than male. In the west of the country, the 
phenomenon of low female enrolment and high female drop-out rates is quite striking. Beginning in 1989, the National 
Women’s Federation and the Chinese Children’s Fund established special funds to help girls enroll in school and 
enable girls from poor districts to attend compulsory primary education in effect free of charge. In 1992, these were 
renamed the "Spring Buds Scheme". 
 
CRC/C/SR.298 [China] (1996) 10. It was an arduous task for a developing country with a population of 1.2 billion 
people to guarantee the health and happiness of its 300 million children. That was why the State did all in its power 
to improve the situation of children. According to The State of the World’s Children 1996 report by UNICEF, China 
compared well with most developing countries in terms of, for example, mortality rates, nutrition, health care and 
education. Of course, there was still room for improvement. For example, it was acknowledged that some children in 
certain regions were not receiving schooling, children were still occasionally being sold or abducted and some parents 
abandoned their girl children. Those practices could be explained by poverty (65 million people were still living below 
the poverty line) and by the persistence of feudal and backward thinking. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government 
believed that economic and social progress would allow those bad practices to be gradually remedied. 
 
CRC/C/CHN/3-4 (2013) [China] 22. The Chinese Government realizes that as a developing country, China still has 
much to do in order to fully implement the stipulations of the Convention and to promote and realize children’s rights. 
There still exist difficulties and challenges in a whole series of processes from legislation to policy decisions and 
adoption of concrete measures for effective implementation, whilst continual improvements are needed in respect of 
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factors such as raising of awareness, capacity building, coordination between organizations, financial support and 
social mobilization. 
 
CAT/C/SR.416 (2000) [China] 8. He cited some specific examples to illustrate the Chinese Government’s efforts in 
that direction. For example, a hotline set up by the Ministry of Justice provided legal advice and assistance by 
telephone and a travelling exhibition organized with the assistance of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on the 
functions and powers of procurators had produced positive social effects in the country. Those measures had led to a 
substantial reduction in cases of torture over the previous five years. The number of persons convicted of extorting 
confessions by torture and inflicting physical violence on persons in custody had fallen from 193 in 1998 to 173 in 
1999. In conclusion, he pointed out that China was a developing country with a population of 1.2 billion, 900 million 
of whom still lived in rural areas. The country’s economic and social development was therefore uneven. In addition, 
for historical reasons, China’s legal system, especially the system of judicial supervision, still had some weak links 
which hindered the eradication of torture. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government was making progress in that respect 
and hoped that the Committee’s constructive suggestions would make it possible to do even more to prevent the use 
of torture in the future. 
 
CAT/C/SR.416 (2000) [China] 51. Mr. LI Baodong (China), referring to the other specific cases that had been 
mentioned, said that several days would be needed to provide replies to the questions asked. He hoped that the 
Committee members could give more details of those cases to enable the Chinese authorities to carry out the serious 
investigations required. The delegation thanked the Committee members who had commended the efforts of the 
Chinese Government to implement the Convention. During the consideration of China’s report, the Committee had 
made observations and suggestions that were fully relevant and the delegation undertook to transmit them to its 
Government, which would give them due consideration. Programmes would be elaborated to implement the proposals 
relating to medium- and long-term objectives. Concerning the technical proposals, the authorities would do their best 
to coordinate the activities of the departments concerned with a view to their implementation. The prohibition of 
torture was a delicate task that posed a number of difficulties for China, which was a developing country. It would 
continue to ensure implementation of the provisions of the Convention and would make significant efforts to 
strengthen democracy and the rule of law. It attached great importance to its relations with the Committee and would 
gladly welcome any future opportunity of dialogue with it. 
 
E/1990/5/Add.59 (2005) [China] 13. China is still a developing country. In view of constraints relating to the level of 
the country’s economic and social development, even though the Covenant has come into force in China, not all its 
articles have been fully realized. The degree of enjoyment of certain rights does not yet reach the requirements of the 
Covenant. China still has a duty to reduce poverty and the gap between the wealthy and the poor, while it also faces 
such pressures as population growth and resource depletion. On the foundation of 50 years of development, and in 
particular the recent 20 years of liberal reforms, however, the Government and people of China are fully capable of 
overcoming all problems encountered on the road to development, and will continue to enhance the level of enjoyment 
of human rights and basic freedoms. 
 
E/1990/5/Add.59 (2005) [China] 109. China is a developing country, and great imbalances exist between levels of 
development in different regions. While the great majority of the people are enjoying the material benefits of 
development, there are still a few groups, for the most part minority peoples living in small rural communities, for 
whom life is still difficult. In order to solve the problems of inadequate food and clothing for the rural poor, in March 
1994, the Government promulgated the “National ‘8-7’ War on Poverty Plan”, which proposed to use the roughly 7-
year period between 1994 and 2000 basically to resolve the food and clothing problems of the 80 million persons 
living in rural poverty nationwide. The concrete objectives of the Plan were: (a) to support poor homes in creating 
stable conditions on the basis of which to overcome their food and clothing problems; (b) to step up construction of 
basic facilities in poor areas; (c) basically to resolve problems with the supply of potable water for people and 
livestock, and to provide road connections between most impoverished villages and markets for farm produce and 
manufacturing centres; (d) to supply electricity to the great majority of poor homes; and (e) to overcome the prevailing 
backwardness in education, culture and health, and achieve a universal basic standard of education while eradicating 
illiteracy among the young and active adult population. The Plan also sought to promote vocational skills education 
and skills training for adults; to improve medical and sanitation conditions so as to prevent or reduce the incidence of 
endemic disease; and to contain population growth within the nationally stipulated range. Over the past few years of 
its implementation, this Plan has achieved great results. By the end of 2001, the majority of poor people living in rural 
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areas were properly fed and clothed, while some remaining poor areas with hostile environments or fragile ecosystems 
were beginning to approach a state of sustainable development. 
 
E/1990/5/Add.59 (2005) [China] 126. With reference to the right to food, China has always made of agriculture the 
very foundation of the national economy. Since the era of liberalizing reforms, the Government has stabilized and 
perfected the system of family-contract operations, developed rural-community enterprises, progressively adjusted 
and optimized agricultural structures, increased investment in agriculture, and implemented sustainable-development 
strategies for farmers. Very effective measures have been taken to increase agricultural output and reduce poverty 
levels. A developing country with a large population, China has done its duty and upheld the universal right to adequate 
food, capturing worldwide attention with its accomplishment. 
 
E/1990/5/Add.59 (2005) [China] 174. The funds and resources available to China, a densely populated developing 
country with limited financial resources, cannot cover the needs of the country’s poor areas. Particularly in the poorer 
parts of the west, women’s health still faces many challenges, the most prominent of which is high maternal mortality. 
In 2000, the maternal mortality rate nationwide was 53 per 100,000; in remote areas, this reached 114.9 per 100,000, 
and in some areas even exceeded 400 per 100,000. In rural areas, more than 90 per cent of deaths in childbirth occur 
in backward areas, 40.5 per cent of them during in-home births. A multitude of factors contribute to this situation, 
foremost among them being that economic conditions in these backward communities prevent women from giving 
birth in hospitals. Ignorant and backward customs and indifference to health and hygiene also mean that the safety of 
pregnant women does not command due attention. A second factor is that health workers in these rural communities 
often possess very rudimentary knowledge, utilize backward techniques and the service they provide may be 
unsatisfactory. According to a survey conducted in 1998 by the Ministry of Health, only 1.4 per cent of health 
technicians in rural hospitals had a level of education at the undergraduate level or above, 53 per cent had completed 
a polytechnic high school, and 36.4 per cent were graduates of a regular senior middle school or lower. The great 
majority had not undergone any sort of systematic professional training and could not handle an obstetric emergency 
on their own. As such, they presented a latent risk of maternal mortality. A third factor is that the health-care facilities 
in these rural areas are often outmoded, and, in many areas, emergency and clinical-transfer services are unavailable. 
The obstetric facilities available in many rural hospitals are primitive and ill-prepared to deal with emergencies; this 
is also a contributing factor in maternal mortality. In view of these conditions, the Government of China has legislated 
in the China Women’s Development Programme (2001-2010), the China Children’s Development Programme, the 
Tenth 5-Year Plan and the development strategy for the west for the implementation of policies and strategies aimed 
at improving women’s health in poor areas. It continues to invest a good deal of manpower, material and financial 
resources in this area, and is developing broad-based cooperative programmes in concert with the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Canadian International Development 
Agency and other international organizations to speed efforts on behalf of women’s health in China’s poorer regions. 
 
E/C.12/1/Add.107 (2005) [Committee] C. Factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant 
11. The Committee, while recognizing the sizeable population in the vast expanse of the territory of the State party, 
notes that there are no significant factors and difficulties impeding its capacity to effectively implement the Covenant. 
 
E/C.12/CHN/2 (2014) [China] 5. Difficulties and challenges facing China 
China is still a developing country. Although China’s total economic volume is already ranked among the largest in 
the world, its per capita level is still ranked below 100 in the world. There are imbalances in development between 
urban and rural areas, and between regions. The per capita resource occupancy rate is low, and economic and social 
development is still constrained by such bottlenecks as resources, energy and the environment. Based on China’s 
current poverty alleviation standard (per capita annual income of RMB 1,196), there are still 35.97 million people in 
the impoverished population, whilst the development of various social causes still relatively lags behind; the social 
security system must adapt to such circumstances as the aging population, accelerated urbanization, diversification of 
forms of employment, and price inflation; the contradictory situation in which the level of public health development 
has not adapted to the health requirements of the general public, is relatively pronounced; the guaranteeing of the 
rights of special groups such as people with disabilities still faces pressures; among state functionaries, in particular 
local government personnel, awareness of human rights and the level of administration in accordance with the law 
need to be raised. 
 
E/C.12/2014/SR.17 [Committee] 33. Mr. Abdel-Moneim said that, despite its huge industrial base, the State party 
remained a developing country and, as such, was entitled to apply article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, subject to 
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certain limits. Its industrial and agricultural base and economic infrastructure had been achieved precisely because 






Gender equality in general  
CEDAW/C/CHN/3-4 (1999) [China] p.3 China is a developing country, hampered by its level of economic and social 
development as well as by traditional attitudes. In real life, Chinese women’s equal rights to political participation, 
employment and education as well as in marriage and family life have yet to be fully realized. Disrespect for and 
discrimination against women, and even violations of their rights and interests, are not uncommon, and the overall 
talents and abilities of China’s women also need further improvement. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 25. Nevertheless, the inspection had also revealed a number of problems. 
Women’s participation in leading political positions was not commensurate with their participation in social and 
economic development. The problems of re-employment of laid-off female workers, their unequal access to 
employment opportunities and inadequate labour protection had become more acute. Many institutions and enterprises 
set higher standards for the recruitment of women because they viewed women’s physiological characteristics as 
weaknesses. Those and other problems had become a cause of concern at all levels of government, and were the 
subject of numerous studies aimed at devising solutions. 
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/5-6 (2006) [China] Given the constraints stemming from varying levels of economic and social 
development, the influence of traditional modes of thought, and especially the numerous new phenomena, 
characteristics and problems emerging as a result of the transition from a planned economy to a socialist market 
economy, the full realization of equal rights for Chinese women in the political, economic, cultural, social and familial 
spheres will continue to be a lengthy process. It therefore remains a long-term and arduous task for the Chinese 
Government and the society as a whole to further improve the social environment for women’s development, 
overcome obstacles and eliminate discrimination against women in all its forms. The Chinese Government and the 
entire Chinese people together will make unremitting efforts to that end.  
 
China was a feudal society for a long time, so thoroughly changing the old ways men and women behave in social and 
cultural settings and overcoming misconceptions based on gender discrimination is a long and arduous challenge. At 
present, women’s participation at the decision-making level in the media is still low; elements of gender discrimination 
and stereotyping persist in media content; some movies, TV programmes, advertisements and print media still distort, 
derogate and even insult the image of women; and the public lacks sensitivity to or critical awareness of gender 
discrimination in the media. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 12. Although the situation had improved significantly as a result of those 
efforts, China remained a developing country with a population of over 1.3 billion and a modest level of productivity 
and education. There were still many difficulties and problems to be resolved in the lives and work of Chinese women 
and in the protection of their rights. Women took little part in high-level decision-making. Discrimination against 
women occurred in employment. The education and health of women needed to be improved. It would be a fairly long 
process to progress from de jure equality to de facto equality. The Government was committed to pursuing a scientific 
development concept, building a harmonious society and implementing the National Programme for Development 
2006-2010, which would create new opportunities for Chinese women. With support and help from the Committee 
and with promotion and facilitation by the international community, China would achieve more impressive 
accomplishments in the implementation of the Convention. 
 
E/C.12/CHN/2 (2014) [China] Owing to the constraints and limitations of such factors as levels of economic and 
social development, especially in the process of economic structural adjustment, and establishing and perfecting the 
socialist market economic system, China’s promotion of gender equality and women’s development faces a number 
of new circumstances and new problems: social stratification of women’s groups is becoming ever more complex, 
and the demands of women’s life, development and protection of rights and interests have diversified; there are 
relatively marked imbalances between women’s development in different regions, different social strata and different 
groups; outdated gender-unequal customs and practices that have survived from China’s history and traditional culture 
have still not yet been completely eliminated, and violations of women’s rights and interests still exist to different 
degrees in some regions. 
 
To meet the above challenges, China will continue to carry out thoroughly the basic national policy of gender equality, 
protecting the rights and interests of women in accordance with the law, implementing the target requirements of the 
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Women’s Development Programme, and making efforts to promote equal enjoyment of rights by men and women in 





Women’s participation in government  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 52. In reply to the questions in paragraph 20, she enumerated the measures taken 
by ACWF to promote women’s participation in decision-making. The Federation had put pressure on government 
departments to formulate training programmes and set quotas for women’s appointment to leading positions. It had 
contributed to the drafting of the Programme for the Development of Chinese Women, which set targets for women’s 
political participation by 2000. Secondly, it had organized training courses and workshops in women’s colleges and 
schools across the country on improving management skills. Women leaders were also given education in self-respect, 
self-confidence, self-reliance and self-improvement. Thirdly, the Federation had built an information network of 
women’s talents, on the basis of which women candidates had been recommended to various government departments. 
Some 20 to 30 per cent were appointed, as a rule. Fourthly, it used the 47 newspapers and magazines of the women’s 
federations to carry out extensive publicity campaigns on gender equality and the significance of political participation 
by women. The aim was to reach the whole of society, expanding public knowledge, changing social prejudices and 
creating a favourable environment for women’s participation in decision-making. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 53. Women represented 16.3 per cent of the membership of the Communist Party. 
Women deputies to the Fifteenth Congress of the Party in 1997 numbered 344, or 16.8 per cent of the total. There was 
one female alternate member in the Political Bureau. Among the reasons for the slowness of the increase in the number 
of women deputies to the National People’s Congress was the fact that, with the adoption of a market-oriented 
economic system, the administrative system had undergone a similar change, including the introduction of 
competitiveness among personnel. That had affected women’s political participation and there were no fixed targets 
for their future participation. Secondly, women still faced various forms of constraint and discrimination. Traditional 
notions of male superiority continued to influence the evaluation of women’s ability, and promotion tended to go to 
men rather than women. Thirdly, women lacked self-confidence. The equal competition mechanism was still not good 
enough. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 54. Since the passage of the Women’s Law in 1992, more and more women from 
the national minorities had joined public decision-making bodies. For economic reasons, however, there were few 
statistics on rural women, including women from the minorities. There were currently 607,600 women from the 
national minorities in leading positions nationwide, or 26.6 per cent of the total. They included deputies to people’s 
congresses, members of decision-making bodies of governments at every level or judges, prosecutors and lawyers. 
The President of the People’s Court in one province was from the Dai national minority. In the Linxia Autonomous 
Prefecture of Gansu Province, an area inhabited mainly by national minorities, 33.2 per cent of the 8,864 women 
leaders of the region (themselves 29.8 per cent of the total of local leaders) were from the national minorities. National 
minorities provided 48.3 per cent of the 58 women leaders above county level and 54 per cent of women leaders at 
section level. Of the 19 women promoted to leading positions at county level in 1996, 40 per cent were from the 
national minorities.  
 
C.O A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [Committee] 293. The committee urges the Government to adopt temporary special 
measures within the meaning of article 4, ‘paragraph 1 of the Convention to increase the number of women at the 
higher echelons of Government. The women’s talent bank of the All China Women’s Federation should be used 
extensively to increase the percentage of women in all public bodies. The Government should also encourage gender-
balance in the composition of village committees. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 7. Turning to the Committee’s concluding comments and recommendations 
concerning the previous report, in particular the recommendation that China should adopt special measures to promote 
women’s participation in high-level decision-making, she explained that the Chinese Government had organized 
educational and publicity campaigns to enhance public awareness of gender equality and women’s participation in 
decision-making. It had explicitly defined the proportion of female officials in government leadership at all levels so 
as to further institutionalize mandatory requirements for governmental bodies to be staffed with women leaders. It had 
selected more outstanding women to serve in leadership at all levels, with priority being given to medium- and high-
ranking women cadres and female principals. Measures had been adopted to give women cadres better training so as 
to enhance their ability and level of political participation. The Government had improved mechanisms for fair 
competition and management of civil servants in connection with reform of the personnel system so as to provide 
equal opportunities for women to participate in decision making and management and ensure that preference would 
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be given to women cadres when all conditions were equal. The fifth national conference on cultivation and selection 
of women cadres had been convened in August 2006. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 8. At present, nine Chinese State leaders were women, five more than in 1999. 
Of the nine, three were vice-chairpersons of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, four were 
vicechairpersons of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, one was Vice-Premier of the State 
Council, and one was State Councilor. In the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the State 
Council ministries, there were 27 women ministers and vice-ministers, and women cadres at and above the ministerial 
rank totalled 241. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 7. Ms. Gabr wondered why there had been no increase in the numbers of 
women engaged in high level political participation in China since the previous report. Attributing the situation to 
gender stereotypes was inadequate. The report indicated that an amendment of the basic law for political participation 
in villages was envisaged. Information about when that would be achieved would be appreciated. Representation of 
women at the ambassadorial level was also insufficient…  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 8. Ms. Popescu asked how political representation of women from ethnic 
minorities was being handled. She noted that the phrase “an appropriate number” of women deputies appeared in 
various legislative texts. The meaning of that phrase was unclear, and could be used to mask indirect discrimination, 
since it was never used in relation to men in political life. Numbers and quotas should be established. The references 
to the proportion of female officials in government leadership at all levels raised the question of who defined that 
proportion and whether it was standard for all government bodies, regions and provinces, or differentiated. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 10. Ms. Belmihoub-Zerdani asked why, in a country where there were 
approximately 650 million women, it was impossible to find 10,000 women to engage in politics. China was an 
example to the world and must apply the Convention. From 2002 to 2005, women’s political representation had tripled, 
reaching approximately 11 per cent. If it continued to triple every three years, by 2011 it would approach 50 per cent. 
China had the resources to become a world leader in representation of women in politics. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 11. Mr. Yin Peizhuang (China) said that the revised provisions of the Organic 
Law of the Villagers’ Committees stipulated that at least one woman should be included in each villagers’ committee, 
replacing the rule that each committee should have what was considered to be an appropriate number of women. The 
National People’s Congress would decide whether to adopt the draft law during 2006. In relation to the way the 
appropriate number of women represented on a villagers’ committee was determined, it was important to remember 
that China was a predominantly rural country. Men performed the majority of physical labour in rural areas and that 
responsibility determined the status of men in the village and in the family. That high status gave men an advantage 
in elections, particularly in leadership contests. There were no special provisions for gender in elections because it 
was essential to respect the fairness of the elections. The appropriate number of women reflected the lower status of 
women in rural areas but the draft law would ensure that at least one woman was represented on each committee. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 12. Mr. Su Yan (China) said that the Government was taking measures to 
increase the participation of women in public life, and he presented complimentary data to the Committee to show the 
progress that had been made in increasing the number of cadres in various organs at the provincial, county, municipal 
and government levels. At the end of 2005, there were 15 million female cadres in total throughout the country, 
constituting 38.9 per cent of the total number of cadres. That represented an increase of 2.7 per cent as against 2001. 
However, there was still room for improvement and the Government would take further measures to increase the 
participation of women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 30. Lastly, she took issue with a suggestion made by a member of the 
Chinese delegation that women were not as valuable as men in leadership positions in rural areas because they were 
not capable of as much physical labour. Women worked very long hours and were engaged in another kind of physical 
labour. There was therefore no need to devalue women or deny them decision-making positions. If the community 
perceived women in such a discriminatory way, it was incumbent on the Chinese Government to change that 





CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China]49. Ms. Jin Chunzi (China) said that, with regard to the representation of 
women members of ethnic minorities in public affairs, at the end of 2004, there were over two million middle 
management personnel who belonged to ethnic minorities, and 74 per cent of them were women; also, 32 per cent of 
the members of the People’s National Congress were women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [Committee] 43. She wished to know whether the Government intended to introduce 
gender quotas for elected and appointed political positions in order to achieve a minimum participation rate for women 
of 30 per cent. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [China] 56. Ms. Zhang Li (China) said that, under the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, State bodies and institutions were required to appoint 
and train a certain number of women, including women from national minority groups. Moreover, women accounted 
for at least 30 per cent of the candidates standing for election to the people’s congresses of the autonomous regions of 
China. Women currently accounted for over 40 per cent of the members of the National People’s Congress… 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [Committee] 16. Ms. Pires said that, according to the Working Group on the issue of 
discrimination against women in law and in practice, which had visited China in December 2013, the percentage of 
women at high levels of decision-making remained low. Given that China ranked sixty-second among the world’s 
countries in terms of the representation of women in its legislature, perhaps temporary special measures were in order. 
Had there been an analysis of barriers impeding women’s participation in political and public life? How did the State 
party ensure that women from ethnic minority groups and female candidates who did not belong to the Communist 
Party were not harassed as they sought to make their views heard?  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [China] 17. Ms. Song Xiuyan (China) said that indeed more efforts to boost women’s 
participation were needed and that the Programme for the Development of Chinese Women addressed the issue.  
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) (China) 18. Mr. Shao Yujin (China) said that the regional governments devoted attention 
to the participation of women from ethnic minorities in public and political life. For example, as of July 2013, some 
35 per cent of civil servants in the Tibet Autonomous Region had been women.  
 
E/C.12/2005/SR.7 (2005) [China] 17. Regarding the promotion of women in politics, women currently accounted for 
24 per cent of the members of the National People’s Congress, ranking China thirty-seventh in the world in terms of 
the percentage of women parliamentarians. Through affirmative action programmes, the Government actively 
encouraged women to participate in political elections, and there was at least one female cadre in the administrations 
of the 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Despite those efforts, awareness of gender equality was 
weak in some areas, the capacity of women to participate in policy-making and management required improvement 
and many women were constrained by the traditional belief that their place was in the home. 
E/C.12/2014/SR.17 (2014) [Committee] 30. The policy objective of ensuring “at least one woman in local government 
leadership at the county level and above” mentioned in the State party’s replies to the list of issues 
(E/C.12/CHN/Q/2/Add.1) was at best extremely modest and he urged the State party to adopt more ambitious quotas. 
 
Women’s employment and equal pay issue 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 14. With regard to employment, over the past few years more than 7 million new 
jobs had been created annually, 40 per cent of them held by women. At the same time, many female workers had been 
laid off. His Government was providing free vocational training and guidance to facilitate their re-employment and 
guarantee them a minimum standard of living. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 20. In addition, the range of employment for women had expanded, so that the 
number of women employed in new industries such as information technologies, environmental protection, 
engineering, finance and law was currently five to 10 times the number before the reforms. The number of women 
entrepreneurs, managers and professionals had also increased. The introduction of the household responsibility 
contract system had enhanced the autonomy, income and status of rural women. Women’s level of education had 
improved, and women had represented over 30 per cent of those working in scientific and technological fields in 1997. 
The spread of the mass media and the country’s legal education campaign had broadened women’s vision and 
awareness. Between 1978 and 1997, net incomes in rural and urban areas had increased by an average of 8.1 and 6.2 




CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 21. The reform’s adverse effects on women included an increase in the number of 
laid-off women workers, which sometimes lowered women’s status in the home and even led to domestic violence in 
some cases. The challenge of market competition was particularly stressful for many women. Some private businesses 
and jointly funded, foreign-funded and jointly operated enterprises failed to protect women in the workplace from 
long hours, poor working conditions and violations of their human rights. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 22. With respect to changes in social services, the State had reformed the pension, 
medical care, maternity benefits and housing systems to reflect the principle of socialized pooling, under which the 
costs of benefits were reasonably shared among the State, enterprises and individuals. The new practice in respect of 
maternity benefits, which was described in the report (CEDAW/C/CHN/3-4), had improved women’s employment 
environment and the protection of women’s health. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [China] 2. Ms. Zhang Jianmin, replying to questions raised by the experts, said that more 
female workers had been laid off than men owing to rigorous structural adjustment programmes in the textile and 
other female dominated industries. In 1997, however, women accounted for only 45 per cent of a total of 6.31 million 
laid-off workers. The aim of the Re-employment Project, begun in 1993, was to protect the right of all workers to 
employment. Policies that specifically targeted women included the creation of job opportunities in the tertiary sector, 
the development of community services in order to employ laid-off female workers, and the provision of free 
vocational training and guidance. Moreover, special measures favouring the re-employment of women had been 
introduced throughout China, and outstanding cases had been publicized in the mass media. In 1998, the reemployment 
rate of laid-off female workers in 11 provinces had been approximately 50 per cent. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 27. The report provided little information on the problem of female 
unemployment during China’s transition to a decentralized market economy. The delegation had stated that violation 
of legislation requiring equal pay for equal work was limited to foreign-funded private businesses, and she asked why 
those businesses were not subject to Chinese law. She also wondered how, in view of the current economic crisis, the 
Government could achieve its employment targets for women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 42. Ms. Khan said that women seemed to have paid a disproportionate price 
for China’s economic progress, and they were especially affected by cuts in welfare programmes. She would have 
welcomed more detailed statistics on differences in income between rural and urban women and on the relative 
numbers of women living in rural and urban areas. She asked whether there were any programmes to help unemployed 
rural women to learn new skills. Training, education, microcredit and other programmes must be made available to 
women, especially rural women. In a market economy, it was often difficult to ensure that workers earned at least the 
minimum wage, and a strong trade-union movement was needed to protect workers’ rights. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 52. In the field of employment, it would be interesting to know in what fields 
unemployed women were being trained, how and by whom wage levels were determined, and how the jobs for which 
such women were being trained compared with jobs in other sectors. She was concerned that women might be 
disproportionately represented in the low-paid tertiary sector. It would be useful to have additional information on 
arrangements for the long-term monitoring of the programme under which subsidies were granted to companies that 
hired women. Statistics on length of employment, average age of women employed, types of jobs available to women 
and programmes to assist the long-term unemployed would also be welcome. Since the work units through which 
certain workers’ rights, including the right to housing and a pension, could be claimed had been disbanded with the 
advent of the market economy, there was an increasing need to develop alternative mechanisms to protect those rights. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 9. The Committee had expressed concern regarding women’s employment in 
China’s transition to a market economy. In that regard, the Government had decided to: formulate and implement 
preferential policies for women’s re-employment and provide employment assistance to women; grant tax reduction 
or exemption to employers that recruited laid-off women workers and provide them with social insurance subsidies; 
give preference to laid-off women workers in job recommendation and recruitment; offer free job placement services 
to laid-off workers; organize cooperation between government labour authorities, trade unions and women’s 
federations to provide women with job placement services and skills training to enhance their employability and 
entrepreneurship; and introduce policies and organize training programmes for business start-ups with a view to 




CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 17. In relation to the 3,188 labour protection and monitoring offices, it 
was apparent that only a small number of cases were being investigated, and it would be useful to learn if there had 
been an evaluation of those offices. Even though China had ratified the International Labour Organization Conventions 
No 100 and No. 111, there was insufficient domestic legislation to ensure that women and men were given equal 
remuneration. It was important to learn which measures the Government was taking to deal with wage discrimination 
and which government bodies were responsible for gathering information on wage levels in the different sectors. It 
would also be useful to know which methodology was being used to ensure that indicative wage levels were 
established in accordance with the Convention. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 18. Ms. Shin said that the restructuring of the Chinese economy was 
creating problems for women because women were often the first employees to be made redundant. Furthermore, 
women were sometimes forced to accept employment from employers who did not comply with the labour laws, and 
that meant accepting poor working conditions, low pay and work without insurance. The State party should indicate 
whether it was aware of that form of discrimination and should provide information on the measures that were being 
taken in the context of the restructuring of the economy. The Government had established training programmes to 
assist women who had been made redundant, and there were initiatives to help those women set up their own 
businesses, but most of the training focused on the informal sectors. It would be useful to learn whether it would be 
possible to include the formal sectors in those training initiatives. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 21. Mr. Guan Jinghe (China), in response to the question raised about equal 
pay, said that China had ratified the Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for 
Work of Equal Value (Convention No. 100). Equal pay for equal work was practiced in China. Men and women 
working in the same position enjoyed the same benefits and salary. Any difference in pay was owing to differences in 
job levels and competencies. His Government was concerned, however, that women tended to work in low-paying 
professions. It was therefore actively engaged in training for women to enhance their ability to compete in the labour 
market. China was striving to attain the goal of equal pay for work of equal value. It had encountered some difficulties, 
however, in gauging the value of work done. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 22. Economic restructuring in China affected not only women, but also other 
categories of workers regardless of gender. For example, the elderly, including elderly women, had been affected by 
the change. In recent years, his Government had held several meetings and developed various policies to promote 
employment. The measures taken included the retraining of women and provision of information on available jobs. 
For laid-off workers, his Government provided one-time free training to enhance their ability to find new employment. 
Unemployment benefits were provided for women workers over 40. Incentives were given to businesses to hire laid-
off women workers, including tax breaks and social security subsidies. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [Committee] 26. Regarding the gap between women’s and men’s pay, he said that, 
according to information provided to the Committee, the average income of urban women as a percentage of urban 
men’s income had dropped from 78 per cent in 1999 to 67 per cent in 2010. The gap had reportedly also increased in 
rural areas. Gender-based segregation with regard to types of jobs appeared to be a major factor in the gap. Despite 
the situation, the State party had not implemented the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. He asked how 
the State party intended to tackle the pay gap.  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) 34. Mr. Ma Hezu (China) said that labour legislation in China guaranteed equal rights for 
men and women and that it was effectively implemented in the workplace. An increasing number of women were 
availing themselves of legal remedies, in correlation with their growing awareness of their labour rights. Wages were 
protected under labour law and rates were determined at sectoral level. Efforts would be stepped up to monitor 
observance of equal pay for equal work. Furthermore, women enjoyed full maternity protection and fines were 
imposed on enterprises that contravened the law in that respect. The current retirement age for women was 55 years 
for female cadres and 50 for other women workers. There were plans to raise the retirement age for women, enabling 
those at senior levels to choose to work up to the age of 70, if so required. Information on any developments in that 





Eliminating violence against women  
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 17. There had been a reduction in the number of cases of forced prostitution and 
trafficking, while the incidence of rape had remained unchanged and cases of domestic violence against women had 
increased. Educational and awareness-raising campaigns had been conducted and measures adopted in the localities 
in order to address that problem. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 42…First, China had a long history as a feudal society, and patriarchal ideas still 
had some influence. Women victims mistakenly believed that being beaten by their husbands was a family stigma and 
endured the abuse in silence. In addition, there were still many women who did not have an independent income, and 
their fragile economic status and dependence left them powerless. Ideas about family life which had arisen during the 
transitional period had led in some cases to a lack of responsibility towards the family, which in turn had led to 
domestic violence. Finally, in remote rural areas, there were still cases of arranged marriages and mercenary marriages; 
it had been shown that domestic violence occurred more frequently in such marriages. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 43. Violence against women as a universal social issue had become a matter of 
serious concern in China. The relevant government departments, social organizations and non-governmental 
organizations were making efforts to reduce and eliminate such violence. The Women’s Law, the Criminal Law and 
the Regulations on Administrative Penalties and Public Security all contained provisions on violence against women. 
In urban areas, victims of domestic violence could go to the police stations, neighbourhood offices or the 
neighbourhood committee for help. In rural areas the police station or the Committee for Public Security could offer 
assistance. Victims could also seek help through legal aid services, hotlines for domestic violence complaints and 
formal letters of complaint regarding domestic violence and infringement of their personal dignity. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 19. The Government should consider enacting specific legislation on 
domestic violence and establishing shelters for victims. China should study other countries’ mechanisms for dealing 
with that problem 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 54. She sought clarification of the legislative provisions under which 
landowners could pass ownership of land on to their children. She urged the Government of China to demonstrate its 
concern over the issue of violence against women by inviting the Special Rapporteur on violence against women to 
visit China. 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 56. The Committee would welcome information on the proposed duration 
and funding of the educational programme that had been launched in order to eradicate existing stereotypes of the role 
of women in the family and in society. It would also be useful to know whether special legislation had been adopted 
to protect women from domestic violence and whether other services, such as shelters and telephone hotlines, were 
available to them. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 2…The amended version of the Marriage Law adopted in April 2001 included 
provisions such as prohibition of domestic violence and compensation by the guilty party, as well as compensation 
for unpaid work done by divorced women. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 80. Ms. Deng Li (China), responding to the question regarding measures to 
combat domestic violence, said that up to the end of July 2006, 26 municipalities, provinces and autonomous regions 
had promulgated anti-domestic violence laws. The question of whether to enact a special law to combat domestic 
violence or include the issue in separate chapters of existing laws was still under discussion. The Government was 
making a special effort to collect statistics on efforts to combat domestic violence, and a sample survey had been 
conducted in 2002. From 2003 to the present, the courts had tried 100,000 cases relating to domestic violence. Cases 
of humiliation accounted for three per cent, and abduction and trafficking in women, for 5.3 per cent. Those statistics 
were examples of the type of data that were being collected and analysed. Statistics were published on a regular basis. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [China] 27. Ms. Gao Shawei (China) said that new legislation to combat domestic 
violence had been drafted and submitted to the National People’s Congress for consideration. NGOs and civil society 
organizations had been invited to comment on the text and their suggestions had been taken into account. The bill 
would focus solely on violence against women within the family; other acts of violence against women would continue 




CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [China] 11. Ms. Gao Shawei (China) said that more than 20 provinces and some 100 
cities had centres to assist victims of domestic violence. All coercive sexual conduct was considered rape and therefore 





Women’s health  
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 16. The health-care targets had been achieved in all the eastern regions, whereas 
in the rural western regions indicators such as the rate of child delivery in hospitals had remained low (45 to 65 per 
cent), leading to relatively high rates of maternal and infant mortality. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.419 (1999) [China] 33. Women belonging to ethnic minorities in China accounted for 8.05 per cent 
of the country’s total female population. Great improvements had been made in their political, economic and cultural 
participation; for example, many minority women were deputies to the National People’s Congress. Lastly, local 
governments in areas populated by minorities conducted educational campaigns on maternal and child health. 
However, the Government imposed no mandatory policies on minority nationalities in that regard. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [China] 8. Ms. Hao Linna said that 90 per cent of urban women and 65 per cent of rural 
women had access to prenatal health services. The major cause of infant mortality was pneumonia. Each year, some 
40 million women were screened for common diseases, including cervical and breast cancer. In view of the inadequacy 
of health-care services and high mortality rates in ethnic minority areas, the Chinese Government attached great 
importance to developing women’s health-care facilities and training midwives, gynaecologists and paediatricians in 
those areas. Farming communities received visits from mobile medical teams, and free medical and prenatal care for 
women was provided in Tibet and other remote regions. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 19. … Furthermore, it was important to enforce the labour protection laws 
and ensure that women did not suffer discrimination after a change in their marital status. Prostitution should be 
decriminalized and prostitutes should receive adequate health care, particularly in view of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Although the Government was endeavouring to address the high incidence of suicide among rural women through the 
provision of legal assistance and complaint mechanisms, the report made no mention of measures taken in the area of 
mental health.  
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/5-6 (2006) [China] The Chinese Government has also noted that in many rural areas, especially 
those with high rates of poverty, there remains a serious lack of health-care facilities and medical personnel, and huge 
inputs are needed to build the infrastructure required; this is a situation that is not easily changed in a short time. In 
the mountainous areas, the hinterlands and areas of high poverty, the lack of health knowledge and inaccessibility in 
terms of transportation result in relatively low rates of in-hospital births (45-65 per cent), with comparatively high 
rates of maternal and infant mortality as a consequence. The incidence of HIV/AICS is also rising rapidly in China. 
There are still some people who cling to the traditional view of sons as being more advantageous or better than 
daughters, especially in areas of high poverty. Owing to the low level of productivity and the lack of information in 
those areas, changing such attitudes will take some time. With these obstacles in mind, the Government has formulated 
policies to increase inputs into rural health care, strengthen the training of rural health-care personnel, and promote 
education efforts regarding health and population issues. The efforts of all sectors of society will be needed in working 
towards a solution to these issues step by step. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [China] 5…The Government had steadily increased its budget for education and 
health... From 2006 onwards, the Government would move towards full exemption of miscellaneous fees for all rural 
students receiving compulsory education. In 2003, the Government had initiated the policy of providing free anti-virus 
drugs to those affected by HIV/AIDS, free anonymous testing for HIV/AIDS, free prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission and free school education for AIDS orphans, so that persons affected by HIV/AIDS and their families 
could receive proper care. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 28. Concerning the health of rural women and access to health services, 
in rural areas the decentralization of health-care spending and privatization of services had led to problems for women 
such as the imposition of user fees and the neglect of preventive care in favour of curative care, which was more 
lucrative. As the successful rural cooperative system had been withdrawn, people were constrained to pay for medical 
services. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights had expressed concern at the reduced expenditure 
on rural health services. It would therefore be useful to have data on access to services. More information was needed 
on how access was monitored, especially in rural areas. She would particularly appreciate information on access for 




CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [Committee] 30. Ms. Pimentel requested information on measures to ensure access for 
all women, particularly those from vulnerable groups, to health services; on capacity-building and improvement of 
services for victims of gender-based violence; on compensation for women who had contracted HIV/AIDS through 
blood transfusions using illegal blood collection; and on guarantees of confidentiality for women living with 
HIV/AIDS. She asked for details of the fines imposed on persons who carried out forced abortion, forced sterilization 
and female infanticide, how those funds were used and about measures to address corruption of local officials who 
enforced birth control. What procedures were in place to ensure access to family planning and reproductive health 
services for unmarried couples, single women and adolescents? What was being done to monitor the impact of 
environmental pollution on women’s health? What measures were taken to address the alarmingly high rate of 
Caesarean sections in China? Lastly, she asked whether the Government envisaged developing programmes targeted 
at men under the project on common gynaecological diseases prevention and control survey.  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1252 (2014) [China] 36. Ms. Liu Ying (China) said that total health expenditure in China amounted 
to 5.2 per cent of GDP as at 2013. Various policies had been drawn up to improve women’s and children’s health, 
including specific programmes regarding maternal health, particularly for rural women and other vulnerable groups. 
Programmes had also been developed concerning hospital births, which were subsidized by the State, and treatment 
for HIV/AIDS and syphilis. The new rural cooperative medical care system covered 99 per cent of the rural population. 
Contributions could be made to either the urban or the rural health insurance scheme, regardless of the place of 
residence. Further subsidies for medical treatment and services were granted to women from poor households. Recent 
efforts on the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases involved awareness-raising campaigns on HIV/AIDS, safe 
sex and contraception. The rights of persons living with HIV/AIDS were upheld and institutions found responsible in 





Collecting and reporting statistics  
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [China] 9. Since 1989 the number of cases of torture referred to the procurators had 
been steadily declining and had dropped from 472 in 1990 to 407 in 1991, representing a 13.5 per cent decrease, then 
to 339 in 1992, representing a 16.7 per cent decrease as compared with the previous year. In his speech at the eighth 
session of the National People’s Congress, the Procurator-General of the People’s Supreme Procuratorate had reported 
on the constant progress achieved in the prevention of torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 18. Furthermore, was the Chinese delegation able to provide the 
information requested by the Committee concerning any judicial decisions handed down against persons found guilty 
of acts of torture? 
 
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 21. It would also be useful for the Chinese delegation to give statistics on 
persons convicted for acts of torture and on the number of complaints filed in that connection against public officials, 
and for it to inform the Committee of the findings of the investigations conducted and the number and nature of the 
judicial decisions handed down. 
 
CAT/C/SR.143/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 36. Paragraphs 94 and 95 of the report described the apparently 
satisfactory conditions existing in Chinese prisons. He nevertheless wished to have information about the number of 
persons who had died in prison or in reform-through-labour camps and to know whether public officials had already 
been convicted for causing the death of detainees? 
 
CAT/C/SR.145/Add.2 (1993) [China] 7. The following were the figures relating to complaints filed for acts of torture:  
 
1990: 472 complaints filed 
279 prosecutions initiated 
270 cases concluded 
 
1991: 407 complaints filed 
307 prosecutions initiated 
279 cases concluded 
 
1992: 339 complaints filed 
189 prosecutions initiated 
180 cases concluded. 
 
CAT/C/SR.146/Add.2 (1993) [Committee] 2. "The Committee is nevertheless aware of the obvious difficulties facing 
the Republic of China. However, the Committee would welcome precise statistical data concerning the number of 
persons in administrative detention, sentenced to capital punishment and executed. 
CAT/C/SR.252/Add.1 (1996) [China] 15. Over the past three years, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate had 
investigated a total of 1,194 allegations of torture. In 1993, it had investigated 373 cases, an increase of 10 per cent 
over the number investigated in the previous year; in 1994, 409 cases, an increase of 9.4 per cent; and in 1995, 412 
cases, an increase of 0.773 per cent. It might be asked why increasing numbers of cases were being investigated. The 
answer was, first, that Chinese legislation in the matter of torture had been improved, secondly, that the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate, abiding strictly by the law, had stepped up the number of investigations, and thirdly, that the 
Government had mobilized citizens to report cases of torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.252/Add.1 (1996) [Committee] 28. Mr. Dipanda Mouelle had referred to a report published in a legal 
journal of Yunnan Province, according to which 41 people had died as a result of torture. Such cases would normally 
be reported to the Ministry of Public Security. He had so far been unable to obtain any information on the matter from 
that Ministry, but he would pursue his inquiries on returning to China and inform the Committee accordingly. 
 
CAT/C/SR.416 (2000) [Committee] 29…She welcomed the data provided in paragraph 68 of the report regarding 
investigations by the Chinese inspectorate. She would appreciate receiving a breakdown of the statistics, if possible, 
by category of crime, region, sex of the perpetrator, sex of the victim, etc. 
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CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 36. Ms.GAER (Country Rapporteur) said that she gladly welcomed the 
information received but regretted that the delegation had tended to generalize instead of entering into the details of 
specific cases. She also regretted the lack of statistics, which the State party justified by its situation as a developing 
country. It was now almost 20 years since China had become a party to the Convention. Furthermore, contrary to other 
instruments affording protection to rights that were realized only gradually, such as social, economic and cultural 
rights, the Convention imposed on States an immediate obligation to end torture. In truth, the problem lay not so much 
in the lack of statistics as in the fact that they could not be published as a result of the Law on State Secrets. Article 2 
of that Law, for instance, classed as confidential a large amount of the information that the Committee needed to know 
in order to ascertain whether the State party was meeting its obligations. It would nevertheless be useful if the 
delegation were at least to provide data on matters that were normally made public. 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] [Ms Gaer] 31. With regard to article 2 of the Convention, the Committee 
appreciated the information on laws for the prevention of torture promulgated by the State party since the consideration 
of its third periodic report in 2000 (CAT/C/32/Add.2), but deplored the dearth of statistical data, which gave rise to 
doubts as to the effective implementation of the Convention. In particular, it would wish to know the number of 
detainees and of complaints, the number of punishments meted out, the whereabouts of detainees, the number of 
persons executed or awaiting execution, that of persons placed in psychiatric establishments, the legal follow-up of 
complaints or the number of refugees or immigrants recognized as such, the conditions of detention and state of health 
of detainees, the number of persons punished for having committed serious acts of violence in connection with the 
population policy, the follow-up given to complaints from the families of victims of the Tiananmen demonstrations, 
and the number of cases declared non-receivable on the grounds that proof had been obtained by torture or constraint. 
The Committee would also wish to see statistics of violent acts among detainees, deaths in detention and 
condemnations for trafficking, and to know the number of complaints relating to acts of violence perpetrated within 
the framework of investigations relating to terrorism in particular. The absence of statistics was not a new fact, as the 
Committee had already noted the dearth of such information in its concluding observations adopted following the 
consideration of China’s third periodic report (A/55/44, paras. 106 to 145). Would the delegation explain the reason 
for the absence of the requested statistics? 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 32. Data on detention of persons from ethnic minorities were also lacking, as 
were those on the prominent events of 2008 – the March protests by Tibetans which had reportedly led to 18 deaths. 
The State party had failed to provide a list of all persons detained in the context of those incidents, as requested by the 
Committee under point 2(b) of the list of issues, or to indicate the whereabouts of those persons or the punishments to 
which they had been sentenced. It had confined itself to stating that 953 persons had been “detained”, that 362 had 
“surrendered” and that 42 had been “convicted”, whereas according to the Congressional Executive Commission on 
China 4434 Tibetans had been arrested and 1249 others had disappeared and several NGOs had published detailed 
lists of 200 to over 800 Tibetans still missing. Presenting the Chinese delegation with a list of 817 names submitted 
by a Tibetan group, she asked whether the persons concerned had been detained or released, or whether they had died, 
recalling that unacknowledged detention or disappearance increased the risk of torture. 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 34. Lastly, could the delegation please state its view of the recommendation by 
the China Society for Human Rights Studies urging the State party to strengthen its work on classified statistics and 
to promote the improvement of its investigating techniques so as to change the stereotyped thinking patterns of law 
enforcement officials? 
 
CAT/C/SR.844 (2008) [Committee] 37. It was to be regretted that by way of response to question 3(b) of the list of 
issues requesting statistics of the number and geographical origin of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants, as well 
as of expulsions, extradition measures or other repatriations from Chinese territory, the Committee had received just 
one chart recapitulating the number of persons suspected of a criminal offence who had been returned to their country 
of origin between 2000 and 2008. It was desirable that the data requested should reach the Committee before the 
meeting scheduled for the State party’s oral replies to those questions 
 
CAT/C/SR.846 (2008) [China] 3. The Chinese authorities had endeavoured to provide the Committee with the fullest 
possible information. Much remained to be done, however, in the area of statistics. China was a developing country 
with only limited resources and the task was made no easier by the size of its population. It took time to achieve reform 




CAT/C/CHN/CO/4/Add.2 [China] 6. Concerning the recommendation in paragraph 17 of the observations that “the 
State party should compile statistical data relevant to the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention at the 
national level” 
 
The observations contain a request to the State party to provide detailed and complex statistical data, which are very 
difficult for a large developing country with extremely complicated national conditions such as China to compile 
within a short period of time, to say nothing of the huge cost involved in the compilation of the requested statistical 
data. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government attaches great importance to the Committee's observations and will work 
harder to improve its statistics regarding its efforts to combat torture. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 5. All labour laws applied throughout China, including its economic 
development zones. The Labour Law stipulated that each employing unit should establish a system of occupational 
safety and health, that workers must strictly observe safety regulations and that the State should collect statistics on 
work related injuries or deaths and occupational diseases and publish its findings. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 16. In future reports, statistics should be provided consistently either in 
percentages or in real numbers. The relevant statistics for men should be included, and the information should be 
arranged in such a way as to facilitate comparison with the previous report. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 47…More statistical information should be provided on women who were 
serving time in prison and on the reasons for which they had been sentenced to that form of punishment. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 49…She requested more statistics on abandoned children; in particular, she 
wished to know how many of those children were illegitimate. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 51. Ms. Schöpp-Schilling suggested that, in view of China’s size, ethnic 
diversity and politically decentralized system, it would be helpful if the information submitted in China’s fifth report 
were broken down by province. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.420 (1999) [Committee] 52…Statistics on length of employment, average age of women employed, 
types of jobs available to women and programmes to assist the long-term unemployed would also be welcome. Since 
the work units through which certain workers’ rights, including the right to housing and a pension, could be claimed 
had been disbanded with the advent of the market economy, there was an increasing need to develop alternative 
mechanisms to protect those rights. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.743 (B) (2006) [Committee] 70. Although the Chinese Government had provided some information 
on the trafficking of women, there was still a lack of data on the numbers of internally trafficked women. He was 
worried about the limited definition of trafficking contained in Chinese criminal law, which only defined trafficking 
for purposes of prostitution and not for other purposes. He was also concerned about the fact that prostitutes could be 
held in administrative detention centres and that not many perpetrators of trafficking were being prosecuted. 
 
Finally, he would like to associate himself with the questions that had been posed for the Macao SAR Government.  
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [Committee] 29. There was a need for more data on the economic situation of rural 
women, as it was related to access to health and other services. That data should include access to land and the technical 
assistance which rural women received for their livelihoods. She noted that, although women enjoyed equal rights in 
rural land contracting under the law, at least 70 per cent of women in rural areas did not have access to land in their 
own name. The report and the statements made before the Committee had mentioned big rural development projects 
and China’s movement towards the West, but there was no information on how women were benefiting from such 
projects and whether the large expenditures in rural areas went to infrastructure or social spending to improve women’s 
livelihoods, living conditions and access to health. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.744 (B) (2006) [China] 35. Mr. Deng Li (China) said that about 8.3 per cent of the rural population 
had no land in their own name. Among them, 70 per cent were women. His Government had taken a series of measures 
to resolve the land contracting problem for rural women, including those mentioned in the report. The new law on 
land contracting included specific provisions for such contracting in the event of marriage and divorce. Women could 
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seek mediation at the village level in cases of violations of their rights or file a complaint with the People’s Court. 
They could also request mediation by the collective. After two years of experience with land contracting, her 
Government recognized that the issue was difficult. Some additions had therefore been introduced into the amended 
Law on the protection of the rights and interests of women in that regard to ensure that arbitration by counties and the 
People’s Governments was carried out in accordance with the law. Some collectives had deprived women of their 
rights in the past by majority vote, especially those who had married outside of the collective. A specific provision 
had therefore been made for Government intervention in such matters. His Government had reached its intended 
objectives. In Zhongshan in Guangdong Province, for example, some 80 per cent of such married women had resolved 
their land issues, and 11 per cent of the complaints had been partially resolved. 
 
CEDAW/C/CHN/7-8 (2014) [China] 35. In order to obtain facts to inform the formulation of policies, efforts have 
been made to strengthen the work on gender-disaggregated statistics and the survey on the status of women. The 
Chinese Government attaches great importance to the work on sex-disaggregated statistics; it has made efforts to 
overcome the difficulties encountered in statistical work and constantly improve the national statistical system, expand 
the fields and contents of gender-disaggregated statistics, achieving many breakthroughs. In order to enhance 
understanding of the situation regarding gender equality and to provide an important basis for policy-making, the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) has edited and released several publications on gender statistics, including Women 
and Men in Chinese Society, No. 4, published in 2007, and Statistics on the Status of Women and Children, an annual 
publication since 2008. In addition, the Chinese Government has set up a special evaluation system for the 
implementation of the Outline for the Development of Chinese Women, and has established statistical index for 
monitoring the key goals of the Outline. 
 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [Committee] 21. Ms. Hayashi said that there continued to be a lack of statistics, for 
example on the incidence of rape, and there appeared to be a lack of transparency with regard to information connected 
to the rights of women. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [China] 24. Ms. Song Xiuyan (China) said the National Working Committee on Children 
and Women was responsible for preparing, implementing and monitoring the Programme for the Development of 
Chinese Women. The National Bureau of Statistics collected disaggregated data on each objective under the 
Programme and published an annual report which summarized the progress made towards gender equality. National 
and regional teams, comprised of Government officials and independent experts, also carried out unannounced 
inspections in order to evaluate the implementation of the Programme in both urban and rural areas of the country. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [China] 29. Mr. Chen Jialin (China) said that confidentiality and privacy legislation 
contained strict provisions regarding data collection. Data could only be made public if it was in the public interest 
and did not threaten State sovereignty or national security. Regulations regarding Government transparency had been 
adopted in 2010 in order to strengthen public access to national data and Government ministries that failed to comply 
with data publication standards could be held legally accountable. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [China] 30. Ms. Xiao Li (China) said that the Government had published data for each of 
the indicators under the Programme for the Development of Chinese Women. The National Bureau of Statistics had 
also established a statistics databank on women’s development and had recently begun to collect disaggregated data 
on the number of women in employment 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) [Committee] 46. Ms. Jahan said that the lack of detailed information in the State party’s 
report made it difficult for the Committee to assess the situation of trafficking in women and girls in China and the 
special administrative regions. She requested additional information on the root causes of human trafficking in the 
State party and the measures taken by the Government to address them. She also requested statistical data on the 
victims of human trafficking disaggregated by sex, age, ethnicity and nationality. 
CEDAW/C/SR.1251 (2014) 51. Ms. Wang Ying (China) said that the anti-trafficking unit of the Ministry of Public 
Security had been set up in 2007 to coordinate efforts to combat human trafficking. A higher number of cases of 
trafficking in persons were recorded in certain regions of the country on account of the sophisticated and extensive 
trafficking networks established by traffickers. The number of cases of trafficking involving women and children 
continued to rise. The public security authorities used the Palermo Protocol to guide their activities to combat human 
trafficking and to provide the victims with adequate protection. A special databank on human trafficking had also been 
developed, which had allowed the public security authorities to track down around 2,000 children who had been 
trafficked a number of years before. 
CRC/C/SR.299 (1996) [China] 2…As for the question whether disaggregated statistical data were collected, he said 
that such work was done by legislative bodies and non-governmental organizations; members of the State Council 
Committee also exchanged information. The task was complicated, however, by the country’s size, the variation in 
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numbers of children in different regions and the varying statistical methods in use. It was therefore difficult to obtain 
reliable disaggregated data. 
 
CRC/C/SR.299 (1996) [Committee] 28…What was needed was a comprehensive plan to classify data, review 
legislation and so on, as described in the Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women held in 
Beijing. All United Nations agencies had declared their readiness to help countries implement such measures. 
 
CRC/C/SR.300 (1996)39. Mr. WU Jianmin (China) said that all children admitted to care centres could be registered 
and that his country’s data collection system was reliable. 
 
CRC/C/SR.300 (1996) [Committee] 40. The CHAIRPERSON said that she doubted whether a universal data 
collection system as described by Mr. Wu, was in fact reliable. 
 
CRC/C/SR.300 (1996) [Committee] 41. Mr. HAMMARBERG reminded Mr. Wu Jianmin that Mr. Wu himself had 
acknowledged that the data collection system was not extremely accurate. 
 
CRC/C/SR.300 (1996) [China]42. Mr. WU Jianmin (China) replied that all statistics were only relatively reliable, that 
the specific situation of the country in question had to be considered and that, given the circumstances, China had 
done its best. The data collection system would certainly improve as the country developed economically. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1062 (1996) [China] 3. In response to the Committee’s concluding observations on China’s initial report, 
the Government had formulated the National Programme of Action for Child Development (2001-2010), which 
contained specific measures to improve children’s health, education, legal protection and environment. A standardized 
system to monitor statistical data had been established, and monitoring and assessment agencies and a reporting and 
review mechanism were currently in place. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1064 (2005) [Committee] 58. The reporting State should indicate whether it planned to conduct a study 
on cross-border trafficking and establish cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries. The data on the number 
of females abducted at the national level should be clarified. The State party should provide statistics on trafficking in 
children, disaggregated by gender, province and international border. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1065 (2005) [Committee] 58. The Chairperson said that he was surprised to read in the report that 
children’s welfare homes housed 50,000 children with disabilities, abandoned and orphaned taken together since other 
sources indicated that the problem was graver, with some 100,000 children abandoned each year. A recent study 
carried out in eight cities in southern China had revealed that between 30 and 50 per cent of abandoned children were 
healthy girls. He wondered whether the data provided by the State party reflected reality or whether a large number 
of orphans and children’s homes were disregarded, even if the data on the number of domestic adoptions were 
accurate. Further information was required and the situation must be examined more closely, especially in remote 
rural areas that might have large traditional overcrowded children’s homes with appalling living conditions. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1833 (2013) [China] 6. Between 2009 and June 2013, 180,000 persons had been tried for child rights 
violations. Some trials had involved serious cases of human trafficking, which had been brought to light following a 
special anti-trafficking campaign. All sectors of society supported the cause. The Ministry of Public Security, for 
instance, had set up an antitrafficking microblogging site, which was followed by more than 5 million people and had 
made it possible to collect a great deal of data. At the same time, China had worked to improve its legal procedures 
applicable to minors, in particular by developing alternative sentencing to deprivation of liberty and focusing on 
education. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1833 (2013) [Committee] 19. It would also be helpful if the delegation could indicate whether steps had 
been taken to improve disaggregated data collection, and whether data on infanticide and the abduction of children 
from ethnic minorities were still classified as State secrets in mainland China. The delegation should also indicate 
whether there were plans to establish, in each of the State party’s three regions, independent human rights monitoring 
mechanisms with the authority to receive complaints from children. 
 
CRC/C/SR.1834 (2013) [China] 2…Both the central Government and the local authorities carried out annual 
evaluations of programme implementation using over 30 quantifiable indicators, and the resulting statistics were used 
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in reports and integrated into a databank. In addition, major evaluations had been conducted in 2006 and 2011, under 
the direction of department heads. 
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